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Frontispiece  : 


(Leiden,  University  Library,  ms  Vulcanianus  46,  f.  130) 

Produced  at  Fulda  in  1176-77,  it  accompanies  the  text  of  Hugh's  Didascalicon.  On  the 
open  book  appears  the  first  sentence  of  the  Didascalicon :  Omnium  expetendoritm  prima  est 
sapientia  in  qua  (perfecti  boni)  forma  consistit  (Of  all  things  to  be  sought,  the  first  is  that 
Wisdom  in  which  the  Form  of  the  Perfect  Good  stands  fixed). 

Library  of  Congress  Catalog  Card  Number:  61-10982 
Printed  in  The  Netherlands 





Seth  Low  Professor  of  History 


Bryce  Professor  Emeritus  of  the  History  of  International  Relations 

Professor  Emeritus  of  History 




Associate  Professor  of  History 

editors:  oriental  records 

Professor  of  Chinese  History 

Professor  of  Chinese  and  Japanese 

consulting  editors 

Professor  of  Jewish  History,  Literature, 
and  Institutions  on  the  Miller  Foundation 


Anthon  Professor  of  the  Latin  Language  and  Literature 


Professor  of  Japanese 


Professor  of  Philosophy 


William  R.  Shepherd  Professor  of  European  History 

special  editor  for  this  volume 



The  present  translation,  the  first  complete  one  in  English,  is 
based  upon  Brother  Charles  Henry  Buttimer's  critical  edition  of 
Hugh  of  Saint  Victor's  Didascalicon :  De  studio  legendi.  An  effort 
has  been  made  to  meet  the  demands  of  technical  accuracy  by 
consistently  adhering  to  a  single  rendering  for  philosophical  and 
theological  terms,  despite  the  varying  contexts  in  which  these 
recur.  It  is  hoped  that  readability  has  not  been  sacrificed  there- 
by. Buttimer's  text,  excellent  in  the  main,  has  not  been  above 
correction,  and  upwards  of  forty  emendations  of  his  text  have 
been  made.  These  vary  from  the  correction  of  apparent  mis- 
prints to  recasting  the  punctuation  of  several  passages  in  which 
unawareness  of  Hugh's  source  or  of  his  meaning  had  produced 
confusion.  Significant  alterations  of  Buttimer's  text  are  in- 
dicated in  the  footnotes. 

The  purpose  of  the  notes  is  primarily  to  indicate  new  sources 
and  to  set  Hugh's  text  in  illustrative  relief  against  the  contrasting 
work  of  predecessors  and  contemporaries.  Authors  and  works 
from  classical,  patristic,  and  Carolingian  times,  as  well  as  from 
the  twelfth  century,  are  cited.  At  one  extreme,  the  discoveries 
made  involve  minor  curiosities  like  Hugh's  inexplicable  trans- 
ference to  geometry  of  a  portion  of  the  traditional  definition  of 
"topica"  (n.  xv.  n.  55),  or  his  use  of  a  Hermetic  prayer  to 
conclude  the  Didascalicon  (vi.  xiii.  n.  54);  or  they  involve  the 
identification  of  incidental  phrases  from  Boethius,  Chalcidius, 
Augustine,  Jerome,  and  Gregory  the  Great — phrases  which, 
precisely  by  their  incidental  character,  suggest  the  extent  to 
which  Hugh's  thought  was  penetrated  by  the  very  expressions  of 
these  authors.  At  the  other  extreme,  the  notes  report  the  sources 
of  whole  chapters,  e.g.,  the  Isagoge  Johanitii  ad  Tegni  Galiegni, 
which  provides  the  substance  of  the  chapter  on  medicine 
(11.  xxvi);  or  they  elucidate  complex  relationships  like  those 
which  chapters  i,  vi,  vii,  ix,  and  x  of  Book  I  bear  to  texts  in  the 
commentary  traditions  on  Boethius's  De  consolatione  philosophiae, 
Plato's  Timaeus,  and  Macrobius's  commentary  on  the  S omnium 


Scipionis  of  Cicero — relationships  which  reveal  not  merely  Hugh's 
indebtedness  to  the  traditions  but,  more  significantly,  his  reser- 
vations in  the  use  of  heterodox  cosmological  texts  and  themes. 
The  recent  publication  by  Professor  Theodore  Silverstein  of  the 
"Liber  Hermetis  Mercurii  Triplicis  de  VI  rerum  principiis" 
made  it  possible  to  identify  a  contemporary  analogue  of  Book  i, 
chapter  vii,  and  perhaps  to  identify  the  source,  in  a  pseudo- 
Pythagorean  Matentetraden,  of  certain  cosmological  distinctions 
occurring  in  the  same  chapter.  Professor  A.  van  de  Vyver's 
report  of  the  existence  of  Hugh's  personal  copy  of  Remigius  of 
Auxerre's  commentary  on  Martianus  Capella  in  the  Bibliotheque 
Nationale  led  to  the  discovery  of  the  source,  in  Remigius's 
commentary,  of  numerous  details  on  the  authors  of  the  arts 
reported  by  Hugh  in  Book  in,  chapter  ii. 

But  the  notes  do  more  than  indicate  sources  and  analogues. 
They  attempt,  at  times,  to  offer  sketches  in  the  history  of  an 
idea,  a  phrase,  a  definition,  together  with  a  selection  of  primary 
sources  and  recent  secondary  studies.  Such,  for  example,  are 
the  notes  on  "nature"  as  the  archetypal  Exemplar  of  creation 
and  as  a  cosmic  fire  (i.  x.  n.  69,  71),  on  the  Boethian  phrase 
"Form  of  the  Good"  (1.  i.  n.  1),  on  Hugh's  definition  of  philo- 
sophy as  "the  discipline  which  investigates  comprehensively  the 
ideas  of  all  things,  human  and  divine"  (1.  iv.  n.  27),  on  Hugh's 
curious  use  of  the  term  "entelechy"  (1.  i.  n.  7),  on  the  literary 
practice  of  concealing  inner  meaning  beneath  a  fabulous  surface 
{involucrum  or  integnmenturn)  (1.  iv.  n.  26),  on  the  doctrine  of  the 
"three  works"  (1.  ix.  n.  59)  and  that  of  the  "three  manners  of 
things"  (1.  vi.  n.  34,  3  5,  38,  42),  and  on  the  "number  'four'  of  the 
soul"  (n.  iv.  n.  25-29). 

The  notes  also  call  attention  to  not  yet  recognized  citations  or 
reminiscences  of  the  Didascalicon  in  twelfth-century  authors,  as 
in  John  of  Salisbury  and  Alanus  de  Insulis.  Moreover,  Hugh's 
dependence  on  John  the  Scot's  translation  of  the  pseudo- 
Dionysian  Celestial  Hierarchy  in  preparing  his  own  commentary 
on  that  work,  plus  the  appearance  in  the  Didascalicon  of  certain 
terms  frequently  a  sign  of  Scotist  influence,  raised  the  whole 
question  of  Hugh's  relationship  to  John  the  Scot  and  made  it 
desirable  to  call  particular  attention  to  differences  or  likenesses 
between  Hugh  and  the  Carolingian  author  as  these  were  found 


at  various  points  (e.g.  in  i.  i.  n.  16;  i.  ii.  n.  21;  1.  vi.  n.  42). 
Finally,  the  singular  consistency  and  unity  of  Hugh's  thought, 
often  remarked  upon  by  scholars,  invited  frequent  citations 
from  his  other  works  to  illustrate  or  expand  his  meaning  in  the 

The  introductory  essay  attempts  to  go  beyond  what  is  current- 
ly said  of  the  Didascalicon  and  to  offer  new  suggestions  regarding 
its  date,  its  argument  for  a  fourfold  "philosophy,"  its  peculiar 
use  of  cosmological  lore,  and  its  distinctiveness  vis-a-vis  the 
De  doctrina  Christiana  of  Augustine  and  the  Institutiones  divinarum 
et  saecularium  lectionum  of  Cassiodorus.  The  aim  has  been  to 
make  some  beginning,  however  slight,  toward  setting  the 
originality  and  achievement  of  the  Didascalicon  in  clearer  light. 

Several  matters  of  editorial  nature  deserve  notice.  Biblical 
quotations  are  given  in  the  Douay  translation  of  the  Latin 
Vulgate  as  revised  by  Bishop  Challoner,  and  the  names  and 
numeration  of  the  books  of  the  Bible  follow  this  version,  as 
does  the  spelling  of  all  proper  names.  Occasionally,  however,  as 
in  Book  v,  chapter  iv,  the  original  Latin  quotations  are  so  dis- 
posed as  to  make  it  impossible  to  use  the  corresponding  Douay- 
Challoner  translation  without  alteration.  Where  terms  such  as 
"Truth,"  "Wisdom,"  "Nature,"  "Idea,"  "Pattern,"  and  "Exem- 
plar" are  capitalized,  the  capital  indicates  that  Hugh,  in  the  trans- 
lator's understanding,  is  referring  to  God,  or,  more  specifically, 
to  the  Second  Person  of  the  Trinity.  The  terms  "catholic," 
"catholic  church,"  and  "catholic  faith"  are  not  capitalized 
because  to  have  capitalized  these  would  have  been  to  suggest 
the  modern  sense  of  "Catholic"  as  contrasted  to  "Protestant,"a 
distinction  which  could  hardly  have  been  in  Hugh's  thought. 
For  him,  it  was  still  possible  to  refer  simply  to  the  universal 
belief  of  Christians  and  to  the  universal  church. 

Latin  sources  quoted  in  the  footnotes  have  generally  been 
translated,  except  when  the  original  is  a  new  source  or  analogue 
found  in  a  manuscript  or  in  a  book  hard  to  come  by;  in  such 
cases,  the  Latin  text  has  been  reproduced  for  readers  who  may 
wish  to  compare  it  with  Hugh's  Latin  in  Buttimer's  text.  Names 
of  twelfth-century  authors  have  been  modernized,  except  when 
identification  of  the  place  name  has  been  disputed,  as  in  the  case 
of  Honorius  Augustodunensis  and  Alanus  de  Insulis,  or  when 


the  Latin  form  of  the  name  has  come  into  general  usage,  as  in 
the  case  of  Bernardus  Silvestris  and  Clarenbaldus  of  Arras.  How- 
ever, the  form  "Abaelard"  has  been  adopted  in  preference  to  the 
more  common  "Abelard"  in  order  to  indicate  the  proper 
pronunciation  of  the  name,  which  seems  to  have  been  accented 
on  the  second  syllable. 

I  am  grateful  to  Professor  Theodore  Silverstein  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Chicago  for  first  interesting  me  in  Hugh  of  Saint 
Victor,  and  to  Professors  Blanche  Boyer  and  Richard  Peter 
McKeon  of  the  same  University,  as  well  as  to  Professor  Nicholas 
Haring  of  the  Pontifical  Institute  of  Mediaeval  Studies,  Toronto, 
for  reading  the  translation,  notes,  and  introduction  and  offering 
helpful  criticisms  and  suggestions.  I  am  indebted  to  the 
American  Council  of  Learned  Societies  and  to  the  Danforth 
Foundation  for  year-long  fellowships  which  enabled  me  to  work 
on  the  project,  and  to  Dartmouth  College  and  the  University  of 
Notre  Dame  for  leaves  of  absence  which  made  possible  the 
acceptance  of  the  fellowships ;  in  the  case  of  Notre  Dame,  I  am 
indebted  for  a  subsidy  as  well.  Thanks  are  likewise  due  to 
Canon  Astrik  L.  Gabriel,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Mediaeval 
Studies  of  the  University  of  Notre  Dame,  for  assistance  in 
obtaining  microfilm  materials  from  the  Victorine  collection  of 
the  Bibliotheque  Nationale;  to  Doctor  R.  W.  Hunt  of  the 
Bodleian  for  several  helpful  suggestions  and  for  allowing  me  to 
read  two  as  yet  unpublished  articles  on  the  divisions  of  phi- 
losophy in  the  twelfth  century;  to  Brother  Charles  Henry 
Buttimer  for  obtaining  for  me  a  copy  of  his  edition  of  the 
Didascalicon^  which  has  for  some  time  been  out  of  print ;  and, 
last  but  not  least,  to  Professors  Austin  P.  Evans  and  Jacques 
Barzun  of  Columbia  University  for  encouraging  me  to  submit 
the  translation  to  the  Records  of  Civilization  series.  To 
Professor  Evans,  I  am  above  all  indebted  for  his  meticulous  care 
and  perceptive  guidance  in  the  final  editing  of  the  manuscript, 
and  to  Mr.  Edward  McLeroy,  editor,  Columbia  University 
Press  for  expertly  seeing  the  work  through  to  final  publication. 

The  University  of  Notre  Dame  jerome  taylor 

December  28,  19 ; 9 





BOOK  ONE  46 

BOOK  TWO  6l 




BOOK  SIX  135 



NOTES  158 


INDEX  237 



I.  General  Nature,  Date,  Significance  of  the  Didascalicon.  The 
Didascalicon  of  Hugh  of  St.  Victor  aims  to  select  and  define  all 
the  areas  of  knowledge  important  to  man  and  to  demonstrate 
not  only  that  these  areas  are  essentially  integrated  among  them- 
selves, but  that  in  their  integrity  they  are  necessary  to  man  for 
the  attainment  of  his  human  perfection  and  his  divine  destiny. 
Composed  at  Paris  in  the  late  1120's,1  the  book  provided 
intellectual  and  practical  orientation  for  students  of  varying 
ages  and  levels  of  attainment  who  came  in  numbers  to  the  open 
school2  of  the  newly  founded  Abbey  of  Saint  Victor.  To  such, 
as  they  took  up  studies  at  their  different  levels,  it  offered  a  survey 
of  all  they  should  ultimately  read,  and  of  the  order,  manner,  and 
purpose  which  should  govern  their  reading,  both  in  the  arts  or 
disciplines  and  in  Sacred  Scripture. 

The  very  title  of  the  work  places  it  squarely  in  a  long  ante- 
cedent tradition  of  didascalic,  or  didactic,  literature  concerned 
in  various  ways  with  what  arts  or  disciplines  a  man  should  study 
and  why  he  should  acquire  them.  In  the  Latin  Christian  West, 
such  literature  begins  with  Augustine  and  continues  through 
Boethius,  Cassiodorus,  Isidore  of  Seville,  Bede,  Alcuin, 
Rhabanus  Maurus,  and  the  late  Carolingian  masters,  including 
John  the  Scot.  Before  them,  it  is  found  in  the  writings  of 
Cicero  and  Quintilian  on  the  education  of  the  orator;  in  the  lost 
works  of  M.  Terentius  Varro  on  the  arts;  in  the  introductions  to 
specialized  treatises  on  particular  arts,  like  that  of  Vitruvius  on 
architecture  or  that  of  Galen  on  medicine;  in  certain  moral 
epistles  of  Seneca;  and  in  the  allegory  on  the  arts  by  Martianus 
Capella,  Augustine's  contemporary.  Its  roots  reach  far  back  to 
the  ancient  Greek  conception  of  an  'eyxiixXto?  TioaSsia  to  the 
objections  of  Socrates  to  Sophist  education  in  the  fifth  century 
B.  C.  and  to  the  opposed  views  of  education  propounded  in  the 
next  generation  by  Isocrates  on  the  one  hand  and  by  Plato  and 
Aristotle  on  the  other. 3  In  a  sense,  the  Didascalicon  can  be 
regarded  as  both  a  summary  and  an  extension  of  this  tradition ; 


it  is  bound  to  it  in  most  of  its  materials  and  in  aspects  of  its 
form,  yet  it  provides  a  new  synthesis  of  the  materials,  a  synthesis 
remarkable  for  its  originality  and  its  wholeness. 

However,  the  Didascalicon  is  important  not  only  because  it 
recapitulates  an  entire  antecedent  tradition,  but  because  it  inter- 
prets that  tradition  in  a  special  and  an  influential  way  at  the  very 
dawn  of  the  twelfth-century  renaissance.  A  crude  index  of  its 
influence  on  its  own  and  subsequent  ages  can  be  seen  in  its 
survival  in  nearly  a  hundred  manuscripts  of  the  twelfth  through 
the  fifteenth  centuries,  preserved  in  some  forty-five  libraries 
stretching  across  Europe  from  Ireland  to  Italy,  from  Poland  to 
Portugal.4  It  appeared  at  a  time  when  centers  of  education  had 
moved  from  the  predominantly  rural  monasteries  to  the  cathedral 
schools  of  growing  cities  and  communes ;  when  education  in  the 
new  centers  was  becoming  specialized,  hence  unbalanced,  ac- 
cording to  the  limited  enthusiasms  or  capacities  of  particular 
masters ;  and  when,  in  response  to  the  flowering  of  secular  life, 
learning  itself  was  making  secularist  adaptations.5  In  contrast, 
for  example,  to  the  specializations  in  law,  medicine,  or  the 
poetic  arts  at  the  schools  of  Bologne,  Salerno,  Montpellier, 
Tours,  and  Orleans ;  in  contrast  to  the  belletristic  humanism  of  a 
John  of  Salisbury,  a  Bernardus  Silvestris,  or  a  Matthew  of 
Vendome;  in  contrast  to  the  concern  with  a  Platonized  quad- 
rivium  and  physics  of  the  Chartrian  masters,  or  the  absorption 
in  dialectic  of  an  Abaelard,  or  the  demand  for  a  quick,  money- 
making  education  by  the  Cornificians;  in  contrast,  finally,  to 
Cistercianism,  which  forbade  "profane"  learning  and  aimed  to 
make  of  every  monastery  a  "school  of  charity"  only,  the 
Didascalicon  set  forth  a  program  insisting  on  the  indispensability 
of  a  whole  complex  of  the  traditional  arts  and  on  the  need  for 
their  scientific  pursuit  in  a  particular  order  by  all  men  as  a 
means  both  of  relieving  the  physical  weaknesses  of  earthly  life 
and  of  restoring  that  union  with  the  divine  Wisdom  for  which 
man  was  made. 

The  Didascalicon 's  influence  was  immediate  and  penetrating. 
It  provided  on  the  one  hand  an  outline  of  work  partly  fulfilled 
in  Hugh's  own  scholarly  production,  continued  in  that  of 
Andrew  and  Richard,  his  successors  in  the  Victorine  chair,  and 
reflected  in  the  philosophical  poetry  of  Godfrey  and  the  liturgical 


sequences  of  Adam,  so  that  the  book  forms  a  kind  of  key  to  the 
Victorine  corpus .  On  the  other  hand,  for  twelfth-  and  thirteenth- 
century  writers  as  different  from  the  Victorines  and  from  one 
another  as  John  of  Salisbury,  Clarenbaldus  of  Arras,  William  of 
Conches  (or  his  disciples),  Peter  Comestor,  Stephen  Langton, 
Robert  Kilwardby,  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas,  Saint  Bonaventure, 
and  Vincent  of  Beauvais  it  served  either  as  a  source  of  references 
and  extracts  which  they  incorporated  into  their  own  writings  or, 
more  significantly,  as  a  source  of  leading  ideas  to  the  guidance 
of  which  they  submitted  their  thought  and  their  work. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  the  Didascalicon  can  be  approached 
from  many  different  points  of  view.  Considering  it  as  a  docu- 
ment in  the  didascalic  tradition  as  a  whole,  one  might  seek  to 
measure  the  extent  to  which  it  transmits  and  adapts  the  common 
materials  of  that  ancient  tradition.6  More  narrowly,  one  might 
compare  and  contrast  its  particular  schematization  of  the  sciences 
to  earlier  and  later  schematizations  in  the  Christian  tradition  and 
attempt  to  trace  the  line  of  a  developing  scholastic  Wissenschajts- 
lehre.1  More  narrowly  still,  one  might  study  the  relation  it 
establishes  between  the  arts  and  scriptural  exegesis  and  ask  how 
its  program  figured  in  the  shift  from  positive  to  systematic 
theology  which  took  place  across  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth 
centuries.8  Turning  to  educational  history,  one  might  center 
attention  on  what  the  work  reveals  of  the  teaching  aims, 
methods,  and  materials  of  the  schools  of  the  same  period.9 
Finally,  one  might  examine  the  Didascalicon' 's  treatment  of  the 
individual  arts,  following  the  previous  history  of  their  various 
terms  in  such  fashion  as  to  explicate  their  special  significance  in 
Hugh — a  most  important  approach  and  one  which,  if  followed 
through,  would  produce  in  effect  a  critical  history  of  the  arts  in 
the  middle  ages.10 

But  if  the  variety  and  scope  of  these  historical  considerations, 
each  of  which  would  require  a  separate  study  or  series  of  studies 
for  its  adequate  development,  suggest  the  importance  of  the 
Didascalicon,  they  imply  its  originality  as  well.  Of  the  work's 
originality,  in  fact,  there  has  never  been  doubt,  though  the 
grounds  on  which  it  has  been  advanced  leave  much  to  be 
desired.  In  part,  the  Didascalicon  has  been  given  a  deceptive 
prominence  because  closely  affiliated  schematizations  of  knowl- 


edge  in  its  own  time  have  been  ignored.11  In  part,  the  attempt 
to  qualify  its  originality  with  greater  accuracy  has  led  to  the 
proposal  of  other  schematizations,  actually  of  later  date,  as  its 
antecedents,  and  to  the  irrelevant  measurement  of  its  achieve- 
ment against  theirs.12  Again,  it  has  been  given  a  value  borrowed 
from  Aristotle  or  Aquinas,  and,  brought  into  step  with  the 
march  of  truth  from  the  Stagirite  to  the  Angelic  Doctor,  it  has 
been  praised  because  it  makes  advances  over  the  former  and 
almost,  but  not  quite,  achieves  the  perfection  of  the  latter.1 3 
Yet  again,  its  purposeful  and  organic  arrangement  of  twenty-one 
arts  has  been  contrasted  to  the  listing,  "encore  rudimentaire," 
of  the  seven  liberal  arts  by  writers  from  Martianus  Capella 
through  the  Carolingians,  and  the  causes  of  its  great  advance 
over  these  sought  (i)  in  the  entrance  into  the  West  of  new 
Arabic  learning,  which,  however,  Hugh  gives  no  evidence  of 
having  known,  (2)  in  the  discovery  of  the  new  logic  of  Aristotle, 
with  which,  however,  Hugh  seems  to  have  been  unacquainted, 
and  (3)  in  the  actual  state  of  development,  by  the  twelfth  century, 
of  each  of  the  arts  which  Hugh  mentions,  a  state  not  historically 
verifiable  and  one  which,  even  if  shown  to  exist,  would  explain 
only  the  material  and  not  the  formal  aspects  of  Hugh's  work.14 
When  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  place  the  Didascalicon  with 
respect  to  like  works  of  its  own  time,  it  has  been  bracketed  with 
the  Heptateuchon  of  Thierry  of  Chartres  and  with  it  made  the 
source  of  broad  inferences  concerning  "le  programme  d'en- 
seignement  generalised  de  son  temps" ;  or  it  has  been  contrasted 
with  John  of  Salisbury's  Metalogicon,  which  appeared  more  than 
a  quarter  of  a  century  later,  in  1 1 5  9,  and  therefore  exercised  no 
influence  upon  it;  or  it  has  been  balanced  in  general  terms 
against  an  assortment  of  twelfth-century  "humanists,"  utili- 
tarians, and  scientists,  as  well  as  religious  reformers  and 
dialecticians,  a  procedure  which  provides  illuminating  com- 
parisons, to  be  sure,  but  which  fails  to  shed  particular  light  on 
precisely  those  immediately  antecedent  authors,  texts,  and 
problems  to  which  the  Didascalicon  applies  and  to  which  many 
features  of  the  text  seem  a  direct  response.15  In  particular,  the 
work  of  William  of  Conches,  which  appears  to  have  challenged 
Hugh  to  a  particular  line  of  argument  at  many  points  in  the 
Didascalicon,  and,   together  with  that  of  Abaelard,   to   have 


exercised  a  determining  influence  even  upon  his  choice  of 
certain  authorities  and  terms,  has  not  been  examined  from  this 
point  of  view.16 

Of  the  Didascalicon' s  relation  to  earlier  works  in  its  tradition, 
it  has  been  said,  for  example,  that  it  provides  a  "refonte  com- 
plete" of  the  De  doctrina  Christiana,  adapting  Augustine's  ideas 
to  the  special  needs  of  the  twelfth  century  and  calling  a  rebellious 
learning  back  to  the  scriptural  basis  posited  by  Augustine  for 
Christian  intellectual  and  spiritual  formation.1  ~>  It  has  also  been 
said  that  the  Didascalicon  was  to  its  time  what  the  Institutiones 
divinarum  et  saecularium  lectionum  of  Cassiodorus  were  to  the  sixth 
century,  the  Etymologiae  of  Isidore  to  the  seventh,  and  Rhabanus 
Maurus's  De  institutione  clericorum  to  the  ninth.18  Such  com- 
parisons are  suggestive  and,  up  to  a  point,  true.  Like  all 
analogies,  however,  they  ignore  specific  differences  in  order  to 
stress  general  similarities ;  they  do  not  pinpoint  what  is  distinctive 
or  original  about  the  Didascalicon.^ 

If,  then,  by  way  of  introduction  to  the  Didascalicon,  we  wish 
to  know  something  of  the  work's  originality,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  examine,  if  even  on  a  severely  limited  scale,  how  the  work 
compares  in  intention  and  structure,  in  its  terms  and  its  argu- 
ment, and  in  its  adaptation  of  source  materials,  with  certain 
selected  earlier  and  contemporary  works  in  the  didascalic 
tradition.  Because  Book  1,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  Books  11  and 
in,  seem  determined  in  many  ways  by  problems  peculiar  to  the 
early  twelfth  century,  the  contemporary  relationships  of  the 
work  will  be  discussed  first.  Because  Books  iv,  v,  and  vi — and 
in  particular  the  disputed  connection  of  divinitas  or  sacra  pagina 
with  the  arts  and  philosophia — are  best  discussed  with  reference 
to  Augustine's  De  doctrina  Christiana  and  the  Institutiones 
divinarum  et  saecularium  lectionum  of  Cassiodorus,  the  relationship 
of  the  Didascalicon  to  earlier  works  will  be  treated  last. 

II.  The  "Quaternary"  of  the  Arts.  The  first  book  of  the 
Didascalicon  provides  a  carefully  articulated  demonstration  that 
philosophy  must  comprise  four,  and  only  four,  master-categories 
of  arts  and  disciplines — theoretical,  practical,  mechanical,  and 
logical.  The  caption  "De  origine  artium,"  which  in  the  Buttimer 
edition  is  affixed  only  to  the  first  chapter  of  the  Didascalicon,  must 


therefore  be  taken  as  the  title  of  the  whole  first  book,20  the 
"origin"  in  question  being  Hugh's  reasoned  derivation  of  these 
four  categories  from  certain  fundamental  postulates  concerning 
the  divine  Wisdom  in  relation  to  the  postlapsarian  state,  but 
divinely  ordained  restoration,  of  man. 

Hugh's  fourfold  scheme,  Aristotelian  in  ultimate  inspiration 
and  character,  stands  in  contrast  to  a  threefold  division  of 
philosophy  into  physics,  ethics,  and  logic,  which,  largely  on  the 
authority  of  Augustine,  prevailed  as  Plato's  division  almost 
without  exception  in  the  West  until  the  twelfth  century.21 
Famous  in  his  own  time  for  his  fidelity  to  Augustine,22  Hugh 
has  nonetheless  been  credited  with  taking  unexplained  leave  of 
Augustine  on  this  essential  matter  and  with  introducing  an 
Aristotelian  division  of  knowledge  to  the  later  middle  ages. 
That  the  Didascalicon  cooperated  in  spreading  interest  in  the 
so-called  Aristotelian  division  is  evident  from  the  book's  wide 
dissemination  and  use.  But  that  Hugh's  originality  did  not 
consist  in  the  initial  rediscovery  and  rehabilitation,  for  his  time, 
of  the  Aristotelian  scheme  is  evident  from  the  reappearance  of 
the  Boethian  version  of  that  scheme  in  William  of  Conches' 
glosses  on  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae,  datable  between  1 1 20 
and  1 125,  or  some  years  earlier  than  the  Didascalicon,  and 
possibly  in  the  pre-1125  version  of  William's  commentary  on 
the  Timaeus  as  well.23  Moreover,  that  Hugh's  departure  from 
Augustine  was  strictly  limited  and  that,  paradoxically,  it  was 
motivated  by  his  loyalty  to  Augustine  in  other  and  more  basic 
respects,  becomes  clear  when  certain  structural  and  material 
features  of  the  first  book  of  the  Didascalicon  are  studied  with 
reference  to  fuller  expressions  of  Hugh's  thought  in  others  of  his 
works  and  to  contrasting  points  of  view  in  his  immediate 
contemporaries.  His  true  originality  then  appears  to  lie  in  the 
adaptation  of  an  already  current  Aristotelian  division  of  phi- 
losophy within  a  system  of  thought  and  action  radically 
Augustinian,  attentively  orthodox,  and  mystically  oriented  as 
against  certain  contemporaries,  including  William  of  Conches, 
who  are  heterodox  in  tendency  and  more  concerned  with 
disputation,  the  quadrivium,  and  physics  than  with  the  final  end 
of  man. 


The  argument  of  the  first  book  of  the  Didascalicon  may  be 
summarized  as  follows : 

Through  knowledge,  man's  immortal  mind  is  capable  of  containing  all 
things,  visible  and  invisible.  As  man  recognizes  this  dignity  of  his  nature  by 
the  light  of  the  divine  Wisdom,  he  turns  from  mere  animal  existence  to 
pursuit  of  that  same  Wisdom,  which  deserves  to  be  sought  above  all  things 
(c.  i).  The  name  of  this  pursuit  is  "philosophy,"  and  the  divine  Wisdom 
sought  is  the  divine  Mind,  living  primordial  Pattern  or  Idea  of  things. 
Calling  man  back  to  Itself,  It  bestows  Its  own  divinity  on  man's  soul  and 
restores  human  nature  to  proper  force  and  purity  through  leading  it  to 
truth  and  to  holiness  of  action  (c.  ii).  Soul  has  three  kinds  of  power:  the 
first  produces  growth  and  nourishment  and  is  found  in  plants ;  the  second 
includes  the  first  and  adds  sense  perception — it  is  found  in  animals;  the 
third  includes  the  first  two  and  adds  reason — it  is  found  exclusively  in  man, 
whom  it  prompts  to  seek  out  the  natures  of  things  and  instruction  in  morals 
(c.  iii).  Because  philosophy  is  the  peculiar  prerogative  of  human  nature,  it 
must  extend  not  only  to  studying  the  natures  of  things  and  regulating 
conduct  but  to  the  ideas  of  all  human  acts  and  pursuits  whatever  (c.  iv).  But 
all  human  acts  and  pursuits  are  ordered  either  to  restoring  the  likeness  of 
man's  soul  to  divine  and  supernal  substances,  or  to  relieving  the  weaknesses 
of  man's  body,  which  belongs  to  the  lowest,  or  temporal  category  of  things 
(c.  v).  There  are  three  categories  of  things :  eternal,  in  which  existence  and 
the  existing  individual  are  identical — such  alone  is  the  Begetter  and  Artificer 
of  nature; perpetual,  in  which  endless  existence  is  conferred  upon  individuals 
by  an  extrinsic  principle — such  alone  is  nature,  the  twofold  character  of 
which  is  exemplified  by  the  ousiai  on  the  one  hand  and  the  superlunary 
bodies  on  the  other ;  temporal,  in  which  temporary  existence  is  conferred  by 
nature — such  are  the  corporeal  beings,  or  "works  of  nature,"  begotten  upon 
the  sublunary  earth  by  an  artifacting  fire  descending  from  above  (c.  vi). 
Astronomers  have  divided  the  world  into  superlunary,  which  they  call 
"nature,"  and  sublunary,  which  they  call  "the  work  of  nature"  because  all 
living  things  in  the  lower  world  are  nourished  by  emanations  from  above. 
They  also  call  the  upper  world  "time"  because  it  governs  movement  in  the 
lower  world,  and  "elysium"  because  its  order  contrasts  with  the  flux  and 
confusion  of  the  lower  region,  or  "infernum."  Man,  who  resembles  the 
divine  in  his  soul,  is  subject  to  necessity  in  his  bodily  or  temporal  part,  which 
must  be  cherished  and  conserved  in  proportion  to  its  weakness  (c.  vii).  The 
contemplation  of  truth  and  the  practice  of  virtue,  divine  actions  because 
they  restore  the  divine  likeness  in  man,  constitute  "understanding,"  higher 
of  the  two  parts  of  wisdom.  Understanding  is  theoretical  when  it  concerns 
truth,  practical  when  it  concerns  morals.  "Knowledge,"  lower  of  the  two 
parts  of  wisdom,  is  properly  called  "mechanical,"  that  is,  adulterate  (c.  viii). 
For  there  are  three  works — the  work  of  God,  which  is  to  create  nature ;  the 
work  of  nature,  which  is  to  bring  forth;  and  the  work  of  the  human  artificer, 
adulterate  because  it  only  copies  the  work  of  nature,  yet  a  tribute  to  man's 
reason  by  its  ingenuity  (c.  ix).    By  "nature"  men  of  former  times  have 


meant  (i)  the  archetypal  Exemplar  of  all  things  in  the  divine  Mind,  pri- 
mordial cause  of  each  thing's  existence  and  character ;  (2)  the  peculiar  being  of 
each  thing;  and  (3)  an  artificer  fire  coming  forth  with  a  certain  power  from 
above  and  begetting  sensible  objects  upon  the  earth  (c.  x).  After  the  inven- 
tion of  the  theoretical,  the  practical,  and  the  mechanical  sciences,  the  logical 
sciences  were  invented  because  men  became  conscious  of  inconsistencies 
and  errors  in  their  discussions.  Though  invented  last,  the  logical  sciences 
should  be  studied  first,  for  without  them  no  philosophical  explanation  is 
possible.  The  four  branches  of  knowledge  can  be  taken  as  that  sacred 
"four"  which  ancient  authority  attributed  to  the  soul  (c.  xi). 

The  tightly  knit,  chapter-to-chapter  sequence  of  the  argument, 
observed  in  passing  by  Baur  but  without  attention  to  its 
significance,24  evinces  the  deliberateness  with  which  Hugh 
expands  to  four  the  two  categories  of  theoretical  and  practical 
science  which  Boethius,  and  William  of  Conches  following  him, 
report  in  philosophy.  The  first  three  chapters,  developing  the 
soul's  capacity  to  know  all  things,  its  relationship  with  the 
divine  Wisdom,  and  its  possession  of  vegetative  and  animal  as 
well  as  rational  functions,  prepare  directly  for  chapters  iv,  v, 
and  viii,  which  contain  the  heart  of  the  argument.  The  argu- 
ment can  be  expressed  in  three  propositions : 

Philosophy,  as  the  unique  prerogative  of  human  nature,  must  contain  as 
many  parts  as  there  are  types  of  human  action. 

But  of  the  types  of  human  action,  two  restore  human  nature  through 
knowledge  or  virtue ;  a  third  aims  to  relieve  the  weaknesses  of  bodily  life. 

Therefore,  philosophy,  first  of  all,  has  three  parts :  theoretical,  ordered  to 
truth;  practical,  ordered  to  virtue;  mechanical,  ordered  to  the  relief  of 
physical  existence. 

The  fourth  part,  last  to  be  discovered  and  therefore  left  to 
last  by  Hugh,  is  introduced  in  chapter  xi  as  the  indispensible 
means  of  assuring  clear  and  true  conclusions  in  the  other  three. 
The  excursion  into  cosmology  in  chapters  vi  and  vii,  though 
recognized  as  digressive  by  Hugh,  is  justified  by  him  as  making 
clear  the  temporal,  dependent,  and  fragile  nature  of  bodily  life, 
and  hence  relates  to  the  mechanical  arts.25  Chapters  ix  and  x 
may  be  similarly  accounted  for. 

Hugh's  management  of  three  long  extracts  from  Boethius  in 
Book  1  affords  a  second  evidence  of  the  care  with  which  he 
builds  his  argument  for  the  fourfold  division  of  philosophy. 
The  first  passage,  taken  from  Boethius's  earlier  commentary  on 


the  Isagoge  of  Porphyry,26  supplies  the  material  on  the  divine 
Wisdom  for  the  larger  part  of  Hugh's  chapter  ii.  It  continues  in 
the  original  source  with  a  merely  bipartite  division  of  philosophy 
and  suspends  judgment  on  whether  logic  is  part,  or  an  instru- 
ment only,  of  philosophy.  Suppressing  this  portion  of  the 
passage,  which  contradicts  the  fourfold  division  of  philosophy 
he  seeks  to  establish,  Hugh  selects  for  the  continuation  of  his 
first  extract  a  portion  of  Boethius's  later  commentary  on  the 
Isagoge.  Selected  to  need  no  explanatory  transition,  this  passage 
is  placed  immediately  after  the  first  extract  and  forms  the  last 
paragraph  of  Hugh's  chapter  ii  and  the  entire  content  of  chapter 
iii.27  In  Boethius,  the  passage  provides  the  psychological  basis 
for  logic ;  in  Hugh,  by  adroit  alteration  of  context,  it  provides 
the  psychological  basis  for  his  fourfold  division  of  philosophy.28 
Again,  in  the  original,  this  passage  moves  on  at  once  to  a 
discussion  of  the  errors  committed  by  Epicurus  and  other 
ancient  philosophers  through  ignorance  of  logic,  and  to  a  clear 
pronouncement  that  logic  is  both  instrument  and  part  of  philoso- 
phy. This  discussion  and  pronouncement  Hugh  reserves  for  his 
chapter  xi,  where  they  form  the  third  long  extract  from  Boethius 
and  serve  to  round  out  Hugh's  quaternary  of  the  arts.29 

Hugh's  concern  to  establish  a  fourfold  division  of  philosophy 
derives  from  a  view  of  fallen  man  which  is  peculiarly  Augustinian 
even  when,  as  in  the  Didascalicon,  passages  lifted  from  Boethius 
or  reminiscent  of  Plato,  are  made  to  express  certain  of  its 
aspects.  The  sense  of  a  disaster  primitively  suffered  by  man 
pervades  Book  i,  though  never  set  forth  in  familiar  religious  or 
doctrinal  terms.  Thus,  the  divine  Wisdom  must  call  man  back 
to  Itself,  must  restore  the  proper  force  and  purity  of  his  nature.30 
The  mind  of  man,  "stupefied  by  bodily  sensations  and  enticed 
outside  itself  by  sensuous  forms,  has  forgotten  what  it  was,  and, 
because  it  does  not  remember  that  it  was  anything  different, 
believes  that  it  is  nothing  but  what  is  seen";  it  is  restored  through 
instructional  Finally,  in  the  first  chapter  of  book  two:  "This, 
then,  is  what  the  arts  are  concerned  with,  this  is  what  they 
intend,  namely,  to  restore  within  us  the  divine  likeness . . .  then 
there  begins  to  shine  forth  again  in  us  what  has  forever  existed  in 
the  divine  Idea  or  Pattern,  coming  and  going  in  us  but  standing 
changeless  in  God."32 


The  relationship  of  the  four  branches  of  philosophy  to  the 
fall  of  man  is  made  clear  by  the  interlocutor  in  Hugh's  dialogue, 
the  Epitome  Dindimi  in  philosophiam.  Asked  how  philosophy 
arose,  the  interlocutor  explains  that  its  four  branches  presented 
necessary  expedients  against  as  many  evils  resulting  from  the  fall : 

Although,  Sosthenes,  a  great  chaos  of  forgetfulness  clouds  human  minds 
so  that  the  hearts  of  mortals,  submerged  in  an  abyss  of  ignorance,  cannot 
fully  remember  their  origin,  there  nonetheless  lives  in  men  something  of  that 
eternal  fire  of  Truth,  which,  gleaming  in  the  midst  of  their  darkness,  en- 
lightens them  to  see  a  little  way  in  their  search  for  Wisdom.  Wisdom  stirred 
our  nature  to  that  search  by  providing  that  we  should  neither  know  all  we 
had  lost  nor  be  totally  unaware  of  what  we  yet  retained.  For  by  that  self- 
same light  gleaming  within  us  we  saw  our  darkness;  our  nature  knew  its 
evils  and  understood  from  them  what  opposed  goods  to  seek.  It  knew  to 
what  evils  mortal  life  lay  subject  and  what  things  hostile  to  its  original  good- 
ness it  sustained,  both  interiorly  and  exteriorly,  when  it  became  corrupted. 
Three  were  the  sources  of  all  those  evils  which  infected  human  nature 
interiorly  and  exteriorly  when  the  pestilence  passed  over  it.  Ignorance  of 
good  and  desire  for  evil  beset  the  mind  of  man ;  the  weakness  of  mortality 
sickened  his  flesh.  And  man  knew  of  his  change  because  he  was  aware  of 
his  inability  to  approve  the  evils  he  now  desired  or  to  hate  the  things  which 
had  once  been  his  goods.  Therefore,  with  what  strength  he  could  summon, 
he  began  to  strive  for  his  liberation — to  avoid  his  evils  and  obtain  his  goods. 
And  so  arose  the  pursuit  of  that  Wisdom  we  are  required  to  seek — a  pursuit 
called  "philosophy" — so  that  knowledge  of  truth  might  enlighten  our 
ignorance,  so  that  love  of  virtue  might  do  away  with  wicked  desire,  and  so 
that  the  quest  for  necessary  conveniences  might  alleviate  our  weaknesses. 
These  three  pursuits  first  comprised  philosophy.  The  one  which  sought 
truth  was  called  theoretical;  the  one  which  furthered  virtue  men  were 
pleased  to  call  ethics;  the  one  devised  to  seek  conveniences  custom  called 
mechanical.  Art  had  not  yet  joined  logic  to  philosophy;  crude  discourse 
handled  the  secrets  of  Wisdom  with  common  and  vulgar  simplicity  until 
finally  a  more  skilled  teaching,  setting  up  the  form  of  polished  discourse, 
added  logic  last  of  all  and  completed  the  quaternary.33 

That  Hugh's  conception  of  philosophy  should  be  rooted  in 
Genesis  reflects  on  the  one  hand  Augustine's  own  preoccupation 
with  that  book,34  and  on  the  other  a  twelfth-century  pre- 
occupation with  the  creation  account  as  part  of  a  larger  concern 
with  the  relationship  of  the  entire  order  of  nature  to  the 
divine.35  Hugh's  interest  in  Genesis,  however,  true  to  the  spirit 
of  Augustine's  thought,  is  man-centered;  he  seeks  in  it  the 
antecedents  of  the  present  human  condition  and  a  norm  of 
human  nature  to  which  man  may  return.  His  historical  approach, 


careful  to  preserve  the  literal  features  of  the  biblical  text,  stands 
in  contrast  to  that  of  William  of  Conches,  who,  approaching 
Genesis  primarily  as  a  physicist,  seeks  to  reconcile  revelation 
with  the  science  of  the  day,  particularly  with  the  cosmogony  of 
Plato's  Timaeus.  To  do  so,  William  is  willing  to  interpret  key 
features  of  the  text  allegorically  and,  from  Hugh's  point  of  view 
irresponsibly.  Thus,  whereas  William  of  Conches  denies  the 
existence  of  initial  chaos  and  holds  that  the  six  days  of  creation 
must  be  taken  figuratively,  Hugh  insists  that  chaos  literally 
existed  and  that  its  ordering  in  an  equally  literal  six-day  period 
is  a  mystery,  a  "sacrament,"  through  which  the  Creator  de- 
termined to  teach  the  rational  creature  that  it  must  rise  from  the 
disorder  of  its  initial  and  untaught  existence  to  an  intellectual 
and  moral  beauty  of  form  conferred  by  the  divine  Wisdom.3<> 
Differences  between  Hugh  and  the  Chartrians  in  matters  of 
cosmology  and  cosmogony,  as  these  relate  to  the  Didascalicon, 
will  be  further  examined  in  the  next  section  of  the  introduction. 
The  interest  here  is  to  note  that  Hugh's  approach  to  the 
materials  of  Genesis  focuses  upon  their  relation  to  the  spiritual 
perfectibility  of  man — a  concern  which  dominates  the  whole  of 
his  theology.37 

The  conception  of  the  divine  Wisdom  as  archetypal  Exemplar 
of  creation,  elaborated  in  patristic  and  especially  in  Augustinian 
exegesis  of  Genesis,  is  one  of  the  most  important  of  such 
materials.  The  sources  of  the  conception  as  it  appears  in  twelfth- 
century  writers  are,  to  be  sure,  many  and  complex.38  It  recurs 
in  various  forms  in  the  Platonic,  Neoplatonic,  Stoic,  and 
Hermetic  texts  which  interested  Abaelard  and  fascinated  the 
Chartrians — in  Chalcidius's  translation  of  and  commentary  on 
the  Timaeus,  in  Macrobius's  commentary  on  Cicero's  Somnium 
Scipionis,  in  Boethius's  De  consolatione  philosophiae,  in  the  Latin 
Asclepius.  It  is  implicit  in  the  Bible,  not  only  in  Genesis  but  in 
the  sapiential  books,  in  the  Joannine  prologue,  in  scattered 
verses  of  the  psalms;  and  it  finds  full  elaboration  in  the 
commentaries  upon  all  of  these  by  the  Fathers,  in  whom  Neo- 
platonic influences  and  Christian  teaching  meet.  From  his 
contemporaries  Hugh  parts  ways  to  expose,  following  Augustine, 
not  the  cosmological  nor  even  the  Trinitarian,  but  especially  the 
moral  implications  of  this  concept  and  these  texts. 


Thus,  in  his  De  sapientia  animae  Christi,  Hugh  transmits  in 
detail,  and  in  the  Didascalicon  he  echoes,  Augustine's  doctrine 
that  there  are  not  many  wisdoms,  but  only  one  Wisdom  which 
makes  men  wise,  and  this  Wisdom  is  God — the  Wisdom  begotten 
from  all  eternity  by  the  Father.  3 9  In  holding  further  that  the 
rational  creature's  wisdom  is  a  participation  in  the  "ideas  and 
causes,  likenesses  and  forms,  dispositions  and  foreseeings"  of 
all  things  begotten  in  the  divine  Wisdom,  Hugh  follows 
Augustine  in  such  manner  as  to  remove  the  ambiguity  and 
paradox  of  the  teaching  of  John  the  Scot  and  the  twelfth- 
century  Bernard  of  Chartres  on  the  nature  and  location  of  the 
ousiai — the  "essences"  or  "substances"  of  all  things.40  Accord- 
ing to  John  and  Bernard,  these  "essences,"  primordial  exemplars 
of  all  created  realities,  subsisted  in  the  Mind  of  God,  yet  were 
created;  though  one  with  God,  they  were  distinct  from  Him, 
and  though  eternal,  they  were  not  quite  coeternal  with  Him. 
Hugh,  who  likewise  believes  that  the  primordial  exemplars  of 
created  realities  subsist  in  the  Mind  of  God,  simply  identifies 
them  with  the  divine  Mind  or  Wisdom,  uncreated  and  coeternal 
with  God.  The  term  ousiai  he  reserves  for  the  participated 
knowledge  of  the  primordial  exemplars  on  the  part  of  the 
rational  creature — angels  and  the  mind  of  prelapsarian  man,  who 
enjoyed  such  participation  in  the  divine  Wisdom  "not  through 
study  or  any  teaching  over  periods  of  time,  but  simultaneously 
and  immediately  from  the  first  moment  of  his  creation,  by  a  single 
and  simple  illumination  of  divine  imparting."41 

What  man  saw  before  the  fall,  what  he  lost  by  it,  and  what  he 
must  do  to  restore  the  loss,  Hugh  expresses  by  the  pseudo- 
Dionysian  figure  of  the  three  eyes.42  Before  the  fall  man  saw 
the  physical  world  with  the  eye  of  flesh;  with  the  eye  of  reason 
he  saw  himself  and  what  he  contained;  with  the  eye  of  con- 
templation he  saw  within  himself  God  and  "the  things  which 
are  within  God"  (primordial  exemplars).  By  the  fall  the  eye  of 
flesh  was  left  unimpaired,  the  eye  of  reason  and  self-knowledge 
bleared,  and  the  eye  of  contemplation  blinded.  Philosophy  must 
therefore  perfect  man's  self-knowledge  (eye  of  reason)  through 
the  practical  arts,  which  "cleanse  the  heart  by  the  study  of  virtue 
so  that  it  may  thereafter  see  clearly  for  the  investigation  of  truth 
in  the  theoretical  arts."43    And  it  must  then  renew  the  know- 


ledge  of  God  and  "the  things  which  are  within  God,"  that  is, 
must  renew  man's  eye  of  contemplation,  through  the  theoretical 
arts,  which,  because  they  are  specifically  restorative  of  the  divine 
Wisdom's  image  in  man,  are  "wisdom"  in  a  preeminent  sense, 
while  the  remaining  arts,  though  necessary  parts  of  philosophy, 
are  "more  precisely  spoken  of  as  prudence  or  knowledge."44 
The  first  stage  in  the  restoration  of  man  which  philosophy 
effects  is  lectio,  or  study,  with  which  alone  the  Didascalicon  is 
concerned,45  though  the  book  points  beyond  lectio  to  the 
meditation,  prayer,  performance,  and  finally  contemplation, 
"foretaste  even  in  this  life  of  what  the  future  reward  of  good 
work  is,"46  in  which  the  task  of  philosophy  is  consummated. 

In  such  a  view  as  this,  the  pursuit  of  the  arts  becomes, 
in  effect,  convertible  with  religion — an  equivalence  explicitly 
stated  by  John  the  Scot  but  asserted  before  him  by  Augu- 
stine, who,  rather  than  John,  inspires  Hugh.47  Hugh's 
consciousness  of  the  need  to  justify  the  view  in  his  own 
time  is  reflected  in  his  statement  that  the  etymology  of 
"philosophy"  requires  explanation  because,  though  the  verbal 
components  of  the  term  are  commonly  known,  not  all  men 
understand  the  same  thing  by  "love"  and  "Wisdom,"  or  "the 
True."48  Granted  Hugh's  integration  of  the  four  parts  of 
philosophy  in  the  task  of  man's  relief  and  restoration,  his  attack, 
in  the  Epitome,  upon  "the  commonly  bruited  opinion  of  many 
persons"  who  "try  to  eliminate  certain  of  the  arts  from  phi- 
losophy by  an  excessively  rigid  test"49  is  understandable.  "In 
fact,"  Hugh  observes,  "one  may  not  deny  that  the  things  in 
which  the  practice  of  philosophy  consists  belong  to  it  first;  but 
second,  so  do  the  things  which  further  that  practice."  Of  the 
arts,  he  says : 

...certain  ones  are  both  in  the  search  for  the  True  and  for  the  search  for 
the  True,  and  no  one  denies  that  these  must  be  thought  parts  of  philosophy, 
as  authority  declares.  But  others,  because  they  are  for  that  search  only,  and 
are  not  found  in  it,  certain  men  have  condemned.50  I  mean  grammar  and  the 
mechanical  arts.  Grammar  is  for  philosophy  only,  not  about  philosophy  nor 
developed  philosophically;  the  mechanical  arts  are  developed  philosophi- 
cally, but  they  are  not  about  philosophy  nor  are  they  for  it.  Some  wish  to 
exclude  the  whole  of  logic  from  philosophy,  but  this  makes  little  sense,  since 
obviously  the  theory  of  argument  is  not  only  for  philosophy  but  about 
philosophy.  In  my  opinion,  men  of  greater  discrimination  hold  that  it  is  not 


only  philosophizing  which  ought  to  be  called  philosophy,  but  also  what- 
ever has  been  established  for  the  sake  of  philosophizing,  whether  for 
philosophy  or  whether  philosophically  developed  in  itself.51 

Held  up  to  scorn  are  those  who,  apparently  forgetting  phi- 
losophy altogether,  become  lost  in  disputes  about  disputations : 

In  former  times,  seekers  who  did  not  know  how  to  philosophize  disputed 
about  philosophy.  Now  another  generation  has  succeeded  them,  and  these 
do  not  even  know  for  sure  how  one  ought  to  conduct  a  dispute  about 
philosophy.  They  have  gone  one  step  back  beyond  those  who  were  already 
backward  enough,  in  order  to  learn  how  to  dispute  about  disputations,  and 
they  can't  figure  out  where  to  classify52  the  very  disputations  they  dispute 
about.  For  if  philosophy  is  an  art,  and  to  dispute  about  philosophy  is  an  art, 
to  what  art  do  we  leave  it  to  dispute  about  disputations?53 

Against  those  who  separate  the  arts  of  speech  from  phi- 
losophy and,  devoting  themselves  to  the  former,  shamelessly 
ignore  the  latter,  William  of  Conches  also  writes.54  The  reverse 
pretension  that  the  arts  of  speech  are  useless  because  no  part  of 
philosophy,  John  of  Salisbury,  looking  back  toward  the  third 
decade  of  the  century,  attributes  to  the  Cornificians.55  He 
observes  in  passing  that  this  sect  had  small  reverence  for  Hugh,56 
and  he  praises  William  of  Conches,  along  with  Abaelard, 
Thierry  of  Chartres,  and  Gilbert  of  Porree,  for  active  resistance 
to  the  Cornifician  "madmen."  Yet  he  notes  that  not  all  of  these 
masters  resisted  successfully,  but  succumbed  instead  to  the  very 
foolishness  they  combatted.57  Whether  John  has  William  of 
Conches  in  mind  here  or  not,  William  himself  maintains  the 
distinctness  of  eloquentia  and  philosophia  in  his  commentary  on 
the  De  consolatione  phi/osophiae,  and  does  so  in  terms  suggestive 
of  Hugh's  statement  quoted  just  above: 

. . .  neither  eloquentia  nor  any  part  of  it  is  about  philosophy.  This  is  con- 
firmed by  the  authority  of  Tully,  who,  in  the  prologue  to  the  Rhetoric  [De 
inventione],  says:  'Wisdom  without  eloquence  is  helpful,  but  not  much; 
eloquence  without  wisdom  not  only  is  not  helpful — it  is  harmful ;  eloquence 
and  wisdom  together  are  truly  helpful.'  So  Tully  wanted  eloquence  and 
wisdom  to  be  distinct.  Likewise  Sallust,  who  in  his  description  of  Catiline 
says:  'He  had  eloquence  enough  but  small  wisdom.'58 

The  persistence  of  William's  point  of  view  is  evident  in  the 
reviser  of  William's  De  philosophia  mundi,  who,  writing  con- 
siderably later,  makes  unmistakable  references  to  the  Didascalicori' 's 


conception  of  a  fourfold  philosophy  as  something  that  should 
not  disturb  his  readers  if  they  encounter  it,  and  himself  main- 
tains, following  William,  that  the  theoretical  and  practical  arts 
are  "about  philosophy  itself,"  the  arts  of  speech  only  "for 
philosophy"  ("its  appendages  and  tools"),  and  the  mechanical 
arts  its  mere  "menials."59 

In  standing  against  such  positions,  Hugh  is  not  seeking 
agreement  on  the  meaning  of  a  word — "philosophy": 

If  anyone  thinks  that  the  term  'philosophy'  should  be  reserved  to  philos- 
ophizing-proper  and  to  the  search  for  the  True  which  I  have  put  in  first 
place,  I  will  not  argue  with  him  about  a  name.  What  good  is  that?  As 
anyone  is  free  to  use  words  in  a  plausible  manner  as  it  pleases  him,  so  I 
judge  a  teaching  and  its  utility  by  one  same  standard  of  truth.60 

Hugh's  one  standard  is  the  necessity  for  so  pursuing  all 
knowledge,  all  human  activity,  that  human  restoration  to 
beatitude  in  the  knowledge  and  love  of  God  will  result. 

The  starting-point  of  a  division  of  philosophy,  the  term 
initially  divided,  is  above  all  what  determines  the  whole 
character  of  the  result.  Hugh  begins  with  a  conception  of  man's 
fall  and  divides  man's  pursuit  of  restoration  into  parts  which 
reflect  the  effects  of  that  fall.  By  contrast,  William  of  Conches 
begins  simply  with  natural  knowledge,  scientia.  Borrowing  an 
Augustinian  distinction,  but  a  subordinate  one,  between  res 
(things)  and  verba  (words),  he  divides  knowledge  into  "wisdom," 
or  knowledge  of  things,  and  "eloquence,"  or  knowledge  of  how 
to  state  one's  knowledge  of  things  decorously.  Wisdom  he 
equates  with  philosophy;  the  sole  difference  between  "wisdom" 
and  "philosophy"  for  him  is  that  one  name  is  Latin,  the  other 
Greek.61  From  such  naturalistic  rationalism  Hugh's  thought  is 
poles  apart.  For  Hugh,  Wisdom  is  the  second  person  of  the 
trinitarian  Godhead,  and  philosophy  is  pursuit  of  that  Wisdom; 
secondarily,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  intellectual  creature, 
wisdom  is  a  participation  in  the  divine  Wisdom.  Without  such 
orientation,  without  the  divine  root  and  end,  knowledge  is 
fruitless :  "Logic,  mathematics,  and  physics  teach  a  sort  of  truth, 
but  they  do  not  attain  to  that  Truth  in  which  the  salvation  of 
the  soul  lies  and  without  which  everything  that  is,  is  vain";62 
and  again,  "Behold,  we  have  shown. . .  the  cause  of  our  disease, 
namely  love  of  the  world,  and  the  cure  of  that  disease,  namely 


love  of  God . . .  without  which  to  have  known  all  other  things 
avails  either  little  or  nothing."" 

Against  Haureau's  misconception  of  Hugh  as  one  who  had 
"pris  en  degout  la  science  elle-meme"  or  against  the  textual 
misrepresentation  by  Ueberweg  and  Heinze  to  the  same  effect,64 
Hugh's  stress  upon  knowledge  has  been  exaggerated  to  the  level 
of  an  absolute  and  his  "Learn  everything...  A  skimpy  know- 
ledge is  not  a  pleasing  thing"65  quoted  without  the  qualification 
afforded  by  its  context,  where  it  forms  part  of  an  exhortation 
to  learn  perfectly  the  letter  or  historia  of  Scripture  and  the  arts 
that  will  make  that  letter  clear.  Hugh,  unlike  William  of 
Conches  and  others  of  his  time,  will  not  allow  study  to  be  the 
proposition  (objective)  or  occupatio  (preoccupation)  of  his 
students.66  One  thinks  of  Abaelard's  complaint  that  his  enemies 
kept  objecting  to  him  "quod  scilicet  proposito  monachi  valde 
sit  contrarium  saecularium  librorum  studio  detineri"  ("that  it 
is  altogether  contrary  to  a  monk's  objective  to  be  seduced  by 
worldly  books").67  Not  against  natural  science,  Hugh  none- 
theless teaches  that  the  man  engrossed  in  the  investigation  of 
temporal  things  "not  only  forgets  his  Creator,  but  neglects 
himself,  and  becomes  preoccupied  in  the  lowest  order  of 
things — things  without  relevance  for  salvation"" — one  thinks 
of  William  of  Conches'  grouchy  remonstrance  against  those 
who,  "ignorant  themselves  of  the  forces  of  nature,  don't  want 
others  to  find  out  anything  about  them  either,  so  that  they  may 
have  everyone  as  companions  in  their  ignorance."69 

Differing  from,  and,  it  seems,  in  part  replying  to,  the  natural- 
istic conception  of  philosophy  of  William  of  Conches  or  the 
interest  in  disputation  of  Abaelard ;  differing  equally  from  such 
ingenious  but  fictive  conceptions  as  that  of  Honorius  Augusto- 
dunensis,  who  sees  philosophy  as  a  highway  and  the  arts  as 
cities  strung  along  it,  leading  the  soul  from  ignorant  exile  to 
scriptural  wisdom ;7o  more  profound,  finally,  than  Adelard  of 
Bath,  who  sees  the  arts  as  "liberal"  because  they  liberate  the 
soul  from  the  chains  of  worldly  love  which  bind  it  within  the 
prison-house  of  the  body71 — Hugh  presents  philosophy  as  the 
instrument  of  a  literal  return  to  the  divine  Wisdom  from  the 
literal  exile  of  the  fall;  as  the  means  of  restoring  to  man  an 
ontological  perfection  which  he  knows,  through  experience, 


that  he  lacks;  which  by  faith  he  believes  he  lost  in  Adam;  which 
by  philosophy  he  struggles  toward  in  time;  and  which  by  grace 
he  receives  abundantly  in  eternity. 

III.  The  Readaptation  of  Heterodox  Cosmological  Texts  and 
Themes.  It  is  not  only  in  the  adaptation  of  an  Aristotelian 
division  of  knowledge  to  an  Augustinian  view  of  man's  fall  and 
redemption  through  "philosophy"  that  Hugh,  as  it  were,  con- 
fronts and  reorients  contemporary  interests.  In  the  first  book  of 
the  Didascalicon,  and  to  a  smaller  extent  in  the  second,  he  has 
chosen  to  express  and  support  his  argument  by  allusions  to 
Platonic,  Neoplatonic,  and  Hermetic  texts  and  themes  which 
reflect,  not  directly  through  uncritical  repetition  of  them,  but 
obliquely  and  correctively  through  implicit  alteration  of  their 
meaning,  certain  dominant  cosmological  concerns  of  the  early 
twelfth  century.  One  such  concern  deals  with  the  divine 
Wisdom,  formal  cause  or  Exemplar  of  the  created  universe,  and 
with  the  specific  agency  by  which  the  prototypes  therein  con- 
tained are  transferred  to  the  material  world.  Directly  related  to 
the  latter  is  also  the  concern  for  "nature,"  conceived  not  only  as 
the  primordial  form  of  each  thing  residing  in  the  divine  Mind 
or  as  the  form  inhering  in  the  actualized  thing  itself,  but  also 
as  an  intermediary  of  uncertain  character  presiding  in  one  way 
or  another  over  creation. 

It  seems  to  have  been  Abaelard  who,  zealous  to  refute  the 
Sabellianism  of  Roscelin  with  a  great  show  of  authority  as  well 
as  of  dialectic,  first  marshaled  for  the  twelfth  century  those  loci 
from  Plato,  Chalcidius,  Macrobius,  "Mercury,"  Vergil,  the 
Sybil,  and  others,  by  which  he  intended  to  show  that  even  the 
pagans  had  knowledge  of  the  three  divine  persons  and  which, 
for  a  quarter  of  the  century  and  partly  through  the  influence  of 
Abaelard  upon  the  Platonizing  cosmologists  of  Chartres,  were 
to  become  involved  in  the  heated  disputes  over  the  existence  and 
identity  of  the  world-soul  and  over  the  role  of  the  Son  and  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  in  creation.72  At  the  same  time,  the  De  consolatione 
philosophiae  of  Boethius,  orthodox  and  congenial  to  the  Victorine 
outlook  by  the  quest  for  the  Summum  Bonum  which  forms  its 
central  subject  matter  but  suspect  and  alien  to  the  Victorines  in 
the  Timaean  cosmology  of  the  celebrated  Book  in,  metre  ix,7^, 


attracted  renewed  interest  after  a  century  of  disfavor  and  neglect, 
and  the  twelfth  century  saw  the  production  of  at  least  the  four 
new  commentaries  reported  by  Courcelle,74  including  that  by 
William  of  Conches,  which  was  destined  to  a  diffusion  surpassing 
even  that  of  Remigius  of  Auxerre's  commentary,  on  which  it 
relies  heavily  but  over  which  it  makes  numerous  original 
advances.  Led  constantly  back  to  the  Timaeus  in  his  efforts  to 
gloss  the  De  consolatione philosophiae,  William  ultimately  produced 
a  full-length  commentary  on  the  Platonic  dialogue  as  well. 
Both  commentaries  are  replete  with  cosmological,  cosmogonal, 
and  other  themes  widely  circulated  throughout  the  century  and 
reflected,  with  careful  selection  and  adaptation,  in  the  Didas- 
calicon.15  Finally,  the  Hermetic  tradition  not  only  provided  the 
concepts  of  Nous  or  secundum  Dominum,  of  a  generating  celestial 
natura,  and  of  the  divine  stars  as  found  in  the  Latin  Asclepius, 
known  to  and  even  quoted  by  Hugh  in  the  Didascalicon,16  but  it 
served  as  a  cover  for  pseudepigraphous  concoctions  like  the 
"Liber  Hermetis  Mercurii  Triplicis  de  VI  rerum  principiis," 
through  which  a  broader  selection  of  cosmological  materials 
from  sources  like  Firmicus  Maternus,  Alcabitius,  and  Zahel  ben 
Bischr  were  diffused  in  the  twelfth  century.77  The  "Liber 
Hermetis"  is  of  particular  interest  because,  by  a  passage  having 
close  verbal  resemblance  to  the  Didascalicon,  it  suggests  the 
existence  of  a  further  cosmological  pseudepigraph,  a  Alatentetrade 
ascribed  to  Pythagoras,  which  is  possibly  a  source  common  to 
Hugh  and  the  "Liber  Hermetis"  author.78 

The  Didascalkon  bears  evidence  of  Hugh's  intimate  knowledge 
of  these  works  through  direct  quotations,  through  unmistakable 
allusions,  and,  perhaps  more  telling  than  both  of  these,  through 
incidental  phrases  which  are  not  easy  to  recognize  and  which 
were  introduced,  it  seems,  rather  by  the  unconscious  prompting 
of  Hugh's  memory  than  by  his  deliberate  intention.79  That 
Hugh  should  have  studied  these  works  with  the  attentiveness 
suggested  by  his  use  of  them,  however,  or  that  knowing  them 
he  should  have  employed  them  in  his  own  work,  seems  at  first 
sight  inconsistent  with  attitudes  he  abundantly  expresses  else- 
where. Unlike  Remigius  of  Auxerre,  whose  commentaries  on 
Statius,  Cato,  Persius,  Juvenal,  Martianus  Capella,  Prudentius, 
Sedulius,  and  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae  mark  him  as  "un 


humaniste  qui  ne  veut  rien  perdre  de  l'heritage  antique,  rien 
condamner";80  unlike  William  of  Conches,  whose  creationist 
interpretation  of  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae  and  the  Timaeus 
marks  him  as  "un  humaniste  nourri  de  culture  antique  et 
convaincu  de  ses  secretes  harmonies  avec  la  foi,"81  Hugh, 
though  a  voluminous  commentator,  has  no  commentary  on 
texts  other  than  scriptural  or  religious,82  and  never  recommends 
such  texts  as  those  under  discussion,  or  any  commentary  on  them, 
to  his  students.  In  the  Didascalicon  itself,  purely  literary  or 
poetic  works  are  classified  as  the  mere  appendicta  artium,  "which 
touch  in  scattered  and  confused  fashion  upon  some  topics  lifted 
out  of  the  arts";83  the  writings  of  philosophers  are  described  as 
so  many  "whitewashed  walls  of  clay,"  shining  with  eloquence 
on  their  verbal  surface  but  concealing  the  clay  of  error  and 
falsehood  underneath.84 

In  others  of  his  works,  Hugh  deplores  the  number  of  con- 
temporary men  of  letters  who  think  more  often  of  pagan  lore, 
of  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  than  of  Christ  and  his  saints ; 
who  delight  in  the  trifles  of  poetry  and  contemn  Scripture ;  who 
know  truth  but  love  falsehood.85  To  the  "philosophers  of  the 
gentiles,"  whom  he  characterizes  as  peering  toward  Wisdom 
with  "an  alien  love  that  comes  seeking  from  afar,"  he  ascribes 
three  types  of  false  opinion,  of  groundless  teaching,  on  the 
origin  and  continuing  existence  of  the  world : 

Some  say  that  nature  alone  exists  and  nothing  else,  and  that  God  is 
nothing  but  the  invention  of  empty  fear,  and  that  things  were  always  as  they 
are,  from  the  beginning,  before  the  beginning,  without  beginning.  And  the 
ages  roll  by,  and  nature  produces  and  renews  itself,  and  nothing  can  be 
different  from  what  it  has  always  been.  Others  declare  the  contrary  and 
fight  because  of  such  insults  to  the  Creator,  and  think  that  they  are  defending 
him,  when  in  fact  they  too  are  attacking  him  with  their  lies.  They  say  that 
there  is  an  "opifex,"  who  shaped  all  things  out  of  matter  coeternal  with 
himself,  giving  matter  an  improved  form.  These  do  not  know  the  power  of 
the  Creator ;  they  deny  that  anything  has  been  made  from  nothing  or  can  fall 
back  into  nothingness,  and  they  make  the  work  of  the  Creator  consist  only 
in  shifting  things  about.86 

The  third  group,  Hugh  continues,  admit  that  all  things  were 
made  from  nothing,  that  once  nothing  was  yet  created,  that  then 
the  Maker  of  all  things  existed  and  has  always  existed.  But  from 
this  promising  beginning  they  come  to  a  bad  end : 


Seeming  to  perceive  the  truth  about  creation,  they  fall  into  countless  lies 
about  the  subsistence  of  things.  They  invent  essences  and  forms  and  atoms 
and  'ideas  of  the  principal  constitutions'  and  numerous  elements  and  infinite 
births  and  invisible  motions  and  procreative  agencies.  And  in  all  these 
things  they  multiply  mere  shadows  of  thought . . .  and  the  truth  is  in  none 
of  them.87 

Repeatedly  Hugh  remarks  upon  the  disparity  between  the 
cosmogony  of  the  Timaeus  and  the  truth  taught  by  Christian 
authors  according  to  the  true  faith.88  Since  the  basic  truth  about 
the  creation  and  subsistence  of  the  world  is  known,  continued 
disputes  over  its  constitution  are  "the  disputes  of  men  who,  out 
of  vain  curiosity,  pry  into  the  hidden  things  of  God's  works — 
disputes  which  they  multiply  by  making  up  for  themselves  lies 
about  things  of  which  they  are  ignorant."89 

For  Hugh,  philosophy  is  essentially  Christian  philosophy.  The 
pagan  philosophers,  to  be  sure,  wished  to  find  Wisdom,  but  not 
believing  in  Christ,  they  did  not  know  the  Way.  Serving  as 
their  own  guides,  they  explored  moon,  sun,  the  stars  of  heaven, 
heaven  itself,  and  beyond  heaven,  the  firmament.  There  was 
nothing  higher  toward  which  they  could  reach  in  their  search 
for  Wisdom.  But  that  Wisdom  which  is  above  all  things  lies  in 
none  of  the  physical  things  He  has  made.  He  resides  within 
man — and  these  philosophers  sought  him  in  the  outside  world  !90 
In  the  arts  of  the  trivium  and  quadrivium — wherever  they  were 
not  dealing  with  God,  whether  taken  in  himself,  or  as  Creator, 
or  as  the  final  end  of  man — Hugh  concedes  that  the  ancients 
were  preeminent.  But  even  here  he  minimizes  their  role  by 
asserting  their  subservience  to  the  Christian  philosophers  who 
were  to  follow  them.  If  for  Bernard  of  Chartres  the  ancients 
were  giants  on  whose  shoulders  the  moderns  perched  like 
dwarfs,  for  Hugh  the  ancients  were  but  laborers  upon  an  inferior 
truth,  while  to  Christians,  to  the  sons  of  Life,  was  reserved  the 
consummation  of  truth.91 

Heterodox  and  inconsistent  with  the  general  tenor  of  Hugh's 
thought,  the  cosmological  texts  and  allusions  found  in  the 
Didascalicon  seem  at  first  sight  not  only  out  of  place  but 
peculiarly  gratuitous.  While  they  appear  in  the  opening  chapter 
of  Book  i,  they  are  above  all  centered  in  chapters  vi  and  vii, 
and  ix  and  x,  the  digressive  and  inessential  character  of  which, 


from  the  standpoint  of  the  argument  of  Book  1,  has  been  noted 
above.92  It  is  only  when  Hugh's  use  of  such  texts  and  allusions 
in  the  Didascalicon  is  examined  in  some  detail  that  they  are  found 
carefully  altered  in  meaning  and  thus  made  consistent  with  his 
thought  as  elsewhere  expressed.  Further,  once  their  adaptation 
is  recognized,  their  introduction  into  the  Didascalicon  ceases  to 
seem  gratuitous  and  assumes  instead  a  rhetorical  value.  Given 
new  currency  by  revived  interest  in  the  works  which  embody 
them,  propounded  by  teachers  as  dynamic  and  contentious  as 
Abaelard  and  William  of  Conches,  receiving  added  importance 
by  the  very  notoriety  of  Abaelard's  condemnation  at  Soissons 
in  1 121,  such  texts  and  ideas  would  be  well  known  to  readers  of 
the  Didascalicon.  By  using  them,  Hugh  spoke  to  his  contempo- 
raries in  terms  significant  in  their  times;  by  adapting  their 
meaning,  he  made  them  promote  a  point  of  view  actually  alien, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  the  borrowed  texts  themselves,  and  hence 
gave,  even  to  those  who  might  disagree  with  him,  an  attractive 
proof  of  ingenuity. 

The  opening,  or  keynote,  sentence  of  the  Didascalicon,  with  its 
Boethian  "Form  of  the  Perfect  Good,"  at  once  evokes  a 
commentary  tradition  which,  from  as  far  back  as  John  the  Scot 
and  Remigius  of  Auxerre,  risked  heterodoxy  in  order  to  give 
Christian  accommodation  to  Timaean  concepts  of  the  world  and 
its  origin.93  While  the  over-all  phraseology  of  the  opening 
sentence  derives  from  the  De  consolatione  pbilosoftbiae,  Book  in, 
prose  x,  and  from  Boethius's  inquiry  there  into  the  existence  and 
identity  of  the  Perfect  Good,  source  of  human  felicity,  the  term 
"perfecti  boni  forma"  looks  back  also  to  the  "insita  summi 
forma  boni,"  "ratio  perpetua,"  "supermini  exemplum,"  "mens," 
"lux,"  and  "fons  boni"  of  the  De  consolatione  pbilosopbiae,  Book 
in,  metre  ix.  Consistently  identifying  these  terms  with  the 
Joannine  Creator-Logos,  with  the  Pauline  "Christ,  Wisdom  of 
the  Father,"  or  "Christ,  form  of  God,"  commentators  from  the 
ninth  century  onward  were  led  into  a  variety  of  strategems  in 
their  efforts  to  give  comparable  Christian  naturalization  to 
Platonic  teaching  on  the  perpetuity  of  matter,  on  God  as  the 
mere  shaper  of  a  preexistent  material  chaos,  on  the  descent 
through  the  cosmos  of  souls  created  on  stars,  or  on  the  stars 
themselves  as  living  divine  beings  sharing  with  the  "anima 


mundi"  a  superintendence  over  life  and  motion  in  the  inferior 
reaches  of  the  cosmos. 

Hugh's  acceptance  of  the  Christianized  Platonic  Nous  in  its 
cosmic  and  creationist  role  is  explicit  in  his  mention  of  "that 
archetypal  Exemplar  of  all  things  which  exists  in  the  divine 
Mind,  according  to  the  idea  of  which  all  things  have  been 
formed."94  The  opening  words  of  the  Didascalkon,  however, 
present  the  divine  Wisdom  not  as  exemplary  cause  of  creation 
at  large,  but  specifically  as  instigator  and  term  of  man's  illumin- 
ation and  restoration;  not  as  a  general  ontological  cause,  but  as  a 
moral  objective,  as  something  to  be  sought,  and  sought  first,  by 
man.  By  reminding  man  of  his  origin,  the  divine  Wisdom, 
Hugh  says,  keeps  man  from  being  like  the  other  animals.95  The 
"tripod"  of  Apollo,  with  its  superscription  "Know  theyself "  is 
actually  the  threefold  sense  of  Scripture,  inspired  by  the  divine 
Wisdom  to  teach  man  self-knowledge.96  Further  relations 
between  the  divine  Wisdom  and  man  are  detailed  in  the  Boethian 
definition  of  philosophy  in  chapter  ii,  which  extends  the 
materials  of  the  opening  paragraph  of  chapter  i.  Thus,  with  an 
emphasis  wholly  different  from  that  of  Chartrian  contemporaries 
who  were  preoccupied  with  the  role  of  the  divine  Wisdom  in  the 
genesis  of  the  cosmos — from  Bernard  of  Chartres,  who  became 
entangled  in  the  paradoxes  of  John  the  Scot's  "natura  quae  et 
creatur  et  creat";97  or  from  William  of  Conches,  bent  upon 
eliciting  an  Augustinian  creationism  from  the  Timaeus;^  or 
from  Thierry  of  Chartres,  who  drew  upon  Neopythagorean 
arithmology  to  explain  how  the  created  many  derive  from  the 
creating  One99 — Hugh  begins,  in  his  very  opening  words,  to 
lead  toward  the  expression  of  his  belief,  following  Augustine, 
that  the  human  mind  is  made  in  the  image  of  the  divine  Wisdom, 
and  that  this  image,  damaged  by  the  fall,  is  to  be  restored 
through  the  arts,  in  cooperation  with  grace.100 

Arresting,  however,  is  the  sudden  reference  to  the  Timaeus, 
and  thus,  ostensibly,  to  the  world-soul,  in  the  second  paragraph 
of  the  first  chapter.101   Plato's  Timaeus,  we  are  told, 

...formed  the  entelechy  out  of  substance  \ which  is  'dividual'  and 
'individual'  and  mixed  of  these  two ;  and  likewise  out  of  nature  which  is 
'same'  and  'diverse'  and  a  mixture  of  this  pair,  by  which  the  universe  is 


We  are  told  further,  in  a  passage  lifted  from  the  Chalcidian 
elucidation  of  the  "anima  mundi,"  that  the  entelechy  grasps 
"not  only  the  elements  but  all  things  that  are  made  from  them,"103 
and  to  substantiate  this  capacity  certain  Empedoclean  verses, 
found  also  in  Chalcidius  and  also  in  connection  with  the  "anima 
mundi"  (though  a  second  time  in  connection  with  man's  soul),  are 
cited.104  Lastly,  a  verse  from  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae,  Book 
in,  metre  ix("Quae  cum  secta  duos  motum  glomeravit  inorbes" — 
line  1 5),  a  verse  alluding  to  the  two  circles  into  which  the  world- 
soul  is  arranged  in  Timaeus  36  B-C,  is  closely  paraphrased.105 

Interpretations  of  these  passages  current  at  the  time  the 
Didascalkon  was  written  were  associated  with  heretical  points  of 
view  and  were,  in  fact,  abandoned  by  their  authors  within  a 
decade  or  a  little  after  the  appearance  of  the  Didascalkon.  To 
Abaelard,  the  Timaean  passage  on  the  world-soul  referred  "per 
pulcherrimuminvolucrum"to  the  Holy  Spirit,  "same"  innature 
with  Father  and  Son,  "diverse"  in  person;  "individual,"  that  is, 
indivisible,  because  the  divine  substance  is  simple,  "dividual" 
because  it  divides  its  gifts  among  many.106  To  William  of 
Conches,  who  also  identified  the  world-soul  with  the  Holy 
Spirit107  but  who  explained  Plato's  terms  with  a  typical  cos- 
mological  emphasis,  the  world-soul  is  "individual"  because,  as 
spirit,  it  lacks  parts,  "dividual"  because  of  the  different  grades  of 
vital  power  it  bestows  upon  plants,  upon  animals,  upon  men; 
"same"  as  productive  of  reason  and  intellect,  which  are  un- 
changing, "diverse"  as  productive  of  sense  and  opinion,  which 
change  and  err.108  Following  Chalcidius,  William  cited  the 
Empedoclean  verses  in  his  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  as 
showing  why  the  world-soul,  if  it  was  to  discern  as  well  as  to 
vivify  all  things,  would  have,  in  some  fashion,  to  be  composed 
of  them.109  The  "Quae  cum  secta  duos"  verse  from  the  De 
consolatione  philosophiae  he  interpreted  as  referring  to  the  spheres 
of  the  planets  and  the  firmament,  which,  contrary  in  movement, 
exercise  different  influences  upon  the  corporeal  world.110  The 
term  "entelechy,"  moreover,  was  reported  by  John  the  Scot  and 
Remigius  of  Auxerre  to  be  Plato's  name  for  the  "anima  mundi," 
and  its  use  in  this  sense  in  Bernardus  Silvestris's  De  mundi 
universitate  testifies  to  the  currency  of  this  mistaken  identification 
in  the  twelfth  century.111 


But  by  all  these  terms — "entelechy,"  the  "same  and  diverse" 
and  "dividual  and  individual"  of  the  Timaeus  passage,  the 
Empedoclean  verses,  and  the  terms  taken  from  the  "Quae  cum 
secta  duos"  line  of  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae,  Book  in, 
metre  ix — Hugh  intends  not  the  "anima  mundi"  but  the  human 
soul.  That  "entelechy"  was  not  Plato's  but  Aristotle's  term  for 
"the  first  perfection  of  a  natural  organic  body"  he  might  have 
learned  from  Chalcidius,  who  makes  the  point  in  a  context 
dealing  with  man;112  and  one  notes  that  Hugh  endows  his 
entelechy  with  senses  and  sense  perceptions,  explicitly  denied  to 
the  animate  world  by  Plato  in  Timaeus,  33.  That  "persons  of 
better  judgment"  apply  the  Timaeus  passage  to  man,  to  the 
microcosm  rather  than  to  the  macrocosm,  he  might  also  have 
read  in  John  the  Scot  and  Remigius,113  and  John  the  Scot 
supplies  the  psychological  interpretation  of  the  "Quae  cum 
secta  duos"  verse  which,  rather  than  William  of  Conches' 
astrological  one,  Hugh  follows ;  the  "two  spheres"  being  those 
of  sensory  and  intellectual  cognition.114 

The  bases  for  Hugh's  application  of  these  materials  to  man 
thus  exist  in  aspects  of  the  commentary  tradition  ignored  by 
William  of  Conches.  But  beyond  this,  the  opening  chapter's 
concluding  references  to  the  dignity,  fall,  and  restoration  of 
human  nature  make  it  unmistakable,  should  one  have  missed 
Hugh's  meaning  earlier  in  the  chapter,  that  he  has  been  speaking 
of  the  human  soul.  Similarly,  the  title  of  chapter  iii,  "Con- 
cerning the  threefold  power  of  the  soul,  and  the  fact  that  man 
alone  is  endowed  with  reason,"  excludes  the  common  attribution 
of  reason  to  the  world-soul,  just  as  the  chapter  itself,  by  present- 
ing vegetative,  sensitive,  and  rational  life  with  reference  to 
terrestrial  beings  alone,  stands  pointed  against  the  current  inter- 
pretation of  the  world-soul  as  threefold  in  nature  because  of  the 
source  of  these  three  forms  of  life.115  In  his  De  tribus  diebus, 
Hugh  admits  that  God  fills  the  universe  as  source  of  vitality  and 
motion,  but  he  denies  that  "the  Creator  Spirit"  can  be  present 
to  the  universe  as  a  soul.116  Finally,  the  brano  revision  of 
William  of  Conches'  De  philosophia  mundi  lists  several  con- 
temporary interpretations  of  the  Timaean  "dividual  and  in- 
dividual substance"  and  "same  and  diverse  nature";  one  of 
these,  agreeing  in  all  particulars  with  various  passages  in  the 


Didascalicon,  refers  entirely  to  the  human  soul  and  may  safely  be 
concluded  to  be  Hugh's.117 

In  later  chapters  Hugh  makes  further  modifications  in  current 
cosmological  teachings.  Among  the  commonest  current  syno- 
nyms for  "world-soul"  was  the  term  "nature."118  Hugh  first  of 
all  uses  "nature"  to  indicate  the  whole  of  creation,  intellectual 
and  material,  viewed  as  a  perpetual  ordinance  of  God.1 19  Second, 
he  uses  "nature"  to  indicate  the  superlunary  world,  following 
the  pseudepigraphous  "Liber  Hermetis"  in  strictly  astronomical 
details  but  no  farther.  He  does  not,  like  that  work,  make  the 
celestial  "nature"  an  offspring  of  the  divine  Cause  or  Good 
("Tugaton")  and  the  Nous  or  Ratio,  a  generative  hierarchy  un- 
comfortably suggestive  of  the  Trinity;  he  does  not,  like  that 
work,  make  the  celestial  "nature"  distributor  to  the  inferior 
world  of  those  essences  of  which  Nous  is  the  source,  but 
reserves  that  function  to  the  divine  Exemplar  itself,  in  accord- 
ance with  a  more  orthodox  view  of  Providence.120  Last,  in  a 
brief  survey  of  three  basic  meanings  of  "nature"  among  the 
ancients,  he  limits  himself  to  recording  the  term's  extension  to 
the  archetypal  Exemplar,  to  the  "proprium  esse"  of  each 
created  thing,  and  to  a  certain  cosmic  fire,  which,  as  we  learn 
from  his  homilies  on  Ecclesiastes,  he  would  locate  not  in  a 
world-soul,  but  in  nothing  more  mysterious  than  the  sun, 
William  of  Conches'  objections  to  this  view  notwithstanding.121 

The  distinction  among  "the  work  of  God,"  "the  work  of 
nature,"  and  "the  work  of  the  artificer,  who  imitates  nature," 
Hugh  borrows  from  Chalcidius,  but  with  basic  modifications  in 
meaning.122  Both  the  title  of  Didascalicon  1.  vi  ("Concerning  the 
three  'manners'  of  things")  and  that  chapter's  differentiation 
among  "eternal,"  "perpetual,"  and  "temporal"  can  be  traced  to 
WilHam  of  Conches'  commentaries  on  the  De  consolatione 
philosophiae  and  the  Timaeus,12^  but  Hugh  includes  the  chapter, 
as  he  includes  Didascalicon  1.  x,  not  for  its  intrinsic  cosmological 
interest  but  to  identify  precisely  the  temporal  nature  of  the  needs 
served  by  the  mechanical  arts  and  the  "adulterate"  character  of 
their  products.124  The  chapter  "Concerning  the  three  sub- 
sistences of  things,"125  possibly  intended  for  interpolation  after 
Didascalicon  1.  vi,126  presents  the  angels  not  in  Chalcidian  terms 
as  cosmically  localized  fiery  intermediaries  between  God  and 


man,  as  do  William  of  Conches  and  numerous  contemporaries,127 
but  as  participants,  through  knowledge,  in  the  primordial  causes 
subsisting  in  the  divine  Mind  and  in  this  sense  as  containing  the 
exemplars  according  to  which  material  creation  was  made.128 

The  reactivation  of  the  Timaean,  Boethian,  and  Hermetic 
cosmological  materials  in  the  twelfth  century  did  not  spring 
from  a  simple  desire  to  bring  these  to  light  for  their  own  sakes, 
from  what  Chenu  has  called  "une  curiosite  de  bibliothecaire  en 
mal  de  souvenirs  antiques."129  Chartres  had  its  own  immediate 
interests  and  purposes  in  regard  to  these  materials,  and  so  did 
Abaelard,  as  Parent  and  others  have  long  ago  shown.  Perhaps 
we  can  now  see  as  well  the  reason  for  the  interest  which  Hugh 
displays  in  the  same  materials  in  the  Didascalicon.  If  he  used 
them  there  at  all,  it  was  because  others  had  misused  them  first; 
if  he  was  interested  in  them,  it  was  because  others  were  ex- 
cessively interested  in  them.  He  used  them  in  an  altered  sense, 
and  he  reapplied  and  absorbed  them  into  the  ethico-mystical 
objective  which  governs  the  program  of  study  set  forth  in  the 

IV.  The  Didascalicon  and  Earlier  Works  in  the  Didascalic 
Tradition.  Original  in  its  own  time  for  its  argument  for  a  four- 
fold "philosophy"  oriented  toward  the  perfecting  of  fallen  man, 
and  for  its  distinctive  adaptation  of  currently  fashionable 
cosmological  texts  and  themes  within  the  line  of  that  argument, 
the  Didascalicon  is  original  in  relation  to  traditional  Christian 
didascalic  works  as  well.  Thus,  though  it  has  been  likened  to  the 
De  doctrina  Christiana  of  Augustine,  the  Institutiones  divinarum  et 
saecularium  lectionum  of  Cassiodorus,  the  Etymologiae  of  Isidore, 
and  the  De  institutione  clericorum  of  Rhabanus  Maurus,  as  we  have 
seen,130  it  is  essentially  different  from  all  four. 

The  Didascalicon,  in  the  first  place,  is  not  rhetorical  in  aim, 
like  the  De  doctrina  Christiana;  it  is  not,  like  it,  a  manual  for 
Christian  indoctrination,  showing  first  how  to  discover  truth 
from  Scripture  and  then  how  to  teach,  please,  and  persuade  in 
presenting  the  discovered  truth  to  others.  In  short,  it  is  not 
conceived  by  a  bishop  for  the  preparation  of  preachers.  Nor  is 
it  a  manual  of  clerical,  much  less  of  monastic  formation,  and  in 
this  it  differs  from  the  work  of  Rhabanus,  written  to  form  a 


clergy  for  the  German  missions,  and  of  Cassiodorus,  who  out- 
lined a  plan  of  study  and  work  peculiarly  adapted  to  the  re- 
sources and  aims  of  his  new  monastic  foundation  at  Vivarium. 
Finally,  the  Didascalicon  is  not  an  impersonal  digest  of  universal 
knowledge,  an  encyclopedic  source  book,  and  in  this  it  differs 
from  the  Etymologiae  of  Isidore.131 

But  since  Hugh  was  undoubtedly  inspired  by  Augustine  more 
than  by  any  other  single  authority,  it  will  be  particularly  in- 
structive to  compare  the  Didascalicon  and  the  De  doctrina 
christiana  in  greater  detail. 

The  orientation  of  the  Didascalicon  is  toward  the  restoration 
within  the  individual  lector ^  or  student,  of  the  image  of  the 
divine  Wisdom,  the  second  person  of  the  trinitarian  Godhead, 
through  whom,  as  through  the  primordial  Idea  or  Pattern  of  all 
things,  the  Father  has  established  the  universe  and  through 
whose  mysteries,  from  the  fall  to  the  end  of  time,  he  accomplish- 
es the  work  of  restoration.  The  orientation  of  the  Didascalicon 
is  therefore,  in  a  sense,  mystical,  since  it  looks  toward  man's 
union  with  the  divine  Wisdom,  or  Son.  It  must  also  be  called 
noetic  and  ethical,  since  the  mystical  union  is  to  be  promoted 
through  the  pursuit  and  contemplation  of  truth  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  practice  of  virtue  on  the  other.  It  must  also  be  called 
"philosophical,"  not  only  because  of  the  love  of  the  divine 
Wisdom  which  motivates  the  pursuit  but  because  of  the  full 
complement  of  arts  and  disciplines  which  effects  that  pursuit. 
Lastly,  it  must  be  called  universal,  intended  for  all  men,  partly 
because  in  the  preface  to  the  Didascalicon  Hugh  exhorts  all  men 
to  study  at  the  cost  even  of  great  efforts  should  they  lack  ability 
and  of  keen  physical  sufferings  should  they  lack  material  means, 
partly  because  the  program  itself  is  postulated  upon  a  catastrophe 
which  Hugh  accepts  as  universal  for  the  race,  but  finally  because 
he  teaches  expressly  that  no  man  may  excuse  himself  from  the 
obligation  to  construct  within  his  own  soul  the  "area  Sapientiae" 
— a  dwelling  place  for  the  divine  Wisdom.132  The  result  of  the 
philosophic  quest  is  the  restoration  in  man  of  that  form  of  the 
divine  nature  or  Wisdom,  lost  to  him  through  the  fall : 

This,  then,  is  what  the  arts  are  concerned  with,  this  is  what  they  intend, 
namely,  to  restore  within  us  the  divine  likeness,  a  likeness  which  to  us  is  a 
form  but  to  God  is  his  nature.   The  more  we  are  conformed  to  the  divine 


nature,  the  more  do  we  possess  Wisdom,  for  then  there  begins  to  shine  forth 
again  in  us  what  has  forever  existed  in  the  divine  Idea  or  Pattern,  coming 
and  going  in  us  but  standing  changeless  in  God.133 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  for  Augustine,  as  for  Hugh,  the 
philosophic  quest  had  a  religious  importance,  that  he  valued  at 
least  certain  of  the  arts  as  assisting  man  to  the  divine  Wisdom, 
and  that  he  regarded  the  restoration  of  the  divine  likeness  in 
man  as  man's  destined  end.  But  beyond  this  point  qualifications 
accumulate.  For  Augustine,  the  restoration  of  the  divine  likeness 
in  man  is  altogether  reserved  to  the  perfect  vision  of  God  in 
glory  to  come;134  it  is  not,  as  in  Hugh,  a  process  which  begins 
with  a  study  of  the  arts  in  this  life.  The  arts  render  a  man 
"quicker,  more  persevering,  and  better  equipped  for  the  truth 
he  should  embrace,"135  but  they  are  not  themselves  integral  parts 
of  that  truth,  increments  of  a  growing  divine  likeness  in  man,  as 
Hugh  would  have  them;  philosophy,  whatever  its  part  in 
Augustine's  own  spiritual  growth,  is  not  the  normal  avenue  of 
Christian  intellectual  development  as  he  finally  conceives  it  in 
the  De  doctrina  Christiana.1^ 

The  De  doctrina  Christiana  holds  up  the  study  of  Scripture  as  the 
exclusive  source  of  normal  Christian  intellectual  development ; 
the  result  immediately  intended  is  charity,  not  Wisdom.  The 
opening  book  of  the  De  doctrina  Christiana  is  devoted,  not  like 
that  of  the  Didascalicon,  to  elucidating  the  relationship  between 
the  arts  and  man's  pursuit  of  the  divine  Wisdom,  but  to 
elucidating  the  twofold  law  of  love  which  directs  that  God 
alone  be  enjoyed  and  one's  fellow-man  well  used  in  reference  to 
God  as  man's  end.  For  Augustine,  all  knowledge  is  reducible 
to  charity,  or  love.  Whatever  a  man  has  learned  outside  of 
Scripture,  if  it  is  harmful,  is  condemned  in  Scripture;  if  it  is 
useful,  is  found  in  Scripture  in  greater  abundance  along  with 
much  that  can  be  found  nowhere  else;137  yet  Scripture  teaches 
nothing  but  love  in  all  that  it  says.138  To  be  sure,  Augustine 
speaks  of  the  knowledge  gained  from  Scripture  as  the  third  step 
in  a  sevenfold  ascent  to  Wisdom:139  but  the  "knowledge"  of 
which  Augustine  here  speaks  has  nothing  in  common  with  the 
knowledge  Hugh  seeks  from  the  arts;  it  is  man's  "knowledge" 
that  he  is  entangled  in  temporal  things,  that  he  lacks  the  great 
love  Scripture  enjoins,  and  that  he  has  good  hope  of  deliverance; 


and  "Wisdom"  in  this  context  is  not  specifically  identified,  as  in 
Hugh,  with  the  divine  Idea  or  Pattern  of  all  things,  source  and 
object  of  truth  and  virtue  even  in  the  secular  arts. 

Of  the  arts,  the  De  doctrina  Christiana  offers  a  scheme  radically 
different  from  that  of  the  Didascalicon.  Hugh  elaborates  a 
division  of  philosophy  containing  twenty-one  distinct  arts,  with 
further  subdivision  possible.140  While  seven  of  these  are  singled 
out  for  special  attention,1*!  all  constitute  "divisive  parts  of 
philosophy"  and  are  integral  to  its  pursuit.  Augustine,  on  the 
other  hand,  interpolates  his  analysis  of  the  arts  into  a  discussion 
of  what  pagan  learning  a  Christian  intellectual  may  not  im- 
properly acquire.  His  analysis  is  not  presented  as  a  division  of 
philosophy  but,  more  loosely,  as  a  critical  survey  of  the  kinds  of 
teachings  practiced  among  the  pagans.142  Pagan  knowledge  he 
classifies  thus: 

I.  Knowledge  of  things  men  have  instituted  : 

A.  In  cooperation  with  demons:  magic,  soothsaying,  omens,  super- 
stitious practices. 

B.  Among  themselves : 

i.    Unnecessarily     and     excessively:     acting,     dancing,     painting, 

sculpture,  fiction. 
2.    Usefully  and  indispensably:  weights,  measures,  coins,  uniforms, 

written  notations,  and  various  arrangements  necessary  for  the 

management  of  society. 

II.  Knowledge  of  things  done  through  time  or  divinely  instituted : 

A.  Pertaining  to  the  senses : 
i.    History. 

2.  Natural  history. 

3.  Astronomy. 

4.  Useful  corporeal  arts : 

a.  Those  producing  enduring  effects  like  a  house,  a  bench,  or 
a  dish. 

b.  Those  assisting  God  in  his  works,  like  medicine,  agriculture, 

c.  Those    terminating    in    an    action,    like    leaping,    running, 

B.  Pertaining  to  the  reason: 

1.  The  science  of  conclusions,  definitions,  and  divisions. 

2.  Eloquence. 

3.  The  science  of  number  considered  in  itself  or  applied  to  figures, 
sounds,  and  motions.143 


Having  outlined  pagan  knowledge,  Augustine  classifies  as 
unsuitable  for  Christians  various  parts  of  it  which  Hugh  accepts 
as  necessary.  Of  things  instituted  by  men,  Augustine  counte- 
nances only  those  useful  and  indispensable  for  the  management 
of  society  (I.  B.  2.).  He  disallows  dramatics  and  fiction  (I.  B.  1.), 
the  former  of  which  finds  a  place  in  Hugh's  scheme  as  one  of  the 
mechanical  arts,144  and  the  latter  of  which  Hugh  recommends 
for  recreation  though  not  for  serious  study.145  On  the  con- 
demnation of  magic  both  men  agree.146  Of  things  done  through 
time  or  divinely  instituted,  Augustine  dismisses  astronomy 
(II.  A.  3.)  as  useless147  and  depreciates  the  importance  of  formal 
study  of  eloquence  (II.  B.  2.),148  both  of  which  Hugh  finds 
essential.  Of  all  the  teachings  of  the  pagans,  none  are  useful, 
Augustine  thinks,  except  history,  natural  history  (II.  A.  1  and  2.), 
corporeal  arts  (II.  A.  4.),  and  the  sciences  of  reasoning  and 
number  (II.  B.  1  and  3.).149  His  criterion  is  the  immediate  value 
of  every  branch  of  knowledge  in  the  interpretation  of  Scripture. 
The  limits  of  study  as  Augustine  conceives  it  appear  in  the 
projects  he  recommends:  histories  to  supplement  scriptural 
history;  handbooks  to  explain  scriptural  names,  places,  animals, 
plants,  trees,  stones,  metals,  numbers,  and,  if  possible,  types  of 
reasoning.150  Hugh,  too,  regards  secular  learning  as  of  value 
for  scriptural  exegesis,  but  he  requires  a  broader  base  of  secular 
arts  as  preparation  for  this  purpose  than  Augustine  does,  and  he 
groups  the  secular  arts  according  to  their  service  to  particular 
levels  of  scriptural  interpretation.151  Finally,  while  Hugh  is 
faithful  to  Augustine  in  the  concept  of  the  divine  Wisdom's 
relation  to  the  rational  creature,  a  concept  which  underlies  the 
Didascalicon,  it  must  be  said  that  he  draws  from  this  concept,  in 
his  fourfold  "philosophy"  and  his  web  of  twenty-one  arts,  a 
program  of  study  which  exceeds  anything  that  Augustine 
thought  necessary. 

But  it  has  also  been  claimed  that  the  Didascalicon  bears  closer 
resemblance  to  the  Institutiones  divinarum  et  saecularium  lectionum 
of  Cassiodorus  than  to  any  other  previous  work.152  The 
comparison,  whatever  its  truth,  obscures  differences  at  least  as 
radical  as  those  distinguishing  the  Didascalicon  from  the  De 
doctrina  Christiana.  Written  "for  the  instruction  of  simple  and 
unpolished  brothers  in  order  that  they  may  be  filled  with  an 


abundance  of  Heavenly  Scriptures,"  the  Institutiones  outlines  for 
the  cenobites  of  Vivarium  a  reading  course  in  the  Bible  and  the 
Fathers.153  A  compendium  of  secular  arts  is  added  only  because 
these  arts,  though  they  do  not  promote  spiritual  advancement 
and  can  even  be  dangerous,  are  useful  for  interpreting  Scripture, 
and  because  those  already  instructed  in  this  sort  of  knowledge 
may  wish  a  brief  review,  while  those  who  are  not,  may  profit  by 
a  few  rudiments.154  The  arts  treated  are  only  the  seven  of  the 
trivium  and  quadrivium;  missing  are  theology  and  physics,  the 
three  branches  of  ethics,  and  the  seven  mechanical  arts,  all 
integral  to  Hugh's  scheme.  A  division  of  philosophy  into 
"inspective"  and  "actual"  arts,  prefixed  to  the  chapter  on 
dialectic  in  obedience  to  a  custom  set  by  commentators  on 
Porphyry's  Isagoge,155  is  analogous  to  Hugh's  divisions  of  the 
theoretical  and  practical  arts,  different,  however,  in  terminol- 
ogy156 and  without  organic  relevance  to  Cassiodorus's  total 
presentation.  Of  Hugh's  mechanical  arts,  agriculture,  fishing, 
and  medicine  appear,  but  the  first  is  a  last  resort  for  brethren  too 
simple  for  instruction  in  letters,  the  last  two  are  praised  as  works 
of  mercy,  especially  to  strangers;157  there  is  no  vision  of  a 
complex  of  mechanical  arts  serving  the  philosophic  quest  by 
repairing  physical  weaknesses  sustained  by  man  in  the  fall.  In 
fact,  Hugh  is  indebted  to  the  Institutiones  principally  for  a 
definition  of  theology  which  he  enriches  by  associating  it  with 
concepts  found  in  Boethius,158  and  possibly  for  a  definition  of 
philosophy,  in  which,  however,  he  modifies  the  words  and  the 

Responsible  for  the  notion  that  Hugh  resembles  Cassiodorus 
is  the  bipartite  division  of  the  Didascalicon  into  the  first  three 
books,  which  deal,  as  some  have  alleged,  with  philosophy  or  the 
profane  sciences,  and  the  last  three,  which  deal,  according  to  the 
same  view,  with  theology  or  sacred  science.160  The  bipartite 
division  into  two  groups  of  three  books  each  cannot  be  denied ; 
but  to  infer  that  it  represents  a  cleavage  between  sacred  and 
profane  like  that  in  Cassiodorus,  or  a  distinction  between 
philosophy  and  theology  like  that  common  from  the  thirteenth 
century  onwards  is  to  misread  the  Didascalicon  and  do  violence 
to  Hugh's  thought  as  there  and  elsewhere  expressed.  For  Hugh, 
philosophy  is  the  pursuit  of  the  divine  Wisdom;161  it  is  the  only 


wisdom  a  man  can  have  in  this  life;162  it  governs  all  human 
actions  or  occupations;163  it  comprehends  all  knowledge  what- 
ever.164 Philosophy  is  simply  the  whole  of  human  life  pursued 
in  proper  relation  to  its  final  cause,  or,  one  may  also  say,  its 
formal  cause.165  Its  all-inclusive  divisions  are  outlined  in  the 
first  part  of  the  Didascalicon  without  concern  for  the  sources  of 
the  knowledge,  whether  in  reason  or  faith,  in  the  created  world 
or  the  mysteries  of  revelation,  in  secular  writings  or  in  Sacred 
Scripture.  The  last  three  books,  then,  do  not  "add"  theology 
to  the  first  three.  Theology,  the  science  of  intellectible  being, 
however  that  science  be  obtained,  has  its  place  among  the  dis- 
ciplines outlined  in  the  first  three  books,  and  a  different  ex- 
planation must  be  found  for  the  bipartite  division  of  the 

The  explanation  lies  in  the  divine  Wisdom's  double  mani- 
festation of  itself  in  the  works  of  creation  and  the  works  of 
salvation,  the  former  constituting  the  matter  of  secular  writings, 
the  latter  constituting  the  matter  of  Sacred  Writings.166  The 
existence  of  the  Sacred  Scripture  alters  the  character  of  phi- 
losophy for  Hugh,  and  no  adequate  grasp  of  his  thought  is 
possible  without  clear  understanding  of  the  reciprocal  role  he 
assigns  to  secular  writings  and  Scripture  in  the  one  pursuit  of 
the  one  Wisdom,  the  one  philosophy. 

Scripture,  in  the  first  place,  is  the  primary  "documentum,"  or 
evidence,  in  the  theological  art.  A  false  "worldly  theology"  was 
elaborated  by  the  ancients,  who,  first  ignoring,  then  proudly 
rejecting  the  works  of  salvation,  restricted  themselves  to  the 
indistinct  natural  evidences  of  the  created  world.  The  terms  in 
which  Hugh  speaks  of  "worldly  theology"  are  almost  vitu- 
perative: "dense  gloom,"  "deep  darkness  of  ignorance,"  "a  trap 
of  error  to  ensnare  the  proud,"  "foolishness,"  "lying  fictions  of 
their  own  fashioning."167  Clearly,  he  does  not  think  oimundana 
theologia  as,  in  the  thirteenth  century  and  later,  men  were  to 
think  of  natural  theology.  It  can  hardly  be  "worldly  theology," 
so  characterized  and,  moreover,  a  purely  natural  theology,  which 
is  meant  by  "theology"  in  the  first  three  books  of  the  Didacalicon. 
The  great  mistake  of  non-Christian  theologians,  Hugh  teaches, 
was  precisely  that  they  reasoned  exclusively  from  natural 
evidences  and  so  became  fools : 


Invisible  things  can  only  be  made  known  by  visible  things,  and  therefore 
the  whole  of  theology  must  use  visible  demonstrations.  But  worldly 
theology  adopted  the  works  of  creation  and  the  elements  of  this  world  that 
it  might  make  its  demonstration  in  these...  And  for  this  reason,  namely, 
because  it  used  a  demonstration  which  revealed  little,  it  lacked  ability  to 
bring  forth  the  incomprehensible  truth  without  the  stain  of  error. . .  In  this 
were  the  wise  men  of  this  world  fools,  namely,  that  proceeding  by  natural 
evidences  alone  and  following  the  elements  and  appearances  of  the  world, 
they  lacked  the  lessons  of  grace.168 

True  theology,  divine  because  it  bases  itself  primarily  on  the 
works  of  restoration,  on  the  humanity  of  Jesus  and  his  mysteries 
from  the  beginning  of  the  world,  does  not  ignore  the  works  of 
creation  altogether,  however;  it  "adds  natural  considerations 
in  due  measure,  in  order  that  it  may  fashion  instruction  from 
them."169  In  part  these  "natural  considerations"  are  demonstra- 
tions of  the  existence  and  even  the  trinitarian  nature  of  God 
drawn  from  the  immensity,  beauty,  and  utility  of  the  external 
world  as  well  as  from  introspective  examination  of  the  rational 
creature  in  operation.170  In  part,  they  are  the  "natural  arts"  or 
"lower  wisdom" — the  arts  of  the  trivium,  the  quadrivium,  and 
physics — needed  for  the  interpretation  of  Scripture.  For  the 
Sacred  Text  "excels  all  other  writings  in  subtlety  and  profundity, 
not  only  in  its  subject  matter  but  also  in  its  method  of  treatment, 
for  whereas  in  other  writings  words  alone  convey  the  meaning, 
in  it  things  as  well  as  words  are  significant."171  Hence,  the  arts 
of  the  trivium  are  needed  to  illuminate  the  verbal  surface  of  the 
Sacred  Writings  as  of  non-sacred;  while  physics  and  the  arts  of 
the  quadrivium  are  uniquely  needed  to  illuminate  the  meaning 
of  scriptural  things,  which,  allegorically  interpreted  {facta 
mysticd),  lead  to  truth,  tropologically  interpreted  (facienda 
my s tied),  lead  to  virtue.172 

Scripture,  then,  is  the  source  par  excellence,  but  not  the  only 
source,  of  theology;  and  theology  in  turn  is  the  "peak  of 
philosophy  and  the  perfection  of  truth."173  Scripture  is  like- 
wise, though  again  not  exclusively,  the  source  par  excellence  for 
ethics.174  All  the  other  arts,  apart  from  their  intrinsic  value, 
serve  to  explain  Scripture.  Because  Scripture  exists  as  a  distinct 
corpus,  having  its  own  history  and  canon  and  requiring  its  own 
bibliographical  approach,  and  because  it  has  unique  properties 
demanding  specialized  techniques  of  interpretation  and  fitting  it 


for  varied  uses  at  different  points  in  the  spiritual  and  intellectual 
development  of  man,  it  is  given  special  attention  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  Didascalicon. 

The  originality  of  the  Didascalicon  does  not  extend,  then,  to  an 
anticipation  of  the  Thomistic  distinction  between  philosophy 
and  theology,  as  Hugonin,  Mignon,  Marietan,  Manitius,  Kleinz, 
Vernet,  and  others  have  believed.  On  the  contrary,  the  Didas- 
calicon is  true  to  Augustine,  as  to  its  own  time,  in  adhering  to  a 
conception  of  philosophy  as  coterminous  with  all  knowledge 
whatever,  including  revealed  or  scriptural  knowledge,  and  as 
consisting  essentially  in  man's  search  for  reunion  with  the  God 
by  and  for  whom  he  was  made  and  without  whom  he  can  have 
neither  peace  nor  profit  in  any  earthly  pursuit.  It  is  true  to 
Augustine  in  its  independent  rehandling  of  an  Aristotelian 
division  of  knowledge,  grouping  the  arts  into  a  fourfold  remedy 
for  the  needs  of  fallen  man.  It  is  true  to  its  time  as  well,  though 
in  a  different  sense,  by  endeavoring,  as  it  seems,  to  stand  against 
secularist  adaptations  of  learning  everywhere  current,  but 
especially  among  the  Chartrians,  and  by  reclaiming  even  suspect 
cosmological  texts  and  themes  for  its  divinely  oriented  formu- 
lation of  the  intellectual  life.  And  finally,  in  the  very  vigor  of  its 
response  to  the  interests  of  its  time,  in  its  very  willingness  to 
formulate  its  Augustinian  viewpoint  in  terms  currently  vital,  it 
is  led  beyond  the  achievement  of  Augustine,  as  it  is  led  beyond 
that  of  Cassiodorus,  and  cannot  adequately  be  described  as  a 
refurbishment  either  of  the  De  doctrina  christiana  or  thclnstitutiones 
divinarum  et  saecularium  lectionum. 

V.  The  Author  of  the  Didascalicon.  Hugh  is  an  author  who  is, 
as  de  Ghellinck  has  remarked,  "tres  discret  quand  il  parle  de 
lui-meme."175  In  all  his  writings,  only  three  passages  shed  light 
upon  his  origin  and  early  life.  Two  of  these  appear  in  the 
Didascalicon.  The  first,  in  Didascalicon  in.  xix,  occurs  in  con- 
nection with  Hugh's  observation  that  the  perfect  lover  of 
Wisdom  considers  all  the  world  a  place  of  exile.  The  unpracticed 
beginner,  he  remarks,  must  try  little  by  little  to  withdraw  him- 
self from  love  of  the  world.  He  must  separate  himself  first  of  all 
from  those  tender  ties  which  bind  him  to  his  homeland, 
extending  his  love  to  all  lands  equally.   Later  he  can  withdraw 


his  love  even  from  these.  Then  he  adds :  "From  boyhood  I  have 
dwelt  on  foreign  soil,  and  I  know  with  what  grief  the  mind  takes 
leave  of  the  narrow  hearth  of  a  peasant's  hut,  and  I  know  too 
how  frankly  it  afterwards  disdains  marble  firesides  and  panelled 
halls."  Apart  from  the  reference  to  dwelling  abroad  since  early 
life,  the  statement  seems  to  be  largely  rhetorical,  a  tissue  of 
allusions  to  Vergil,  Horace,  Cicero.176  In  the  second  passage,  in 
Didascalicon  vi.  iii,  Hugh  reminisces  on  his  love  of  learning, 
specifically  his  experimental  curiosity  in  the  arts  of  the  trivium 
and  quadrivium,  while  still  a  schoolboy.177  The  third,  which 
comprises  the  dedicatory  epistle  to  the  De  arrha  animae,11*  shows 
a  fondness  for  and  a  familiarity  with  the  brethren  of  the  small 
Augustinian  priory  of  St.  Pancras,  Hamersleben,  which  have  led 
to  the  identification  of  that  far-off  Saxon  house  as  the  scene  of 
Hugh's  early  religious  life  and  his  schoolboy  pursuits. 

To  these  passages  from  Hugh's  works  must  be  added  several 
items  from  the  Victorine  archives.  The  Victorine  necrology  for 
February  n  records  the  "anniversarium  solemne"  of  Master 
Hugh,  "who,  yielding  himself  to  the  service  of  God  in  this  our 
house  from  the  first  flower  of  his  youth,  so  outstandingly  took 
to  himself  the  gifts  given  him  by  the  heavenly  Wisdom  from 
above  that  in  all  the  Latin  Church,  no  man  can  be  found  to 
compare  with  him  in  wisdom."  The  necrology  goes  on  to 
mention  relics  of  the  martyr  St.  Victor  which  Hugh  brought  to 
the  Abbey  from  Marseilles,  having  "sought  them  with  much 
effort  and  begged  them  with  great  difficulty."  For  May  5,  the 
necrology  mentions  Hugh's  uncle,  also  named  Hugh,  whom  it 
identifies  as  "an  archdeacon  of  the  church  of  Halberstadt,  who 
came  to  us  from  Saxony,  following  in  the  footsteps  of  Master 
Hugh,  his  nephew."  It  observes  that  he  "enriched  our 
establishment  magnificently  with  gold,  silver,  precious  vest- 
ments, carpets,  draperies,  and  other  furnishings  from  his  own 
goods"  and  that  he  supplied  funds  for  the  building  of  the 
Abbey  church.  For  June  17,  the  day  on  which  the  Abbey 
celebrated  the  feast  of  its  reception  of  the  relics  of  St.  Victor,  the 
necrology  and  ordo  prescribe  that  mass  be  celebrated  for  the 
soul  of  Hugh,  their  donor.  Adam  of  St.  Victor's  twelfth- 
century  sequence  for  this  feast  likewise  records  the  story  of  the 
relics  having  been  brought  from  Marseilles. 


These  records,  plus  a  variety  of  references  to  Hugh  in 
chronicles  from  the  region  of  Halberstadt,  lie  at  the  basis  of  the 
account  of  Hugh's  life  which  the  Victorines  prefixed  to  the 
Rouen,  1648,  edition  of  Hugh's  works  and  of  the  comparably 
circumstantial  version  of  his  life  found  in  the  mid-sixteenth- 
century  Halberst'ddter  Bischofschronik  of  Johann  Winnigstedt.  If 
the  complementary  data  of  these  two  accounts  are  combined, 
the  following  story  emerges :  Hugh  was  born  a  lord  of  Blanken- 
burg  in  the  diocese  of  Halberstadt  toward  the  end  of  the 
eleventh  century.  His  parents  sent  him  to  the  newly  founded 
Augustinian  house  of  St.  Pancras,  Hamersleben,  in  the  same 
diocese,  to  learn  letters.  There,  captivated  by  love  of  learning, 
he  chose  to  become  a  novice,  despite  the  unwillingness  of  his 
parents.  His  uncle,  Reinhard,  was  bishop  of  Halberstadt.  When 
he  was  eighteen  years  of  age,  Bishop  Reinhard,  his  diocese  about 
to  be  devastated  by  the  Emperor  Henry  V,  sent  Hugh  to  Paris 
accompanied  by  his  uncle  and  namesake,  the  Archdeacon  Hugh. 
The  two  Hughs  traveled  first  to  Marseilles,  where  they  obtained 
relics  of  St.  Victor  from  the  monastery  of  that  name.  Sub- 
sequently, they  went  to  Paris,  where,  on  June  17  in  approxi- 
mately the  year  1 1 1 5 ,  they  offered  both  the  relics  and  their  vows 
to  Gilduin,  first  abbot  of  the  Paris  Abbey  of  St.  Victor.  When, 
after  a  time,  Hugh  had  confirmed  his  vows,  he  was  placed  in 
charge  of  studies  in  the  trivium  and  quadrivium,  and  finally 
made  master  of  the  school.  After  twenty-five  years  of  life  at  the 
Abbey,  he  died  on  February  11,  11 40  or  1141.  An  eye-witness 
account  of  his  death,  written  by  the  infirmarian  Osbert,  is 

Belief  in  this  story  of  Hugh's  life  is  not  universal,  but  for 
reasons  set  forth  in  detail  elsewhere,  it  seems  to  the  present 
writer  to  be  dependable  in  main  outline.180  Significant  is  Hugh's 
early  contact  with  the  canonical  movement,  which  sought  to 
make  available  to  men  living  in  the  world  the  life  of  primitive 
Christian  perfection — the  vita  apostolica  et  canonica  primitivae 
ecclesiae — formerly  confined  to  the  monasteries.181  To  this  aim 
of  the  canonical  movement  in  general  may  perhaps  be  traced 
Hugh's  interest  in  a  view  of  "philosophy,"  that  is,  of  education 
and  life,  which  is  directed  to  all  men;  to  it  may  also  be  traced,  in 
part,  his  desire  to  incorporate  the  mechanical  arts,  beginning  to 


flourish  in  the  rising  centers  of  urban  life,  into  "philosophy"  so 
conceived.  Apart  from  this,  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  influence 
the  facts  of  his  life,  meager  as  we  know  them,  exercised  upon 
his  work. 


On  the  Study  of  Reading 
by  Hugh  of  Saint  Victor 


There  are  many  persons  whose  nature  has  left  them  so  poor  in 
ability  that  they  can  hardly  grasp  with  their  intellect  even  easy 
things,  and  of  these  persons  I  believe  there  are  two  kinds.  There 
are  those  who,  while  they  are  not  unaware  of  their  own  dullness, 
nonetheless  struggle  after  knowledge  with  all  the  effort  they  can 
put  forth  and  who,  by  tirelessly  keeping  up  their  pursuit, 
deserve  to  obtain  as  a  result  of  their  will  power  what  they  by  no 
means  possess  as  a  result  of  their  work.  Others,  however, 
because  they  know  that  they  are  in  no  way  able  to  compass  the 
highest  things,  neglect  even  the  least,  and,  as  it  were,  carelessly 
at  rest  in  their  own  sluggishness,  they  all  the  more  lose  the  light 
of  truth  in  the  greatest  matters  for  their  refusal  to  learn  those 
smallest  of  which  they  are  capable.  It  is  of  such  that  the 
Psalmist  declares,  "They  were  unwilling  to  understand  how  they 
might  do  well."1  Not  knowing  and  not  wishing  to  know  are 
far  different  things.  Not  knowing,  to  be  sure,  springs  from 
weakness;  but  contempt  of  knowledge  springs  from  a  wicked 

There  is  another  sort  of  man  whom  nature  has  enriched  with 
the  full  measure  of  ability  and  to  whom  she  shows  an  easy  way 
to  come  at  truth.  Among  these,  even  granting  inequality  in  the 
strength  of  their  ability,  there  is  nevertheless  not  the  same  virtue 
or  will  in  all  for  the  cultivation  of  their  natural  sense  through 
practice  and  learning.  Many  of  this  sort,  caught  up  in  the 
affairs  and  cares  of  this  world  beyond  what  is  needful  or  given 
over  to  the  vices  and  sensual  indulgences  of  the  body,  bury  the 
talent  of  God  in  earth,2  seeking  from  it  neither  the  fruit  of 
wisdom  nor  the  profit  of  good  work.  These,  assuredly,  are 
completely  detestable.  Again,  for  others  of  them,  lack  of  family 
wealth  and  a  slender  income  decrease  the  opportunity  of 
learning.    Yet,  we  decidedly  do  not  believe  that  these  can  be 


altogether  excused  by  this  circumstance,  since  we  see  many 
laboring  in  hunger,  thirst,  and  nakedness  attain  to  the  fruit  of 
knowledge.  And  still  it  is  one  thing  when  one  is  not  able,  or  to 
speak  more  truly,  when  one  is  not  easily  able  to  learn,  and 
another  when  one  is  able  but  unwilling  to  learn.  Just  as  it  is 
more  glorious  to  lay  hold  upon  wisdom  by  sheer  exertion,  even 
though  no  resources  support  one,  so,  to  be  sure,  it  is  more 
loathsome  to  enjoy  natural  ability  and  to  have  plenty  of  wealth, 
yet  to  grow  dull  in  idleness.3 

The  things  by  which  every  man  advances  in  knowledge  are 
principally  two — namely,  reading  and  meditation.  Of  these, 
reading  holds  first  place  in  instruction,  and  it  is  of  reading  that 
this  book  treats,  setting  forth  rules  for  it.  For  there  are  three 
things  particularly  necessary  to  learn  for  reading:  first,  each 
man  should  know  what  he  ought  to  read;  second,  in  what  order 
he  ought  to  read,  that  is,  what  first  and  what  afterwards;  and 
third,  in  what  manner  he  ought  to  read.  These  three  points  are 
handled  one  by  one  in  this  book.  The  book,  moreover,  instructs 
the  reader  as  well  of  secular  writings  as  of  the  Divine  Writings. 
Therefore,  it  is  divided  into  two  parts,4  each  of  which  contains 
three  subdivisions.  In  the  first  part,  it  instructs  the  reader  of  the 
arts,  in  the  second,  the  reader  of  the  Sacred  Scripture.  It 
instructs,  moreover,  in  this  way :  it  shows  first  what  ought  to  be 
read,  and  next  in  what  order  and  in  what  manner  it  ought  to  be 
read.  But  in  order  to  make  known  what  ought  to  be  read,  or 
what  ought  especially  to  be  read,  in  the  first  part  it  first  of  all 
enumerates  the  origin  of  all  the  arts,  and  then  their  description 
and  division,  that  is,  how  each  art  either  contains  some  other  or 
is  contained  by  some  other,  thus  dividing  up  philosophy  from 
the  peak  down  to  the  lowest  members.  Then  it  enumerates  the 
authors  of  the  arts  and  afterwards  makes  clear  which  of  these 
arts  ought  principally  to  be  read;  then,  likewise,  it  reveals  in 
what  order  and  in  what  manner.  Finally,  it  lays  down  for  students 
their  discipline  of  life,  and  thus  the  first  part  concludes. 

In  the  second  part  it  determines  what  writings  ought  to  be 
called  divine,  and  next,  the  number  and  order  of  the  Divine 
Books,  and  their  authors,  and  the  interpretations  of  the  names  of 
these  Books.  It  then  treats  certain  characteristics  of  Divine 
Scripture  which  are  very  important.  Then  it  shows  how  Sacred 


Scripture  ought  to  be  read  by  the  man  who  seeks  in  it  the 
correction  of  his  morals  and  a  form  of  living.  Finally,  it  instructs 
the  man  who  reads  in  it  for  love  of  knowledge,  and  thus  the 
second  part  too  comes  to  a  close. 


Chapter  One :  Concerning  the  Origin  of  the  Arts 

Of  all  things  to  be  sought,  the  first  is  that  Wisdom  in  which 
the  Form  of  the  Perfect  Good  stands  fixed.1  Wisdom  illumi- 
nates man  so  that  he  may  recognize  himself;2  for  man  was  like 
all  the  other  animals  when  he  did  not  understand  that  he  had 
been  created  of  a  higher  order  than  they.3  But  his  immortal 
mind,  illuminated  by  Wisdom,  beholds  its  own  principle  and 
recognizes  how  unfitting  it  is  for  it  to  seek  anything  outside 
itself  when  what  it  is  in  itself  can  be  enough  for  it.  It  is  written 
on  the  tripod  of  Apollo:  yv£>6i  oeaurov,  that  is,  "Know  thy- 
self,"4 for  surely,  if  man  had  not  forgotten  his  origin,  he  would 
recognize  that  everything  subject  to  change  is  nothing.5 

An  opinion  approved  among  philosophers  maintains  that  the 
soul  is  put  together  out  of  all  the  parts  of  nature.  And  Plato's 
Timaeus6  formed  the  entelechy7  out  of  substance  which  is 
"dividual"  and  "individual"  and  mixed  of  these  two;  and  like- 
wise out  of  nature  which  is  "same"  and  "diverse"  and  a  mixture 
of  this  pair,  by  which  the  universe  is  defined.8  For  the  entelechy 
grasps  "not  only  the  elements  but  all  things  that  are  made  from 
them,"9  since,  through  its  understanding,  it  comprehends  the 
invisible  causes  of  things  and,  through  sense  impressions,  picks 
up  the  visible  forms  of  actual  objects.  "Divided,  it  gathers 
movement  into  twin  spheres"10  because,  whether  it  goes  out  to 
sensible  things  through  its  senses  or  ascends  to  invisible  things 
through  its  understanding,  it  circles  about,  drawing  to  itself  the 
likenesses  of  things ;  and  thus  it  is  that  one  and  the  same  mind, 
having  the  capacity  for  all  things,  is  fitted  together  out  of  every 
substance  and  nature  by  the  fact  that  it  represents  within  itself 
their  imaged  likeness. 

Now,  it  was  a  Pythagorean  teaching  that  similars  are  com- 
prehended by  similars:  so  that,  in  a  word,  the  rational  soul 


could  by  no  means  comprehend  all  things  unless  it  were  also 
composed  of  all  of  them;  or,  as  a  certain  writer  puts  it: 

Earth  we  grasp  with  the  earthly,  fire  with  flame, 
Liquid  with  moisture,  air  with  our  breath.11 

But  we  ought  not  to  suppose  that  men  most  familiar  with  all 
the  natures  of  things  thought  that  simple  essence  was  in  any  way 
distended  in  quantitative  parts.12  Rather,  in  order  to  demon- 
strate the  soul's  marvelous  power  more  clearly  did  they  declare 
that  it  consists  of  all  natures,  "not  as  being  physically  composed 
of  them,  but  as  having  an  analogous  type  of  composition."13 
For  it  is  not  to  be  thought  that  this  similitude  to  all  things  comes 
into  the  soul  from  elsewhere,  or  from  without;  on  the  contrary, 
the  soul  grasps  the  similitude  in  and  of  itself,  out  of  a  certain 
native  capacity  and  proper  power  of  its  own.  As  Varro  says  in 
the  Periphysion  :14  Not  all  change  comes  upon  things  from  with- 
out and  in  such  a  way  that  whatever  changes  necessarily  either 
loses  something  it  had  or  gains  from  the  outside  some  other  and 
different  thing  which  it  did  not  have  before.  We  see  how  a  wall 
receives  a  likeness  when  the  form  of  some  image  or  other  is  put 
upon  it  from  the  outside.  But  when  a  coiner  imprints  a  figure 
upon  metal,  the  metal,  which  itself  is  one  thing,  begins  to  repre- 
sent a  different  thing,  not  just  on  the  outside,  but  from  its  own 
power  and  its  natural  aptitude  to  do  so.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the 
mind,  imprinted  with  the  likenesses  of  all  things,  is  said  to  be  all 
things  and  to  receive  its  composition  from  all  things  and  to 
contain  them  not  as  actual  components,  or  formally,  but  virtu- 
ally and  potentially.15 

This,  then,  is  that  dignity  of  our  nature  which  all  naturally 
possess  in  equal  measure,16  but  which  all  do  not  equally  under- 
stand. For  the  mind,  stupefied  by  bodily  sensations  and  enticed 
out  of  itself  by  sensuous  forms,  has  forgotten  what  it  was,  and, 
because  it  does  not  remember  that  it  was  anything  different, 
believes  that  it  is  nothing  except  what  is  seen.  But  we  are 
restored  through  instruction,  so  that  we  may  recognize  our 
nature  and  learn  not  to  seek  outside  ourselves  what  we  can  find 
within.  "The  highest  curative  in  life,"17  therefore,  is  the  pursuit 
of  Wisdom:  he  who  finds  it  is  happy,  and  he  who  possesses  it, 


Chapter  Two :  That  Philosophy  is  the  Pursuit  of  Wisdom 

"Pythagoras  was  the  first  to  call  the  pursuit  of  Wisdom 
philosophy"19  and  to  prefer  to  be  czlledphilosophos :  for  previous- 
ly philosophers  had  been  called  sophoi,  that  is,  wise  men.  Fitly 
indeed  did  he  call  the  seekers  of  truth  not  wise  men  but  lovers  of 
Wisdom,  for  certainly  the  whole  truth  lies  so  deeply  hidden  that 
the  mind,  however  much  it  may  ardently  yearn  toward  it  or 
however  much  it  may  struggle  to  acquire  it,  can  nonetheless 
comprehend  only  with  difficulty  the  truth  as  it  is.  Pythagoras, 
however,  established  philosophy  as  the  discipline  "of  those 
things  which  truly  exist  and  are  of  themselves  endowed  with 
unchangeable  substance."20 

"Philosophy,  then,  is  the  love  and  pursuit  of  Wisdom,  and, 
in  a  certain  way,  a  friendship  with  it:  not,  however,  of  that 
'wisdom'  which  is  concerned  with  certain  tools  and  with  knowl- 
edge and  skill  in  some  craft,  but  of  that  Wisdom  which,  wanting 
in  nothing,  is  a  living  Mind  and  the  sole  primordial  Idea  or 
Pattern  of  things.  This  love  of  Wisdom,  moreover,  is  an  illumi- 
nation of  the  apprehending  mind  by  that  pure  Wisdom  and,  in 
a  certain  way,  a  drawing  and  a  calling  back  to  Itself  of  man's 
mind,  so  that  the  pursuit  of  Wisdom  appears  like  friendship 
with  that  Divinity  and  pure  Mind.  This  Wisdom  bestows  upon 
every  manner  of  souls  the  benefit  of  its  own  divinity,  and  brings 
them  back  to  the  proper  force  and  purity  of  their  nature.  From 
it  are  born  truth  of  speculation  and  of  thought  and  holy  and 
pure  chastity  of  action."21 

"But  since  this  most  excellent  good  of  philosophy  has  been 
prepared  for  human  souls,  we  must  begin  with  those  very 
powers  of  the  soul,  so  that  our  exposition  may  follow  an  orderly 
line  of  progression."22 

Chapter  Three :  Concerning  the  Threefold  Power  of  the  Soul,,  and  the 
Fact  that  Man  Alone  is  Endowed  with  Reason 

"Altogether,  the  power  of  the  soul  in  vivifying  bodies  is 
discovered  to  be  of  three  kinds :  one  kind  supplies  life  to  the 
body  alone  in  order  that,  on  being  born,  the  body  may  grow 
and,  by  being  nourished,  may  remain  in  existence;  another 


provides  the  judgment  of  sense  perception;  a  third  rests  upon 
the  power  of  mind  and  reason. 

"Of  the  first,  the  function  is  to  attend  to  the  forming,  nour- 
ishing, and  sustaining  of  bodies;  its  function  is  not,  how- 
ever, to  bestow  upon  them  the  judgment  either  of  sense 
perception  or  of  reason.  It  is  the  vivifying  force  seen  at  work  in 
grasses  and  trees  and  whatever  is  rooted  firmly  in  the  earth. 

"The  second  is  a  composite  and  conjoint  power  which  sub- 
sumes the  first  and  makes  it  part  of  itself,  and  which  exercises 
judgment  of  several  different  kinds  upon  such  objects  as  it  can 
compass;  for  every  animal  endowed  with  sense  perception  is 
likewise  born,  nourished,  and  sustained;  but  the  senses  it 
possesses  are  diverse  and  are  found  up  to  five  in  number.  Thus, 
whatever  receives  nutriment  only,  does  not  also  have  sense 
perception ;  but  whatever  has  sense  perception  does  also  receive 
nutriment,  and  this  fact  proves  that  to  such  a  being  the  first 
vivifying  power  of  the  soul,  that  of  conferring  birth  and 
nourishment,  also  belongs.  Moreover,  such  beings  as  possess 
sense  perception  not  only  apprehend  the  forms  of  things  that 
affect  them  while  the  sensible  body  is  present,  but  even  after  the 
sense  perception  has  ceased  and  the  sensible  objects  are  removed, 
they  retain  images  of  the  sense-perceived  forms  and  build  up 
memory  of  them.  Each  animal  retains  these  images  more  or  less 
enduringly,  according  to  its  ability.  However,  they  possess  them 
in  a  confused  and  unclear  manner,  so  that  they  can  achieve 
nothing  from  joining  or  combining  them,  and,  while  they  are 
therefore  able  to  remember  them  all,  they  cannot  do  so  with 
equal  distinctness;  and,  having  once  forgotten  them,  they  are 
unable  to  recollect  or  re-evoke  them.  As  to  the  future,  they  have 
no  knowledge  of  it. 

"But  the  third  power  of  the  soul  appropriates  the  prior 
nutritional  and  sense-perceiving  powers,  using  them,  so  to 
speak,  as  its  domestics  and  servants.  It  is  rooted  entirely  in  the 
reason,  and  it  exercises  itself  either  in  the  most  unfaltering  grasp 
of  things  present,  or  in  the  understanding  of  things  absent,  or 
in  the  investigation  of  things  unknown.  This  power  belongs  to 
humankind  alone.  It  not  only  takes  in  sense  impressions  and 
images  which  are  perfect  and  well  founded,  but,  by  a  complete 
act  of  the  understanding,  it  explains  and  confirms  what  imagi- 


nation2 3  has  only  suggested.  And,  as  has  been  said,  this  divine 
nature  is  not  content  with  the  knowledge  of  those  things  alone 
which  it  perceives  spread  before  its  senses,  but,  in  addition,  it  is 
able  to  provide  even  for  things  removed  from  it  names  which 
imagination  has  conceived  from  the  sensible  world,  and  it  makes 
known,  by  arrangements  of  words,  what  it  has  grasped  by 
reason  of  its  understanding.  For  it  belongs  to  this  nature,  too, 
that  by  things  already  known  to  it,  it  should  seek  after  things 
not  known,  and  it  requires  to  know  of  each  thing  not  only 
whether  it  exists,  but  of  what  nature  it  is,  and  of  what  properties, 
and  even  for  what  purpose. 

"To  repeat,  this  threefold  power  of  soul  is  the  exclusive 
endowment  of  human  nature,  whose  power  of  soul  is  not 
lacking  in  the  movements  of  understanding.  By  this  power  it 
exercises  its  faculty  of  reason  properly  upon  the  following  four 
heads:  either  it  inquires  whether  a  thing  exists,  or,  if  it  has 
established  that  it  does,  it  searches  out  the  thing's  nature;  but 
if  it  possesses  reasoned  knowledge  of  both  these  things,  it 
investigates  the  properties  of  each  object,  and  sifts  the  total 
import  of  all  other  accidents ;  and  knowing  all  these  things,  it 
nevertheless  further  inquires  and  searches  rationally  why  the 
object  exists  as  it  does. 

"While  the  mind  of  man,  then,  so  acts  that  it  is  always  con- 
cerned with  the  apprehension  of  things  before  it  or  the  under- 
standing of  things  not  present  to  it  or  the  investigation  and 
discovery  of  things  unknown,  there  are  two  matters  upon  which 
the  power  of  the  reasoning  soul  spends  every  effort :  one  is  that 
it  may  know  the  natures  of  things  by  the  method  of  inquiry; 
but  the  other  is  that  there  may  first  come  to  its  knowledge  those 
things  which  moral  earnestness  will  thereafter  transform  into 

Chapter  Four:  What  Matters  Pertain  to  Philosophy 

But,  as  I  perceive,  the  very  course  of  our  discussion  has 
already  led  us  into  "a  trap  from  which  there  is  no  escape."25 
However,  it  is  not  involved  words  but  an  obscure  subject 
matter  that  gives  rise  to  our  difficulty.26  Because  we  have  under- 
taken to  speak  of  the  pursuit  of  Wisdom,  and  have  affirmed 


that  this  pursuit  belongs  to  men  alone  by  a  distinct  prerogative 
of  their  nature,  we  must  consequently  seem  committed  now  to 
the  position  that  Wisdom  is  a  kind  of  moderator  over  all  human 
actions.  For  while  the  nature  of  brute  animals,  governed  by  no 
rational  judgment,  produces  movements  guided  only  by  sense 
impressions  and  in  pursuing  or  fleeing  anything  uses  no  dis- 
cretion born  of  understanding  but  is  driven  by  a  certain  blind 
inclination  of  the  flesh :  it  remains  true  that  the  actions  of  the 
rational  soul  are  not  swept  away  by  blind  impulse  but  are  always 
preceded  by  Wisdom  as  their  guide.  If  this  is  settled  as  true, 
then  we  shall  say  that  not  only  such  studies  as  are  concerned 
with  the  nature  of  things  or  the  regulation  of  morals  but  also 
those  concerned  with  the  theoretical  consideration  of  all  human 
acts  and  pursuits  belong  with  equal  fitness  to  philosophy. 
Following  this  view,  we  can  define  philosophy  thus :  Philosophy 
is  the  discipline  which  investigates  comprehensively  the  ideas  of 
all  things,  human  and  divine.27 

And  yet  we  ought  not  to  retract  what  we  said  at  the  outset, 
namely,  that  philosophy  is  the  love  and  the  pursuit  of  Wisdom, 
not,  however,  of  that  "wisdom"  which  is  deployed  with  tools, 
like  building  and  farming  and  other  activities  of  this  kind,  but 
of  that  Wisdom  which  is  the  sole  primordial  Idea  or  Pattern  of 
things.  For  the  same  action  is  able  to  belong  to  philosophy  as 
concerns  its  ideas  and  to  be  excluded  from  it  as  concerns  its 
actual  performance.  For  example,  to  speak  in  terms  of  instances 
already  before  us,  the  theory  of  agriculture  belongs  to  the 
philosopher,  but  the  execution  of  it  to  the  farmer.  Moreover, 
the  products  of  artificers,  while  not  nature,  imitate  nature,28  and, 
in  the  design  by  which  they  imitate,  they  express  the  form  of 
their  exemplar,  which  is  nature. 

You  see,  then,  for  what  reason  we  are  compelled  to  extend 
philosophy  to  all  the  actions  of  men,  so  that  necessarily  the  parts 
of  philosophy  are  equal  in  number  to  the  different  types  of  those 
things  over  which  its  extension  has  now  been  established.29 

Chapter  Five :  Concerning  the  Rise30  of  the  Theoretical,  the  Practical, 
and  the  Mechanical 

Of  all  human  acts  or  pursuits,  then,  governed  as  these  are  by 
Wisdom,  the  end  and  the  intention  ought  to  regard  either  the 


restoring  of  our  nature's  integrity,  or  the  relieving  of  those 
weaknesses  to  which  our  present  life  lies  subject.  What  I  have 
just  said,  let  me  more  fully  explain. 

In  man  are  two  things — the  good  and  the  evil,  his  nature  and 
the  defective  state  of  his  nature.  The  good,  because  it  is  his 
nature,  because  it  has  suffered  corruption,  because  it  has  been 
lessened,  requires  to  be  restored  by  active  effort.  The  evil, 
because  it  constitutes  a  deficiency,  because  it  constitutes  a 
corruption,  because  it  is  not  our  nature,  requires  to  be  removed, 
or,  if  not  able  to  be  removed  completely,  then  at  least  to  be 
alleviated  through  the  application  of  a  remedy.  This  is  our 
entire  task — the  restoration  of  our  nature  and  the  removal  of 
our  deficiency. 

The  integrity  of  human  nature,  however,  is  attained  in  two 
things — in  knowledge  and  in  virtue,  and  in  these  lies  our  sole 
likeness  to  the  supernal  and  divine  substances.31  For  man,  since 
he  is  not  simple  in  nature  but  is  composed  of  a  twofold  substance, 
is  immortal  in  that  part  of  himself  which  is  the  more  important 
part — that  part  which,  to  state  the  case  more  clearly,  he  in  fact 
is*2  In  his  other  part,  however — that  part  which  is  transitory 
and  which  is  all  that  has  been  recognized  by  those  too  ignorant 
to  give  credit  to  anything  but  their  senses33 — he  is  subject  to 
death  and  to  change.  In  this  part  man  must  die  as  often  as  he 
loses  concrete  substantiality.  This  part  is  of  that  lowest  category 
of  things,  things  having  both  beginning  and  end. 

Chapter  Six:  Concerning  the  Three  "Manners"  of  Things** 

Among  things  there  are  some  which  have  neither  beginning 
nor  end,  and  these  are  named  eternal;  there  are  others  which 
have  a  beginning  but  are  terminated  by  no  end,  and  these  are 
called  perpetual;  and  there  are  yet  others  which  have  both 
beginning  and  end,  and  these  are  temporal.35 

In  the  first  category  we  place  that  in  which  the  very  being 
(esse)  and  "that  which  is"  (id  quod  est)  are  not  separate,  that  is,  in 
which  cause  and  effect  are  not  different  from  one  another,36  and 
which  draws  its  subsistence  not  from  a  principle  distinct  from 
it  but  from  its  very  self.  Such  alone  is  the  Begetter  and  Artificer 
of  nature. 


But  that  type  of  thing  in  which  the  very  being  (esse)  and  "that 
which  is"  {id  quod  est)  are  separate,  that  is,  which  has  come  into 
being  from  a  principle  distinct  from  it,37  and  which,  in  order 
that  it  might  begin  to  be,  flowed  into  actuality  out  of  a  preceding 
cause — this  type  of  being,  I  say,  is  nature,  which  includes  the 
whole  world,  and  it  is  divided  into  two  parts:38  it  is  that  certain 
being  which,  in  acquiring  existence  from  its  primordial  causes,39 
came  forth  into  actuality  not  as  moved  thereto  by  anything  it- 
self in  motion,  but  solely  by  the  decision  of  the  divine  will,40 
and,  once  in  existence,  stood41  immutable,  free  from  all  de- 
struction or  change  (of  this  type  are  the  substances  of  things, 
called  by  the  Greeks  ousiai)42  and  it  is  all  the  bodies  of  the  super- 
lunary world,  which,  from  their  knowing  no  change,  have  also 
been  called  divine.43 

The  third  type  of  things  consists  of  those  which  have  both 
beginning  and  end  and  which  come  into  being  not  of  their  own 
power  but  as  works  of  nature.  These  come  to  be  upon  the  earth, 
in  the  sublunary  world,  by  the  movement  of  an  artifacting  fire 
which  descends  with  a  certain  power  to  beget  all  sensible 

Now,  of  the  second  sort  it  is  said,  "Nothing  in  the  world 
perishes,"45  for  no  essence  suffers  destruction.46  Not  the 
essences  but  the  forms  of  things  pass  away.47  When  the  form  is 
said  to  pass  away,  this  is  to  be  understood  as  meaning  not  that 
some  existing  thing  is  believed  to  have  perished  altogether  and 
lost  its  being,  but  rather  that  it  has  undergone  change,  perhaps 
in  one  of  the  following  ways:  that  things  once  joined  are  now 
apart,  or  once  apart  are  now  joined;  or  that  things  once  standing 
here  now  move  there;  or  that  things  which  now  are  only 
"have-beens"  once  subsisted;  in  all  these  instances  the  being  of 
the  things  suffers  no  loss.  Of  the  third  sort  it  is  said,  "All  things 
which  have  arisen  fall,  and  all  which  have  grown  decline":48 
for  all  the  works  of  nature,  as  they  have  a  beginning,  so  have 
they  an  end.  Of  the  second  sort,  again,  it  is  said,  "Nothing 
comes  from  nothing,  and  into  nothingness  can  nothing  revert,"49 
from  the  fact  that  all  of  nature  has  both  a  primordial  cause  and  a 
perpetual  subsistence.  And  of  the  third  sort,  once  more,  "That 
which  before  was  nothing  returns  again  thereto"  :50  for  just  as 
every  work  of  nature  flows  temporarily  into  actuality  out  of  its 


hidden  cause,  so  when  its  actuality  has  temporarily  been 
destroyed,  that  work  will  return  again  to  the  place  from  which 
it  came. 

Chapter  Seven :  Concerning  the  Superlunary  and  Sublunary  World 

Because  of  these  facts,51  astronomers  {tnathematici)  have 
divided  the  world  into  two  parts:  into  that,  namely,  which 
stretches  above  the  sphere  of  the  moon  and  that  which  lies 
below  it.52  The  superlunary  world,  because  in  it  all  things 
stand  fixed  by  primordial  law,  they  called  "nature,"53  while  the 
sublunary  world  they  called  "the  work  of  nature,"54  that  is,  the 
work  of  the  superior  world,  because  the  varieties  of  all  animate 
beings  which  live  below  by  the  infusion  of  life-giving  spirit, 
take  their  infused  nutriment  through  invisible  emanations  from 
above,  not  only  that  by  being  born  they  may  grow  but 
also  that  by  being  nourished  they  may  continue  in  existence. 
Likewise  they  called  that  superior  world  "time"  because  of  the 
course  and  movement  of  the  heavenly  bodies  in  it,  and  the 
inferior  world  they  called  "temporal"  because  it  is  moved  in 
accordance  with  the  movements  of  the  superior.55  Again,  the 
superlunary,  from  the  perpetual  tranquility  of  its  light  and 
stillness,  they  called  elysium,  while  the  sublunary,  from  the 
instability  and  confusion  of  things  in  flux,  they  called  the  under- 
world or  infemum.56 

Into  these  things  we  have  digressed  somewhat  more  broadly 
in  order  to  explain  how  man,  in  that  part  in  which  he  partakes  of 
change,  is  likewise  subject  to  necessity,  whereas  in  that  in  which 
he  is  immortal,  he  is  related  to  divinity.  From  this  it  can  be 
inferred,  as  said  above,  that  the  intention  of  all  human  actions  is 
resolved  in  a  common  objective:  either  to  restore  in  us  the 
likeness  of  the  divine  image  or  to  take  thought  for  the  necessity 
of  this  life,  which,  the  more  easily  it  can  suffer  harm  from  those 
things  which  work  to  its  disadvantage,  the  more  does  it  require 
to  be  cherished  and  conserved. 

Chapter  Bight:  In  What  Man  Is  like  unto  God 

Now  there  are  two  things  which  restore  the  divine  likeness  in 
man,  namely  the  contemplation  of  truth  and  the  practice  of 


virtue.  For  man  resembles  God  in  being  wise  and  just — though, 
to  be  sure,  man  is  but  changeably  so  while  God  stands  change- 
lessly  both  wise  and  just.  Of  those  actions  which  minister  to  the 
necessity  of  this  life,  there  are  three  types :  first,  those  which 
take  care  of  the  feeding  of  nature ;  second,  those  which  fortify 
against  harms  which  might  possibly  come  from  without;  and 
third,  those  which  provide  remedy  for  harms  already  besieging 
us.  When,  moreover,  we  strive  after  the  restoration  of  our 
nature,  we  perform  a  divine  action,  but  when  we  provide  the 
necessaries  required  by  our  infirm  part,  a  human  action.  Every 
action,  thus,  is  either  divine  or  human.  The  former  type,  since 
it  derives  from  above,  we  may  not  unfittingly  call  "under- 
standing" {intelligentid);  the  latter,  since  it  derives  from  below 
and  requires,  as  it  were,  a  certain  practical  counsel,  "knowledge" 

If,  therefore,  Wisdom,  as  declared  above,  is  moderator  over 
all  that  we  do  deliberately,  we  must  consequently  admit  that  it 
contains  two  parts,  understanding  and  knowledge.  Under- 
standing, again,  inasmuch  as  it  works  both  for  the  investigation 
of  truth  and  the  delineation  of  morals,  we  divide  into  two 
kinds — into  theoretical,  that  is  to  say  speculative,  and  practical, 
that  is  to  say  active.  The  latter  is  also  called  ethical,  or  moral. 
Knowledge,  however,  since  it  pursues  merely  human  works,  is 
fitly  called  "mechanical,"  that  is  to  say  adulterate.58 

Chapter  Nine :  Concerning  the  Three  Works 

"Now  there  are  three  works — the  work  of  God,  the  work  of 
nature,  and  the  work  of  the  artificer,  who  imitates  nature."59 
The  work  of  God  is  to  create  that  which  was  not,  whence  we 
read,  "In  the  beginning  God  created  heaven  and  earth";60  the 
work  of  nature  is  to  bring  forth  into  actuality  that  which  lay 
hidden,  whence  we  read,  "Let  the  earth  bring  forth  the  green 
herb,"61  etc.;  the  work  of  the  artificer  is  to  put  together  things 
disjoined  or  to  disjoin  those  put  together,  whence  we  read, 
"They  sewed  themselves  aprons."62  For  the  earth  cannot  create 
the  heaven,  nor  can  man,  who  is  powerless  to  add  a  mere  span 
to  his  stature,63  bring  forth  the  green  herb. 

Among  these  works,  the  human  work,  because  it  is  not 


nature  but  only  imitative  of  nature,  is  fitly  called  mechanical, 
that  is  adulterate,  just  as  a  skeleton  key  is  called  a  "mechanical" 
key.64  How  the  work  of  the  artificer  in  each  case  imitates  nature 
is  a  long  and  difficult  matter  to  pursue  in  detail.  For  illustration, 
however,  we  can  show  the  matter  briefly  as  follows:  The 
founder  who  casts  a  statue  has  gazed  upon  man  as  his  model. 
The  builder  who  has  constructed  a  house  has  taken  into  con- 
sideration a  mountain,  for,  as  the  Prophet  declares,  "Thou 
sendest  forth  springs  in  the  vales ;  between  the  midst  of  the  hills 
the  waters  shall  pass";65  as  the  ridges  of  mountains  retain  no 
water,  even  so  does  a  house  require  to  be  framed  into  a  high 
peak  that  it  may  safely  discharge  the  weight  of  pouring  rains. 
He  who  first  invented  the  use  of  clothes  had  considered  how 
each  of  the  growing  things  one  by  one  has  its  proper  covering 
by  which  to  protect  its  nature  from  offense.  Bark  encircles  the 
tree,  feathers  cover  the  bird,  scales  encase  the  fish,  fleece 
clothes  the  sheep,  hair  garbs  cattle  and  wild  beasts,  a  shell 
protects  the  tortoise,  and  ivory  makes  the  elephant  unafraid  of 
spears.  But  it  is  not  without  reason  that  while  each  living  thing 
is  born  equipped  with  its  own  natural  armor,  man  alone  is 
brought  forth  naked  and  unarmed.66  For  it  is  fitting  that  nature 
should  provide  a  plan  for  those  beings  which  do  not  know  how 
to  care  for  themselves,  but  that  from  nature's  example,  a  better 
chance  for  trying  things  should  be  provided  to  man  when  he 
comes  to  devise  for  himself  by  his  own  reasoning  those  things 
naturally  given  to  all  other  animals.  Indeed,  man's  reason  shines 
forth  much  more  brilliantly  in  inventing  these  very  things  than 
ever  it  would  have  had  man  naturally  possessed  them.  Nor  is  it 
without  cause  that  the  proverb  says:  "Ingenious  want  hath 
mothered  all  the  arts."  Want  it  is  which  has  devised  all  that  you 
see  most  excellent  in  the  occupations  of  men.  From  this  the 
infinite  varieties  of  painting,  weaving,  carving,  and  founding 
have  arisen,  so  that  we  look  with  wonder  not  at  nature  alone  but 
at  the  artificer  as  well. 

Chapter  Ten:  What  "Nature"  Is 

But  since  we  have  already  spoken  so  many  times  of  "nature,' ' 
it  seems  that  the  meaning  of  this  word  ought  not  to  be  passed 


over  in  complete  silence,  even  though  as  Tully  says,  "'Nature' 
is  difficult  to  define."67  Nor,  because  we  are  unable  to  say  of  it 
all  we  might  wish,  ought  we  to  maintain  silence  about  what  we 
can  say. 

Men  of  former  times,  we  find,  have  said  a  great  deal  concerning 
"nature,"  but  nothing  so  complete  that  no  more  should  seem  to 
remain  to  be  said.  So  far  as  I  am  able  to  conclude  from  their 
remarks,  they  were  accustomed  to  use  this  word  in  three  special 
senses,  giving  each  its  own  definition.68 

In  the  first  place,  they  wished  by  this  word  to  signify  that 
archetypal  Exemplar  of  all  things  which  exists  in  the  divine 
Mind,  according  to  the  idea  of  which  all  things  have  been 
formed;  and  they  said  that  nature  was  the  primordial  cause  of 
each  thing,  whence  each  takes  not  only  its  being  (esse)  but  its 
"being  such  or  such  a  thing"  {talis  esse)  as  well.69  To  the  word 
in  this  sense  they  assigned  the  following  definition:  "Nature  is 
that  which  gives  to  each  thing  its  being." 

In  the  second  place  they  said  that  "nature"  meant  each  thing's 
peculiar  being  (proprium  esse),  and  to  "nature"  in  this  sense  they 
assigned  this  next  definition:  "The  peculiar  difference  giving 
form  to  each  thing  is  called  its  nature."70  It  is  with  this  meaning 
in  mind  that  we  are  accustomed  to  say,  "It  is  the  nature  of  all 
heavy  objects  to  tend  toward  the  earth,  of  light  ones  to  rise,  of 
fire  to  burn,  and  of  water  to  wet." 

The  third  definition  is  this:  "Nature  is  an  artificer  fire  coming 
forth  from  a  certain  power  to  beget  sensible  objects."71  For 
physicists  tell  us  that  all  things  are  procreated  from  heat  and 
moisture.72  Therefore  Vergil  calls  Oceanus  "father,"73  and 
Valerius  Soranus,  in  a  certain  verse  which  treats  Jove  as  a 
symbol  of  aethereal  fire,  says : 

Jupiter  omnipotent,  author  of  things  as  of  kings, 
Of  all  true  gods  the  father  and  womb  in  one!74 

Chapter  Eleven :  Concerning  the  Origin  of  Logic 

Having  demonstrated  the  origin  of  the  theoretical,  the 
practical,  and  the  mechanical  arts,  we  must  now  therefore 
investigate  as  well  the  derivation  of  the  logical ;  and  these  I  have 
left  to  the  end  because  they  were  the  last  to  be  discovered.  All 

5  8  HUGH  OF  ST.  VICTOR 

the  other  arts  were  invented  first;  but  that  logic  too  should  be 
invented  was  essential,  for  no  man  can  fitly  discuss  things  unless 
he  first  has  learned  the  nature  of  correct  and  true  discourse. 
For,  as  Boethius  declares,  when  the  ancients  first  applied  them- 
selves to  searching  out  the  natures  of  things  and  the  essentials 
of  morality,  they  of  necessity  erred  frequently,  for  they  lacked 
discrimination  in  the  use  of  words  and  concepts:  "This  is 
frequently  the  case  with  Epicurus,  who  thinks  that  the  universe 
consists  of  atoms,  and  who  falsely  maintains  that  pleasure  is 
virtue.  Clearly,  such  errors  befell  Epicurus  and  others  because, 
being  unskilled  in  argument,  they  transferred  to  the  real  world 
whatever  conclusion  they  had  reached  by  reasoning.  This  is  a 
great  error  indeed,  for  real  things  do  not  precisely  conform  to 
the  conclusions  of  our  reasoning  as  they  do  to  a  mathematical 
count.  In  counting,  whatever  result  obtains  in  the  figures  of  one 
who  computes  correctly  is  sure  to  obtain  in  reality  as  well,  so 
that  if  a  count  of  one  hundred  is  registered,  one  hundred  objects 
will  also  necessarily  be  found  as  the  basis  for  that  count.  In 
argument,  however,  such  a  relationship  does  not  obtain  with 
equal  force,  and  whatever  emerges  in  the  course  of  a  discussion 
does  not  find  a  fixed  counterpart  in  nature,  either.  Thus  it  is 
that  the  man  who  brushes  aside  knowledge  of  argumentation 
falls  of  necessity  into  error  when  he  searches  out  the  nature  of 
things.  For  unless  he  has  first  come  to  know  for  certain  what 
form  of  reasoning  keeps  to  the  true  course  of  argument,  and 
what  form  keeps  only  to  a  seemingly  true  course,  and  unless  he 
has  learned  what  form  of  reasoning  can  be  depended  upon  and 
what  form  must  be  held  suspect,  he  cannot  attain,  by  reasoning, 
the  imperishable  truth  of  things. 

"Since,  therefore,  the  ancients,  having  fallen  often  into  many 
errors,  came  to  certain  conclusions  and  arguments  which  were 
false  and  contrary  to  each  other;  and  since  it  seemed  impossible, 
when  contrary  conclusions  had  been  constructed  concerning  the 
same  matter,  either  that  both  the  conclusions  which  mutually 
inconsistent  trains  of  reasoning  had  established  should  be  true, 
or  that  there  should  be  ambiguity  concerning  which  train  of 
reasoning  should  be  credited,  it  was  apparent  that  the  true  and 
whole  nature  of  argument  itself  should  be  considered  first. 
Once  this  was  known,  then  they  could  also  know  whether  the 


results  discovered  by  argument  were  truly  held.  Hence,  skill 
in  the  discipline  of  logic  began — that  discipline  which  provides 
ways  of  distinguishing  between  modes  of  argument  and  the 
trains  of  reasoning  themselves,  so  that  it  can  be  known  which 
trains  of  reasoning  are  sometimes  true,  sometimes  false,  which 
moreover  are  always  false,  and  which  never  false."75  And  so 
logic  came  last  in  time,  but  is  first  in  order.  It  is  logic  which 
ought  to  be  read  first  by  those  beginning  the  study  of  philosophy, 
for  it  teaches  the  nature  of  words  and  concepts,  without  both  of 
which  no  treatise  of  philosophy  can  be  explained  rationally. 

Logic  is  so  called  from  the  Greek  word  logos,  which  has  a 
double  sense.  For  logos  means  either  word  (sermo)  or  reason,  and 
hence  logic  can  be  called  either  a  linguistic  {sermocinalis)  or  a 
rational  science.  Rational  logic,  which  is  called  argumentative, 
contains  dialectic  and  rhetoric.  Linguistic  logic  stands  as  genus 
to  grammar,  dialectic,  and  rhetoric,  thus  containing  argumen- 
tative logic  as  a  subdivision.  It  is  linguistic  logic  that  we  put 
fourth  after  the  theoretical,  practical,  and  mechanical.  It  must 
not  be  supposed,  however,  that  this  science  is  called  logical, 
that  is,  linguistic,  because  before  its  discovery  there  were  no 
words,  or  as  if  men  before  its  time  did  not  have  conversations 
with  one  another.76  For  both  spoken  and  written  words 
existed  previously,  but  the  theory  of  spoken  and  written 
language  was  not  yet  reduced  to  an  art;  no  rules  for  speaking  or 
arguing  correctly  had  yet  been  given.  All  sciences,  indeed,  were 
matters  of  use  before  they  became  matters  of  art.  But  when  men 
subsequently  considered  that  use  can  be  transformed  into  art, 
and  what  was  previously  vague  and  subject  to  caprice  can  be 
brought  into  order  by  definite  rules  and  precepts,  they  began, 
we  are  told,  to  reduce  to  art  the  habits  which  had  arisen  partly 
by  chance,  partly  by  nature — correcting  what  was  bad  in  use, 
supplying  what  was  missing,  eliminating  what  was  superfluous, 
and  furthermore  prescribing  definite  rules  and  precepts  for  each 

Such  was  the  origin  of  all  the  arts ;  scanning  them  all,  we  find 
this  true.  Before  there  was  grammar,  men  both  wrote  and 
spoke;  before  there  was  dialectic,  they  distinguished  the  true 
from  the  false  by  reasoning;  before  there  was  rhetoric,  they 
discoursed   upon   civil    laws;   before    there    was    arithmetic, 


there  was  knowledge  of  counting;  before  there  was  an  art  of 
music,  they  sang;  before  there  was  geometry,  they  measured 
fields ;  before  there  was  astronomy,  they  marked  off  periods  of 
time  from  the  courses  of  the  stars.  But  then  came  the  arts, 
which,  though  they  took  their  rise  in  usage,  nonetheless  excel 


This  would  be  the  place  to  set  forth  who  were  the  inventors 
of  the  separate  arts,  when  these  persons  flourished  and  where, 
and  how  the  various  disciplines  made  a  start  in  their  hands: 
first,  however,  I  wish  to  distinguish  the  individual  arts  from  one 
another  by  dividing  philosophy  into  its  parts,  so  to  say.  I 
should  therefore  briefly  recapitulate  the  things  I  have  said  thus 
far,  so  that  the  transition  to  what  follows  may  more  easily  be 

We  have  said  that  there  are  four  branches  of  knowledge  only, 
and  that  they  contain  all  the  rest :  they  are  the  theoretical,  which 
strives  for  the  contemplation  of  truth;  the  practical,  which 
considers  the  regulation  of  morals;  the  mechanical,  which 
supervises  the  occupations  of  this  life;  and  the  logical,  which 
provides  the  knowledge  necessary  for  correct  speaking  and  clear 
argumentation.  And  so,  here,  we  may  not  incongruously 
understand  that  number  "four"  belonging  to  the  soul — that 
"four"  which,  for  reverence  of  it,  the  ancients  called  to  witness 
in  their  oaths,  whence  we  read: 

"By  him  who  gave  the  quaternary  number  to  our  soul!"79 

How  these  sciences  are  comprised  under  philosophy,  and 
again  what  they  themselves  comprise  we  shall  now  show, 
briefly  repeating  first  the  definition  of  philosophy. 


Chapter  One :  Concerning  the  Distinguishing  of  the  Arts 

"Philosophy  is  the  love  of  that  Wisdom  which,  wanting  in 
nothing,  is  a  living  Mind  and  the  sole  primordial  Idea  or  Pattern 
of  things."1  This  definition  pays  special  attention  to  the  etymo- 
logy of  the  word.  For  philos  in  Greek  means  love,  and  sophia 
means  wisdom,  so  that  from  them  "philosophy,"  that  is,  "love 
of  wisdom,"  was  coined.  The  words  "which,  wanting  in 
nothing,  is  a  living  Mind  and  the  sole  primordial  Idea  or 
Pattern  of  things"  signify  the  divine  Wisdom,  which  is  said  to 
be  wanting  in  nothing  because  it  contains  nothing  inadequately, 
but  in  a  single  and  simultaneous  vision  beholds  all  things  past, 
present,  and  future.  It  is  called  "living  Mind"  because  what  has 
once  existed  in  the  divine  Mind  never  is  forgotten;  and  it  is 
called  "the  primordial  Idea  or  Pattern  of  things"  because  to  its 
likeness  all  things  have  been  formed.  There  are  those  who  say 
that  what  the  arts  are  concerned  with  remains  forever  the  same.2 
This,  then,  is  what  the  arts  are  concerned  with,  this  is  what  they 
intend,  namely,  to  restore  within  us  the  divine  likeness,  a  like- 
ness which  to  us  is  a  form  but  to  God  is  his  nature.  The  more 
we  are  conformed  to  the  divine  nature,  the  more  do  we  possess 
Wisdom,  for  then  there  begins  to  shine  forth  again  in  us  what 
has  forever  existed  in  the  divine  Idea  or  Pattern,  coming  and 
going  in  us  but  standing  changeless  in  God.3 

"Again,  philosophy  is  the  art  of  arts  and  the  discipline  of 
disciplines"4 — that,  namely  toward  which  all  arts  and  disci- 
plines are  oriented.  Knowledge  can  be  called  an  art  "when  it 
comprises  the  rules  and  precepts  of  an  art"5  as  it  does  in  the 
study  of  how  to  write;  knowledge  can  be  called  a  discipline 
when  it  is  said  to  be  "full"6  as  it  is  in  the  "instructional"  science, 
or  mathematics.7  Or,  it  is  called  art  when  it  treats  of  matters 
that  only  resemble  the  true  and  are  objects  of  opinion;  and 


discipline  when,  by  means  of  true  arguments,  it  deals  with 
matters  unable  to  be  other  than  they  are.  This  last  distinction 
between  art  and  discipline  is  the  one  which  Plato  and  Aristotle 
wished  to  establish.8  Or,  that  can  be  called  art  which  takes 
shape  in  some  material  medium  and  is  brought  out  in  it  through 
manipulation  of  that  material,  as  is  the  case  in  architecture; 
while  that  is  called  a  discipline  which  takes  shape  in  thought 
and  is  brought  forth  in  it  through  reasoning  alone,  as  is  the  case 
in  logic. 

"Philosophy,  furthermore,  is  a  meditating  upon  death,  a 
pursuit  of  especial  fitness  for  Christians,  who,  spurning  the 
solicitations  of  this  world,  live  subject  to  discipline  in  a  manner 
resembling  the  life  of  their  future  home."9  Yet  again,  philosophy 
is  the  discipline  which  investigates  demonstratively  the  causes  of 
all  things,  human  and  divine.10  Thus,  the  theory  of  all  pursuits 
belongs  to  philosophy  (their  administration  is  not  entirely  phil- 
osophical), and  therefore  philosophy  is  said  to  include  all  things 
in  some  way.11 

Philosophy  is  divided  into  theoretical,  practical,  mechanical, 
and  logical.  These  four  contain  all  knowledge.12  The  theoreti- 
cal may  also  be  called  speculative;  the  practical  may  be  called 
active,  likewise  ethical,  that  is,  moral,  from  the  fact  that  morals 
consist  in  good  action ;  the  mechanical  may  be  called  adulterate 
because  it  is  concerned  with  the  works  of  human  labor1 3 ;  the 
logical  may  be  called  linguistic14  from  its  concern  with  words. 
The  theoretical  is  divided  into  theology,  mathematics,  and 
physics — a  division  which  Boethius  makes  in  different  terms, 
distinguishing  the  theoretical  into  the  intellectible,  the  intelli- 
gible, and  the  natural,  where  the  intellectible  is  equivalent  to 
theology,  the  intelligible  to  mathematics,  and  the  natural  to 
physics.  And  the  intellectible  he  defines  as  follows. 

Chapter  Two:  Concerning  Theology 

"The  intellectible  is  that  which,  ever  enduring  of  itself,  one 
and  the  same  in  its  own  divinity,  is  not  ever  apprehended  by  any 
of  the  senses,  but  by  the  mind  and  the  intellect  alone.  Its  study," 
he  says,  "the  Greeks  call  theology,  and  it  consists  of  searching 
into  the  contemplation  of  God  and  the  incorporeality  of  the 


soul  and  the  consideration  of  true  philosophy."1  s  It  was  called 
theology  as  meaning  discourse  concerning  the  divine,  for  theos 
means  God,  and  logos  discourse  or  knowledge.  It  is  theology, 
therefore,  "when  we  discuss  with  deepest  penetration  some 
aspect  either  of  the  inexpressible  nature  of  God  or  of  spiritual 

Chapter  Three :  Concerning  Mathematics 

The  "instructional"  science  is  called  mathematics:17  mathesis, 
when  the  "t"  is  pronounced  without  the  "h,"  means  vanity,  and 
it  refers  to  the  superstition  of  those  who  place  the  fates  of  men 
in  the  stars  and  who  are  therefore  called  "mathematicians";  but 
when  the  "t"  is  pronounced  with  the  "h,"  the  word  refers  to  the 
"instructional"  science.18 

This,  moreover,  is  the  branch  of  theoretical  knowledge  "which 
considers  abstract  quantity.  Now  quantity  is  called  abstract 
when,  intellectually  separating  it  from  matter  or  from  other 
accidents,  we  treat  of  it  as  equal,  unequal,  and  the  like,  in  our 
reasoning  alone"19 — a  separation  which  it  receives  only  in  the 
domain  of  mathematics  and  not  in  nature.  Boethius  calls  this 
branch  of  knowledge  the  intelligible  and  finds  that  "it  itself  in- 
cludes the  first  or  intellectible  part  in  virtue  of  its  own  thought 
and  understanding,  directed  as  these  are  to  the  celestial  works  of 
supernal  divinity  and  to  whatever  sublunary  beings  enjoy  more 
blessed  mind  and  purer  substance,  and,  finally,  to  human  souls. 
All  of  these  things,  though  they  once  consisted  of  that  primary 
intellectible  substance,  have  since,  by  contact  with  bodies, 
degenerated  from  the  level  of  intellectibles  to  that  of  intelli- 
gibles;  as  a  result,  they  are  less  objects  of  understanding  than 
active  agents  of  it,  and  they  find  greater  happiness  by  the  purity 
of  their  understanding  whenever  they  apply  themselves  to  the 
study  of  things  intellectible."20 

For  the  nature  of  spirits  and  souls,  because  it  is  incorporeal 
and  simple,  participates  in  intellectible  substance;  but  because 
through  the  sense  organs  spirit  or  soul  descends  in  different 
ways  to  the  apprehension  of  physical  objects  and  draws  into 
itself  a  likeness  of  them  through  its  imagination,  it  deserts  its 
simplicity  somehow  by  admitting21  a  type  of  composition.22 


For  nothing  that  resembles  a  composite  can,  strictly  speaking, 
be  called  simple. 

In  different  respects,  therefore,  the  same  thing  is  at  the  same 
time  intellectible  and  intelligible — intellectible  in  being  by- 
nature  incorporeal  and  imperceptible  to  any  of  the  senses; 
intelligible  in  being  a  likeness  of  sensible  things,  but  not  itself  a 
sensible  thing.  For  the  intellectible  is  neither  a  sensible  thing 
nor  a  likeness  of  sensible  things.  The  intelligible,  however,  is 
itself  perceived  by  intellect  alone,  yet  does  not  itself  perceive 
only  by  means  of  intellect.  It  has  imagination  and  the  senses,  and 
by  these  lays  hold  upon  all  things  subject  to  sense.  Through 
contact  with  physical  objects  it  degenerates,^3  because,  while 
through  sense  impressions  it  rushes  out  toward  the  visible  forms 
of  bodies24  and,  having  made  contact  with  them,  draws  them 
into  itself  through  imagination,  it  is  cut  away  from  its  simplicity 
each  time  it  is  penetrated  by  any  qualities  entering  through 
hostile  sense  experience.  But  when,  mounting  from  such  dis- 
traction toward  pure  understanding,  it  gathers  itself  into  one,  it 
becomes  more  blessed  through  participating  in  intellectible 

Chapter  Four:  Concerning  the  Number  "Four"  of  the  Soul25 

Number  itself  teaches  us  the  nature  of  the  going  out  and  the 
return  of  the  soul.  Consider:  Three  times  one  makes  three;  three 
times  three,  nine;  three  times  nine,  twenty-seven;  and  three 
times  twenty-seven,  eighty-<?^.  See  how  in  the  fourth  multi- 
plication the  original  "one,"  or  unity,  recurs;  and  you  would 
see  the  same  thing  happen  even  if  you  were  to  carry  the  multi- 
plication out  towards  infinity :  always,  at  every  fourth  stage  of 
the  process,  the  number  "one"  recurs.26  Now  the  soul's  simple 
essence  is  most  appropriately  expressed  by  "one,"  which  itself 
is  also  incorporeal.27  And  the  number  "three"  likewise,  because 
of  the  "one"  which  is  its  indivisible  constitutent  link,  is  fittingly 
referred  to  the  soul,  just  as  the  number  "four,"  because  it  has 
two  constitutent  links  and  is  therefore  divisible,  belongs, 
properly  speaking,  to  the  body.28 

The  first  progression  of  the  soul,  therefore,  is  that  by  which 


from  its  simple  essence,  symbolized  by  the  monad,  it  extends 
itself  into  a  virtual  threeness,  in  which  it  desires  one  thing 
through  concupiscence,  detests  another  through  wrath,  and 
judges  between  these  two  through  reason.29  And  we  rightly  say 
it  flows  from  the  monad  into  threeness,  because  every  essence  is 
by  nature  prior  to  its  powers.  Again,  the  fact  that  the  same 
"one"  is  found  in  the  number  "three,"  being  multiplied  in  it 
three  times,  signifies  that  the  soul  is  not  distributed  into  parts 
but  consists  wholly  in  each  of  its  powers :  for  we  may  not  say 
that  reason  alone,  or  wrath  alone,  or  concupiscence  alone  are 
each  a  third  part  of  the  soul,  since  reason  is  neither  other  than 
nor  less  than  the  soul  in  substance,  and  wrath  is  neither  other 
than  nor  less  than  the  soul,  and  concupiscence  is  neither  other 
than  nor  less  than  the  soul;  but  on  the  contrary,  the  soul,  as 
one  and  the  same  substance,  receives  different  names  according 
to  its  different  powers. 

Next,  the  soul,  from  its  being  virtually  threefold,  steps  down 
by  a  second  progression  to  controling  the  music  of  the  human 
body,30  which  music  is  constituted  in  the  number  "nine",  since 
nine  are  the  openings  in  the  human  body  by  which,  according  to 
natural  adjustment,  everything  by  which  the  body  is  nourished 
and  kept  in  balance  flows  in  or  out.  And  this  is  the  order  (which 
obtains  between  these  first  two  progressions)  because  the  soul 
by  nature  possesses  its  powers  before  it  is  compounded  with  the 

Subsequently,  however,  in  a  third  progression,  the  soul, 
having  poured  itself  out  through  the  senses  upon  all  visible 
things — which  demand  its  supervision  and  which  are  sym- 
bolized by  "twenty-seven,"  a  cube  number,  extended  tri- 
dimensionally  after  the  manner  of  body — is  dissipated  in  count- 
less actions.31 

But  finally,  in  a  fourth  progression,  the  soul,  freed  from  the 
body,  returns  to  the  pureness  of  its  simplicity,  and  therefore  in 
the  fourth  multiplication,  in  which  three  times  twenty-seven 
makes  eighty-one,  the  number  "one"  reappears  in  the  arith- 
metical product  in  order  that  it  may  be  glowingly  evident  that 
the  soul,  after  this  life's  end,  designated  by  "eighty,"  returns  to 
the  unity  of  its  simple  state,  from  which  it  had  previously 
departed  when  it  descended  to  rule  a  human  body.32  That  the 


measure  of  human  life  naturally  consists  in  "eighty"  is  declared 
b  y  the  Prophet,  saying : 

If  by  reason  of  strength  men  live  fourscore  years,  even  greater  is  their 
labor  and  sorrow.33 

Some  men  think  that  this  fourfold  progression  is  to  be  under- 
stood as  being  that  number  "four"  of  the  soul  of  which  we  made 
mention  above;34  and  they  call  it  the  number  "four"  of  the  soul 
to  distinguish  it  from  the  number  "four"  of  the  body. 

Chapter  Five:  Concerning  the  Number  ''Four'"  of  the  Body 

For  to  the  body  too  do  they  assign  its  number  "four."  As 
the  figure  "one"  fits  the  soul,  so  the  figure  "two"  fits  the  body.35 
Consider:  Two  times  two  makes  four;  two  times  four,  eight; 
two  times  eight,  sixteen;  and  two  times  sixteen,  thirty-two. 
Here  likewise,  in  the  fourth  multiplication  the  same  number 
whence  the  operation  began,  namely  "two,"  reappears,  and  the 
same  thing  would  undoubtedly  happen  if  one  were  to  carry  the 
process  out  to  infinity :  at  each  fourth  stage  of  the  process,  the 
number  "two"  would  recur.  And  this  is  the  number  "four"  of 
the  body,  in  which  it  is  given  to  be  understood  that  everything 
which  is  composed  of  divisibles,  or  solubles,  is  itself  also 
divisible,  or  dissoluble.36 

And  now  you  see  clearly  enough,  I  should  think,  how  souls 
degenerate  from  being  intellectible  things  to  being  intelligible 
things  when,  from  the  purity  of  simple  understanding  clouded 
by  no  images  of  bodily  things,  they  descend  to  the  imagination 
of  visible  objects;  and  how  they  once  more  become  more 
blessed  when,  recollecting  themselves  from  this  distracted  state 
back  toward  the  simple  source  of  their  nature,  they,  marked  as 
it  were  with  the  likeness  of  the  most  excellent  numeral,  come  to 
rest.  Thus,  that  I  may  speak  more  openly,  the  intellectible  in  us 
is  what  understanding  is,  whereas  the  intelligible  is  what 
imagination  is.  But  understanding  is  pure  and  certain  knowl- 
edge of  the  sole  principles  of  things — namely,  of  God,  of  ideas, 
and  of  prime  matter,  and  of  incorporeal  substances.  Imagination, 
however,  is  sensuous  memory  made  up  of  the  traces  of  corporeal 
objects  inhering  in  the  mind;  it  possesses  in  itself  nothing 


certain  as  a  source  of  knowledge.  Sensation  is  what  the  soul 
undergoes  in  the  body  as  a  result  of  qualities  which  come  to  it 
from  without.37 

Chapter  Six:  Concerning  the Quadrivium^ 

Since,  as  we  have  said,  the  proper  concern  of  mathematics  is 
abstract  quantity,  it  is  necessary  to  seek  the  species  of  mathe- 
matics in  the  parts  into  which  such  quantity  falls.  Now  abstract 
quantity  is  nothing  other  than  form,  visible  in  its  linear  dimen- 
sion, impressed  upon  the  mind,  and  rooted  in  the  mind's 
imaginative  part.  It  is  of  two  kinds:  the  first  is  continuous 
quantity,  like  that  of  a  tree  or  a  stone,  and  is  called  magnitude;  the 
second  is  discrete  quantity,  like  that  of  a  flock  or  of  a  people, 
and  is  called  multitude.  Further,  in  the  latter  some  quantities 
stand  wholly  in  themselves,  for  example,  "three,"  "four,"  or 
any  other  whole  number;  others  stand  in  relation  to  another 
quantity,  as  "double,"  "half,"  "once  and  a  half,"  "once  and  a 
third,"  and  the  like.  One  type  of  magnitude,  moreover,  is 
mobile ',  like  the  heavenly  spheres;  another,  immobile ',  like  the 
earth.  Now,  multitude  which  stands  in  itself  is  the  concern  of 
arithmetic,  while  that  which  stands  in  relation  to  another 
multitude  is  the  concern  of  music.  Geometry  holds  forth 
knowledge  of  immobile  magnitude,  while  astronomy  claims 
knowledge  of  the  mobile.  Mathematics,  therefore,  is  divided 
into  arithmetic,  music,  geometry,  and  astronomy.39 

Chapter  Seven:  Concerning  the  Term  "Arithmetic" 

The  Greek  word  ares  means  virtus ',  or  power,  in  Latin;  and 
rithmus  means  numerus,  or  number,  so  that  "arithmetic"  means 
"the  power  of  number."40  And  the  power  of  number  is 
this — that  all  things  have  been  formed  in  its  likeness.41 

Chapter  Eight:  Concerning  the  Term  "Music" 

"Music"  takes  its  name  from  the  word  "water,"  or  aqua 
because  no  euphony,  that  is,  pleasant  sound,  is  possible  without 


Chapter  Nine:  Concerning  the  Term  "Geometry"*! 

"Geometry"  means  "earth-measure,"  for  this  discipline  was 
first  discovered  by  the  Egyptians,  who,  since  the  Nile  in  its 
inundation  covered  their  territories  with  mud  and  obscured  all 
boundaries,  took  to  measuring  the  land  with  rods  and  lines. 
Subsequently,  learned  men  reapplied  and  extended  it  also  to  the 
measurement  of  surfaces  of  the  sea,  the  heaven,  the  atmosphere, 
and  all  bodies  whatever. 

Chapter  Ten :  Concerning  the  Term  "Astronomy" 

"Astronomy"  and  "astrology"  differ  in  the  former's  taking 
its  name  from  the  phrase  "law  of  the  stars,"  while  the  latter 
takes  its  from  the  phrase  "discourse  concerning  the  stars" — for 
nomia  means  law,  and  logos,  discourse.  It  is  astronomy,  then, 
which  treats  the  law  of  the  stars  and  the  revolution  of  the  heaven, 
and  which  investigates  the  regions,  orbits,  courses,  risings,  and 
settings  of  stars,  and  why  each  bears  the  name  assigned  it;  it  is 
astrology,  however,  which  considers  the  stars  in  their  bearing 
upon  birth,  death,  and  all  other  events,  and  is  only  partly 
natural,  and  for  the  rest,  superstitious ;  natural  as  it  concerns  the 
temper  or  "complexion"  of  physical  things,  like  health,  illness, 
storm,  calm,  productivity,  and  unproductivity,  which  vary  with 
the  mutual  alignments  of  the  astral  bodies ;  but  superstitious  as  it 
concerns  chance  happenings  or  things  subject  to  free  choice.44 
And  it  is  the  "mathematicians"  who  traffic  in  the  superstitious 

Chapter  Eleven :  Concerning  Arithmetic 

Arithmetic  has  for  its  subject  equal,  or  even,  number  and 
unequal,  or  odd,  number.  Equal  number  is  of  three  kinds: 
equally  equal,  equally  unequal,  and  unequally  equal.  Unequal 
number,  too,  has  three  varieties :  the  first  consists  of  numbers 
which  are  prime  and  incomposite;  the  second  consists  of 
numbers  which  are  secondary  and  composite ;  the  third  consists 
of  numbers  which,  when  considered  in  themselves,  are  secondary 
and  composite,  but  which,  when  one  compares  them  with  other 
numbers  [to  find  a  common  factor  or  denominator],  are  prime 
and  incomposite.46 


Chapter  Twelve :  Concerning  Music41 

The  varieties  of  music  are  three :  that  belonging  to  the  universe, 
that  belonging  to  man,  and  that  which  is  instrumental. 

Of  the  music  of  the  universe,  some  is  characteristic  of  the 
elements,  some  of  the  planets,  some  of  the  seasons:  of  the 
elements  in  their  mass,  number,  and  volume;  of  the  planets  in 
their  situation,  motion,  and  nature ;  of  the  seasons  in  days  (in  the 
alternation  of  day  and  night),  in  months  (in  the  waxing  and 
waning  of  the  moons),  and  in  years  (in  the  succession  of  spring, 
summer,  autumn,  and  winter). 

Of  the  music  of  man,  some  is  characteristic  of  the  body,  some 
of  the  soul,  and  some  of  the  bond  between  the  two.  It  is 
characteristic  of  the  body  partly  in  the  vegetative  power  by 
which  it  grows — a  power  belonging  to  all  beings  born  to  bodily 
life;  partly  in  those  fluids  or  humors  through  the  mixture  or 
complexion  of  which  the  human  body  subsists — a  type  of 
mixture  belonging  to  all  sensate  beings;  and  partly  in  those 
activities  (the  foremost  among  them  are  the  mechanical)  which 
belong  above  all  to  rational  beings  and  which  are  good  if  they 
do  not  become  inordinate,  so  that  avarice  or  appetite  are  not 
fostered  by  the  very  things  intended  to  relieve  our  weakness. 
As  Lucan  says  in  Cato's  praise: 

He  feasted  in  conquering  hunger; 
Any  roof  from  storms  served  his  hall ; 
His  dearest  garb,  the  toga  coarse, 
Civilian  dress  of  the  Roman.48 

Music  is  characteristic  of  the  soul  partly  in  its  virtues,  like 
justice,  piety,  and  temperance;  and  partly  in  its  powers,  like 
reason,  wrath,  and  concupiscence.49  The  music  between  the 
body  and  the  soul  is  that  natural  friendship  by  which  the  soul 
is  leagued  to  the  body,  not  in  physical  bonds,  but  in  certain 
sympathetic  relationships  for  the  purpose  of  imparting  motion 
and  sensation  to  the  body.  Because  of  this  friendship,  it  is 
written,  "No  man  hates  his  own  flesh."5°  This  music  consists  in 
loving  one's  flesh,  but  one's  spirit  more;  in  cherishing  one's 
body,  but  not  in  destroying  one's  virtue. 

Instrumental  music  consists  partly  of  striking,  as  upon  tym- 
pans  and  strings;  partly  in  blowing,  as  upon  pipes  or  organs; 


and  partly  in  giving  voice,  as  in  recitals  and  songs.  "There  are 
also  three  kinds  of  musicians :  one  that  composes  songs,  another 
that  plays  instruments,  and  a  third  that  judges  instrumental 
performance  and  song."51 

Chapter  Thirteen:  Concerning  Geometry*1 

Geometry  has  three  parts :  planimetry,  altimetry,  and  cosmi- 
metry.  Planimetry  measures  the  plane,  that  is,  the  long  and  the 
broad,  and,  by  widening  its  object,  it  measures  what  is  before 
and  behind  and  to  left  and  right.  Altimetry  measures  the  high, 
and,  by  widening  its  object,  it  measures  what  reaches  above  and 
stretches  below :  for  height  is  predicated  both  of  the  sea  in  the 
sense  of  depth,  and  of  a  tree  in  the  sense  of  tallness.  Cosmos  is 
the  word  for  the  universe,  and  from  it  comes  the  term  "cosmi- 
metry,"  or  "universe-measurement."  Cosmimetry  measures 
things  spherical,  that  is,  globose  and  rotund,  like  a  ball  or  an 
egg,53  and  it  is  therefore  called  "cosmimetry"  from  the  sphere 
of  the  universe,  on  account  of  the  preeminence  of  this  sphere — 
not  that  cosmimetry  is  concerned  with  the  measurement  of 
the  universe  alone,  but  that  the  universe-sphere  excels  all  other 
spherical  things. 

Chapter  Fourteen :  Concerning  Astronomy 

What  we  have  just  said  does  not  contradict  our  previous 
statement  that  geometry  is  occupied  with  immobile  magnitude, 
astronomy  with  mobile:  for  what  we  have  just  said  takes  into 
account  the  original  discovery  of  geometry,  which  led  to  its 
being  called  "earth  measurement."54  We  can  also  say  that  what 
geometry  considers  in  the  sphere  of  the  universe — namely,  the 
measure  of  the  celestial  regions  and  spheres — is  immobile  in 
that  aspect  which  belongs  to  geometrical  studies.  For  geometry 
is  not  concerned  with  movement  but  with  space.  What 
astronomy  considers,  however,  is  the  mobile — the  courses  of  the 
stars  and  the  intervals  of  time  and  seasons.  Thus,  we  shall  say 
that  without  exception  immobile  magnitude  is  the  subject  of 
geometry,  mobile  of  astronomy,  because,  although  both  busy 
themselves  with  the  same  thing,  the  one  contemplates  the  static 
aspect  of  that  thing,  the  other  its  moving  aspect. 


Chapter  Fifteen :  Definition  of  the  Quadrivium 

Arithmetic  is  therefore  the  science  of  numbers.  Music  is  the 
distinguishing  of  sounds  and  the  variance  of  voices.  Or  again, 
music  or  harmony  is  the  concord  of  a  number  of  dissimilar 
things  blended  into  one.  Geometry  is  the  discipline  treating 
immobile  magnitude,  and  it  is  the  contemplative  delineation  of 
forms,  by  which  the  limits  of  every  object  are  shown.  Putting 
it  differently,  geometry  is  "a  fount  of  perceptions  and  a  source  of 
utterances."55  Astronomy  is  the  discipline  which  examines  the 
spaces,  movements,  and  circuits  of  the  heavenly  bodies  at 
determined  intervals. 

Chapter  Sixteen :  Concerning  Physics 

Physics  searches  out  and  considers  the  causes  of  things  as 
found  in  their  effects,  and  the  effects  as  derived  from  certain 
causes : 

Whence  the  tremblings  of  earth  do  rise,  or 

from  what  cause  the  deep  seas  swell; 
Whence  grasses  grow  or  beasts  are  moved  with 

wayward  wrath  and  will; 
Whence  every  sort  of  verdant  shrub,  or  rock, 

or  creeping  thing.56 

The  word  physis  means  nature,  and  therefore  Boethius  places 
natural  physics  in  the  higher  division  of  theoretical  knowledge.57 
This  science  is  also  called  physiology,  that  is,  discourse  on  the 
natures  of  things,  a  term  which  refers  to  the  same  matter  as 
physics.  Physics  is  sometimes  taken  broadly  to  mean  the  same 
as  theoretical  science,  and,  taking  the  word  in  this  sense,  some 
persons  divide  philosophy  into  three  parts — into  physics,  ethics, 
and  logic.  In  this  division  the  mechanical  sciences  find  no  place, 
philosophy  being  restricted  to  physics,  ethics,  and  logic  alone.58 

Chapter  Seventeen :  What  the  Proper  Business  of  Each  Art  Is 

But  although  all  the  arts  tend  toward  the  single  end  of 
philosophy,  they  do  not  all  take  the  same  road,  but  have  each  of 
them  their  own  proper  businesses  by  which  they  are  dis- 
tinguished from  one  another. 


The  business  of  logic  is  with  things,  and  it  attends  to  our 
concepts  of  things,  either  through  the  understanding,  so  that 
our  concepts  may  not  be  either  things  or  even  likenesses  of  them, 
or  through  the  reason,  so  that  our  concepts  may  still  not  be 
things  but  may,  however,  be  likenesses  of  them.59  Logic,  there- 
fore, is  concerned  with  the  species  and  genera  of  things. 

Mathematics,  on  the  other  hand,  has  as  its  business  the  con- 
sideration of  things  which,  though  actually  fused,  are  rationally 
separated  by  it.  For  example,  in  actuality  no  line  is  found  with- 
out surface  and  solidity.  For  no  physical  entity  possesses  pure 
length  in  such  a  way  that  it  lacks  breadth  or  height,  but  in  every 
physical  thing  these  three  are  found  together.  And  yet  the 
reason,  abstracting  from  surface  and  from  thickness,  considers 
pure  line,  in  itself,  taking  line  as  a  mathematical  object  not 
because  it  exists  or  could  exist  as  such  in  reality,  but  because  the 
reason  often  considers  actual  aspects  of  things  not  as  they  are 
but  as  they  can  exist — exist,  that  is,  not  in  themselves,  but  with 
respect  to  reason  itself,  or,  as  reason  might  allow  them  to  be. 
From  this  consideration  derives  the  axiom  that  continuous 
quantity  is  divisible  into  an  infinite  number  of  parts,  and  discrete 
quantity  multipliable  into  a  product  of  infinite  size.  For  such  is 
the  vigor  of  the  reason  that  it  divides  every  length  into  lengths 
and  every  breadth  into  breadths,  and  the  like — and  that,  to  this 
same  reason,  a  continuity  lacking  interruption  continues 

The  business  of  physics,  however,  is  to  analyze  the  com- 
pounded actualities  of  things  into  their  elements.  For  the 
actualities  of  the  world's  physical  objects  are  not  pure  but  are 
compounded  of  pure  actualities  which,  although  they  nowhere 
exist  as  such,  physics  nonetheless  considers  as  pure  and  as  such. 
Thus,  physics  considers  the  pure  actuality  of  fire,  or  earth,  or 
air,  or  water,  and,  from  a  consideration  of  the  nature  of  each  in 
itself,  determines  the  constitution  and  operation  of  something 
compounded  of  them.60 

Nor  ought  we  to  overlook  the  fact  that  physics  alone  is 
concerned  properly  with  things,  while  all  the  other  disciplines 
are  concerned  with  concepts  of  things.  Logic  treats  of  concepts 
themselves  in  their  predicamental  framework,  while  mathematics 
treats  of  them  in  their  numerical  composition.  Logic,  therefore, 


employs  pure  understanding  on  occasion;  whereas  mathematics 
never  operates  without  the  imagination,  and  therefore  never 
possesses  its  object  in  a  simple  or  non-composite  manner. 
Because  logic  and  mathematics  are  prior  to  physics  in  the  order 
of  learning  and  serve  physics,  so  to  say,  as  tools — so  that  every 
person  ought  to  be  acquainted  with  them  before  he  turns  his 
attention  to  physics — it  was  necessary  that  these  two  sciences 
base  their  considerations  not  upon  the  physical  actualities  of 
things,  of  which  we  have  deceptive  experience,  but  upon  reason 
alone,  in  which  unshakeable  truth  stands  fast,  and  that  then, 
with  reason  itself  to  lead  them,  they  descend  into  the  physical 

Having  therefore  already  shown  how  Boethius's  division  of 
theoretical  science  fits  in  with  what  I  gave  just  before,  I  shall 
now  briefly  repeat  both  divisions  so  that  we  may  place  their 
terminologies  side  by  side  and  compare  them. 

Chapter  Eighteen :  Comparison  of  the  Foregoing 

The  theoretical  is  divided  into  theology,  mathematics,  and 
physics;  or,  put  differently,  into  intellectible,  intelligible,  and 
natural  knowledge;  or  still  differently,  into  divine,  "instruc- 
tional," and  philological.62  Thus,  theology  is  the  same  as  the 
intellectible  and  the  divine;  mathematics  as  the  intelligible  and 
the  "instructional";  and  physics  as  the  philological  and  the 

There  are  those  who  suppose  that  these  three  parts  of  the 
theoretical  are  mystically  represented  in  one  of  the  names  of 
Pallas,  fictional  goddess  of  wisdom.  For  she  is  called  "Tritona" 
for  tritoona,  that  is,  threefold  apprehension  of  God,  called  in- 
tellectible; of  souls,  called  intelligible;  and  of  bodies,  called 
natural.63  And  the  name  of  wisdom  by  right  belongs  to  these 
three  alone:  for  although  we  can  without  impropriety  refer  to 
the  remaining  branches  (ethics,  mechanics,  and  logic)  as  wisdom, 
still  these  are  more  precisely  spoken  of  as  prudence  or  know- 
ledge— logic  because  of  its  concern  for  eloquence  of  word,  and 
mechanics  and  ethics  because  of  their  concern  for  works  and 
morals.  But  the  theoretical  alone,  because  it  studies  the  truth  of 
things,  do  we  call  wisdom.64 


Chapter  Nineteen :  Continuation  of  the  Previous  Chapter 

The  practical  is  divided  into  solitary,  private,  and  public; 
or,  put  differently,  into  ethical,  economic,  and  political ;  or,  still 
differently,  into  moral,  managerial,  and  civil.  Solitary,  ethical, 
and  moral  are  one ;  as  also  are  private,  economic,  and  managerial ; 
and  public,  political,  and  civil.  Oeconomus  means  manager, 
whence  economic  science  is  called  managerial.  Polis  is  the  Greek 
word  for  the  Latin  civitas,  or  state,  whence  politics,  the  civil 
science,  derives  its  name.65  And  when  we  speak  of  ethics  as  a 
subdivision  of  the  practical,  we  must  reserve  the  word  for  the 
moral  conduct  of  the  individual,  so  that  ethical  science  and 
solitary  science  are  the  same. 

Solitary  science,  therefore,  "is  that  which,  exercising  care  for 
itself,  raises,  adorns,  and  broadens  itself  with  all  virtues,  allowing 
nothing  in  life  which  will  not  bring  joy  and  doing  nothing  which 
will  cause  regret.  The  private  science  is  that  which  assigns  the 
householder's  tasks,  setting  them  in  order  according  to  this 
middle  type  of  management.  The  public  science  is  that  which, 
taking  over  the  care  of  public  affairs,  serves  the  welfare  of  all 
through  its  concern  for  provisions,  its  balancing  of  justice,  its 
maintenance  of  strength,  and  its  observance  of  moderation. "66 
Thus,  solitary  science  concerns  individuals;  private  science, 
heads  of  families;  and  political  science,  governors  of  states. 
Practical  science  "is  called  'actual'  from  the  fact  that  it  deals 
with  its  object  by  way  of  actions  to  be  performed.  The  moral 
science  is  called  moral  because  it  seeks  a  decent  custom  (mos)  of 
life  and  establishes  rules  conducing  to  virtue.  The  managerial 
science  is  so-called  because  it  manages  a  wise  order  in  domestic 
matters.  The  civil  science  is  so-called  because  it  ministers  to  the 
common  welfare  of  civil  society."67 

Chapter  Twenty :  The  Division  of  Mechanical  Sciences  into  Seven 

Mechanical  science  contains  seven  sciences:  fabric  making, 
armament,  commerce,  agriculture,  hunting,  medicine,  and 
theatrics.  Of  these,  three  pertain  to  external  cover  for  nature,  by 
which  she  protects  herself  from  harms,  and  four  to  internal,  by 
which  she  feeds  and  nourishes  herself.  In  this  division  we  find 


a  likeness  to  the  trivium  and  quadrivium,  for  the  trivium  is 
concerned  with  words,  which  are  external  things,  and  the 
quadrivium  with  concepts,  which  are  internally  conceived.68 
The  mechanical  sciences  are  the  seven  handmaids  which  Mercury 
received  in  dowry  from  Philology,  for  every  human  activity  is 
servant  to  eloquence  wed  to  wisdom.69  Thus  Tully,  in  his  book 
on  rhetoricians,  says  concerning  the  study  of  eloquence : 

By  it  is  life  made  safe,  by  it  fit,  by  it  noble,  and  by  it  pleasurable :  for  from 
it  the  commonwealth  receives  abundant  benefits,  provided  that  wisdom, 
which  regulates  all  things,  keeps  it  company.  From  eloquence,  to  those  who 
have  acquired  it,  flow  praise,  honor,  dignity ;  from  eloquence,  to  the  friends 
of  those  skilled  in  it,  comes  most  dependable  and  sure  protection.70 

These  sciences  are  called  mechanical,  that  is,  adulterate, 
because  their  concern  is  with  the  artificer's  product,  which 
borrows  its  form  from  nature.  Similarly,  the  other  seven  are 
called  liberal  either  because  they  require  minds  which  are  liberal, 
that  is,  liberated  and  practiced  (for  these  sciences  pursue  subtle 
inquiries  into  the  causes  of  things),  or  because  in  antiquity  only 
free  and  noble  men  were  accustomed  to  study  them,  while  the 
populace  and  the  sons  of  men  not  free  sought  operative  skill  in 
things  mechanical.  In  all  this  appears  the  great  diligence  of  the 
ancients,  who  would  leave  nothing  untried,  but  brought  all 
things  under  definite  rules  and  precepts.  And  mechanics  is  that 
science  to  which  they  declare  the  manufacture  of  all  articles  to 

Chapter  Twenty-one :  First — Fabric  Making 

Fabric  making  includes  all  the  kinds  of  weaving,  sewing,  and 
twisting  which  are  accomplished  by  hand,  needle,  spindle,  awl, 
skein  winder,  comb,  loom,  crisper,  iron,  or  any  other  instru- 
ments whatever;  out  of  any  material  made  of  flax  or  fleece,  or 
any  sort  of  hide,  whether  scraped  or  hairy,  out  of  cane  as  well,  or 
cork,  or  rushes,  or  hair,  or  tufts,  or  any  material  of  this  sort 
which  can  be  used  for  the  making  of  clothes,  coverings,  drapery, 
blankets,  saddles,  carpets,  curtains,  napkins,  felts,  strings,  nets, 
ropes;  out  of  straw  too,  from  which  men  usually  make  their 
hats  and  baskets.   All  these  pursuits  belong  to  fabric  making. 


Chapter  Twenty-two :  Second — Armament 

Armament  comes  second.  Sometimes  any  tools  whatever  are 
called  "arms,"  as  when  we  speak  of  the  arms  of  war,  or  the  arms 
of  a  ship,  meaning  the  implements  used  in  war  or  on  a  ship.  For 
the  rest,  the  term  "arms"  belongs  properly  to  those  things  under 
which  we  take  cover — like  the  shield,  the  breastplate,  and  the 
helmet — or  those  by  which  we  strike — like  the  sword,  the  two- 
faced  axe,  and  the  lance.  "Missiles,"  however,  are  things  we 
can  fling,  like  the  spear  or  arrow.  Arms  are  so  called  from  the 
arm,  because  they  strengthen  the  arm  which  we  customarily 
hold  up  against  blows.  Missiles  (tela),  however,  are  named  from 
the  Greek  word  telon,  meaning  "long,"  because  the  things  so 
named  are  long;  therefore,  we  use  the  word protelare,  or  "make 
long,"  to  mean  "protect."  Armament,  therefore,  is  called,  in  a 
sense,  an  instrumental  science,  not  so  much  because  it  uses 
instruments  in  its  activity  as  because,  from  some  material  lying 
shapeless  at  hand,  it  makes  something  into  an  instrument,  if  I 
may  so  name  its  product.  To  this  science  belong  all  such 
materials  as  stones,  woods,  metals,  sands,  and  clays. 

Armament  is  of  two  types,  the  constructional  and  the  craftly. 
The  constructional  is  divided  into  the  building  of  walls,  which 
is  the  business  of  the  wood- worker  and  carpenter,  and  of  other 
craftsmen  of  both  these  sorts,  who  work  with  mattocks  and 
hatchets,  the  file  and  beam,  the  saw  and  auger,  planes,  vises,  the 
trowel  and  the  level,  smoothing,  hewing,  cutting,  filing,  carving, 
joining,  daubing  in  every  sort  of  material — clay,  stone,  wood, 
bone,  gravel,  lime,  gypsum,  and  other  materials  that  may  exist  of 
this  kind.  Craftly  armament  is  divided  into  the  malleable  branch, 
which  forges  material  into  shape  by  beating  upon  it,  and  the 
foundry  branch,  which  reduces  material  into  shape  by  casting 
it — so  that  "'founders'  is  the  name  for  those  who  know  how 
to  cast  a  shapeless  mass  into  the  form  of  an  implement."71 

Chapter  Twenty-three :  Third — Commerce 

Commerce  contains  every  sort  of  dealing  in  the  purchase, 
sale,  and  exchange  of  domestic  or  foreign  goods.  This  art  is 
beyond  all  doubt  a  peculiar  sort  of  rhetoric — strictly  of  its  own 
kind — for  eloquence  is  in  the  highest  degree  necessary  to  it. 


Thus  the  man  who  excels  others  in  fluency  of  speech  is  called  a 
Mercurius,  or  Mercury,  as  being  a  mercatorum  kirrius  (=kyrios) — a 
very  lord  among  merchants.72  Commerce  penetrates  the  secret 
places  of  the  world,  approaches  shores  unseen,  explores  fearful 
wildernesses,  and  in  tongues  unknown  and  with  barbaric  peoples 
carries  on  the  trade  of  mankind.  The  pursuit  of  commerce 
reconciles  nations,  calms  wars,  strengthens  peace,73  and  com- 
mutes the  private  good  of  individuals  into  the  common  benefit 
of  all. 

Chapter  Twenty-jour :  Fourth — Agriculture 

Agriculture  deals  with  four  kinds  of  land :  arable,  set  aside  for 
sowing;  plantational,  reserved  for  trees,  like  the  vineyard,  the 
orchard,  and  the  grove;  pastoral,  like  the  meadow,  the  hillside 
pasture,  and  the  heath;  and  floral,  like  the  garden  and  rose- 

Chapter  Twenty-five :  Fifth — Hunting 

Hunting  is  divided  into  gaming,  fowling,  and  fishing. 
Gaming  is  done  in  many  ways — with  nets,  foot-traps,  snares, 
pits,  the  bow,  javelins,  the  spear,  encircling  the  game,  or 
smoking  it  out,  or  pursuing  it  with  dogs  or  hawks.  Fowling  is 
done  by  snares,  traps,  nets,  the  bow,  birdlime,  the  hook. 
Fishing  is  done  by  drag-nets,  lines,  hooks,  and  spears.  To  this 
discipline  belongs  the  preparation  of  all  foods,  seasonings,  and 
drinks.  Its  name,  however,  is  taken  from  only  one  part  of  it 
because  in  antiquity  men  used  to  eat  merely  by  hunting,  as  they 
still  do  in  certain  regions  where  the  use  of  bread  is  extremely 
rare,  where  flesh  is  the  only  food  and  water  or  mead  the  drink. 

Food  is  of  two  kinds — bread  and  side  dishes.74  Bread  (panis) 
takes  its  name  either  from  the  Latin  word  for  one's  laying  a 
thing  out  (poms),  or  from  the  Greek  word  for  all  {pan),  because 
all  meals  need  bread  in  order  to  be  well  provided.  There  are 
many  kinds  of  bread — unleavened,  leavened,  that  baked  under 
ashes,  brown  bread,  sponge-cake,  cake,  pan-baked,  sweet, 
wheaten,  bun-shaped,  rye,  and  many  other  kinds.  Side  dishes 
consist  of  all  that  one  eats  with  bread,  and  we  can  call  them 
victuals.    They  are  of  many  sorts — meats,  stews,  porridges, 


vegetables,  fruits.  Of  meats,  some  are  roasted,  others  fried, 
others  boiled,  some  fresh,  some  salted.  Some  are  called  loins, 
flitches  also  or  sides,  haunches  or  hams,  grease,  lard,  fat.  The 
varieties  of  meat  dishes  are  likewise  numerous — Italian  sausage, 
minced  meat,  patties,  Galatian  tarts,  and  all  other  such  things 
that  a  very  prince  of  cooks  has  been  able  to  concoct.  Porridges 
contain  milk,  colostrum,  butter,  cheese,  whey.  And  who  can 
enumerate  the  names  of  vegetables  and  fruits?  Of  seasonings 
some  are  hot,  some  cold,  some  bitter,  some  sweet,  some  dry, 
some  moist.  Of  drink,  some  is  merely  that :  it  moistens  without 
nourishing,  like  water;  other  is  both  drink  and  food,  for  it  both 
moistens  and  nourishes,  like  wine.  Of  the  nutritious  drinks, 
furthermore,  some  are  naturally  so,  like  wine  or  any  other  liquor ; 
others  accidentally  so,  like  beer  and  various  kinds  of  mead. 

Hunting,  therefore,  includes  all  the  duties  of  bakers,  butchers, 
cooks,  and  tavern  keepers. 

Chapter  Twenty-six :  Sixth — Medicine 

"Medicine  is  divided  into  two  parts"75 — "occasions"  and 
operations.  "The  'occasions'  are  six:  air,  motion  and  quiet, 
emptiness  and  satiety,  food  and  drink,  sleep  and  wakefulness, 
and  the  reactions  of  the  soul.  These  are  called  'occasions' 
because,  when  tempered,  they  occasion  and  preserve  health,"7** 
or,  when  untempered,  ill-health.  The  reactions  of  the  soul  are 
called  occasions  of  health  or  ill-health  because  now  and  again 
they  either  "raise  one's  temperature,  whether  violently  as  does 
wrath  or  gently  as  do  pleasures ;  or  they  withdraw  and  lower  the 
temperature,  again  whether  violently  as  do  terror  and  fear,  or 
gently  as  does  worry.  And  among  them  are  some  which,  like  grief, 
produce  their  natural  effects  both  internally  and  externally."77 

Every  medicinal  operation  is  either  interior  or  exterior.  "The 
interior  are  those  which  are  introduced  through  the  mouth, 
nostrils,  ears,  or  anus,  such  as  potions,  emetics,  and  powders, 
which  are  taken  by  drinking,  chewing,  or  sucking  in.  The 
exterior  are,  for  example,  lotions,  plasters,  poultices,  and 
surgery,  which  is  twofold:  that  performed  on  the  flesh,  like 
cutting,  sewing,  burning,  and  that  performed  on  the  bone,  like 
setting  and  joining. "78 


Let  no  one  be  disturbed  that  among  the  means  employed  by 
medicine  I  count  food  and  drink,  which  earlier  I  attributed  to 
hunting.  For  these  belong  to  both  under  different  aspects.  For 
instance,  wine  in  the  grape  is  the  business  of  agriculture ;  in  the 
barrel,  of  the  cellarer,  and  in  its  consumption,  of  the  doctor. 
Similarly,  the  preparing  of  food  belongs  to  the  mill,  the  slaughter- 
house, and  the  kitchen,  but  the  strength  given  by  its  consump- 
tion, to  medicine. 

Chapter  Twenty-seven :  Seventh — Theatrics19 

The  science  of  entertainments  is  called  "theatrics"  from  the 
theatre,  to  which  the  people  once  used  to  gather  for  the  perform- 
ance: not  that  a  theatre  was  the  only  place  in  which  entertain- 
ment took  place,  but  it  was  a  more  popular  place  for  entertain- 
ment than  any  other.  Some  entertainment  took  place  in 
theatres,  some  in  the  entrance  porches  of  buildings,  some  in 
gymnasia,  some  in  amphitheatres,  some  in  arenas,  some  at  feasts, 
some  at  shrines.  In  the  theatre,  epics  were  presented  either  by 
recitals  or  by  acting  out  dramatic  roles  or  using  masks  or 
puppets;  they  held  choral  processions  and  dances  in  the  porches. 
In  the  gymnasia  they  wrestled;  in  the  amphitheatres  they  raced 
on  foot  or  on  horses  or  in  chariots;  in  the  arenas  boxers 
performed;  at  banquets  they  made  music  with  songs  and 
instruments  and  chants,  and  they  played  at  dice ;  in  the  temples 
at  solemn  seasons  they  sang  the  praises  of  the  gods.  Moreover, 
they  numbered  these  entertainments  among  legitimate  activities 
because  by  temperate  motion  natural  heat  is  stimulated  in  the 
body  and  by  enjoyment  the  mind  is  refreshed;  or,  as  is  more 
likely,  seeing  that  people  necessarily  gathered  together  for 
occasional  amusement,  they  desired  that  places  for  such  amuse- 
ment might  be  established  to  forestall  the  people's  coming 
together  at  public  houses,  where  they  might  commit  lewd  or 
criminal  acts. 

Chapter  Twenty-eight :  Concerning  Logic,  Which  Is  the  Fourth  Part  of 

Logic  is  separated  into  grammar  and  the  theory  of  argument. 
The  Greek  woi&gramma  means  letter,  and  from  it  grammar  takes 


its  name  as  the  science  of  letters.80  Properly  speaking,  the  letter 
is  a  written  figure,  while  the  term  "element"  is  reserved  for  a 
pronounced  sound;  here,  however,  "letter"  is  to  be  taken  in  a 
larger  sense  as  meaning  both  the  spoken  and  the  written  symbol, 
for  they  both  belong  to  grammar. 

There  are  those  who  say  that  grammar  is  not  a  part  of 
philosophy,  but,  so  to  say,  an  appendage  and  an  instrument  in 
the  service  of  philosophy.  But  concerning  the  theory  of 
argument,  Boethius  declares  that  it  can  be  at  once  a  part  and  an 
instrument  in  the  service  of  philosophy,  just  as  the  foot,  hand, 
tongue,  eyes,  etc.,  are  at  once  the  body's  parts  and  its 

Grammar,  simply  taken,  treats  of  words,  with  their  origin 
formation,  combination,  inflection,  pronunciation,  and  all  things 
else  pertaining  directly  to  utterance  alone.  The  theory  of 
argument  is  concerned  with  the  conceptual  content  of  words. 

Chapter  Twenty-nine :  Concerning  Grammar 

Grammar  is  divided  into  the  letter,  the  syllable,  the  phrase, 
and  the  clause.  Or,  according  to  another  division,  between 
letters  or  written  signs,  and  vocables  or  spoken  signs.  Yet  again, 
by  another  division,  among  the  noun,  the  verb,  the  participle, 
the  pronoun,  the  adverb,  the  preposition,  the  conjunction,  the 
interjection,  the  articulate  word,  the  letter,  the  syllable,  metric 
feet,  accents,  pointing,  punctuating,  spelling,  analogy,  etymo- 
logy, glosses,  differences,  the  barbarism,  the  solecism,  errors, 
metaplasm,  schemata,  tropes,  prose  composition,  verse  com- 
position, fables,  histories.  But  of  all  these  I  shall  omit  further 
explanation,  both  because  I  should  otherwise  be  more  lengthy 
than  the  brevity  of  my  plan  would  warrant,  and  because  in  this 
little  work  I  have  designed  to  inquire  only  into  the  divisions  and 
the  names  of  things,  so  that  the  reader  might  thereby  be 
established  in  some  beginning  of  knowledge  merely.  Let  him 
who  desires  to  inform  himself  concerning  these  things  read 
Donatus,82  Servius,83  Priscian  Concerning  Accents ■,  Priscian 
Concerning  the  Twelve  Verses  of  Vergil  %*  The  Barbarism ,85  and 
Isidore's  Etymologies. ,86 


Chapter  Thirty :  Concerning  the  Theory  of  Argument 

Invention  and  judgment  are  integral  parts  running  through 
the  whole  theory  of  argument,  whereas  demonstration,  proba- 
ble argument,  and  sophistic  are  its  divisive  parts,  that  is,  mark 
distinct  and  separate  subdivisions  of  it.87  Demonstration  consists 
of  necessary  arguments  and  belongs  to  philosophers ;  probable 
argument  belongs  to  dialecticians  and  rhetoricians ;  sophistic  to 
sophists  and  quibblers.  Probable  argument  is  divided  into 
dialectic  and  rhetoric,  both  of  which  contain  invention  and 
judgment  as  integral  parts:  for  since  invention  and  judgment 
integrally  constitute  the  whole  genus,  that  is,  of  argumentative 
logic,  they  are  necessarily  found  in  all  of  its  species  at  once. 
Invention  teaches  the  discovery  of  arguments  and  the  drawing 
up  of  lines  of  argumentation.  The  science  of  judgment  teaches 
the  judging  of  such  arguments  and  lines  of  argumentation. 

Now  it  may  be  asked  whether  invention  and  judgment  are 
contained  in  philosophy.88  They  do  not  seem  to  be  contained 
under  the  theoretical  sciences,  or  under  the  practical,  or  under 
the  mechanical,  or  even  under  the  logical,  where  one  would 
most  expect  them  to  be.  They  are  not  contained  under  the 
logical  because  they  are  not  branches  either  of  grammar  or  of 
argumentative  logic.  They  are  not  branches  of  argumentative 
logic  because  they  comprise  it  integrally,  and  nothing  can  at  the 
same  time  constitute  an  integral  and  a  divisive  part  of  the  same 
genus.  Philosophy,  therefore,  seems  not  to  contain  all  know- 

But  what  we  should  realize  is  that  the  word  "knowledge"  is 
customarily  used  in  two  senses,  namely,  for  one  of  the  disciplines, 
as  when  I  say  that  dialectic  is  knowledge,  meaning  an  art  or 
discipline;  and  for  any  act  of  cognition,  as  when  I  say  that  a 
person  who  knows  something  has  knowledge.  Thus,  for 
example,  if  I  know  dialectic  I  have  knowledge ;  if  I  know  how 
to  swim  I  have  knowledge;  if  I  know  that  Socrates  was  the  son 
of  Sophroniscus  I  have  knowledge — and  so  in  every  instance, 
anyone  who  knows  anything  may  be  said  to  have  knowledge. 
But  it  is  one  thing  when  I  say  that  dialectic  is  knowledge,  that  is 
an  art  or  discipline,  and  another  when  I  say  that  to  know  that 
Socrates  was  the  son  of  Sophroniscus  is  knowledge,  that  is,  an 


act  of  cognition.  It  is  always  true  to  say  that  any  knowledge 
which  is  an  art  or  discipline  is  a  distinct  branch  of  philosophy; 
but  it  cannot  always  be  said  that  all  knowledge  which  is  an  act 
of  cognition  is  a  distinct  branch  of  philosophy:  and  yet  it  is 
certainly  true  that  all  knowledge,  whether  it  be  a  discipline  or 
any  act  of  cognition  whatever,  is  somehow  contained  in 
philosophy — either  as  an  integral  part,  or  as  a  divisive  part  or 

A  discipline,  moreover,  is  a  branch  of  knowledge  which  has 
a  denned  scope  within  the  range  of  which  the  objective  of  some 
art  is  perfectly  unfolded ;  but  this  is  not  true  of  the  knowledge  of 
invention  or  of  judgment,  because  neither  of  these  stands  in- 
dependently in  itself,  and  therefore  they  cannot  be  called 
disciplines  but  are  integral  parts  of  a  discipline — namely,  of 
argumentative  logic. 

Furthermore,  the  question  is  raised  whether  invention  and 
judgment  are  the  same  thing  in  dialectic  that  they  are  in 
rhetoric.  It  seems  they  are  not,  since  then  two  opposed  genera 
would  be  constituted  of  identical  parts.  It  can  be  said,  con- 
sequently, that  these  two  words,  "invention"  and  "judgment," 
are  equivocally  used  for  the  parts  of  dialectic  and  rhetoric ;  or 
better,  perhaps,  let  us  say  that  invention  and  judgment  are 
properly  parts  of  argumentative  logic,  and  as  such  are  univocally 
signified  by  these  words,  but  that  in  the  subdivisions  of  this 
particular  genus  they  are  differentiated  from  one  another  by 
certain  properties — the  differentiations  are  not  revealed  through 
the  terms  "invention"  and  "judgment"  because  these  names,  far 
from  designating  invention  and  judgment  as  separate  species, 
designate  them  only  as  generic  parts. 

Grammar  is  the  knowledge  of  how  to  speak  without  error ; 
dialectic  is  clear-sighted  argument  which  separates  the  true  from 
the  false;  rhetoric  is  the  discipline  of  persuading  to  every  suitable 


Chapter   One:   Concerning  the   Order  and  Method  of  Study  and 

Philosophy  is  divided  into  the  theoretical,  the  practical,  the 
mechanical,  and  the  logical.  The  theoretical  is  divided  into 
theology,  physics,  and  mathematics ;  mathematics  is  divided  into 
arithmetic,  music,  geometry,  and  astronomy.  The  practical  is 
divided  into  solitary,  private,  and  public.  The  mechanical  is 
divided  into  fabric  making,  armament,  commerce,  agriculture, 
hunting,  medicine,  and  theatrics.  Logic  is  divided  into  grammar 
and  argument:  argument  is  divided  into  demonstration,  proba- 
ble argument,  and  sophistic :  probable  argument  is  divided  into 
dialectic  and  rhetoric. 

In  this  division  only  the  divisive  parts  of  philosophy  are 
contained;  there  are  still  other  subdivisions  of  such  parts,  but 
those  given  may  suffice  for  now.  If  you  regard  but  the  number  of 
distinct  sciences,  you  will  find  twenty-one;  if  you  should  wish  to 
count  each  name  mentioned  in  the  scheme,  you  will  find 

We  read  that  different  persons  were  authors  of  these  sciences. 
They  originated  the  arts — some  by  beginning  them,  others  by 
developing  them,  and  others  by  perfecting  them:  and  thus  for 
the  same  art  a  number  of  authors  are  frequently  cited. Of  these  I 
shall  now  list  the  names  of  a  few. 

Chapter  Two :  Concerning  the  Authors  of  the  Arts 

Linus  was  a  theologian  among  the  Greeks;1  among  the 
Romans,  Varro;2  and  in  our  own  time,  John  the  Scot,  Concerning 
the  Ten  Categories  in  Relation  to  God.1  "Thales  of  Miletus,  one  of 
the  seven  sages,  initiated  natural  physics  among  the  Greeks,"4 
while  among  the  Romans,  Pliny  treated  it.5  "Pythagoras  of 
Samos  was  the  inventor  of  arithmetic,"6  and  Nichomachus 


wrote  on  it.  "Among  the  Latins,  first  Apuleius  and  then 
Boethius  translated  this  work."7  The  same  Pythagoras  also 
wrote  the  Matentetradem,  that  is,  a  book  concerning  the  teaching 
of  the  quadrivium,8  and  he  found  in  the  figure  "y"  a  likeness  to 
human  life.9  Moses  declares  that  the  inventor  of  music  was 
Tubal,  who  was  of  the  seed  of  Cain;10  the  Greeks  say  it  was 
Pythagoras,  others  that  it  was  Mercury,  who  first  introduced  the 
tetrachord;  others  that  it  was  Linus,  or  Zetus,  or  Amphio.11 
Geometry,  they  say,  was  first  discovered  in  Egypt:  its  author 
among  the  Greeks  was  the  great  Euclid.  Boethius  passed  this 
man's  art  on  to  us.12  Eratosthenes  too  was  most  learned  in 
geometry,  and  it  was  he  who  first  found  out  about  the  revolution 
of  the  world.  Certain  ones  say  that  Cham,  son  of  Noah,  first 
discovered  astronomy.  The  Chaldeans  first  taught  astrology  as 
connected  with  the  observance  of  birth,  but  Josephus  asserts 
that  Abraham  first  instructed  the  Egyptians  in  astrology.13 
"Ptolemy,  king  of  Egypt,  revived  astronomy;  he  also  drew  up 
the  Canones  by  which  the  courses  of  the  stars  are  found.  Some 
say  that  Nemroth  the  Giant  was  the  greatest  astrologer,  and  to 
his  name  astronomy  too  is  ascribed.  The  Greeks  say  that  this 
art  was  first  thought  out  by  Atlas,  and  because  of  this  it  is  also 
said  that  he  held  up  the  very  heaven."14 

The  originator  of  ethics  was  Socrates,  who  wrote  twenty-four 
books  on  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  positive  justice.  Then 
Plato,  his  disciple,  wrote  the  many  books  of  the  Republic  from 
the  point  of  view  of  both  kinds  of  justice,  natural  and  positive.15 
Then  Tully  set  forth  in  the  Latin  tongue  the  books  of  his  own 
Republic.  Further,  the  philosopher  Fronto  wrote  the  book 
Strategematon,  or  Concerning  Military  Strategy. 

Mechanical  science  has  had  many  authors.  Hesiod  Ascraeus 
was  the  first  among  the  Greeks  who  applied  himself  to  describing 
farming,  and  "after  him  Democritus.  A  great  Carthaginian 
likewise  wrote  a  study  of  agriculture  in  twenty-eight  volumes. 
Among  the  Romans,  Cato  is  first  with  his  Concerning  agriculture, 
which  Marcus  Terentius  subsequently  elaborated.  Vergil  too 
wrote  his  Georgics;  then  Cornelius  and  Julius  Atticus  and 
Aemilian  or  Columella,  the  famous  orator  who  put  together  an 
entire  corpus  on  this  branch  of  knowledge."16  Then  there  are 
Vitruvius,  On  Architecture,  and  Palladius,  On  Agriculture. 


"They  tell  that  the  practice  of  fabric  making  was  first  shown 
the  Greeks  by  Minerva,  and  they  believe  too  that  she  designed 
the  first  loom,  dyed  fleece,  and  was  the  inventress  of  olive- 
growing  and  of  handicraft."17  By  her  Daedalus  was  taught,  and 
he  is  believed  to  have  practiced  handicrafts  after  her.18  "In 
Egypt,  however,  Isis,  daughter  of  Inachus,  introduced  the 
custom  of  weaving  linen  and  showed  how  vesture  might  be 
made  of  it."19  And  she  also  introduced  there  the  use  of  wool. 
In  Lybia  the  use  of  linen  first  began  to  spread  from  the  temple  of 

"Ninus,  king  of  the  Assyrians,  first  set  wars  in  motion. "20 
Vulcan,  they  tell,  was  the  first  smith,  but  divine  history  has  it 
Tubal.21  "Prometheus  first  invented  the  use  of  rings  when  he 
pressed  a  stone  into  an  iron  band."22  The  Pelasgians  first 
discovered  the  use  of  the  boat.  At  Eleusis  in  Greece  Ceres  first 
discovered  the  use  of  grain,  "as  did  Isis  in  Egypt."23  "To  Italy 
Pilumnus  brought  the  use  of  corn  and  spelt  and  the  manner  of 
grinding  and  pounding  them,"24  while  Tagus  brought  the 
practice  of  sowing  to  Spain. 2$  "Osiris  introduced  the  culture  of 
the  vine  among  the  Egyptians,  Liber  among  the  men  of  India."26 
"Daedalus  first  wrought  a  table  and  stool.  One  Apicius  first 
assembled  the  apparatus  of  cookery,  and  in  this  art  died  at 
length  a  willing  death  from  the  consumption  of  delicacies."27 

"Of  medicine  the  author  among  the  Greeks  was  Apollo, 
whose  son  Aesculapius  ennobled  it  with  praise  and  achievement 
and  afterwards  perished  from  lightning.  Then  the  care  of 
medicine  lapsed  and  lay  unknown  for  a  long  time,  nearly  five- 
hundred  years,  until  the  days  of  King  Artaxerxes.  Then 
Hippocrates  brought  it  forth  again  to  light;  he  was  the  son  of 
Asclepius  and  was  born  on  the  Isle  of  Cos."28 

"Games  are  thought  to  have  taken  start  with  the  men  of 
Lydia,  who,  coming  out  of  Asia,  settled  in  Etruria  with  Tyrrenus 
as  prince,  and  there,  amidst  all  the  rites  entailed  by  their  many 
superstitions,  held  spectacles — a  custom  copied  by  the  Romans, 
who  fetched  craftsmen  thence  to  teach  them  how,  and  for  this 
reason  games  bear  in  Latin  the  name  ludi  from  the  Lydi,  or 

"The  letters  of  the  Hebrews  are  believed  to  have  taken  start 
with  Moses  through  the  written  Law;  and  those  of  the  Chaldeans 


and  Syrians  through  Abraham.  Isis  founded  the  letters  of  the 
Egyptians ;  the  Phoenicians  those  of  the  Greeks,  when  Cadmus 
brought  the  alphabet  from  Phoenicia  into  Greece."30  "Carmentis, 
mother  of  Evander,  who  by  her  proper  name  is  called  Nico- 
strata,  invented  Latin  letters."31  "Moses  first  wrote  divine 
history,  while  among  the  gentiles  Dares  the  Phrygian  first 
published  the  history  of  Troy — written  on  leaves  of  palms,  they 
say.  After  Dares,  Herdodotus  was  considered  the  first  historian 
in  Greece,  and  after  him  Pherecydes  flourished  in  those  times 
when  Esdras  wrote  the  Law."32  Alcmon  of  Crotona  is  held  the 
first  inventor  of  fables.33 

Egypt  is  the  mother  of  the  arts,  and  thence  they  came  to 
Greece,  and  thence  to  Italy.34  In  Egypt  grammar  was  first 
founded  in  the  time  of  Osiris,  husband  of  Isis.  "There  too 
dialectic  was  first  founded  by  Parmenides,  who,  fleeing  cities 
and  the  gatherings  of  men,  dwelt  for  no  short  space  of  time  on  a 
rock  where  he  thought  out  the  science :  hence,  it  has  since  been 
called  the  Rock  of  Parmenides."35  "Plato  too,  upon  the  death 
of  Socrates  his  master,  led  by  love  of  learning,  emigrated  into 
Egypt,  whence,  having  acquired  liberal  studies,  he  returned  to 
Athens  and,  taking  to  himself  disciples  at  the  Academy,  his 
villa,  turned  his  efforts  to  studies  in  philosophy."3^  He,  first, 
taught  conceptual  logic  to  the  Greeks,  which  afterwards  his 
disciple  Aristotle  expanded,  perfected,  and  reduced  to  an  art. 
Marcus  Terentius  Varro  first  translated  dialectic  from  Greek 
into  Latin.37  At  a  later  date  Cicero  wrote  his  Topics.  Demos- 
thenes, an  artisan's  son,  is  believed  to  have  devised  rhetoric 
among  the  Greeks,  Tisias  among  the  Latins,  Corax  among  the 
Syracusans.38  Rhetoric  was  written  in  Greek  by  Aristotle  and 
Gorgias  and  Hermagoras,  and  brought  into  Latin  by  Tully, 
Quintilian,  and  Titian.39 

Chapter  Three :  Which  Arts  Are  Principally  to  Be  Read 

Out  of  all  the  sciences40  above  named,  however,  the  ancients, 
in  their  studies,  especially  selected  seven  to  be  mastered  by  those 
who  were  to  be  educated.  These  seven  they  considered  so  to 
excel  all  the  rest  in  usefulness  that  anyone  who  had  been 
thoroughly  schooled  in  them  might  afterward  come  to  a  know- 


ledge  of  the  others  by  his  own  inquiry  and  effort  rather  than  by 
listening  to  a  teacher.  For  these,  one  might  say,  constitute  the 
best  instruments,  the  best  rudiments,  by  which  the  way  is 
prepared  for  the  mind's  complete  knowledge  of  philosophic 
truth.  Therefore  they  are  called  by  the  name  tiwium  and 
quadrmum,  because  by  them,  as  by  certain  ways  {viae),  a  quick 
mind  enters  into  the  secret  places  of  wisdom. 

In  those  days,  no  one  was  thought  worthy  the  name  of 
master  who  was  unable  to  claim  knowledge  of  these  seven. 
Pythagoras,  too,  is  said  to  have  maintained  the  following 
practice  as  a  teacher :  for  seven  years,  according  to  the  number  of 
the  seven  liberal  arts,  no  one  of  his  pupils  dared  ask  the  reason 
behind  statements  made  by  him;  instead,  he  was  to  give  credence 
to  the  words  of  the  master  until  he  had  heard  him  out,  and  then, 
having  done  this,  he  would  be  able  to  come  at  the  reason  of  those 
things  himself.41  We  read  that  some  men  studied  these  seven 
with  such  zeal  that  they  had  them  completely  in  memory,  so 
that  whatever  writings  they  subsequently  took  in  hand  or 
whatever  questions  they  proposed  for  solution  or  proof,  they 
did  not  thumb  the  pages  of  books  to  hunt  for  rules  and  reasons 
which  the  liberal  arts  might  afford  for  the  resolution  of  a  doubt- 
ful matter,  but  at  once  had  the  particulars  ready  by  heart. 
Hence,  it  is  a  fact  that  in  that  time  there  were  so  many  learned 
men  that  they  alone  wrote  more  than  we  are  able  to  read.  But 
the  students42  of  our  day,  whether  from  ignorance  or  from 
unwillingness,  fail  to  hold  to  a  fit  method  of  study,  and  therefore 
we  find  many  who  study  but  few  who  are  wise.  Yet  it  seems  to 
me  that  the  student  should  take  no  less  care  not  to  expend  his 
effort  in  useless  studies  than  he  should  to  avoid  a  lukewarm 
pursuit  of  good  and  useful  ones.  It  is  bad  to  pursue  something 
good  negligently ;  it  is  worse  to  expend  many  labors  on  an  empty 
thing.  But  because  not  everyone  is  mature  enough  to  know 
what  is  of  advantage  to  him,  I  shall  briefly  indicate  to  the  student 
which  writings  seem  to  me  more  useful  than  others,  and  then  I 
shall  add  a  few  words  on  the  method  of  study. 

Chapter  Four:  Concerning  the  Two  Kinds  of  Writings 

There  are  two  kinds  of  writings.  The  first  kind  comprises 
what  are  properly  called  the  arts;  the  second,  those  writings 


which  are  appendages  of  the  arts.  The  arts  are  included  in 
philosophy:  they  have,  that  is,  some  definite  and  established 
part  of  philosophy  for  their  subject  matter — as  do  grammar, 
dialectic,  and  others  of  this  sort.  The  appendages  of  the  arts, 
however,  are  only  tangential  to  philosophy.  What  they  treat  is 
some  extra-philosophical  matter.  Occasionally,  it  is  true,  they 
touch  in  a  scattered  and  confused  fashion  upon  some  topics 
lifted  out  of  the  arts,  or,  if  their  narrative  presentation  is  simple, 
they  prepare  the  way  for  philosophy.  Of  this  sort  are  all  the 
songs  of  the  poets — tragedies,  comedies,  satires,  heroic  verse 
and  lyric,  iambics,  certain  didactic  poems,  fables  and  histories, 
and  also  the  writings  of  those  fellows  whom  today  we  commonly 
call  "philosophers"43  and  who  are  always  taking  some  small 
matter  and  dragging  it  out  through  long  verbal  detours, 
obscuring  a  simple  meaning  in  confused  discourses — who, 
lumping  even  dissimilar  things  together,  make,  as  it  were,  a 
single  "picture"  from  a  multitude  of  "colors"  and  forms.  Keep 
in  mind  the  two  things  I  have  distinguished  for  you — the  arts 
and  the  appendages  of  the  arts.44 

Between  these  two,  however,  there  is  in  my  view  such  distance 
as  the  poet  describes  when  he  says : 

As  much  as  the  wiry  willow  cedes  to  the  pale  olive, 
Or  the  wild  nard  to  roses  of  Punic  red.45 

It  is  a  distance  such  that  the  man  wishing  to  attain  knowledge, 
yet  who  willingly  deserts  truth  in  order  to  entangle  himself  in 
these  mere  by-products  of  the  arts,  will  find,  I  shall  not  say 
infinite,  but  exceedingly  great  pains  and  meagre  fruit.  Finally, 
the  arts  themselves,  without  these  things  that  border  on  them, 
are  able  to  make  the  student  perfect,  while  the  latter  things, 
without  the  arts,  are  capable  of  conferring  no  perfection :  and 
this  the  more  especially  since  the  latter  have  nothing  desirable 
with  which  to  tempt  the  student  except  what  they  have  taken 
over  and  adapted  from  the  arts ;  and  no  one  should  seek  in  them 
anything  but  what  is  of  the  arts.  For  this  reason  it  appears  to  me 
that  our  effort  should  first  be  given  to  the  arts,  in  which  are  the 
foundation  stones  of  all  things  and  in  which  pure  and  simple 
truth  is  revealed — and  especially  to  the  seven  already  mentioned, 
which  comprise  the  tools  of  all  philosophy;  afterwards,  if  time 


affords,  let  these  other  things  be  read,  for  sometimes  we  are 
better  pleased  when  entertaining  reading  is  mixed  with  serious, 
and  rarity  makes  what  is  good  seem  precious.  Thus,  we  some- 
times more  eagerly  take  up  a  thought  we  come  upon  in  the 
midst  of  a  story. 

It  is  in  the  seven  liberal  arts,  however,  that  the  foundation  of 
all  learning  is  to  be  found.  Before  all  others  these  ought  to  be 
had  at  hand,  because  without  them  the  philosophical  discipline 
does  not  and  cannot  explain  and  define  anything.  These, 
indeed,  so  hang  together  and  so  depend  upon  one  another  in 
their  ideas  that  if  only  one  of  the  arts  be  lacking,  all  the  rest 
cannot  make  a  man  into  a  philosopher.  Therefore,  those 
persons  seem  to  me  to  be  in  error  who,  not  appreciating  the 
coherence  among  the  arts,  select  certain  of  them  for  study,  and, 
leaving  the  rest  untouched,  think  they  can  become  perfect  in 
these  alone.46 

Chapter  Five :  That  to  Each  Art  Should  be  Given  What  Belongs  to  It 

There  is  still  another  error,  hardly  less  serious  than  that  just 
mentioned,  and  it  must  be  avoided  with  the  greatest  care: 
certain  persons,  while  they  omit  nothing  which  ought  to  be 
read,  nonetheless  do  not  know  how  to  give  each  art  what 
belongs  to  it,  but,  while  treating  one,  lecture  on  them  all.  In 
grammar  they  discourse  about  the  theory  of  syllogisms;  in 
dialectic  they  inquire  into  inflectional  cases;  and  what  is  still 
more  ridiculous,  in  discussing  the  title  of  a  book  they  practically 
cover  the  whole  work,  and,  by  their  third  lecture,  they  have 
hardly  finished  with  the  incipit.  It  is  not  the  teaching  of  others 
that  they  accomplish  in  this  way,  but  the  showing  off  of  their 
own  knowledge.  Would  that  they  seemed  to  everyone  as  they 
seem  to  me!  Only  consider  how  perverse  this  practice  is. 
Surely  the  more  you  collect  superfluous  details  the  less  you  are 
able  to  grasp  or  to  retain  useful  matters. 

Two  separate  concerns,  then,  are  to  be  recognized  and 
distinguished  in  every  art :  first,  how  one  ought  to  treat  of  the 
art  itself,  and  second,  how  one  ought  to  apply  the  principles  of 
that  art  in  all  other  matters  whatever.  Two  distinct  things  are 
involved  here :  treating  of  the  art  and  treating  by  means  of  the  art. 


Treating  of  an  art  is  treating,  for  instance,  of  grammar;  but 
treating  by  means  of  that  art  is  treating  some  matter  grammati- 
cally. Note  the  difference  between  these  two — treating  of 
grammar,  and  treating  some  matter  grammatically.  We  treat  of 
grammar  when  we  set  forth  the  rules  given  for  words  and  the 
various  precepts  proper  to  this  art ;  we  treat  grammatically  when 
we  speak  or  write  according  to  rule.  To  treat  of  grammar,  then, 
belongs  only  to  certain  books,  like  Priscian,  Donatus,  or 
Servius;  but  to  treat  grammatically  belongs  to  all  books. 

When,  therefore,  we  treat  of  any  art — and  especially  in 
teaching  it,  when  everything  must  be  reduced  to  outline  and 
presented  for  easy  understanding — we  should  be  content  to  set 
forth  the  matter  in  hand  as  briefly  and  as  clearly  as  possible,  lest 
by  excessively  piling  up  extraneous  considerations  we  distract 
the  student  more  than  we  instruct  him.  We  must  not  say  every- 
thing we  can,  lest  we  say  with  less  effect  such  things  as  need 
saying.  Seek,  therefore,  in  every  art  what  stands  established  as 
belonging  specifically  to  it.  Later,  when  you  have  studied  the 
arts  and  come  to  know  by  disputation  and  comparison  what  the 
proper  concern  of  each  of  them  is,47  then,  at  this  stage,  it  will 
be  fitting  for  you  to  bring  the  principles  of  each  to  bear  upon  all 
the  others,  and,  by  a  comparative  and  back-and-forth  examina- 
tion of  the  arts,  to  investigate  the  things  in  them  which  you  did 
not  well  understand  before.  Do  not  strike  into  a  lot  of  by-ways 
until  you  know  the  main  roads :  you  will  go  along  securely  when 
you  are  not  under  the  fear  of  going  astray.48 

Chapter  Six:  What  Is  Necessary  for  Study 

Three  things  are  necessary  for  those  who  study:  natural 
endowment,  practice,  and  discipline.49  By  natural  endowment 
is  meant  that  they  must  be  able  to  grasp  easily  what  they  hear 
and  to  retain  firmly  what  they  grasp;  by  practice  is  meant  that 
they  must  cultivate  by  assiduous  effort  the  natural  endowment 
they  have;  and  by  discipline  is  meant  that,  by  leading  a  praise- 
worthy life,  they  must  combine  moral  behavior  with  their 
knowledge.  Of  these  three  in  turn  we  shall  now  set  forth  a  few 
remarks  by  way  of  introduction. 


Chapter  Seven :  Concerning  Aptitude  as  Related  to  Natural  Endowment 

Those  who  work  at  learning  must  be  equipped  at  the  same 
time  with  aptitude  and  with  memory,  for  these  two  are  so 
closely  tied  together  in  every  study  and  discipline  that  if  one  of 
them  is  lacking,  the  other  alone  cannot  lead  anyone  to  perfection 
— just  as  earnings  are  useless  if  there  is  no  saving  of  them,  and 
storage  equipment  is  useless  if  there  is  nothing  to  preserve. 
Aptitude  gathers  wisdom,  memory  preserves  it. 

Aptitude  is  a  certain  faculty  naturally  rooted  in  the  mind  and 
empowered  from  within.50  It  arises  from  nature,  is  improved  by 
use,  is  blunted  by  excessive  work,  and  is  sharpened  by  temperate 
practice.51   As  someone  has  very  nicely  said: 

Please!  Spare  yourself  for  my  sake — there's  only  drudgery  in  those 
papers!   Go  run  in  the  open  air ! 

Aptitude  gets  practice  from  two  things — reading  and 
meditation.  Reading  consists  of  forming  our  minds  upon  rules 
and  precepts  taken  from  books,  and  it  is  of  three  types :  the 
teacher's,  the  learner's,  and  the  independent  reader's.  For  we 
say,  "I  am  reading  the  book  to  him,"  "I  am  reading  the  book 
under  him,"  and  "I  am  reading  the  book."52  Order  and  method 
are  what  especially  deserve  attention  in  the  matter  of  reading. 

Chapter  Eight:  Concerning  Order  in  Expounding  a  Text 

One  kind  of  order  is  observed  in  the  disciplines,  when  I  say, 
for  instance,  that  grammar  is  more  ancient  than  dialectic,  or 
arithmetic  comes  before  music;  another  kind  in  codices  or 
anthologies,  when  I  declare,  for  instance,  that  the  Catilinarian 
orations  are  ahead  of  the  Jugurtha;  another  kind  in  narration, 
which  moves  in  continuous  series;  and  another  kind  in  the 
exposition  of  a  text. 

Order  in  the  disciplines  is  arranged  to  follow  nature.  In 
books  it  is  arranged  according  to  the  person  of  the  author  or  the 
nature  of  the  subject  matter.53  In  narration  it  follows  an 
arrangement  which  is  of  two  kinds — either  natural,  as  when 
deeds  are  recounted  in  the  order  of  their  occurrence,  or  artificial, 
as  when  a  subsequent  event  is  related  first  and  a  prior  event  is 


told  after  it.   In  the  exposition  of  a  text,  the  order  followed  is 
adapted  to  inquiry. 

Exposition  includes  three  things:  the  letter,  the  sense,  and 
the  inner  meaning.  The  letter  is  the  fit  arrangement  of  words, 
which  we  also  call  construction;  the  sense  is  a  certain  ready  and 
obvious  meaning  which  the  letter  presents  on  the  surface;  the 
inner  meaning  is  the  deeper  understanding  which  can  be  found 
only  through  interpretation  and  commentary.  Among  these, 
the  order  of  inquiry  is  first  the  letter,  then  the  sense,  and  finally 
the  inner  meaning.  And  when  this  is  done,  the  exposition  is 

Chapter  Nine:  Concerning  the  Method  of  Expounding  a  Text55 

The  method  of  expounding  a  text  consists  in  analysis.  Every 
analysis  begins  from  things  which  are  finite,  or  defined,  and 
proceeds  in  the  direction  of  things  which  are  infinite,  or  un- 
defined. Now  every  finite  or  defined  matter  is  better  known  and 
able  to  be  grasped  by  our  knowledge;  teaching,  moreover, 
begins  with  those  things  which  are  better  known  and,  by 
acquainting  us  with  these,  works  its  way  to  matters  which  lie 
hidden.  Furthermore,  we  investigate  with  our  reason  (the  proper 
function  of  which  is  to  analyze)  when,  by  analysis  and  in- 
vestigation of  the  natures  of  individual  things,  we  descend  from 
universals  to  particulars.  For  every  universal  is  more  fully 
defined  than  its  particulars :  when  we  learn,  therefore,  we  ought 
to  begin  with  universals,  which  are  better  known  and  determined 
and  inclusive;  and  then,  by  descending  little  by  little  from  them 
and  by  distinguishing  individuals  through  analysis,  we  ought  to 
investigate  the  nature  of  the  things  those  universals  contain. 

Chapter  Ten:  Concerning  Meditation^ 

Meditation  is  sustained  thought  along  planned  lines:  it 
prudently  investigates  the  cause  and  the  source,  the  manner  and 
the  utility  of  each  thing.  Meditation  takes  its  start  from  reading 
but  is  bound  by  none  of  reading's  rules  or  precepts.  For  it 
delights  to  range  along  open  ground,  where  it  fixes  its  free  gaze 
upon  the  contemplation  of  truth,  drawing  together  now  these, 
now  those  causes  of  things,  or  now  penetrating  into  profundities, 


leaving  nothing  doubtful,  nothing  obscure.  The  start  of 
learning,  thus,  lies  in  reading,  but  its  consummation  lies  in 
meditation ;  which,  if  any  man  will  learn  to  love  it  very  intimately 
and  will  desire  to  be  engaged  very  frequently  upon  it,  renders 
his  life  pleasant  indeed,  and  provides  the  greatest  consolation  to 
him  in  his  trials.  This  especially  it  is  which  takes  the  soul  away 
from  the  noise  of  earthly  business  and  makes  it  have  even  in  this 
life  a  kind  of  foretaste  of  the  sweetness  of  the  eternal  quiet. 
And  when,  through  the  things  which  God  has  made,  a  man  has 
learned  to  seek  out  and  to  understand  him  who  has  made  them 
all,  then  does  he  equally  instruct  his  mind  with  knowledge  and 
fill  it  with  joy.  From  this  it  follows  that  in  meditation  is  to  be 
found  the  greatest  delight. 

There  are  three  kinds  of  meditation:  one  consists  in  a  con- 
sideration of  morals,  the  second  in  a  scrutiny  of  the  command- 
ments, and  the  third  in  an  investigation  of  the  divine  works. 
Morals  are  found  in  virtues  and  vices.  The  divine  command 
either  orders,  or  promises,  or  threatens.57  The  work  of  God 
comprises  what  his  power  creates,  what  his  wisdom  disposes, 
and  what  his  grace  co-effects.  And  the  more  a  man  knows  how 
great  is  the  admiration  which  all  these  things  deserve,  the  more 
intently  does  he  give  himself  to  continual  meditation  upon  the 
wonders  of  God. 

Chapter  Eleven :  Concerning  Memory 

Concerning  memory  I  do  not  think  one  should  fail  to  say  here 
that  just  as  aptitude  investigates  and  discovers  through  analysis, 
so  memory  retains  through  gathering.  The  things  which  we 
have  analyzed  in  the  course  of  learning  and  which  we  must 
commit  to  memory  we  ought,  therefore,  to  gather.  Now 
"gathering"  is  reducing  to  a  brief  and  compendious  outline 
things  which  have  been  written  or  discussed  at  some  length.58 
The  ancients  called  such  an  outline  an  "epilogue,"  that  is,  a 
short  restatement,  by  headings,  of  things  already  said.  Now 
every  exposition  has  some  principle  upon  which  the  entire  truth 
of  the  matter  and  the  force  of  its  thought  rest,  and  to  this 
principle  everything  else  is  traced  back.  To  look  for  and 
consider  this  principle  is  to  "gather." 


The  fountainhead  is  one,  but  its  derivative  streams  are  many : 
why  follow  the  windings  of  the  latter?  Lay  hold  upon  the 
source  and  you  have  the  whole  thing.  I  say  this  because  the 
memory  of  man  is  dull  and  likes  brevity,  and,  if  it  is  dissipated 
upon  many  things,  it  has  less  to  bestow  upon  each  of  them.  We 
ought,  therefore,  in  all  that  we  learn,  to  gather  brief  and 
dependable  abstracts  to  be  stored  in  the  little  chest  of  the 
memory,  so  that  later  on,  when  need  arises,  we  can  derive 
everything  else  from  them.  These  one  must  often  turn  over  in 
the  mind  and  regurgitate  from  the  stomach  of  one's  memory  to 
taste  them,  lest  by  long  inattention  to  them,  thev  disappear.59 

I  charge  you,  then,  my  student,  not  to  rejoice  a  great  deal 
because  you  may  have  read  many  things,  but  because  you  have 
been  able  to  retain  them.  Otherwise  there  is  no  profit  in  having 
read  or  understood  much.  And  for  this  reason  I  call  to  mind 
again  what  I  said  earlier :  those  who  devote  themselves  to  study 
require  both  aptitude  and  memory.60 

Chapter  Twelve :  Concerning  Discipline 

A  certain  wise  man,  when  asked  concerning  the  method  and 
form  of  study,  declared : 

A  humble  mind,  eagerness  to  inquire,  a  quiet  life, 

Silent  scrutiny,  poverty,  a  foreign  soil. 

These,  for  many,  unlock  the  hidden  places  of  learning.61 

He  had  heard,  I  should  judge,  the  saying,  "Morals  equip 
learning."62  Therefore  he  joined  rules  for  living  to  rules  for 
study,  in  order  that  the  student  might  know  both  the  standard  of 
his  life  and  the  nature  of  his  study.  Unpraise worthy  is  learning 
stained  bv  a  shameless  life.  Therefore,  let  him  who  would  seek 
learning  take  care  above  all  that  he  not  neglect  discipline. 

Chapter  Thirteen :  Concerning  Humility 

Now  the  beginning  of  discipline  is  humility.  Although  the 
lessons  of  humility  are  many,  the  three  which  follow  are  of 
especial  importance  for  the  student:  first,  that  he  hold  no 
knowledge  and  no  writing  in  contempt;  second,  that  he  blush 



to  learn  from  no  man;  and  third,  that  when  he  has  attained 
learning  himself,  he  not  look  down  upon  everyone  else. 

Many  are  deceived  by  the  desire  to  appear  wise  before  their 
time.  They  therefore  break  out  in  a  certain  swollen  importance 
and  begin  to  simulate  what  they  are  not  and  to  be  ashamed  of 
what  they  are;  and  they  slip  all  the  farther  from  wisdom  in 
proportion  as  they  think,  not  of  being  wise,  but  of  being  thought 
so.  I  have  known  many  of  this  sort  who,  although  they  still 
lacked  the  very  rudiments  of  learning,  yet  deigned  to  concern 
themselves  only  with  the  highest  problems,  and  they  supposed 
that  they  themselves  were  well  on  the  road  to  greatness  simply 
because  they  had  read  the  writings  or  heard  the  words  of  great 
and  wise  men.  "We,"  they  say,  "have  seen  them.  We  have 
studied  under  them.  They  often  used  to  talk  to  us.  Those  great 
ones,  those  famous  men,  they  know  us."  Ah,  would  that  no 
one  knew  me  and  that  I  but  knew  all  things!  You  glory  in 
having  seen,  not  in  having  understood,  Plato.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  I  should  think  it  not  good  enough  for  you  to  listen  to  me. 
I  am  not  Plato.  I  have  not  deserved  to  see  him.  Good  for 
you!  You  have  drunk  at  the  very  fount  of  philosophy — but 
would  that  you  thirsted  still!  "The  king,  having  drunk  from  a 
goblet  of  gold,  drinks  next  from  a  cup  of  clay!"63  Why  are 
you  blushing?  You  have  heard  Plato! — may  you  hear 
Chrysippus  too!  The  proverb  says,  "What  you  do  not  know, 
maybe  Ofellus  knows."64  There  is  no  one  to  whom  it  is  given  to 
know  all  things,  no  one  who  has  not  received  his  special  gift 
from  nature.  The  wise  student,  therefore,  gladly  hears  all,  reads 
all,  and  looks  down  upon  no  writing,  no  person,  no  teaching. 
From  all  indifferently  he  seeks  what  he  sees  he  lacks,  and  he 
considers  not  how  much  he  knows,  but  of  how  much  he  is 
ignorant.  For  this  reason  men  repeat  Plato's  saying:  "I  would 
rather  learn  with  modesty  what  another  man  says  than  shameless- 
ly push  forward  my  own  ideas."65  Why  do  you  blush  to  be 
taught,  and  yet  not  blush  at  your  ignorance?  The  latter  is  a 
greater  shame  than  the  former.  Or  why  should  you  affect  the 
heights  when  you  are  still  lying  in  the  depths?  Consider, 
rather,  what  your  powers  will  at  present  permit:  the  man  who 
proceeds  stage  by  stage  moves  along  best.  Certain  fellows, 
wishing  to  make  a  great  leap  of  progress,  sprawl  headlong.  Do 


not  hurry  too  much,  therefore ;  in  this  way  you  will  come  more 
quickly  to  wisdom.  Gladly  learn  from  all  what  you  do  not 
know,  for  humility  can  make  you  a  sharer  in  the  special  gift 
which  natural  endowment  has  given  to  every  man.  You  will 
be  wiser  than  all  if  you  are  willing  to  learn  from  all. 

Finally,  hold  no  learning  in  contempt,  for  all  learning  is  good. 
Do  not  scorn  at  least  to  read  a  book,  if  you  have  the  time.  If 
you  gain  nothing  from  it,  neither  do  you  lose  anything; 
especially  since  there  is,  in  my  judgment,  no  book  which  does 
not  set  forth  something  worth  looking  for,  if  that  book  is  taken 
up  at  the  right  place  and  time;  or  which  does  not  possess  some- 
thing even  special  to  itself  which  the  diligent  scrutineer  of  its 
contents,  having  found  it  nowhere  else,  seizes  upon  gladly  in 
proportion  as  it  is  the  more  rare. 

Nothing,  however,  is  good  if  it  eliminates  a  better  thing.  If 
you  are  not  able  to  read  everything,  read  those  things  which  are 
more  useful.  Even  if  you  should  be  able  to  read  them  all,  how- 
ever, you  should  not  expend  the  same  labor  upon  all.  Some 
things  are  to  be  read  that  we  may  know  them,  but  others  that  we 
may  at  least  have  heard  of  them,  for  sometimes  we  think  that 
things  of  which  we  have  not  heard  are  of  greater  worth  than 
they  are,  and  we  estimate  more  readily  a  thing  whose  fruit  is 
known  to  us. 

You  can  now  see  how  necessary  to  you  is  that  humility  which 
will  prompt  you  to  hold  no  knowledge  in  contempt  and  to  learn 
gladly  from  all.  Similarly,  it  is  fitting  for  you  that  when  you 
have  begun  to  know  something,  you  not  look  down  upon 
everyone  else.  For  the  vice  of  an  inflated  ego  attacks  some  men 
because  they  pay  too  much  fond  attention  to  their  own  know- 
ledge, and  when  they  seem  to  themselves  to  have  become  some- 
thing, they  think  that  others  whom  they  do  not  even  know  can 
neither  be  nor  become  as  great.  So  it  is  that  in  our  days  certain 
peddlers  of  trifles  come  fuming  forth;  glorying  in  I  know  not 
what,66  they  accuse  our  forefathers  of  simplicity  and  suppose 
that  wisdom,  having  been  born  with  themselves,  with  them- 
selves will  die.67  They  say  that  the  divine  utterances  have  such 
a  simple  way  of  speaking  that  no  one  has  to  study  them  under 
masters,  but  can  sufficiently  penetrate  to  the  hidden  treasures  of 
Truth  by  his  own  mental  acumen.  They  wrinkle  their  noses  and 


purse  their  lips  at  lecturers  in  divinity  and  do  not  understand 
that  they  themselves  give  offense  to  God,  whose  words  they 
preach — words  simple  to  be  sure  in  their  verbal  beauty,  but 
lacking  savor  when  given  a  distorted  sense.  It  is  not  my  advice 
that  you  imitate  men  of  this  kind.68 

The  good  student,  then,  ought  to  be  humble  and  docile, 
free  alike  from  vain  cares  and  from  sensual  indulgences,  diligent 
and  zealous  to  learn  willingly  from  all,  to  presume  never  upon 
his  own  knowledge,  to  shun  the  authors  of  perverse  doctrine  as 
if  they  were  poison,  to  consider  a  matter  thoroughly  and  at 
length  before  judging  of  it,  to  seek  to  be  learned  rather  than 
merely  to  seem  so,  to  love  such  words  of  the  wise  as  he  has 
grasped,  and  ever  to  hold  those  words  before  his  gaze  as  the 
very  mirror  of  his  countenance.  And  if  some  things,  by  chance 
rather  obscure,  have  not  allowed  him  to  understand  them,  let 
him  not  at  once  break  out  in  angry  condemnation  and  think  that 
nothing  is  good  but  what  he  himself  can  understand.  This  is  the 
humility  proper  to  a  student's  discipline. 

Chapter  Fourteen :  Concerning  Eagerness  to  Inquire 

Eagerness  to  inquire  relates  to  practice  and  in  it  the  student 
needs  encouragement  rather  than  instruction.  Whoever  wishes 
to  inspect  earnestly  what  the  ancients  in  their  love  of  wisdom 
have  handed  down  to  us,  and  how  deserving  of  posterity's 
remembrance  are  the  monuments  which  they  left  of  their  virtue, 
will  see  how  inferior  his  own  earnestness  is  to  theirs.  Some  of 
them  scorned  honors,  others  cast  aside  riches,  others  rejoiced  in 
injuries  received,  others  despised  hardships,  and  still  others, 
deserting  the  meeting  places  of  men  for  the  farthest  withdrawn 
spots  and  secret  haunts  of  solitude,  gave  themselves  over  to 
philosophy  alone,  that  they  might  have  greater  freedom  for  un- 
disturbed contemplation  insofar  as  they  subjected  their  minds 
to  none  of  the  desires  which  usually  obstruct  the  path  of  virtue. 
We  read  that  the  philosopher  Parmenides  dwelt  on  a  rock  in 
Egypt  for  fifteen  years.69  And  Prometheus,  for  his  unrestrained 
love  of  thinking,  is  recorded  to  have  been  exposed  to  the  attacks 
of  a  vulture  on  Mount  Caucasus.  For  they  knew  that  the  true 
good  lies  not  in  the  esteem  of  men  but  is  hidden  in  a  pure 


conscience  and  that  those  are  not  truly  men  who,  clinging  to 
things  destined  to  perish,  do  not  recognize  their  own  good. 
Therefore,  seeing  that  they  differed  in  mind  and  understanding 
from  all  the  rest  of  men,  they  displayed  this  fact  in  the  very  far- 
removal  of  their  dwelling  places,  so  that  one  community  might 
not  hold  men  not  associated  by  the  same  objectives.  A  certain 
man  retorted  to  a  philosopher,  saying,  "Do  you  not  see  that  men 
are  laughing  at  you?"  To  which  the  philosopher  replied,  "They 
laugh  at  me,  and  the  asses  bray  at  them."  Think  if  you  can  how 
much  he  valued  the  praise  of  those  men  whose  vituperation, 
even,  he  did  not  fear.  Of  another  man  we  read  that  after 
studying  all  the  disciplines  and  attaining  the  very  peaks  of  all 
the  arts  he  turned  to  the  potter's  trade.  Again,  the  disciples  of  a 
certain  other  man,  when  they  exalted  their  master  with  praises, 
gloried  in  the  fact  that  among  all  his  other  accomplishments  he 
even  possessed  that  of  being  a  shoemaker. 

I  could  wish  that  our  students  possessed  such  earnestness  that 
wisdom  would  never  grow  old  in  them.  None  but  Abisag  the 
Sunamitess  warmed  the  aged  David,  because  the  love  of  wisdom, 
though  the  body  decay,  will  not  desert  her  lover.70  "Almost  all 
the  powers  of  the  body  are  changed  in  aged  men;  while  wisdom 
alone  increases,  all  the  rest  fade  away."71  "The  old  age  of  those 
who  have  formed  their  youth  upon  creditable  pursuits  becomes 
wiser  with  the  years,  acquires  greater  polish72  through  ex- 
perience, greater  wisdom  with  the  passage  of  time,  and  reaps 
the  sweetest  fruits  of  former  studies.  That  wise  and  well-known 
man  of  Greece,  Themistocles,73  when  he  had  lived  a  full  one- 
hundred  seven  years  and  saw  that  he  was  about  to  die,  is  said  to 
have  declared  that  he  was  sad  to  depart  this  life  when  he  had 
just  begun  to  be  wise.  Plato  died  writing  in  his  eighty-first 
year.74  Socrates75  filled  ninety-nine  years  with  the  pain  and 
labor  of  teaching  and  writing.  I  pass  over  in  silence  all  the 
other  philosophers — Pythagoras,  Democritus,  Xenocrates,  Zeno, 
and  the  Elean  (Parmenides) — who  flourished  throughout  a  long 
life  spent  in  the  pursuit  of  wisdom.  I  come  now  to  the  poets — 
Homer,  Hesiod,  Simonides,  and  Tersichorus,76  who,  when 
advanced  in  years,  sang,  with  the  approach  of  death — how  shall 
I  say  it? — a  swan-song  sweeter  than  even  their  former  wont. 
When  Sophocles,  after  an  exceedingly  old  age  and  a  long  neglect 



of  his  family  affairs,  was  accused  by  his  sons  of  madness,  he 
declaimed  to  the  judge  the  story  of  Oedipus  which  he  had  only 
recently  composed,  and  gave  such  a  specimen  of  his  wisdom  in 
these  already  broken  years  that  he  moved  the  austere  dignity  of 
the  courtroom  to  the  applause  of  the  theatre.  Nor  is  this  a 
matter  for  wonder,  when  even  Cato  the  censor,  most  erudite  of 
the  Romans,  neither  blushed  nor  despaired  to  learn  Greek  when 
he  was  already  an  old  man.  And,  indeed,  Homer  reports  that 
from  the  tongue  of  Nestor,  who  was  already  stooped  with  age 
and  nearly  decrepit,  flowed  speech  sweeter  than  honey."77 
Consider,  then,  how  much  these  men  loved  wisdom  when  not 
even  decrepit  age  could  call  them  away  from  its  quest. 

The  greatness  of  that  love  of  wisdom,  therefore,  and  the 
abundance  of  judgment  in  elderly  men  is  aptly  inferred  from  the 
interpretation  of  that  very  name  "Abisag"  which  I  mentioned 
above.  "For  'Abisag'  means  'father  mine,  superabounding'  or 
again  'my  father's  deep-voiced  cry,'  whence  it  is  most  abundant- 
ly shown  that,  with  the  aged,  the  thunder  of  divine  discourse 
tarries  beyond  human  speech.  For  the  word  'superabounding' 
here  signifies  fulness,  not  redundance.  And  indeed,  'Sunamitess' 
in  our  language  means  'scarlet  woman,'"78  an  expression  which 
can  aptly  enough  signify  zeal  for  wisdom. 

Chapter  Fifteen :  Concerning  the  Four  Remaining  Precepts 

The  four  following  precepts  are  so  arranged  that  they  alter- 
nately refer  first  to  discipline  and  next  to  practice. 

Chapter  Sixteen :  On  Quiet 

Quiet  of  life — whether  interior,  so  that  the  mind  is  not 
distracted  with  illicit  desires,  or  exterior,  so  that  leisure  and 
opportunity  are  provided  for  creditable  and  useful  studies — is 
in  both  senses  important  to  discipline. 

Chapter  Seventeen :  On  Scrutiny 

Now,  scrutiny,  that  is,  meditation,  has  to  do  with  practice. 
Yet  it  seems  that  scrutiny  belongs  under  eagerness  to  inquire, 
and  if  this  is  true,  we  are  here  repeating  ourselves  needlessly, 


since  we  mentioned  the  latter  above.  It  should,  however,  be 
recognized  that  there  is  a  difference  between  these  two.  Eager- 
ness to  inquire  means  insistent  application  to  one's  work; 
scrutiny  means  earnestness  in  considering  things.  Hard  work 
and  love  make  you  carry  out  a  task ;  concern  and  alertness  make 
you  well-advised.  Through  hard  work  you  keep  matters  going; 
through  love  you  bring  them  to  perfection.  Through  concern 
you  look  ahead;  through  alertness  you  pay  close  attention. 
These  are  the  four  footmen  who  carry  the  chair  of  Philology, 
for  they  give  practice  to  the  mind  over  which  Wisdom  sits  ruler. 
The  chair  of  Philology  is  the  throne  of  Wisdom,  and  it  is  said  to 
be  carried  by  these  bearers  because  it  is  carried  forward  when 
one  practices  these  things.  Therefore,  the  two  front  bearers, 
because  of  their  power,  are  neatly  designated  as  the  youths 
Philos  and  Kophos,  that  is  Love  and  Hard  Work,  because  they 
bring  a  task  to  external  perfection ;  the  two  rear  bearers  are  with 
equal  neatness  designated  as  the  maidens  Philemia  and  Agrimnia 
(Epimeleia  and  Agrypnia),  that  is  Concern  and  Alertness, 
because  they  inspire  interior  and  secret  reflection.79  There  are 
some  who  suppose  that  by  the  Chair  of  Philology  is  meant  the 
human  body,  over  which  the  rational  soul  presides,  and  which 
four  footmen  carry — that  is,  the  four  elements  of  which  the  two 
upper  ones,  namely  fire  and  air,  are  masculine  in  function  and  in 
gender,  and  the  two  lower,  earth  and  water,  feminine.80 

Chapter  Eighteen:  On  Parsimony 

Men  have  wished  to  persuade  students  to  be  content  with 
slender  means,  that  is,  not  to  hanker  after  superfluities.  This  is 
a  matter  of  especial  importance  for  their  discipline.  "A  fat 
belly,"  as  the  saying  goes,  "does  not  produce  a  fine  perception."8  * 
But  what  will  the  students  of  our  time  be  able  to  say  for  them- 
selves on  this  point?  Not  only  do  they  despise  frugality  in  the 
course  of  their  studies,  but  they  even  labor  to  appear  rich  beyond 
what  they  are.  Each  one  boasts  not  of  what  he  has  learned  but 
of  what  he  has  spent.  But  perhaps  the  explanation  of  this  lies  in 
their  wish  to  imitate  their  masters,82  concerning  whom  I  can 
find  nothing  worthy  enough  to  say! 


Chapter  Nineteen:  On  a  Foreign  Soil*3 

Finally,  a  foreign  soil  is  proposed,  since  it  too  gives  a  man 
practice.  All  the  world  is  a  foreign  soil  to  those  who  philoso- 
phize.84  However,  as  a  certain  poet  says : 

I  know  not  by  what  sweetness  native  soil  attracts  a  man 
And  suffers  not  that  he  should  e'er  forget.85 

It  is,  therefore,  a  great  source  of  virtue  for  the  practiced  mind 
to  learn,  bit  by  bit,  first  to  change  about  in  visible  and  transitory 
things,  so  that  afterwards  it  may  be  able  to  leave  them  behind 
altogether.  The  man  who  finds  his  homeland  sweet  is  still  a 
tender  beginner;  he  to  whom  every  soil  is  as  his  native  one  is 
already  strong ;  but  he  is  perfect  to  whom  the  entire  world  is  as 
a  foreign  land.  The  tender  soul  has  fixed  his  love  on  one  spot  in 
the  world;  the  strong  man  has  extended  his  love  to  all  places; 
the  perfect  man  has  extinguished  his.  From  boyhood  I  have 
dwelt  on  foreign  soil,  and  I  know  with  what  grief  sometimes  the 
mind  takes  leave  of  the  narrow  hearth  of  a  peasant's  hut,86  and  I 
know,  too,  how  frankly  it  afterwards  disdains  marble  firesides87 
and  panelled  halls.88 


Chapter  One :  Concerning  the  Study  of  the  Sacred  Scriptures 

Neither  all  nor  only  those  writings  which  treat  of  God  or  of 
invisible  goods  are  to  be  called  sacred.  In  the  books  of  pagans 
we  find  many  things  quite  plausibly  argued  about  the  eternity  of 
God  and  the  immortality  of  souls,  about  eternal  rewards  owing 
to  the  virtues,  and  about  eternal  punishments  owing  to  evils, 
and  yet  no  one  supposes  that  these  books  merit  the  term 
"sacred."  Again,  as  we  run  through  the  series  of  books  in  the 
Old  Testament  and  the  New,  we  see  that  the  collection  is 
devoted  almost  entirely  to  the  state  of  this  present  life  and  to 
deeds  done  in  time,  while  rarely  is  anything  clearly  to  be  drawn1 
from  them  concerning  the  sweetness  of  eternal  goods  or  the  joys 
of  the  heavenly  life.  And  yet  these  writings  the  catholic  faith 
traditionally  calls  Sacred  Scriptures. 

The  writings  of  philosophers,  like  a  whitewashed  wall  of  clay, 
boast  an  attractive  surface  all  shining  with  eloquence;  but  if 
sometimes  they  hold  forth  to  us  a  semblance  of  truth,  never- 
theless, by  mixing  falsehoods  with  it,  they  conceal  the  clay  of 
error,  as  it  were,  under  an  over-spread  coat  of  color.  The 
Sacred  Scriptures,  on  the  other  hand,  are  most  fittingly  likened 
to  a  honeycomb,  for  while  in  the  simplicity  of  their  language 
they  seem  dry,  within  they  are  filled  with  sweetness.  And  thus  it 
is  that  they  have  deservedly  come  by  the  name  sacred,  for  they 
alone  are  found  so  free  from  the  infection  of  falsehood  that  they 
are  proved  to  contain  nothing  contrary  to  truth. 

Sacred  Scriptures  are  those  which  were  produced  by  men  who 
cultivated  the  catholic  faith  and  which  the  authority  of  the 
universal  church  has  taken  over  to  be  included  among  the 
Sacred  Books  and  preserved  to  be  read  for  the  strengthening  of 
that  same  faith.  Besides  these,  there  exists  an  exceedingly  large 
number  of  short  works  which  holy  and  wise  men  have  written  at 


various  times  and  which,  although  they  are  not  approved  by  the 
authority  of  the  universal  church,  nevertheless  pass  for  Sacred 
Scriptures,  both  because  they  do  not  depart  from  the  catholic 
faith  and  because  they  teach  many  useful  matters.  But  very  likely 
more  can  be  shown  by  enumerating  these  writings  than  by 
denning  them. 

Chapter  Two :  Concerning  the  Order  and  Number  of  the  Books 

The  whole  of  Sacred  Scripture  is  contained  in  two  Testaments, 
namely,  in  the  Old  and  in  the  New.  The  books  in  each  Testament 
are  divided  into  three  groups.  The  Old  Testament  contains  the 
Law,  the  Prophets,  and  the  Hagiographers ;  the  New  contains 
the  Gospel,  the  Apostles,  and  the  Fathers.2 

The  first  group  in  the  Old  Testament — that  is,  the  Law, 
which  the  Hebrews  call  the  Torafo — contains  the  Pentateuch,  or 
the  five  books  of  Moses.  First  in  this  group  is  Bresith,  or 
Genesis;  second  Hellesmoth,  or  Exodus;  third,  Vaiecra,  or 
Leviticus,  fourth  Vaiedaber,  or  Numbers;  fifth,  Adabarim,  or 

The  second  group  is  that  of  the  Prophets.  It  contains  eight 
books.  The  first  is  called  Josue  ben  Nun,  which  means  "Son  of 
Nun" — also  called  simply  Josue  or  Jesus  or  Jesu  Nave.  The 
second  is  called  Sophtim,  and  it  is  the  book  of  Judges;  the  third, 
Samuel,  and  it  is  the  first  and  second  books  of  Kings;  the  fourth, 
Malachim,  and  it  is  the  third  and  fourth  books  of  Kings;  the 
fifth,  Isaias;  the  sixth,  Jeremias;  the  seventh,  Ezechiel;  the 
eighth,  Thareasra,  and  it  consists  of  the  Twelve  [Minor]  Prophets. 

Next,  the  third  group  has  nine  books.  The  first  is  Job;  the 
second,  David;  the  third,  Mas/oth,  which  in  Greek  is  called 
Parables  and  in  Latin,  Proverbs — and  these  are  Solomon's ;  the 
fourth,  Coe/eth,  which  is  Ecclesiastes ;  the  fifth,  Sira  Syrin,  that  is, 
the  Canticle  of  Canticles;  the  sixth,  Daniel;  the  seventh, 
Dabrehiamin,  which  is  Paralipomenon ;  the  eighth,  Esdras;  the 
ninth,  Esther.  All  these  total  twenty-two. 

Besides  all  these  there  are  five  other  books — The  Wisdom  of 
Solomon,  the  Book  of  Jesus  Son  of  Sirach,  the  Book  of  Judith, 
the  Book  of  Tobias,  and  the  Books  of  the  Machabees — which 
are  read,  to  be  sure,  but  which  are  not  included  in  the  canon.4 


The  first  group  of  the  New  Testament  contains  four  books : 
Matthew,  Mark,  Luke,  and  John.  The  second  likewise  contains 
four :  the  fourteen  letters  of  Paul  collected  in  one  book ;  then  the 
Canonical  Epistles;  the  Apocalypse;  and  the  Acts  of  the 
Apostles.  In  the  third  group,  first  place  is  held  by  the  Decretals, 
which  we  call  canons,  or  rules;  the  second,  by  the  writings  of  the 
holy  Fathers  and  Doctors  of  the  Church — Jerome,  Augustine, 
Gregory,  Ambrose,  Isidore,  Origen,  Bede,  and  many  other 
orthodox  authors.  Their  works  are  so  limitless  that  they  cannot 
be  numbered — which  makes  strikingly  clear  how  much  fervor 
they  had  in  that  Christian  faith  for  the  assertion  of  which  they 
left  so  many  and  such  great  remembrances  to  posterity.  Indeed, 
we  stand  convicted  of  indolence  by  our  inability  to  read  all  that 
they  could  manage  to  dictate. 

In  these  groups  most  strikingly  appears  the  likeness  between 
the  two  Testaments.  For  just  as  after  the  Law  come  the 
Prophets,  and  after  the  Prophets,  the  Hagiographers,  so  after  the 
Gospel  come  the  Apostles,  and  after  the  Apostles  the  long  line 
of  Doctors.  And  by  a  wonderful  ordering  of  the  divine  dispen- 
sation, it  has  been  brought  about  that  although  the  truth  stands 
full  and  perfect  in  each  of  the  books,  yet  none  of  them  is  super- 
fluous. These  few  things  we  have  condensed  concerning  the 
order  and  number  of  the  Sacred  Books,  that  the  student  may 
know  what  his  required  reading  is. 

Chapter  Three :  Concerning  the  Authors  of  the  Sacred  Books 

"Moses  wTrote  the  five  books  of  the  Law.  Of  the  Book  of 
Josue,  that  same  Josue  whose  name  it  bears  is  believed  to  have 
been  the  author.  The  Book  of  Judges,  they  say,  was  produced 
by  Samuel.  The  first  part  of  the  Book  of  Samuel  he  himself 
wrote,  but  the  rest  to  the  very  end,  David.  Malachim,  Jeremias 
first  brought  together  into  a  single  book,  for  previously 
this  material  had  been  scattered  in  histories  of  the  individual 

Isaias,  Jeremias,  and  Ezechiel  each  wrote  the  books  inscribed 
with  their  names.  "The  Book  of  the  Twelve  Prophets  is 
inscribed  with  the  names  of  its  authors,  whose  names  are:  Osee, 
Joel,    Amos,    Abdias,    Jonas,    Michaeas,    Nahum,    Habacuc, 


Sophonias,  Aggeus,  Zacharias,  and  Malachias.  These  are  called 
the  Minor  Prophets  because  their  discourses  are  short  and  are 
therefore  included  in  a  single  book."6  As  for  Isaias  and  Jeremias 
and  Ezechiel  and  Daniel,  these  four  are  the  Major  Prophets,  each 
set  apart  in  a  separate  book. 

"The  Book  of  Job  some  believe  was  written  by  Moses;  others 
hold  it  to  have  been  written  by  one  of  the  Prophets,  while  a 
number  suppose  it  the  work  of  Job  himself."7  The  Book  of 
Psalms  David  produced,  though  afterwards  Esdras  gave  the 
psalms  their  present  order  and  added  the  titles.  Parables, 
Ecclesiastes,  and  the  Canticle  of  Canticles  Solomon  composed. 
Daniel  was  the  author  of  his  own  book.  "The  Book  of  Esdras 
bears  its  author's  name  in  its  title,  though  in  it  the  discourses  of 
Esdras  and  of  Nehemias  are  equally  contained.  The  Book  of 
Esther  is  believed  to  have  been  written  by  Esdras.  The  Book  of 
Wisdom  is  nowhere  found  among  the  Hebrews,  and  indeed  its 
very  title  bespeaks  a  Greek  origin  for  it.  Certain  Jews  affirm 
that  the  book  was  produced  by  Philo.  The  Book  of  Ecclesias- 
ticus  was  most  certainly  the  work  of  Jesus  son  of  Sirach  of 
Jerusalem,  nephew  of  Jesus  the  high  priest,  whom  Zacharias 
mentions.  This  book  is  found  among  the  Hebrews,  but  is 
placed  among  the  Apocrypha.  As  for  Judith  and  Tobias  and  the 
Books  of  the  Machabees,  of  which,  as  Jerome  says,  the  second 
proves  rather  to  be  Greek,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  who  wrote 

Chapter  Four:  What  a  " Bibliotheca"  Is 

"A  bibliotheca  (library)  takes  its  name  from  the  Greek,  because 
in  it  books  are  preserved.  For  biblio-  is  to  be  understood  as 
meaning  'of  books'  and  -theca  as  'repository.'  After  the  Law 
had  been  burned  by  the  Chaldeans  and  when  the  Jews  had 
returned  to  Jerusalem,  Esdras  the  scribe,  inspired  by  the  Divine 
Spirit,  restored  the  books  of  the  Old  Testament,  corrected  all 
the  volumes  of  the  Law  and  the  Prophets  which  had  been 
corrupted  by  the  gentiles,  and  arranged  the  whole  of  the  Old 
Testament  into  twenty-two  books,  so  that  there  might  be  just 
as  many  books  of  Law  as  there  were  letters  in  the  alphabet."9 
"Five  letters  of  the  Hebrew  alphabet,  however,  are  doubles — 


caph,  mem,  nun,  phe,  and  sade :  these  five  are  written  in  one  form 
at  the  beginning  or  middle  of  a  word,  and  in  another  at  the  end. 
For  this  reason,  many  think,  five  of  the  books  are  double: 
Samuel,  Malachim,  Debrehiamin,  Esdras,  and  Jeremias  with  its 
Cynoth,  or  Lamentations."10 

Chapter  Five :  Concerning  Translators 

"The  translators  of  the  Old  Testament:  first,  those  seventy 
translators  whom  Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  king  of  Egypt,  had 
translate  the  Old  Testament  out  of  Hebrew  into  the  Greek 
tongue.  Well  versed  in  all  letters,  he  rivaled  Pisistratus,  tyrant 
of  the  Athenians  (who,  first,  founded  a  library  among  the 
Greeks),  and  Seleucus  Nicanor,  and  Alexander,  and  all  the 
other  ancients  who  cultivated  wisdom,  in  his  zeal  for  libraries. 
Into  his  library  he  gathered  together  not  only  the  writings  of  all 
peoples  but  also  the  Sacred  Scriptures,  with  the  result  that  in  his 
time  seventy  thousand  books  were  to  be  found  at  Alexandria. 
To  get  the  writings  of  the  Old  Testament  he  approached  Eleazar 
the  High  Priest.  Although  the  seventy  translators  had  been 
isolated,  each  in  his  own  cell,  nevertheless,  through  the  operation 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  it  fell  out  that  nothing  in  the  translation  of  any 
one  of  them  was  found  to  differ,  either  in  word  order  or  in  any 
other  matter,  from  that  of  the  rest."11  They  produced,  there- 
fore, but  one  translation.  But  Jerome  says  that  this  is  a  tale 
undeserving  of  belief.12 

"The  second,  third,  and  fourth  translations  were  made 
respectively  by  Aquila,  Symmachus,  and  Theodotion,  of  whom 
Aquila  was  a  Jew  while  Symmachus  and  Theodotion  were 
Ebionite  heretics.  The  practice  of  the  Greek  churches,  how- 
ever, has  been  to  adopt  and  read  texts  which  follow  the  seventy 
translators.  The  fifth  translation  is  the  popular  one,  whose 
author  is  unknown,  so  that  it  has  to  be  called  simply  'the  Fifth.' 
The  sixth  and  seventh  derive  from  Origen,  whose  works  were 
popularized  by  Eusebius  and  Pamphilus.  The  eighth  is  Jerome's, 
which  is  deservedly  preferred  to  the  others  because  it  adheres 
more  closely  to  the  original  words  and  is  clearer  in  its  insight  into 


Chapter  Six:  Concerning  the  Authors  of  the  New  Testament 

Several  persons  have  written  Gospels,  but  some  among  these, 
lacking  the  Holy  Spirit,  were  bent  more  upon  arranging  a  good 
story  than  upon  weaving  together  the  truth  of  history.  For  this 
reason,  our  holy  Fathers,  instructed  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  accepted 
only  four  as  authoritative,  rejecting  the  rest.  These  four  are 
those  of  Matthew,  Mark,  Luke,  and  John,  after  the  likeness  of 
the  four  rivers  of  Paradise,  the  four  carrying-poles  of  the  Ark,14 
and  the  four  animals  in  Ezechiel.  "The  first,  Matthew,  wrote 
his  Gospel  in  Hebrew.  The  second,  Mark,  wrote  in  Greek.  The 
third,  Luke,  better  instructed  in  the  Greek  tongue  than  the 
other  Evangelists — he  was,  in  fact,  a  doctor  in  Greece — wrote 
his  Gospel  for  Bishop  Theophilus,  for  whom  he  likewise  com- 
posed the  Acts  of  the  Apostles.  Fourth  and  last,  John  wrote  his 

"Paul  wrote  fourteen  Epistles — ten  to  the  churches,  four  to 
individuals.  Most,  however,  say  that  the  last  one,  the  Epistle  to 
the  Hebrews,  is  not  Paul's;  some  hold  that  Barnabas  wrote  it, 
others  surmise  it  was  Clement.  The  Canonical  Epistles  are  seven : 
one  by  James,  two  by  Peter,  three  by  John,  one  by  Jude.  John 
the  Apostle  wrote  the  Apocalypse  when  in  exile  on  the  island  of 

Chapter  Seven :  That  All  the  Other  Scriptures  Are  Apocryphal^  and 
What  an  Apocryphal  Scripture  Is 

"These,  then,  are  the  writers  of  the  Sacred  Books,  who, 
speaking  through  the  Holy  Spirit  for  our  instruction,  have  set 
forth  the  precepts  and  rules  of  life.  Apart  from  these,  all  the 
other  works  are  called  apocryphal.  They  are  called  apocryphal, 
that  is,  'hidden,'  because  they  have  come  into  doubt.  For  their 
origin  is  obscure,  unknown  even  to  the  Fathers,  from  whose 
day  unto  our  own  the  authority  of  the  true  Scriptures  has  come 
down  by  a  most  certain  and  well-known  tradition.  Though 
some  truth  is  to  be  found  in  these  apocryphal  writings,  still, 
because  of  their  numerous  errors,  no  canonical  authority  is 
allowed  them;  and  they  are  rightly  judged  not  to  be  by  those 
authors  to  whom  they  are  ascribed.  For  heretics  have  published 
many  things  under  the  names  of  the  Prophets — and  later  things 


under  the  names  of  the  Apostles.  All  of  these  accounts,  after 
diligent  examination,  have  been  deprived  of  canonical  authority 
and  given  the  name  of  Apocrypha."17 

Chapter  Eight:  The  Sense  of  the  Names  of  the  Sacred  Books 

"The  Pentateuch  is  so  called  from  its  five  books :  for  penta  in 
Greek  means  'five,'  and  teucus,  'book.'  Genesis  is  so  called  from 
its  treating  the  generation  of  the  universe;  Exodus,  from  its 
treating  the  exit  of  the  sons  of  Israel  from  Egypt;  Leviticus, 
from  its  treating  the  duties  of  the  levites  and  the  various  kinds  of 
sacrificial  victims ;  the  Book  of  Numbers  from  the  fact  that  in  it 
the  tribes,  once  out  of  Egypt,  are  numbered,  and  also  from  the 
forty-two  halting-places  in  the  desert."18  "The  Greek  word 
deutrns  is  disyllabic  and  means  'second,'  while  nomia  means  'law.' 
Deuteronomy  may  therefore  be  construed  as  'second  law,'  for  in 
this  book  are  recapitulated  those  things  said  at  greater  length  in 
the  preceding  three. 

"In  the  Book  of  Josue,  which  the  Hebrews  call  Josue  ben  Nuny 
the  land  of  the  promise  is  divided  among  the  people.  The  Book 
of  Judges  is  so  called  from  the  leaders  who  judged  the  people 
of  Israel  before  there  were  kings  among  them."19  To  this  book 
some  persons  join  the  history  of  Ruth  so  as  to  form  a  single 
work.  "The  Book  of  Samuel  is  so  called  because  it  describes  the 
birth,  priesthood,  and  deeds  of  that  leader;  although  it  also 
contains  the  histories  of  Saul  and  of  David,  both  these  men  are 
connected  with  Samuel,  since  he  annointed  them  both.  The 
Hebrew  word  malach  means  'of  kings.'  Hence  the  book  called 
Malachim  from  the  fact  that  it  arranges  in  order  the  kings  of 
Juda  and  of  the  Israelite  nation,  together  with  their  deeds."20 

"Isaias,  more  Evangelist  than  Prophet,  produced  his  own 
book,  whose  every  utterance  is  replete  with  eloquent  prose. 
His  canticles,  however,  move  along  in  hexameter  and  penta- 
meter measure.  Jeremias,  too,  produced  his  book,  together 
with  its  Threnodies,  which  we  call  Lamentations,  because  they 
are  used  on  very  sad  occasions  and  at  rites  for  the  dead.  He  has 
constructed  them  along  the  Hebrew  alphabet  four  times  repeat- 
ed, using  different  meters.  The  first  two  alphabets  are  written 
in  something  resembling  Sapphic  verse,  because  three  short 


lines  of  verse,  closely  conjoined  and  beginning  each  with  the 
same  letter,  are  concluded  with  a  heroic  line.  The  third  alphabet 
is  written  in  trimeter,  and  in  it  sets  of  three  stanzas  begin  with 
the  same  Hebrew  letter.  The  fourth  alphabet  is  like  the  first  and 
second."21  "Ezechiel  has  a  very  obscure  beginning  and  end. 
The  Twelve  [Minor]  Prophets  occupy  a  single  book."22 

"The  beginning  and  final  portions  of  the  Hebrew  Book  of 
Job  are  prose  narrative  interspersed  with  direct  discourse,  but 
the  middle  portions  (from  the  words  'Let  the  day  perish  wherein 
I  was  born'  [3 : 3]  to  'Therefore  I  reprehend  myself  and  do 
penance'  [42:6])  are  in  heroic  verse.  The  Book  of  Psalms  is 
called  the  Psalter  in  Greek,  the  Nab/a  in  Hebrew,  and  the 
Organum,  or  musical  instrument,  in  Latin.  It  is  called  the  Psalter 
in  Greek  because  while  one,  as  prophet,  sang  at  the  psaltery 
or  harp,  a  chorus  answered  in  unison. "23  "They  commonly 
group  the  psalms  into  five  divisions  but  assemble  them  in  one 
book."24  David  wrote  the  psalms,  but  Esdras  afterwards 
arranged  them.  "That  all  the  psalms  and  the  Lamentations  of 
Jeremias  and  fully  all  the  canticles  of  the  Hebrews  are  metrical 
compositions  is  attested  by  Jerome,  Origen,  Josephus,  and 
Eusebius  of  Caesarea.  They  resemble  the  work  of  the  Roman 
Flaccus  or  the  Greek  Pindar,  now  running  to  iambics,  now 
brilliantly  Sapphic,  and  falling  into  trimeter  or  tetrameter."25 

"Scripture  most  clearly  teaches  that  Solomon  was  called  by 
three  names :  Idida,  or  Beloved  of  the  Lord,  for  the  Lord  loved 
him;  Coeleth,  or  Ecclesiastes  (the  Greek  word  ecclesiastes  names  a 
man  who  convokes  an  ecclesia,  or  assembly,  a  man  whom  we 
should  call  a  preacher,  and  who  speaks  not  to  a  particular 
individual,  but  to  an  entire  assemblage  of  people) ;  finally,  he  is 
called  'the  Pacific,'  because  in  his  reign  peace  obtained.  He 
produced  books  equal  in  number  to  his  names ;  the  first  inscribed 
Masloth  in  Hebrew,  Parabolae  in  Greek,  Proverbia  in  Latin, 
because  by  means  of  comparison  and  similitude  it  sets  forth 
senses  of  words  and  symbols  of  truth.  From  the  place  where  the 
text  reads,  'Who  shall  find  a  valiant  woman?'  (3 1:10),  each  verse 
begins  with  a  succeeding  letter  of  the  Hebrew  alphabet,  like  the 
Lamentations  of  Jeremias  and  certain  of  the  other  scriptural 
canticles.  The  second  is  that  which  is  called  Coeleth  in  Hebrew, 
Ecclesiastes  in  Greek,  and  Contionator  (The  Preacher)  in  Latin, 


from  the  fact  that  its  discourse  is  addressed  not  specially  to  an 
individual,  as  in  the  case  of  Proverbs,  but  generally,  to  all  men, 
as  if  to  a  whole  assembly  and  the  whole  church.  The  third  is  the 
Sira  Syrin,  or  Canticle  of  Canticles,  which  is,  as  it  were,  the 
epithalamium  or  marriage  song  of  Christ  and  the  church.  In 
Proverbs  he  teaches  a  youth,  and,  by  means  of  aphorisms,  he 
instructs  him  in  his  duties;  for  this  reason,  the  instruction  is 
often  repeated  to  him  as  to  a  son.  In  Ecclesiastes,  however,  he 
instructs  a  man  of  mature  age  that  he  must  think  nothing  in  the 
world  to  be  lasting,  but  that  all  we  see  is  frail  and  short-lived. 
Finally,  in  the  Canticle  of  Canticles,  he  joins  to  the  embraces  of 
the  Spouse  a  man  already  perfected,  a  man  fully  prepared  because 
he  has  turned  his  back  upon  the  world.  Not  far  different  from 
this  order  of  teaching  is  the  instruction  which  philosophers  give 
their  disciples.  First  they  instruct  them  in  ethics,  next  they 
explain  physics  to  them,  and,  when  they  see  that  a  student  has 
become  well  advanced  in  these,  they  lead  him  to  theology  it- 

"Daniel,  among  the  Hebrews,  is  placed  not  among  the 
Prophets  but  among  the  Hagiographers.  The  catholic  church 
does  not  read  his  book  in  the  version  of  the  seventy  translators, 
because  this  version  is  much  at  variance  with  the  truth.  Daniel, 
in  largest  part,  and  also  the  Prophet  Esdras  and  a  portion  of 
Jeremias  are  written  in  the  Chaldaic  tongue,  though  in  Hebrew 
letters.  The  Book  of  Job,  moreover,  shows  a  very  great  affinity 
with  the  Arabic.  In  the  Hebrew  text,  Daniel  lacks  the  story  of 
Susanna,  the  Hymn  of  the  Three  Young  Men,  and  the  tales 
about  Bel  and  the  Dragon."27 

"Paralipomenon  is  the  Greek  word  for  what  we  might  call  'of 
things  omitted'  or  'of  things  left  over.'  In  it  are  summarily  and 
briefly  explained  those  things  which  were  either  omitted  or  not 
fully  set  forth  either  in  the  Law  or  in  the  Books  of  Kings."28 
"In  Hebrew  it  bears  the  name  Dabrebiamin,  which  means  'words 
of  days,'  or,  as  we  might  more  meaningfully  say,  'chronicle  of 
the  entire  divine  history.'"29 

"There  is  but  one  Book  of  Esdras,  and  in  it  the  discourses  of 
that  same  Esdras  and  of  Nehemias  are  contained.  The  second, 
third,  and  fourth  Books  of  Esdras  are  apocryphal."30 

"The  book  entitled  The  Wisdom  of  Solomon  is  called  Wisdom 


because  in  it  the  coming  of  Christ,  the  Wisdom  of  the  Father,is 
clearly  set  forth,  together  with  his  passion."31  The  Book  of 
Jesus  Son  of  Sirach  is  called  Ecclesiasticus  "because,  dealing 
with  the  discipline  of  the  entire  church,  it  was  put  out  with  great 
care  and  attention  to  the  religious  way  of  life."32  Of  these  last 
two  books  Jerome  speaks  as  follows : 

"There  are  also  in  circulation  Panaretus,  or  the  Book  of  Jesus 
Son  of  Sirach,  and  another  inauthentic  book  entitled  The 
Wisdom  of  Solomon.  Of  the  first  of  these  I  have  found  the 
Hebrew  text,  called  Parables,  not  Ecclesiasticus  as  among  the 
Latins.  To  it  had  been  joined  Ecclesiastes  and  the  Canticle  of 
Canticles,  to  establish  its  kinship  with  Solomon  not  only  through 
the  number  of  books  but  also  through  the  nature  of  the 
materials.  The  second  of  these  is  nowhere  found  among  the 
Hebrews,  because  even  its  very  style  has  the  ring  of  Greek 
eloquence.  Some  of  the  ancient  writers  affirm  that  it  is  a  work  of 
Philo  the  Jew.  Therefore,  just  as  the  church  reads,  to  be  sure, 
the  Books  of  Judith  and  Tobias  and  of  the  Machabees,  but  does 
not  adopt  them  into  the  canonical  Scriptures,  so  let  her  read 
these  two  books  to  edify  the  people,  but  not  to  confirm  the 
truth  of  ecclesiastical  dogmas."33 

"In  sum,  as  there  are  twenty-two  letters  through  which,  in 
Hebrew,  we  write  whatever  we  have  to  say,  and  the  range  of  the 
human  voice  is  defined  by  their  initial  sounds,  so  too  there  are 
counted  up  twenty-two  books  by  whose  words  and  principles 
the  still  weak  and  nursling  infancy  of  the  just  man  is  nurtured  in 
the  teachings  of  God."34 

"Certain  persons,  counting  the  history  of  Ruth  and  the 
Lamentations  of  Jeremias  as  separate  and  distinct  books  among 
the  hagiographical  writings,  and  adding  these  two  to  the 
twenty-two  already  mentioned,  total  twenty-four  books  of  the 
Old  Law — a  number  which  symbolizes  the  twenty-four  elders 
who,  in  the  Apocalypse,  adore  the  Lamb."35 

Chapter  Nine :  Concerning  the  New  Testament 

Just  as  the  entire  body  of  the  Old  Testament  writings  can, 
broadly  speaking,  be  called  the  Law,  while  the  five  books  of 
Moses  are  called  the  Law  in  a  special  sense,  so  too,  generally 


speaking,  the  entire  New  Testament  can  be  called  the  Gospel, 
even  though  those  four  books — namely,  Matthew,  Mark,  Luke, 
and  John — in  which  the  deeds  and  words  of  the  Savior  are  fully 
set  forth,  deserve  to  be  called  the  Gospel  in  a  special  sense. 
"Gospel"  means  "good  news,"  because  the  Gospel  promises 
eternal  goods,  not  earthly  happiness  as  the  Old  Testament  does 
if  one  takes  its  literal  meaning. 

Chapter  Ten :  Concerning  the  Tables,  or  Canons,  of  the  Gospels 

"Ammonius  of  Alexandria  was  the  first  to  set  up  the  Gospel 
tables ;  afterwards,  Eusebius  of  Caesarea,  following  him,  worked 
them  out  more  fully.  They  were  set  up  in  order  that  by  their 
means  we  might  discover  and  know  which  of  the  Evangelists 
said  things  similar  to  those  found  in  the  others,  and  unique 
things  as  well.  These  tables  are  ten  in  number :  the  first  contains 
numbers  indicating  places  in  which  Matthew,  Mark,  Luke,  and 
John  have  said  the  same  things;  the  second,  numbers  of  places 
in  which  three  Evangelists — Matthew,  Mark,  and  Luke — have 
done  so;  the  third,  in  which  three — Matthew,  Luke,  and  John; 
the  fourth,  in  which  three — Matthew,  Mark,  and  John;  the  fifth, 
in  which  two — Mark  and  Luke;  the  sixth,  in  which  two — 
Matthew  and  Mark;  the  seventh,  in  which  two — Matthew  and 
John;  the  eighth,  in  which  two — Luke  and  Mark;  the  ninth,  in 
which  two — Luke  and  John;  and  the  tenth,  in  which  individual 
Evangelists  have  said  things  peculiar  to  themselves  alone. 

"This  is  how  these  tables  are  used:  throughout  each 
Evangelist,  a  certain  number  is  fixed  in  the  margin  beside  small 
sections  of  text,  and  under  such  numbers  is  placed  a  certain 
space  marked  in  red  and  indicating  in  which  of  the  ten  tables  one 
will  find  the  section  number  to  which  that  space  is  subjoined. 
For  example,  if  the  space  indicated  is  the  first,  this  number  will 
be  found  in  the  first  table;  if  the  second,  in  the  second;  if  the 
third,  in  the  third;  and  so  through  the  series  till  one  comes  to 
the  tenth.  If,  therefore,  with  any  one  of  the  Gospels  open  before 
one,  one  should  wish  to  know  which  of  the  other  Evangelists 
has  spoken  similarly,  one  would  take  the  number  placed  beside 
the  section  of  text  and  look  for  that  same  number  in  the  table 
indicated  for  it,  and  there  one  would  find  who  has  said  what. 


Finally,  looking  up  in  the  body  of  the  text  the  places  indicated 
by  the  numbers  listed  in  the  tables,  one  would  find  passages  on 
the  same  subject  in  the  individual  Gospels."36 

Chapter  Eleven :  Concerning  the  Canons  of  the  Councils 

"The  Greek  word  canon  is  translated  by  the  Latin  regula  (rule). 
A  rule  is  so  called  because  it  leads  one  straight,  and  does  not 
now  and  then  draw  one  astray.  Others  say  that  a  rule  is  so  called 
either  because  it  rules,  or  because  it  offers  a  norm  for  right 
living,  or  because  it  sets  straight  what  is  distorted  and  corrupted. 

"The  canons  of  the  general  councils,  however,  took  their 
start  in  the  time  of  Constantine.  In  the  years  before  this  time, 
when  persecution  was  aflame,  license  to  teach  the  people  was 
certainly  not  granted.  Therefore,  Christianity  was  torn  asunder 
by  heresy  for  the  very  reason  that  permission  was  not  given  the 
bishops  to  meet  together  in  a  body  until  the  time  of  the  emperor 
just  named.  For  he  it  was  who  gave  Christians  the  right  to 
congregate  freely.  Under  him,  also,  the  holy  Fathers,  gathering 
together  from  all  the  lands  of  the  earth,  gave  us,  in  the  Nicene 
council,  a  creed  which  accords  with  the  evangelical  and  apostolic 
faith,  the  second  such  creed  since  the  Apostles."37 

Chapter  Twelve :  That  the  Principal  Synods  Are  Four 

"But  among  all  the  other  councils,  there  are  four  holy  synods 
which  comprise  the  bases  of  our  entire  faith,  being  four  in 
number  like  the  Gospels  or  the  rivers  of  Paradise.38  Of  these, 
the  first  is  the  Nicene  synod  of  3 1 8  bishops,  held  in  the  reign  of 
Constantine  Augustus.  In  it  was  condemned  the  blasphemy  of 
the  Arian  heresy,  asserted  by  Arius  himself  concerning  in- 
equality in  the  blessed  Trinity.  That  same  holy  synod,. through 
the  creed,  defined  the  consubstantiality  of  God  the  Son  with 
God  the  Father.  The  second  synod  of  1 5  o  Fathers  was  convoked 
at  Constantinople  under  Theodosius  the  elder,  and,  condemning 
Macedonius,  who  denied  that  the  Holy  Spirit  was  God,  it 
demonstrated  that  the  Holy  Spirit  was  consubstantial  with  the 
Father  and  the  Son  and  gave  us  the  form  of  the  creed  which  the 
entire  confession  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Latins  declares  in  the 
churches.    The  third  synod,  the  first  of  Ephesus,  was  of  200 


bishops  and  took  place  under  the  younger  Theodosius  Augustus ; 
it  condemned,  with  just  anathema,  Nestorius,  who  was  asserting 
that  there  were  two  persons  in  Christ,  and  it  showed  that  the 
one  person  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  possesses  two  natures.  The 
fourth  synod,  that  of  Chalcedon,  was  held  with  630  priests  under 
the  Emperor  Marcian,  and  in  it  the  unanimous  judgment  of  the 
Fathers  condemned  Abbot  Eutyches  of  Constantinople  who 
was  announcing  that  the  Divine  Word  and  the  flesh  formed  one 
nature — and  also  his  defender,  a  certain  Dioscorus,  bishop  of 
Alexandria,  and  Nestorius  once  more,  with  all  the  rest  of  the 
heretics.  The  same  synod  declared  that  Christ  as  God  was  born 
of  the  Virgin  in  such  a  way  that  in  him  we  confess  a  substance  of 
both  divine  and  human  nature. 

"These  are  the  four  principal  synods,  most  fully  declaring  the 
doctrine  of  the  faith.  But  if  there  are,  besides,  any  councils  which 
the  holy  Fathers,  filled  with  the  Spirit  of  God,  sanctioned,  it  is 
from  the  authority  of  these  four,  whose  acts  are  set  down  in  this 
work,  that  they  derive  their  permanence  and  all  their  force. 

"The  word  'synod,'  which  is  from  the  Greek,  means  a 
fellowship  or  assembly.  The  name  'council,'  however,  is  taken 
from  Roman  practice.  For  in  the  season  when  suits  were  being 
tried,  all  used  to  come  together  and  deal  with  one  another  by 
common  consent.  From  the  idea  of  common  consent,  we  speak 
of  council'  (concilium)  as  if  for  'counsel'  {consilium) — because  a 
cilium  (lash  or  lid)  is  something  belonging  to  the  eyes.  Hence 
too,  considium  (session)  is  also  a  consilium  (counsel)  by  the  change 
of  the  'd'  to  an  '1.'  An  assembly  {coetus)^  however,  is  a  convention 
or  congregation,  from  the  verb  'to  assemble'  (coire),  that  is,  to 
convene  {convenire)  in  one  body,  and  hence  it  is  also  called 
'convention'  [conventus)-.  'convention,'  'assembly,'  or  'council,' 
then,  from  the  association  of  many  persons  for  one  purpose."39 

"The  Greek  word  'epistle'  means  missa  (message)  in  Latin. 
We  have  the  Canonical,  that  is,  the  regular,  Epistles,  which  are 
also  called  'catholic,'  that  is,  universal,  because  they  have  been 
written  not  to  one  people  or  city  only,  but  to  all  nations 
generally."40  "The  Acts  of  the  Apostles  discuss  the  beginnings 
of  the  Christian  faith  among  the  nations  and  the  history  of  the 
nascent  church,  and  they  narrate  the  deeds  of  the  Apostles, 
which  is  the  reason  why  they  are  called  The  Acts  of  the  Apostles. 


The  Greek  word  apocalypsis  is  translated  by  the  Latin  word 
revelatio,  or  revelation.  Thus,  John  says:  'The  Apocalypse  of 
Jesus  Christ,  which  God  has  given  him  to  make  known  to  his 
servant  John.'"41 

Chapter  Thirteen:  Who  Have  Made  Libraries 

"Among  us,  the  martyr  Pamphilus,  whose  life  Eusebius  of 
Caesarea  wrote,  sought  to  equal  Pisistratus  in  zeal  for  a  sacred 
library.  Pamphilus  had  in  his  library  nearly  thirty  thousand 
volumes.  Jerome,  too,  and  Gennadius,  hunted  for  ecclesiastical 
writers  throughout  the  whole  world,  set  them  forth  in  order, 
and  listed  their  works  in  a  one-volume  catalogue."42 

Chapter  Fourteen:  Which  Writings  Are  Authentic** 

"Of  our  fellow  Christians  among  the  Greeks,  Origen, 
laboring  upon  his  writings,  surpassed  both  Greeks  and  Latins 
in  the  number  of  his  works.  Jerome  says  that  he  has  read  six 
thousand  of  his  books.  But  Augustine,  in  mental  ability  or  in 
self-knowledge,  surpasses  the  studious  efforts  of  all  these  men. 
He  wrote  so  many  things  that  no  one  finds  enough  days  and 
nights  in  which  to  write  or  indeed  even  to  read  his  books."44 
"Other  catholic  men,  too,  have  written  many  and  outstanding 
books:  Athanasius,  bishop  of  Alexandria;  Hilary,  bishop  of 
Poitiers;  Basil,  bishop  of  Cappadocia;  Gregory  the  theologian 
(Gregory  of  Nyssa)  and  Gregory,  bishop  of  Nazianzen 
Ambrose,  bishop  of  Milan;  Theophilus,  bishop  of  Alexandria 
John,  bishop  of  Constantinople ;  Cyril  of  Alexandria;  Pope  Leo 
Proculus;  Isidore  of  Spain;  Bede;  Cyprian,  martyr  and  bishop  of 
Carthage;  Jerome  the  priest;  Prosper;  Origen,  whose  writings 
the  Church  neither  altogether  repudiates  nor  accepts  as  a  whole; 
Orosius;  Sedulius;  Prudentius;  Juvencus;  Arator."45  Rufinus, 
too,  composed  many  books  and  he  translated  certain  writings, 
"but  because  the  blessed  Jerome  condemned  him  in  some  matters 
concerning  freedom  of  the  will,  we  should  follow  what  Jerome 
teaches  on  those  things."46  "Gelasius  also  composed  five  books 
against  Nestorius  and  Eutyches,  and  tracts  after  the  manner  of 
Ambrose;  likewise  he  wrote  two  books  against  Arius,  and 


composed  liturgical  prefaces  and  orations  and  epistles  on  the 
faith."47  Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  ordained  bishop  of  the 
Corinthians,  has  left  many  volumes  as  testimony  of  his  mental 
ability.  "Also,  as  to  the  Chronicles  of  Eusebius  of  Caesarea  and 
the  books  of  his  Ecclesiastical  History \  although  he  was  lukewarm 
in  the  first  book  of  his  narrative  and  afterwards  wrote  a  book 
praising  and  apologizing  for  Origen  the  schismatic,  nevertheless, 
on  account  of  the  unusual  learning  shown  in  the  contents — 
learning  which  serves  our  instruction — the  catholic  church  does 
not  altogether  repress  it."48  There  is  Cassiodorus,  too,  who 
wrote  quite  a  useful  work  in  explanation  of  the  Psalms.  There 
are  still  others  whose  names  I  shall  not  mention  here. 

Chapter  Fifteen :  Which  Are  the  Apocryphal  Writings^ 

"The  Itinerary  called  that  of  Peter  the  Apostle  and  said  to  be 
by  Saint  Clement;  eight  books:  apocryphal. 

"The  Acts  called  those  of  Andrew  the  Apostle:  apocryphal. 

"The  Acts  called  those  of  Thomas:  apocryphal. 

"The  Gospels  which  go  under  the  name  of  Thaddeus: 

"The  Gospels  which  go  under  the  name  of  the  Apostle 
Barnabas:  apocryphal. 

"The  Gospels  which  go  under  the  name  of  the  Apostle 
Thomas:  apocryphal. 

"The  Gospels  which  go  under  the  name  of  the  Apostle 
Andrew:  apocryphal. 

"The  Gospels  which  Lucian  falsified:  apocryphal. 

"The  Gospels  which  Ytius  falsified:  apocryphal. 

"The  Book  concerning  the  Infancy  of  the  Savior :  apocryphal. 

"The  Book  concerning  the  Birth  of  the  Savior  and  concerning 
Holy  Mary,  or,  concerning  the  Savior's  Midwife:  apocryphal. 

"The  book  which  is  called,  'Of  the  Shepherd' :  apocryphal. 

"All  the  books  made  by  Leucius  the  Devil's  disciple: 

"The  books  which  are  called  'The  Foundation':  apocryphal. 

"The  book  which  is  called  'The  Treasure' :  apocryphal. 

"The  book  which  is  called  'On  the  Daughters  of  Adam,  or 
Genesis':  apocryphal. 


"The  Hundred-verse  Poem  concerning  Christ,  Composed  of 
Verses  out  of  Vergil:  apocryphal. 

"The  book  which  is  called  'The  Acts  of  Thecla  and  Paul' : 

"The  so-called  'Book  of  the  Nephew' :  apocryphal. 

"The  'Book  of  Proverbs'  written  by  heretics  and  signed  with 
the  name  of  Saint  Sixtus :  apocryphal. 

"The  Revelation  which  is  called  that  of  Paul:  apocryphal. 

"The  Revelation  which  is  called  that  of  Thomas  the  Apostle: 

"The  Revelation  which  is  called  that  of  Stephen:  apocryphal. 

"The  Book  which  is  called  'The  Passing  of  Holy  Mary': 

"The  Book  which  is  called  'The  Repentance  of  Adam': 

"The  Book  of  Diogias,  surnamed  the  Giant,  who  heretics  say 
fought  with  the  dragon  after  the  flood:  apocryphal. 

"The    book    which    is    called    'The    Testament    of   Job': 

"The  book  which  is  called  'The  Repentance  of  Origen': 

"The  book  which  is  called  'The  Repentance  of  Cyprian': 

"The  book  which  is  called  that  of  lamne  and  Mambre: 

"The  book  which  is   called   'The  Fate  of  the  Apostles': 

"The  book  of  Lusan:  apocryphal. 

"The  Book  of  the  Canons  of  the  Apostles :  apocryphal. 

"The  book  'Physiologus,'  written  by  heretics  and  signed  with 
the  name  of  the  blessed  Ambrose:  apocryphal. 

"The  History  of  Eusebius  Pamphilus :  apocryphal. 

"The  Opuscula  of  Tertullian  or  Africanus :  apocryphal. 

"The  Opuscula  of  Posthumianus  and  Gallus:  apocryphal. 

"The  Opuscula  of  Montanus  and  Priscilla  and  Maximilla: 

"All  the  Opuscula  of  Faustus  the  Manichean:  apocryphal. 

"The  Opuscula  of  Clement  II  of  Alexandria :  apocryphal. 

"The  Opuscula  of  Cassian,  Priest  of  the  Gauls:  apocryphal. 


"The  Opuscula  of  Victorinus  of  Poitiers :  apocryphal. 

"The  Opuscula  of  Faustus  of  Riez  in  the  Gauls :  apocryphal. 

"The  Opuscula  of  Frumentus:  apocryphal. 

"The  Epistle  of  Jesus  to  Abgar:  apocryphal. 

"The  Passion  of  Cyricus  and  Julitta:  apocryphal. 

"The  Passion  of  George:  apocryphal. 

"The  writings  which  are  called  'The  Contradiction  of 
Solomon':  apocryphal. 

"All  the  phylacteries,  which  were  written  not,  as  they  pretend, 
by  an  angel  but  more  likely  by  a  demon:  apocryphal. 

"These  and  things  like  them,  which  Simon  Magus,  Nicholas, 
Cerinthus,  Marcion,  Basilides,  Ebion,  also  Paul  of  Samosata, 
Photius  and  Bonosus  (who  fell  away  through  a  like  error), 
Montanus  likewise  with  his  most  immoral  followers,  Apollinaris, 
Valentine  or  Manichaeus,  Faustus,  Sabellius,  Arius,  Macedonius, 
Eunomius,  Novatus,  Sabatius,  Calixtus,  Donatus  and  Eustachius, 
Nibianus,  Pelagius,  Julian  and  Laciensis,  Celestine,  Maximian, 
Priscillian  of  Spain,  Lampedius,  Dioscorus,  Euticius,  Peter  and  a 
second  Peter  (of  whom  one  was  a  blot  upon  Alexandria,  the 
other  upon  Antioch),  Achatius  of  Constantinople  and  his 
fellows — and  indeed  all  heresies  which  these  very  men,  or  their 
disciples,  or  schismatics,  have  taught  or  written — men  whose 
names  we  have  by  no  means  recorded — we  declare  to  be  not 
only  rejected  but  also  destroyed  by  the  whole  catholic  and 
Roman  Church,  and,  together  with  their  authors  and  the 
followers  of  their  authors,  damned  under  anathemas  by  an 
indissoluble  bond  unto  eternity." 

Chapter  Sixteen :  Some  Etymologies  of  Things  Pertaining  to  Reading 

"A  codex  is  composed  of  many  books,  a  book  is  composed  of 
one  volume.  And  a  codex  is  so  called,  by  transference,  from  the 
trunks  [codicibus)  of  trees  or  vines,  as  if  it  were  a  trunk  because  it 
contains  a  multitude  of  books  coming  out  of  itself  like  so  many 
branches;  a  volume  {yolumeri)  is  so  called  from  'to  roll  up' 
(yolvere).  Liber  is  the  inner  rind  of  a  tree,  upon  which  the  ancients 
used  to  write  before  the  use  of  paper  or  parchment.  For  this 
reason  they  used  to  call  writers  librarii,  and  a  volume  a  liber."50 
"Scheda  (a  leaf  of  paper),  whose  dimimutive  form  is  schedula^  is  a 



Greek  word.  What  is  still  being  corrected  and  has  not  yet  been 
bound  in  books  is  properly  called  a  scheda."51  "The  use  of  paper 
was  discovered  first  at  Memphis,  a  city  of  Egypt .  Paper  (chartd) 
is  so  called  because  the  stripped  (decerptum)  plant  membrane  of 
the  papyrus  is  glued  together  at  various  points  (carptim),  and 
thus  the  charta  is  made.  It  is  of  several  kinds.  Parchment 
(pergamenum)  is  so  called  from  Pergamum,  where  it  was  invented. 
The  word  'skins'  (membrand)  is  also  used  because  these  are  drawn 
off  from  the  members  {membra)  of  cattle.  Skins  were  first  made 
yellow  in  color;  later,  at  Rome,  they  learned  how  to  make 
white  skins."52 

"The  word  'homily'  is  used  to  mean  a  popular  sermon,  as 
when  one  makes  an  address  before  the  people.  A  'tractate'  is  the 
exposition  of  a  single  matter  in  its  many  aspects.  A  'dialogue'  is 
a  conversation  (collatio)  between  two  or  among  several  persons ; 
the  Latins  call  it  sermo.  Sermo,  or  talk,  moreover,  is  so  called 
because  it  is  interwoven  (sen fur)  among  each  of  the  speakers. 
Commentaries  (com-mentaria)  are  so  named  as  from  cum  mente 
(with  the  mind)  or  from  comminiscor  (call  to  mind) ;  for  they  are 
interpretations,  as,  for  example,  commentaries  on  the  Law  or  on 
the  Gospel."53  Certain  persons  say  that  the  word  "comments" 
should  be  restricted  to  books  of  the  pagans,  while  "expositions"54 
should  be  kept  for  the  Sacred  Books.  "The  word  'gloss'  is 
Greek,  and  it  means  tongue  (lingua),  because,  in  a  way,  it 
bespeaks  (loquitur)  the  meaning  of  the  word  under  it.55  Philoso- 
phers call  this  an  ad-verbum  (upon  the  word)  because,  with  one 
single  word,  it  explains  that  word  concerning  the  meaning  of 
which  there  is  question,  as,  for  example,  when  conticescere  (to 
become  silent)  is  explained  by  the  word  tacere  (to  be  still)."56 


Chapter  One:  Concerning  Properties  of  Sacred  Scripture  and  the 
Manner  of  Reading  It 

It  should  not  be  burdensome  to  the  eager  student  that  we  set 
forth  the  number  and  order  and  names  of  the  Sacred  Books  in 
such  a  variety  and  number  of  ways,  for  it  often  happens  that 
these  least  matters,  when  unknown,  obscure  one's  knowledge  of 
great  and  useful  things.  Therefore,  let  the  student  prepare  him- 
self once  and  for  all  by  fixing  these  matters  in  the  forefront  of  his 
mind,  in  certain  little  formulae,  so  to  say,  so  that  thereafter  he 
will  be  able  to  run  the  course  before  him  with  free  step  and  will 
not  have  to  search  out  new  elementary  facts  as  he  comes  to 
individual  books.  With  these  matters  set  in  order,  we  shall  treat 
successively  all  the  other  things  which  will  seem  of  value  for  the 
task  before  us. 

Chapter  Two :  Concerning  the  Threefold  Understanding} 

First  of  all,  it  ought  to  be  known  that  Sacred  Scripture  has 
three  ways  of  conveying  meaning — namely,  history,  allegory, 
and  tropology.  To  be  sure,  all  things  in  the  divine  utterance 
must  not  be  wrenched  to  an  interpretation  such  that  each  of 
them  is  held  to  contain  history,  allegory,  and  tropology  all  at 
once.  Even  if  a  triple  meaning  can  appropriately  be  assigned  in 
many  passages,  nevertheless  it  is  either  difficult  or  impossible  to 
see  it  everywhere.  "On  the  zither  and  musical  instruments  of 
this  type  not  all  the  parts  which  are  handled  ring  out  with 
musical  sounds;  only  the  strings  do  this.  All  the  other  things  on 
the  whole  body  of  the  zither  are  made  as  a  frame  to  which  may 
be  attached,  and  across  which  may  be  stretched,  those  parts 
which  the  artist  plays  to  produce  sweetness  of  song."2  Similarly, 
in  the  divine  utterances  are  placed  certain  things  which  are 


intended  to  be  understood  spiritually  only,  certain  things  that 
emphasize  the  importance  of  moral  conduct,  and  certain  things 
said  according  to  the  simple  sense  of  history.  And  yet,  there  are 
some  things  which  can  suitably  be  expounded  not  only  histori- 
cally but  allegorically  and  tropologically  as  well.  Thus  is  it  that, 
in  a  wonderful  manner,  all  of  Sacred  Scripture  is  so  suitably 
adjusted  and  arranged  in  all  its  parts  through  the  Wisdom  of 
God  that  whatever  is  contained  in  it  either  resounds  with  the 
sweetness  of  spiritual  understanding  in  the  manner  of  strings ; 
or,  containing  utterances  of  mysteries  set  here  and  there  in  the 
course  of  a  historical  narrative  or  in  the  substance  of  a  literal 
context,  and,  as  it  were,  connecting  these  up  into  one  object,  it 
binds  them  together  all  at  once  as  the  wood  does  which  curves 
under  the  taut  strings;  and,  receiving  their  sound  into  itself,  it 
reflects  it  more  sweetly  to  our  ears — a  sound  which  the  string 
alone  has  not  yielded,  but  which  the  wood  too  has  formed  by 
the  shape  of  its  body.  Thus  also  is  honey  more  pleasing  because 
enclosed  in  the  comb,  and  whatever  is  sought  with  greater  effort 
is  also  found  with  greater  desire.3  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  so 
to  handle  the  Sacred  Scripture  that  we  do  not  try  to  find 
history  everywhere,  nor  allegory  everywhere,  nor  tropology 
everywhere  but  rather  that  we  assign  individual  things  fittingly 
in  their  own  places,  as  reason  demands.  Often,  however,  in  one 
and  the  same  literal  context,  all  may  be  found  together,  as  when 
a  truth  of  history  both  hints  at  some  mystical  meaning  by  way  of 
allegory,  and  equally  shows  by  way  of  tropology  how  we  ought 
to  behave. 

Chapter  Three :  That  Things,  Too,  Have  a  Meaning  in  Sacred  Scripture 

It  ought  also  to  be  known  that  in  the  divine  utterance  not  only 
words  but  even  things  have  a  meaning4 — a  way  of  communica- 
ting not  usually  found  to  such  an  extent  in  other  writings.  The 
philosopher  knows  only  the  significance  of  words,  but  the 
significance  of  things  is  far  more  excellent  than  that  of  words, 
because  the  latter  was  established  by  usage,  but  Nature  dictated 
the  former.5  The  latter  is  the  voice  of  men,  the  former  the  voice 
of  God  speaking  to  men.  The  latter,  once  uttered,  perishes ;  the 
former,  once  created,  subsists.    The  unsubstantial  word  is  the 

122  HUGH  OF  ST.   VICTOR 

sign  of  man's  perceptions;  the  thing  is  a  resemblance  of  the 
divine  Idea.  What,  therefore,  the  sound  of  the  mouth,  which  all 
in  the  same  moment  begins  to  subsist  and  fades  away,  is  to  the 
idea  in  the  mind,  that  the  whole  extent  of  time  is  to  eternity.  The 
idea  in  the  mind  is  the  internal  word,  which  is  shown  forth  by 
the  sound  of  the  voice,  that  is,  by  the  external  word.  And  the 
divine  Wisdom,  which  the  Father  has  uttered  out  of  his  heart, 
invisible  in  Itself,  is  recognized  through  creatures  and  in  them.6 
From  this  is  most  surely  gathered  how  profound  is  the  under- 
standing to  be  sought  in  the  Sacred  Writings,  in  which  we  come 
through  the  word  to  a  concept,  through  the  concept  to  a  thing, 
through  the  thing  to  its  idea,  and  through  its  idea  arrive  at 
Truth.7  Because  certain  less  well  instructed  persons  do  not  take 
account  of  this,  they  suppose  that  there  is  nothing  subtle  in 
these  matters  on  which  to  exercise  their  mental  abilities,  and 
they  turn  their  attention  to  the  writings  of  philosophers  precisely 
because,  not  knowing  the  power  of  Truth,  they  do  not  under- 
stand that  in  Scripture  there  is  anything  beyond  the  bare  surface 
of  the  letter. 

That  the  sacred  utterances  employ  the  meaning  of  things, 
moreover,  we  shall  demonstrate  by  a  particular  short  and  clear 
example.  The  Scripture  says:  "Watch,  because  your  adversary 
the  Devil  goeth  about  as  a  roaring  lion."8  Here,  if  we  should 
say  that  the  lion  stands  for  the  Devil,  we  should  mean  by  "lion" 
not  the  word  but  the  thing.  For  if  the  two  words  "devil"  and 
"lion"  mean  one  and  the  same  thing,  the  likeness  of  that  same 
thing  to  itself  is  not  adequate.  It  remains,  therefore,  that  the 
word  "lion"  signifies  the  animal,  but  that  the  animal  in  turn 
designates  the  Devil.  And  all  other  things  are  to  be  taken  after 
this  fashion,  as  when  we  say  that  worm,  calf,  stone,  serpent,  and 
other  things  of  this  sort  signify  Christ. 

Chapter  Four :  Concerning  the  Seven  Rules 

This,  too,  ought  to  be  taken  diligent  note  of,  namely,  "certain 
learned  men  have  said  that  among  all  other  rules,  seven  pertain 
to  the  utterance  of  the  Sacred  Scriptures. 

"The  first  rule  is  about  the  Lord  and  his  Body  and  expressions 
which  move  from  the  one  to  the  other  and,  in  one  person,  show 


now  the  Head,  now  the  Body — as  when  Isaias  says,  'The  Lord 
hath  clothed  me  with  the  garment  of  salvation,  as  a  bridegroom 
decked  with  a  crown  and  as  a  bride  adorned  with  her  jewels.'9 
For  in  one  person  named  with  two  words,  he  has  shown  both 
the  Head,  that  is,  the  bridegroom,  and  the  church,  that  is,  the 
bride.  Therefore,  in  the  Scriptures  it  must  be  observed  when 
the  Head  specifically  is  being  written  of,  when  both  Head  and 
Body,  when  a  double  exchange  takes  place  between  the  two 
terms,  or  when  there  is  a  single  switch  from  one  to  the  other. 
In  this  way  may  the  intelligent  reader  know  what  pertains  to  the 
Head  and  what  to  the  Body. 

"The  second  rule  concerns  the  true  and  the  mixed  Body  of  the 
Lord.  For  certain  things  seem  to  apply  to  a  single  person 
though  in  reality  they  do  not  all  apply  to  that  one  person,  as  in 
the  following  case:  'Thou  art  my  servant,  O  Israel,  behold  I  have 
blotted  out  thy  iniquities  as  a  cloud  and  thy  sins  as  a  mist.  Be 
converted  to  me  and  I  shall  redeem  thee.'10  This  passage  does 
not  apply  to  a  single  entity,  for  the  first  part  applies  to  him 
whose  sins  God  has  blotted  out  and  to  whom  he  says,  'Thou  art 
mine,'  and  the  second  part  applies  to  him  to  whom  he  says, 
'Be  converted  to  me  and  I  shall  redeem  thee.'  These,  if  they  are 
converted,  have  their  sins  blotted  out.  According  to  this  rule, 
Scripture  speaks  to  all  in  such  a  way  that  the  good  are  censured 
with  the  evil  and  the  evil  are  praised  for  the  good :  but  he  who 
reads  intelligently  will  learn  what  pertains  to  whom. 

"The  third  rule  concerns  the  letter  and  the  spirit,  that  is,  the 
Law  and  grace:  the  Law,  through  which  we  are  admonished 
about  precepts  to  be  observed;  grace,  through  which  we  are 
aided  to  act.  The  Law  ought  to  be  understood  not  only  in  a 
historical  but  also  in  a  spiritual  sense :  for  it  is  necessary  both  to 
remain  faithful  to  the  historical  sense  and  to  understand  the  Law 
in  a  spiritual  way. 

"The  fourth  rule  concerns  'species'  and  'genus'  in  cases  when 
the  part  is  taken  for  the  whole  and  the  whole  for  the  part,  as, 
for  example,  if  God  should  speak  to  one  people  or  city  and  yet 
his  utterance  is  understood  to  be  addressed  to  the  whole  world. 
For  although  the  Lord  threatened  the  one  city  of  Babylon 
through  the  prophet  Isaias,  nevertheless,  while  speaking  against 
that  city  he  passed  from  this  'species,'  or  specific  group   of 


mankind,  to  the  'genus,'  or  mankind  in  general,  and  turned  his 
speech  against  the  whole  world.  Surely,  if  he  were  not  speaking 
against  the  entire  world  he  would  not  have  added  later  the 
following  general  remark:  'And  I  will  destroy  all  the  earth  and 
will  visit  the  evils  of  the  world,'11  and  all  the  other  remarks 
which  follow,  pertaining  to  the  destruction  of  the  world.  For 
this  reason  he  also  added:  'This  is  the  counsel  that  I  have 
purposed  upon  all  the  earth,  and  this  is  the  hand  that  is  stretched 
out  upon  all  nations.'12  In  the  same  way,  after  he  has  charged 
the  whole  world  in  the  person  of  Babylon,  he  once  more  turns 
back  to  that  city  as  from  the  'genus'  to  the  'species,'  telling  the 
things  that  have  happened  specifically  to  it:  "Behold  I  will  stir 
up  the  Medes  against  them.'13  For  while  Balthasar  was  reigning, 
Babylon  was  taken  by  the  Medes.  Thus,  too,  in  the  person  of 
Egypt  alone  he  wishes  us  to  understand  the  whole  world  when 
he  says:  'And  I  will  set  the  Egyptians  to  fight  against  the 
Egyptians,  kingdom  against  kingdom';14  because  Egypt  is 
described  as  having  had  not  many  kingdoms  but  one  kingdom. 

"The  fifth  rule  is  about  times,  and  by  its  means  either  the 
largest  period  of  time  is  represented  through  the  smallest,  or  the 
smallest  period  of  time  is  understood  through  the  largest.  Thus 
is  it  with  the  three  days  of  the  Lord's  burial,  since  he  did  not  lie 
in  the  tomb  three  full  days  and  nights,  but  nevertheless  the  total 
of  three  days  is  understood  from  a  part  of  them.  Or  again,  there 
is  the  fact  that  God  predicted  the  sons  of  Israel  would  be  servants 
in  Egypt  for  four  hundred  years  and  then  depart  from  the 
country,  whereas,  while  Joseph  ruled,  they  were  lords  of  Egypt, 
nor  did  they  depart  from  it  at  once  after  four  hundred  years  as 
had  been  promised,  but  they  left  Egypt  after  four  hundred 
thirty  years  had  been  accomplished. 

"There  is  still  another  figure  relating  to  times,  through  which 
certain  things  belonging  to  future  time  are  recounted  as  if 
already  done,  as  in  the  passage:  'They  have  pierced  my  hands 
and  my  feet,  they  have  numbered  all  my  bones,  they  have  parted 
my  garments  amongst  them,'15  and  words  similar  to  these,  in 
which  future  events  are  spoken  of  as  if  they  had  already  occurred. 
But  why  are  things  which  must  yet  be  done  spoken  of  as  already 
having  occurred?  Because  those  things  which,  from  our  point 
of  view  lie  in  the  future,  have,  from  the  standpoint  of  God's 


eternity,  already  been  done.  For  this  reason,  when  anything  is 
announced  as  having  yet  to  be  done,  this  is  said  from  our  point 
of  view.  But  when  things  in  the  future  are  spoken  of  as  already 
done,  these  must  be  taken  from  the  standpoint  of  the  eternity 
of  God,  with  whom  all  things  belonging  to  the  future  have 
already  been  accomplished. 

"The  sixth  rule  is  about  recapitulation.  Recapitulation  exists 
when  Scripture  turns  back  to  a  subject  the  telling  of  which  has 
already  gone  by,  as  when  Scripture,  in  speaking  of  the  sons  of 
Noah's  sons,  said  that  they  dwelt  'according  to  their  kindreds 
and  their  tongues';16  yet  afterwards,  as  if  this  is  found  in  the 
same  sequence  of  time,  it  says :  'All  the  earth  was  of  one  tongue 
and  of  the  same  speech.'17  But  how  did  the  sons  of  Noah  exist 
according  to  their  kindreds  and  according  to  their  tongues  if 
there  was  one  tongue  for  all,  unless  here,  the  narration,  by 
recapitulating,  has  turned  back  to  that  which  had  already 

"The  seventh  rule  is  about  the  Devil  and  his  body,  and, 
according  to  it,  things  are  often  said  of  the  very  head  of  this  body 
which  belong  more  to  the  body.  But  often  the  things  said  seem 
to  belong  to  its  members  and  yet  are  not  suitable  except  to  the 
head.  Indeed,  under  the  name  of  the  body,  the  head  is  to  be 
understood,  as  in  that  passage  from  the  Gospel  concerning  the 
cockle  mixed  with  the  grain,  where  the  Lord  says :  'A  man  who 
is  an  enemy  hath  done  this,'18  calling  the  Devil  himself  by  the 
name  'man,'  and  designating  the  head  by  the  name  of  the  body. 
Likewise  the  body  is  signified  under  the  name  of  the  head,  as 
when  it  is  said  in  the  Gospel:  'Have  I  not  chosen  you  twelve? 
And  one  of  you  is  a  devil,'19  referring  to  Judas,  to  be  sure, 
because  he  was  a  body  of  the  Devil.  For  the  apostate  angel  is 
the  head  of  all  who  are  evil,  and  all  who  are  evil  are  the  body  of 
this  head.  So  much  is  he  one  with  his  members  that  often  what 
is  said  of  his  body  is  rather  extended  to  him,  and  again,  what  is 
said  of  him  is  referred  back  to  his  members.  So  in  Isaias,  where, 
after  the  prophetic  discourse  has  said  many  things  against 
Babylon,  that  is,  against  the  Devil's  body,  it  once  more  deflects 
the  thought  of  the  oracle  to  the  head  and  says :  'How  art  thou 
fallen  from  heaven,  O  Lucifer,  who  didst  rise  in  the  morning,'20 
and  so  on."21 


Chapter  Five :  What  Interferes  with  Study 

Now  that  we  have  prescribed  definite  material  for  the  student 
and,  by  giving  the  names,  have  determined  what  writings 
especially  belong  to  sacred  reading,  the  next  step  seems  to  be 
that  we  say  something  about  the  manner  and  order  of  reading, 
so  that  from  things  already  said  one  may  know  upon  what 
material  he  ought  to  spend  his  effort,  while  from  those  which 
must  still  be  said  he  may  gather  the  method  and  plan  of  that 
same  study  of  his.  But  because  we  more  easily  understand  what 
ought  to  be  done  if,  earlier,  we  have  grasped  what  ought  not  to 
be  done,  the  student  should  first  of  all  be  taught  what  he  should 
avoid,  and  then  informed  how  he  may  accomplish  the  things  he 
should  get  done. 

We  must  say  why  it  is  that  from  such  a  throng  of  students, 
of  whom  many  are  both  strong  in  natural  talent  and  energetic  in 
applying  themselves,  so  few,  easily  counted,  are  found  who 
manage  to  reach  knowledge.  And,  leaving  out  of  our  con- 
sideration those  who  are  naturally  dull  and  slow  in  under- 
standing things,  it  seems  especially  important  and  worthwhile 
to  ask  why  it  is  that  two  persons  who  have  equal  talent  and 
exert  equal  effort  and  who  are  intent  upon  the  same  study, 
nevertheless  do  not  attain  a  similar  result  in  their  understanding 
of  it.  The  one  penetrates  it  quickly,  quickly  seizes  upon  what  he 
is  looking  for.  The  other  labors  long  and  makes  little  progress. 
But  what  one  should  know  is  that  in  every  business,  no  matter 
what  it  is,  two  things  are  necessary,  namely  work  and  a  method 
for  that  work,  and  these  two  are  so  connected  that  one  without 
the  other  is  either  useless  or  less  effective.  And  yet,  as  it  is  said, 
"Wisdom  is  better  than  strength,"22  for  sometimes  even  weights 
which  we  cannot  budge  by  force,  we  raise  through  cleverness. 
Thus  it  is,  to  be  sure,  in  all  our  study.  He  who  works  along 
without  discretion  works,  it  is  true,  but  he  does  not  make 
progress,  and  just  as  if  he  were  beating  the  air,  he  pours  out  his 
strength  upon  wind.  Consider  two  men  both  traveling  through 
a  wood,  one  of  them  struggling  around  in  bypaths  but  the  other 
picking  the  short  cuts  of  a  direct  route :  they  move  along  their 
ways  with  the  same  amount  of  motion,  but  they  do  not  reach 
the  goal  at  the  same  time.  But  what  shall  I  call  Scripture  if  not  a 


wood?  Its  thoughts,  like  so  many  sweetest  fruits,  we  pick  as  we 
read  and  chew  as  we  consider  them.  Therefore,  whoever  does 
not  keep  to  an  order  and  a  method  in  the  reading  of  so  great  a 
collection  of  books  wanders  as  it  were  into  the  very  thick  of  the 
forest  and  loses  the  path  of  the  direct  route;  he  is,  as  it  is  said, 
"always  learning  yet  never  reaching  knowledge."  For  discretion 
is  of  such  importance  that  without  it  every  rest  from  work  is 
disgraceful  and  work  itself  is  useless.  May  we  all  draw  our  own 
conclusion ! 

There  are  three  things  above  all  which  ordinarily  provide 
obstacles  for  the  studies  of  students :  carelessness,  imprudence, 
and  bad  luck  (for tuna).  Carelessness  arises  when  we  simply  omit, 
or  when  we  learn  less  carefully,  those  things  which  are  there 
to  be  learned.  Imprudence  arises  when  we  do  not  keep  to  a 
suitable  order  and  method  in  the  things  we  are  learning.  Bad 
luck  shows  up  in  a  development,  a  chance  happening,  or  a 
natural  occurrence,  when  we  are  kept  back  from  our  objective 
either  by  poverty,  or  by  illness,  or  by  some  non-natural  slowness, 
or  even  by  a  scarcity  of  professors,  because  either  none  can  be 
found  to  teach  us,  or  none  can  be  found  to  teach  us  well.  But 
as  to  these  three  matters,  in  the  first  of  them — carelessness,  that 
is — the  student  needs  to  be  admonished;  in  the  second — im- 
prudence, that  is — he  needs  to  be  instructed;  while  in  the 
third — bad  luck,  that  is — he  needs  to  be  assisted. 

Chapter  Six:  What  the  Fruit  of  Sacred  Reading  Is 

Let  whoever  comes  to  sacred  reading  for  instruction  first 
know  what  kind  of  fruit  it  yields.  For  nothing  ought  to  be 
sought  without  a  cause,  nor  does  a  thing  which  promises  no 
usefulness  attract  our  desires. 

Twofold  is  the  fruit  of  sacred  reading,  because  it  either 
instructs  the  mind  with  knowledge  or  it  equips  it  with  morals. 
It  teaches  what  it  delights  us  to  know  and  what  it  behooves  us 
to  imitate.  Of  these,  the  first,  namely  knowledge,  has  more  to 
do  with  history  and  allegory,  the  other,  namely  instruction  in 
morals,  has  more  to  do  with  tropology.  The  whole  of  sacred 
Scripture  is  directed  to  this  end. 

Although  it  is  clearly  more  important  for  us  to  be  just  than 

128  HUGH  OF  ST.   VICTOR 

to  be  wise,  I  nevertheless  know  that  many  seek  knowledge 
rather  than  virtue  in  the  study  of  the  Sacred  Word.  However, 
since  I  judge  that  neither  of  these  should  be  disapproved  of  but 
that  both  are  necessary  and  praiseworthy,  I  will  briefly  expound 
what  belongs  to  the  aim  of  each.  And  first  of  all  I  shall  speak 
about  the  man  who  embraces  the  beauty  of  morality.23 

Chapter  Seven :  Hon>  Scripture  Is  to  Be  Studied  for  the  Correction  of 

The  man  who  seeks  knowledge  of  the  virtues  and  a  way  of 
life  from  the  Sacred  Word  ought  to  study  especially  those  books 
which  urge  contemDt  for  this  world  and  inflame  the  mind  with 
love  for  its  creator;  which  teach  the  straight  road  of  life  and 
show  how  virtues  may  be  acquired  and  vices  turned  aside.  For, 
"First  of  all,"  so  Scripture  says,  "seek  the  kingdom  of  God  and 
his  justice."24  It  is  as  if  it  plainly  said:  "Both  desire  the  joys  of 
the  heavenly  kingdom,  and  skillfully  seek  out  those  merits  of 
justice  by  which  one  may  come  to  these  joys.  Love  and  look 
for  every  good  thing,  every  necessary  thing.  If  there  is  love,  a 
man  cannot  take  his  ease.  Do  you  desire  to  reach  your  goal? 
Then  learn  how  a  man  reaches  the  goal  you  are  after." 

This  knowledge,  however,  is  got  in  two  ways,  namely,  by 
example  and  by  instruction :  by  example,  when  we  read  the  deeds 
of  the  saints,  by  instruction  when  we  learn  what  they  have  said 
that  pertains  to  our  disciplining.  Among  the  deeds  and  sayings 
of  the  saints,  those  marvelously  written  down  by  the  most 
blessed  Gregory  should,  I  think,  be  taken  to  heart.  Because 
those  have  seemed  to  me  sweet  beyond  all  others  and  full  of  the 
love  of  eternal  life,  I  did  not  want  to  pass  them  over  in  silence.25 

It  is  necessary,  however,  that  one  who  has  started  out  on  this 
road  should  learn,  in  the  books  that  he  reads,  to  be  stirred  not 
only  by  the  art  of  their  literary  composition26  but  by  a  desire  to 
imitate  the  virtues  set  forth,  so  that  it  is  not  so  much  the  state- 
liness  or  arrangement  of  words  as  the  beauty  of  truth  which 
delights  him.  Let  him  know  too,  that  it  is  not  conducive  to  his 
aim  that,  carried  away  by  an  empty  desire  for  knowledge,  he 
should  delve  into  writings  which  are  obscure  or  of  deep  meaning, 
in  which  the  mind  is  busied  rather  than  edified,  lest  mere  study 


take  such  a  hold  upon  him  that  he  is  forced  to  give  up  good 
works.  For  the  Christian  philosopher,27  reading  ought  to  be  a 
source  of  encouragement,  not  a  preoccupation,28  and  to  feed 
good  desires,  not  to  kill  them.  I  remember  that  I  was  once  told 
of  a  man  of  praiseworthy  life  who  so  burned  with  love  of  Holy 
Scripture  that  he  studied  it  ceaselessly.  And  when,  with  the 
growth  of  his  knowledge  day  by  day,  his  desire  for  knowledge 
also  grew,  finally,  consumed  with  imprudent  zeal  for  it  and 
scorning  the  simpler  Scriptures,  he  began  to  pry  into  every 
single  profound  and  obscure  thing  and  vehemently  to  insist 
upon  untangling  the  enigmas  of  the  Prophets  and  the  mystical 
meanings  of  sacred  symbols  {sacramentonwi).  But  the  human 
mind,  unable  to  sustain  such  a  burden,  soon  began  to  tire  from 
the  greatness  of  the  task  and  the  constancy  of  the  tension,  and  to 
be  confused  by  such  a  great  concern  for  this  troubling  occupa- 
tion that  the  man  stopped  performing  not  only  useful  but  even 
necessary  acts.  When  once  the  matter  had  taken  this  contrary 
turn,  the  person  who  had  begun  to  study  the  Scriptures  for  the 
edification  of  his  life  now  found  them  an  occasion  of  error  to 
him  because  he  did  not  know  how  to  bring  into  play  the 
moderating  influence  of  discretion.  But  at  length,  through  the 
divine  compassion,  he  was  admonished  by  a  revelation  that  he 
should  not  devote  himself  to  the  study  of  these  writings  any 
more  but  should  make  a  habit  of  going  instead  to  the  lives  of 
the  holy  fathers  and  the  triumphs  of  the  martyrs  and  other  such 
writings  dictated  in  a  simple  style;  and  so,  restored  in  a  short 
while  to  his  original  condition,  he  merited  to  receive  so  great  a 
grace  of  internal  peace  that  you  might  truly  say  in  him  was 
fulfilled  that  word  of  our  Lord's — that  word  by  which,  after 
himself  considering  our  labor  and  our  sorrow,  he  wished 
devotedly  to  console  us,  saying:  "Come  to  me,  all  of  you  who 
labor  and  are  heavily  burdened,  and  I  will  refresh  you,"  and 
afterwards  he  says,  "You  will  find  rest  for  your  souls."29 

I  brought  forth  this  example  to  show  those  who  are  bent 
upon  the  discipline,  not  of  literature,  but  of  the  virtues,  that 
their  study  should  not  be  an  affliction  but  a  delight.  For  even 
the  Prophet  says:  "I  have  not  known  literature,"  or  business; 
"I  will  enter  into  the  power  of  the  Lord;  Lord,  I  will  be  mindful 
of  thy  justice  alone.    Thou  hast  taught  me,  O  God,  from  my 

1 30  HUGH  OF  ST.   VICTOR 

youth."30  For  whoever  studies  the  Scriptures  as  a  pre- 
occupation and,  if  I  may  say  so,  as  an  affliction  to  his  spirit,  is 
not  philosophizing  but  is  making  a  business  out  of  them,  and  so 
impetuous  and  unwise  a  purpose  can  hardly  avoid  the  vice  of 
pride.  But  what  shall  I  say  of  the  study  of  the  simple  Paul,  who 
wished  to  fulfill  the  Law  before  he  learned  it?31  Surely  this  can 
be  a  good  enough  example  for  us,  so  that  we  may  be  not  hearers 
nor  students  of  the  Law,  but  rather  doers  of  it32  before  God. 

It  must  be  considered,  moreover,  that  study  customarily  fills 
the  mind  with  loathing  and  afflicts  the  spirit  in  two  ways, 
namely,  through  its  quality,  if  the  material  has  been  too  obscure, 
and  through  its  quantity,  if  there  has  been  too  much  of  it.  In 
both  these  matters  it  is  necessary  to  use  great  discretion  lest 
what  has  been  sought  for  our  recovery  may  be  found  to  stifle  us. 
There  are  those  who  wish  to  read  everything.  Don't  vie  with 
them.  Leave  well  enough  alone.  It  is  nothing  to  you  whether 
you  read  all  the  books  there  are  or  not.  The  number  of  books  is 
infinite;  don't  pursue  infinity!  Where  no  end  is  in  sight,  there 
can  be  no  rest.  Where  there  is  no  rest,  there  is  no  peace.  Where 
there  is  no  peace,  God  cannot  dwell.  "His  place,"  says  the 
Prophet,  "is  in  peace,  and  his  abode  in  Sion."33  "In  Sion,"  but 
"in  peace" ;  it  behooves  us  to  be  Sion,  but  not  to  lose  our  peace. 
Consider,  but  refuse  to  be  preoccupied.  Do  not  be  a  hoarder 
lest  perhaps  you  always  be  in  want.  Give  ear  to  Solomon,  give 
ear  to  the  Wise  Man  and  learn  prudence.  "My  son,"  he  says, 
"more  than  these  require  not.  Of  making  many  books  there  is 
no  end:  and  much  study  is  an  affliction  of  the  flesh."  Where, 
then,  does  all  this  lead  to?  "Let  us  all  hear  together  the  con- 
clusion of  the  discourse.  Fear  God,  and  keep  His  command- 
ments :  for  this  is  all  man."34 

Chapter  Eight:  That  Study  Is  for  Beginners,  Action  for  the  Perfect 

Let  no  one  suppose,  in  view  of  what  I  said  above,  that  I  do 
not  favor  diligence  in  students,  because,  on  the  contrary,  I 
intend  to  encourage  diligent  students  toward  their  objective  and 
to  show  that  those  who  learn  willingly  are  worthy  of  praise. 
But  above  I  was  speaking  for  the  educated,  now  however  for 


those  who  have  yet  to  be  educated  and  are  beginning  the 
instruction  which  is  the  source  of  discipline.  For  the  educated 
it  is  the  pursuit  of  virtues,  but  for  beginners,  at  the  moment,  it 
is  the  practice  of  study  which  is  their  objective — both  pursuits 
to  be  conducted  in  such  a  way,  however,  that  beginners  may  not 
pass  up  virtue,  nor  educated  persons  omit  study,  either.  For 
frequently  a  task  which  has  not  been  preceded  by  study  is  less 
prepared  for,  and  instruction  which  is  not  followed  up  by  good 
application  of  it  is  less  useful.  But  it  is  of  highest  importance 
both  that  those  already  educated  should  watch  out  lest  perhaps 
they  cast  their  eyes  back  upon  things  behind  them,  and  that 
beginners  should  console  themselves  if  sometimes  they  long  to 
reach  the  place  where  the  others  are.  It  is  fitting,  therefore, 
that  both  of  these  should  keep  at  work  and  that  both  of  them 
should  move  ahead.  Let  no  one  turn  backward.  You  may 
climb  ahead,  not  go  back  down.  If,  however,  you  are  not  yet 
able  to  climb  ahead,  keep  to  your  own  place. 

The  man  who  takes  over  someone  else's  job  is  not  without 
fault.  If  you  are  a  monk,  what  are  you  doing  in  a  crowd?  If  you 
love  silence,  why  does  it  delight  you  to  be  constantly  in  attend- 
ance upon  declaimers?  You  ought  always  to  be  taken  up  with 
fastings  and  with  prayers,  yet  you  seek  to  play  the  philosopher, 
do  you?  The  simplicity  of  the  monk  is  his  philosophy.  "But  I 
aspire  to  teach  others,"  you  say.  Yours  is  not  to  teach  but  to 
weep.35  If,  however,  you  desire  to  be  the  learned  teacher,  hear 
what  you  shall  do.  The  inexpensiveness  of  your  dress  and  the 
simplicity  expressed  in  your  countenance,  the  innocence  of  your 
life  and  the  holiness  of  your  behavior  ought  to  teach  men.  You 
teach  better  by  fleeing  the  world  than  by  following  after  it. 
But  perhaps  you  persist,  saying,  "Well,  what  then?  If  I  want  to, 
may  I  not  learn,  at  least?"  I  have  told  you  above:  "Study,  but 
do  not  be  preoccupied  with  it."  Study  can  be  a  practice  for 
you;  it  is  not  your  objective.  Instruction  is  good,  but  it  is  for 
beginners.  You,  however,  have  dedicated  yourself  to  perfection, 
and  therefore  it  is  not  enough  for  you  if  you  put  yourself  on  a 
level  with  beginners.  It  is  fitting  for  you  to  manage  more  than 
this.  Think,  then,  where  you  are,  and  you  will  easily  recognize 
what  you  ought  to  do. 

1 32  HUGH  OF  ST.   VICTOR 

Chapter  Nine :  Concerning  the  Four  Steps 

There  are  four  things  in  which  the  life  of  just  men  is  now 
practiced  and  raised,  as  it  were  by  certain  steps,  to  its  future 
perfection— namely,  study  or  instruction,  meditation,  prayer, 
and  performance.  Then  follows  a  fifth,  contemplation,  in  which, 
as  by  a  sort  of  fruit  of  the  preceding  steps,  one  has  a  foretaste, 
even  in  this  life,  of  what  the  future  reward  of  good  work  is.  It  is 
because  of  this  foretaste  that  the  Psalmist,  when  speaking  of  the 
judgments  of  God  and  commending  them,  immediately  adds: 
"In  keeping  these  there  is  a  great  reward."36 

Of  these  five  steps,  the  first,  that  is,  study,  belongs  to  be- 
ginners; the  highest,  that  is,  contemplation,  to  those  who  are 
perfect.  As  to  the  middle  steps,  the  more  of  these  one  ascends, 
the  more  perfect  he  will  be.  For  example :  the  first,  study,  gives 
understanding;  the  second,  meditation,  provides  counsel;  the 
third,  prayer,  makes  petition;  the  fourth,  performance,  goes 
seeking;  the  fifth,  contemplation,  finds.  If,  therefore,  you  are 
studying  and  you  have  understanding  and  you  already  know 
what  must  be  done,  this  is  the  beginning  of  the  good  for  you, 
but  it  is  not  yet  enough;  you  are  not  yet  perfect.  And  so,  mount 
into  the  ark  of  counsel37  and  meditate  on  how  you  may  be  able 
to  fulfill  what  you  have  learned  must  be  done.  For  there  are 
many  who  have  knowledge,  but  few  who  know  in  the  way  it 
behooves  them  to  know.  Further,  since  the  counsel  of  man  is 
weak  and  ineffective  without  divine  aid,  arouse  yourself  to 
prayer  and  ask  the  help  of  him  without  whom  you  can  ac- 
complish no  good  thing,  so  that  by  his  grace,  which,  going 
before  you  has  enlightened  you,  he  may  guide  your  feet,  as  you 
follow,  onto  the  road  of  peace ;  and  so  that  he  may  bring  that 
which  as  yet  is  in  your  will  alone,  to  concrete  effect  in  good 
performance.  It  then  remains  for  you  to  gird  yourself  for  good 
work,  so  that  what  you  have  sought  in  prayer  you  may  merit  to 
receive  in  your  practice.  God  wishes  to  work  with  you;  you 
are  not  forced,  but  you  are  helped.  If  you  are  alone,  you 
accomplish  nothing;  if  God  alone  works,  you  have  no  merit. 
Therefore,  may  God  work  in  order  that  you  may  be  able  to 
work;  and  do  you  also  work  in  order  that  you  may  have  some 
merit.    Good  performance  is  the  road  by  which  one  travels 


toward  life.  He  who  travels  this  road  is  in  quest  of  life.  "Take 
thou  courage  and  do  manfully."38  This  road  has  its  reward. 
As  often  as  we  become  fatigued  by  the  journey's  labor,  we  are 
enlightened  by  the  grace  of  a  solicitude  from  on  high,  and  we 
"taste  and  see  that  the  Lord  is  sweet."39  And  thus  comes  to 
pass  what  was  said  above — what  prayer  asks,  contemplation 

You  see,  then,  how  perfection  comes  to  those  ascending  by 
means  of  these  steps,  so  that  he  who  has  remained  below  cannot 
be  perfect.  Our  objective,  therefore,  ought  to  be  always  to 
keep  ascending;  but,  because  the  instability  of  our  life  is  such 
that  we  are  not  able  to  hold  fast  in  one  place,  we  are  forced 
often  to  review  the  things  we  have  done,  and,  in  order  not  to 
lose  the  condition  in  which  we  now  stand,  we  now  and  again 
repeat  what  we  have  been  over  before.  For  example:  the  man 
who  is  vigorous  in  his  practice  prays  lest  he  grow  weak;  the 
man  who  is  constant  in  his  prayers  meditates  on  what  should  be 
prayed  for,  lest  he  offend  in  prayer;  and  the  man  who  sometimes 
feels  less  confidence  in  his  own  counsel,  seeks  advice  in  his 
reading.  And  thus  it  turns  out  that  though  we  always  have  the 
will  to  ascend,  nevertheless  we  are  sometimes  forced  by 
necessity  to  descend — in  such  a  way,  however,  that  our  goal 
lies  in  that  will  and  not  in  this  necessity.  That  we  ascend  is  our 
goal;  that  we  descend  is  for  the  sake  of  this  goal.  Not  the  latter, 
therefore,  but  the  former  ought  to  be  the  principal  thing. 

Chapter  Ten :  Concerning  the  Three  Types  of  Students 

It  has,  I  think,  been  clearly  enough  shown  that  the  same  task 
does  not  lie  before  advanced  persons  and  those  who  propose 
something  more  for  themselves,  as  lies  before  beginners.  But 
just  as  something  has  properly  been  allowed  to  the  former 
(those  who  are  advanced)  which  these  beginners  may  by  no 
means  indulge  in  without  committing  a  fault,  so  also  from  the 
beginners  something  is  required  to  which  the  advanced  are  no 
longer  obliged.  Now,  therefore,  I  come  back  to  the  promise 
still  to  be  fulfilled,  namely,  that  I  show  how  the  Sacred  Scripture 
ought  to  be  read  by  those  who  are  still  seeking  in  it  for 
knowledge  alone. 

i34  HUGH  OF  ST.   VICTOR 

There  are  some  who  seek  knowledge  of  the  Sacred  Scripture 
either  in  order  that  they  may  gather  riches  or  in  order  that  they 
may  obtain  honors  or  acquire  fame.  Their  purpose  ought  to  be 
commiserated  in  equal  proportion  to  its  perversity.  There  are 
still  others  who  delight  to  hear  the  words  of  God  and  to  learn 
of  His  works  not  because  these  bring  them  salvation  but  because 
they  are  marvels.  They  wish  to  search  into  hidden  matters  and 
to  know  about  unheard-of  things — to  know  much  and  to  do 
nothing.  In  vain  do  they  gape  at  God's  power  when  they  do  not 
love  his  mercy.  What  else  can  I  call  their  conduct  than  a 
turning  of  the  divine  announcements  into  tales?  It  is  for  this 
that  we  are  accustomed  to  turn  to  theatrical  performances,  for 
this  to  dramatic  recitations — namely,  that  we  may  feed  our  ears, 
not  our  mind.  But  persons  of  this  sort  I  think  should  not  so 
much  be  brought  to  confusion  as  helped.  Their  will  is  not  evil, 
only  senseless. 

There  are  others,  however,  who  study  the  Sacred  Scriptures 
precisely  so  that  they  may  be  ready,  in  accordance  with  the 
Apostle's  teaching,  to  "give  the  reason  of  that  faith"40  in  which 
they  have  been  placed  to  everyone  who  asks  it  of  them,  so  that, 
for  example,  they  may  forthrightly  demolish  enemies  of  the 
truth,  teach  those  less  well  informed,  recognize  the  path  of 
truth  more  perfectly  themselves,  and,  understanding  the  hidden 
things  of  God  more  deeply,  love  them  more  intently.  Surely  the 
devotion  of  these  persons  deserves  praise  and  is  worthy  of 

Three,  therefore,  are  the  classes  of  men  who  study  the 
Sacred  Scripture,  and  of  them  the  first  are  to  be  pitied,  the  second 
to  be  helped,  the  third  to  be  praised.41  But  we,  because  we 
intend  to  give  advice  to  all,  desire  that  what  is  good  should  be 
increased  in  all,  and  what  is  perverted,  changed.  We  wish  that 
all  should  understand  what  we  say  and  that  all  should  do  what 
we  urge. 


Chapter  One:  How  the  Sacred  Scripture  Should  Be  Read  by  Those 
Who  Seek  Knowledge  in  It 

Two  things  I  propose  to  you,  my  student — namely,  order  and 
method — and  if  you  pay  careful  attention  to  them,  the  pathway 
of  study  will  easily  open  up  before  you.  In  my  consideration  of 
these,  however,  I  shall  neither  leave  all  things  to  your  own 
natural  ability  nor  promise  that  from  my  own  diligence  you 
will  get  everything  you  need.  Instead,  by  way  of  foretaste  for 
you,  I  shall  briefly  run  over  certain  matters  in  such  a  way  that 
you  may  find  some  things  set  forth  to  provide  instruction  and 
some  things  skipped  over  to  allow  scope  for  your  own  effort. 

I  have  mentioned  that  order  in  study  is  a  fourfold  matter: 
one  thing  in  the  disciplines,  another  in  books,  another  in 
narrative,  and  another  in  exposition.1  How  these  are  to  be 
applied  in  the  Divine  Scripture  I  have  not  yet  shown. 

Chapter  Tivo :  Concerning  the  Order  Which  Exists  in  the  Disciplines 

First  of  all,  the  student  of  Sacred  Scripture  ought  to  look 
among  history,  allegory,  and  tropology  for  that  order  sought  in 
the  disciplines — that  is,  he  should  ask  which  of  these  three 
precedes  the  others  in  the  order  of  study.2 

In  this  question  it  is  not  without  value  to  call  to  mind  what 
we  see  happen  in  the  construction  of  buildings,  where  first  the 
foundation  is  laid,  then  the  structure  is  raised  upon  it,  and 
finally,  when  the  work  is  all  finished,  the  house  is  decorated  by 
the  laying  on  of  color.3 

Chapter  Three :  Concerning  History 

So  too,  in  fact,  must  it  be  in  your  instruction.  First  you  learn 
history  and  diligently  commit  to  memory  the  truth  of  the  deeds 


that  have  been  performed,  reviewing  from  beginning  to  end 
what  has  been  done,  when  it  has  been  done,  where  it  has  been 
done,  and  by  whom  it  has  been  done.  For  these  are  the  four 
things  which  are  especially  to  be  sought  for  in  history — the 
person,  the  business  done,  the  time,  and  the  place.4  Nor  do  I 
think  that  you  will  be  able  to  become  perfectly  sensitive  to 
allegory  unless  you  have  first  been  grounded  in  history.  Do  not 
look  down  upon  these  least  things.  The  man  who  looks  down 
on  such  smallest  things  slips  little  by  little.  If,  in  the  beginning, 
you  had  looked  down  on  learning  the  alphabet,  now  you  would 
not  even  find  your  names  listed  with  those  of  the  grammar 
students.  I  know  that  there  are  certain  fellows  who  want  to 
play  the  philosopher  right  away.  They  say  that  stories  should 
be  left  to  pseudo  apostles.  The  knowledge  of  these  fellows  is 
like  that  of  an  ass.   Don't  imitate  persons  of  this  kind. 

"Once  grounded  in  things  small,  you  may  safely  strive  for 
all."5  I  dare  to  affirm  before  you  that  I  myself  never  looked 
down  on  anything  which  had  to  do  with  education,  but  that  I 
often  learned  many  things  which  seemed  to  others  to  be  a  sort 
of  joke  or  just  nonsense.  I  recall  that  when  I  was  still  a  school- 
boy I  worked  hard  to  know  the  names  of  all  things  that  my 
eyes  fell  upon  or  that  came  into  my  use,  frankly  concluding  that 
a  man  cannot  come  to  know  the  natures  of  things  if  he  is  still 
ignorant  of  their  names.  How  many  times  each  day  would  I 
make  myself  pay  out  the  debt  of  my  little  bits  of  wisdom,  which, 
thanks  to  their  shortness,  I  had  noted  down  in  one  or  two  words 
on  a  page,  so  that  I  might  keep  a  mindful  hold  on  the  solutions, 
and  even  the  number,  of  practically  all  the  thoughts,  questions, 
and  objections  which  I  had  learned.  Often  I  proposed  cases  and, 
when  the  opposing  contentions  were  lined  up  against  one 
another,  I  diligently  distinguished  what  would  be  the  business 
of  the  rhetorician,  what  of  the  orator,  what  of  the  sophist.  I  laid 
out  pebbles  for  numbers,  and  I  marked  the  pavement  with  black 
coals  and,  by  a  model  placed  right  before  my  eyes,  I  plainly  showed 
what  difference  there  is  between  an  obtuse-angled,  a  right- 
angled,  and  an  acute-angled  triangle.  Whether  or  not  an 
equilateral  parallelogram  would  yield  the  same  area  as  a  square 
when  two  of  its  sides  were  multiplied  together,  I  learned  by 
walking  both  figures  and  measuring  them  with  my  feet.  Often  I 


kept  watch  outdoors  through  the  winter  nights  like  one  of  the 
fixed  stars  by  which  we  measure  time.6  Often  I  used  to  bring 
out  my  strings,  stretched  to  their  number  on  the  wooden  frame, 
both  that  I  might  note  with  my  ear  the  difference  among  the 
tones  and  that  I  might  at  the  same  time  delight  my  soul  with  the 
sweetness  of  the  sound.  These  were  boyish  pursuits,  to  be  sure, 
yet  not  without  their  utility  for  me,  nor  does  my  present 
knowledge  of  them  lie  heavy  upon  my  stomach.  But  I  do  not 
reveal  these  things  to  you  in  order  to  parade  my  knowledge, 
which  is  either  nothing  at  all  or  very  little,  but  in  order  to  show 
you  that  the  man  who  moves  along  step  by  step  is  the  one  who 
moves  along  best,  not  like  some  who  fall  head  over  heels  when 
they  wish  to  make  a  great  leap  ahead. 

As  in  the  virtues,  so  in  the  sciences,  there  are  certain  steps. 
But,  you  say,  "I  find  many  things  in  the  histories  which  seem 
to  be  of  no  utility :  why  should  I  be  kept  busy  with  this  sort  of 
thing?"  Well  said.  There  are  indeed  many  things  in  the 
Scriptures  which,  considered  in  themselves,  seem  to  have 
nothing  worth  looking  for,  but  if  you  look  at  them  in  the  light 
of  the  other  things  to  which  they  are  joined,  and  if  you  begin  to 
weigh  them  in  their  whole  context,  you  will  see  that  they  are  as 
necessary  as  they  are  fitting.  Some  things  are  to  be  known  for 
their  own  sakes,  but  others,  although  for  their  own  sakes  they 
do  not  seem  worthy  of  our  labor,  nevertheless,  because  without 
them  the  former  class  of  things  cannot  be  known  with  complete 
clarity,  must  by  no  means  be  carelessly  skipped.  Learn  every- 
thing; you  will  see  afterwards  that  nothing  is  superfluous.  A 
skimpy  knowledge  is  not  a  pleasing  thing. 

But  you  ask  if  I  have  any  opinion  about  the  books  which  are 
useful  for  this  study.  I  think  the  ones  to  be  studied  most  are: 
Genesis,  Exodus,  Josue,  the  Book  of  Judges,  and  that  of  Kings, 
and  Paralipomenon;  of  the  New  Testament,  first  the  four 
Gospels,  then  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles.  These  eleven  seem  to 
me  to  have  more  to  do  with  history  than  do  the  others — with 
the  exception  of  those  which  we  properly  call  historiographical. 

But  if  we  take  the  meaning  of  the  word  more  broadly,  it  is 
not  unfitting  that  we  call  by  the  name  "history"  not  only  the 
recounting  of  actual  deeds  but  also  the  first  meaning  of  any 
narrative  which  uses  words  according  to  their  proper  nature.7 

1 38  HUGH  OF  ST.   VICTOR 

And  in  this  sense  of  the  word,  I  think  that  all  the  books  of  either 
Testament,  in  the  order  in  which  they  were  listed  earlier,  belong 
to  this  study  in  their  literal  meaning. 

Possibly,  if  it  did  not  seem  childish,  I  should  interject  in  this 
place  a  few  instructions  on  the  manner  of  construing  sentences, 
because  I  know  that  the  Divine  Scripture,  more  than  all  other 
books,  is  compressed  in  its  text:  but  these  matters  I  wish  to 
refrain  from,  lest  I  protract  the  task  before  me  by  excessive 
digression.  There  are  certain  places  in  the  divine  page  which 
cannot  be  read  literally  and  which  it  is  necessary  that  we 
construe  with  great  judgment,  so  that  we  may  not  either  over- 
look some  things  through  negligence  or,  through  misplaced 
diligence,  violently  twist  them  into  something  they  were  not 
written  to  say. 

This,  then,  my  student,  is  what  we  propose  to  you.  This  field 
of  your  labor,  well  cultivated  by  your  plough,  will  bear  you  a 
manifold  harvest.  All  things  were  brought  forth  in  order: 
move  along  in  order  yourself.  Following  the  shadow,  one  comes 
to  the  body :  learn  the  figure,  and  you  will  come  to  the  truth. 
I  am  not  now  saying  that  you  should  first  struggle  to  unfold  the 
figures  of  the  Old  Testament  and  penetrate  its  mystical  sayings 
before  you  come  to  the  Gospel  streams  you  must  drink  from. 
But  just  as  you  see  that  every  building  lacking  a  foundation 
cannot  stand  firm,  so  also  is  it  in  learning.  The  foundation  and 
principle  of  sacred  learning,  however,  is  history,  from  which, 
like  honey  from  the  honeycomb,  the  truth  of  allegory  is 
extracted.8  As  you  are  about  to  build,  therefore,  "lay  first  the 
foundation  of  history;  next,  by  pursuing  the  'typical'  meaning, 
build  up  a  structure  in  your  mind  to  be  a  fortress  of  faith.  Last 
of  all,  however,  through  the  loveliness  of  morality,  paint  the 
structure  over  as  with  the  most  beautiful  of  colors."9 

You  have  in  history  the  means  through  which  to  admire 
God's  deeds,  in  allegory  the  means  through  which  to  believe  his 
mysteries,  in  morality  the  means  through  which  to  imitate  his 
perfection.  Read,  therefore,  and  learn  that  "in  the  beginning 
God  created  heaven  and  earth."10  Read  that  in  the  beginning 
he  planted  "a  paradise  of  pleasure  wherein  he  placed  man  whom 
he  had  formed."11  Him  sinning  God  expelled  and  thrust  out 
into  the  trials  of  this  life.   Read  how  the  entire  offspring  of  the 


human  race  descended  from  one  man;  how,  subsequently,  flood 
destroyed  sinners ;  how,  in  the  midst  of  the  waters,  the  divine 
mercy  preserved  the  just  man  Noah  with  his  sons;  next,  how 
Abraham  received  the  mark  of  the  faith,  but  afterwards  Israel 
went  down  into  Egypt;  how  God  thereafter  led  the  sons  of 
Israel  out  of  Egypt  by  the  hand  of  Moses  and  Aaron,  brought 
them  through  the  Red  Sea  and  through  the  desert,  gave  them 
the  Law,  and  settled  them  in  the  land  of  promise ;  how  often  he 
delivered  them  as  sinners  into  the  hands  of  their  enemies  and 
afterwards  freed  them  again  when  they  were  penitent;  how  first 
through  judges,  then  through  kings,  he  rules  his  people:  "He 
took  his  servant  David  from  following  the  ewes  great  with 
young."12  Solomon  he  enlightened  with  wisdom.  For  the 
weeping  Ezechiel  he  added  on  fifteen  years.  Thereafter  he  sent 
the  straying  people  captive  into  Babylon  by  the  hand  of 
Nabuchodonosor.  After  seventy  years  he  brought  them  back, 
through  Cyrus.  At  last,  however,  when  that  time  was  already 
declining,  he  sent  his  Son  into  our  flesh,  and  he,  having  sent 
his  apostles  into  all  the  world,  promised  eternal  life  to  those 
who  were  repentant.  He  foretold  that  he  would  come  at  the  end 
of  the  ages  to  judge  us,  to  make  a  return  to  each  man  according 
to  his  deeds — namely,  eternal  fire  for  sinners,  but  for  the  just, 
eternal  life  and  the  kingdom  of  which  there  shall  be  no  end. 
See  how,  from  the  time  when  the  world  began  until  the  end  of 
the  ages,  the  mercies  of  God  do  not  slacken. 

Chapter  Four:  Concerning  Allegory 

After  the  reading  of  history,  it  remains  for  you  to  investigate 
the  mysteries  of  allegories,  in  which  I  do  not  think  there  is  any 
need  of  exhortation  from  me,  since  this  matter  itself  appears 
worthy  enough  in  its  own  right.  Yet  I  wish  you  to  know,  good 
student,  that  this  pursuit  demands  not  slow  and  dull  perceptions 
but  matured  mental  abilities  which,  in  the  course  of  their 
searching,  may  so  restrain  their  subtlety  as  not  to  lose  good 
judgment  in  what  they  discern.  Such  food  is  solid  stuff,  and, 
unless  it  be  well  chewed,  it  cannot  be  swallowed.  You  must 
therefore  employ  such  restraint  that,  while  you  are  subtle  in 
your  seeking,  you  may  not  be  found  rash  in  what  you  presume ; 

140  HUGH  OF  ST.   VICTOR 

remembering  that  the  Psalmist  says :  "He  hath  bent  his  bow  and 
made  it  ready.  And  in  it  he  hath  prepared  the  instruments  of 

You  remember,  I  suppose,  that  I  said  above  that  Divine 
Scripture  is  like  a  building,  in  which,  after  the  foundation  has 
first  been  laid,  the  structure  itself  is  raised  up ;  it  is  altogether 
like  a  building,  for  it  too  has  its  structure.  For  this  reason,  let  it 
not  irk  us  if  we  follow  out  this  similitude  a  little  more  carefully. 

Take  a  look  at  what  the  mason  does.14  When  the  foundation 
has  been  laid,  he  stretches  out  his  string  in  a  straight  line,  he 
drops  his  perpendicular,  and  then,  one  by  one,  he  lays  the 
diligently  polished  stones  in  a  row.  Then  he  asks  for  other 
stones,  and  still  others,  and  if  by  chance  he  finds  some  that  do 
not  fit  with  the  fixed  course  he  has  laid,  he  takes  his  file,  smooths 
off  the  protruding  parts,  files  down  the  rough  spots,  and  the 
places  that  do  not  fit,  reduces  to  form,  and  so  at  last  joins  them 
to  the  rest  of  the  stones  set  into  the  row.  But  if  he  finds  some 
to  be  such  that  they  cannot  either  be  made  smaller  or  be  fitly 
shaped,  he  does  not  use  these  lest  perhaps  while  he  labors  to 
grind  down  the  stone  he  should  break  his  file. 

Pay  attention  now!  I  have  proposed  to  you  something 
contemptible  to  gapers  but  worthy  of  imitation  to  those  who 
understand.  The  foundation  is  in  the  earth,  and  it  does  not 
always  have  smoothly  fitted  stones.  The  superstructure  rises 
above  the  earth,  and  it  demands  a  smoothly  proportioned 
construction.  Even  so  the  Divine  Page,  in  its  literal  sense, 
contains  many  things  which  seem  both  to  be  opposed  to  each 
other  and,  sometimes,  to  impart  something  which  smacks  of  the 
absurd  or  the  impossible.  But  the  spiritual  meaning  admits  no 
opposition ;  in  it,  many  things  can  be  different  from  one  another, 
but  none  can  be  opposed.  The  fact,  also,  that  the  first  course  of 
stones  to  be  laid  upon  the  foundation  is  placed  flush  with  a 
taut  cord — and  these  are  the  stones  upon  which  the  entire 
weight  of  the  others  rests  and  to  which  they  are  fitted — is  not 
without  its  meaning.  For  this  is  like  a  sort  of  second  foundation 
and  is  the  basis  of  the  entire  superstructure.  This  foundation 
both  carries  what  is  placed  upon  it  and  is  itself  carried  by  the 
first  foundation.  All  things  rest  upon  the  first  foundation  but 
are  not  fitted  to  it  in  every  way.    As  to  the  latter  foundation, 


everything  else  both  rests  upon  it  and  is  fitted  to  it.  The  first  one 
carries  the  superstructure  and  underlies  the  superstructure.  The 
second  one  carries  the  superstructure  and  is  not  only  under  the 
superstructure  but  part  of  it.  The  foundation  which  is  under  the 
earth  we  have  said  stands  for  history,  and  the  superstructure 
which  is  built  upon  it  we  have  said  suggests  allegory.  Therefore, 
that  basis  of  this  superstructure  ought  also  to  relate  to  allegory. 
The  superstructure  rises  in  many  courses  of  stones,  and  each 
course  has  its  basis.  Even  so,  many  mysteries  are  contained  in 
the  Divine  Page  and  they  each  have  their  bases  from  which  they 
spring.  Do  you  wish  to  know  what  these  courses  are?  The  first 
course  is  the  mystery  of  the  Trinity,  because  this,  too,  Scripture 
contains,  since  God,  Three  and  One,  existed  before  every 
creature.  He,  from  nothing,  made  every  creature — visible, 
namely,  and  invisible.  Behold  in  these  the  second  course.  To 
the  rational  creature  he  gave  free  judgment,  and  he  prepared 
grace  for  it  that  it  might  be  able  to  merit  eternal  beatitude. 
Then,  when  men  fell  of  their  own  will  he  punished  them,  and 
when  they  continued  to  fall  he  strengthened  them  that  they 
might  not  fall  further.  What  the  origin  of  sin,  what  sin,  and 
what  the  punishment  for  sin  may  be :  these  constitute  the  third 
course.  What  mysteries  he  first  instituted  for  man's  restoration 
under  the  natural  law:  these  are  the  fourth  course.  What 
things  were  written  under  the  Law :  these,  the  fifth  course.  The 
mystery  of  the  incarnation  of  the  Lord:  this,  the  sixth  course. 
The  mysteries  of  the  New  Testament:  these,  the  seventh  course. 
Finally,  the  mysteries  of  man's  own  resurrection:  these,  the 
eighth  course.15 

Here  is  the  whole  of  divinity,  this  is  that  spiritual  structure 
which  is  raised  on  high,  built,  as  it  were,  with  as  many  courses  of 
stones  as  it  contains  mysteries.  You  wish  also  to  know  the  very 
bases  themselves.  The  bases  of  the  courses  are  the  principles  of 
the  mysteries.  See  now,  you  have  come  to  your  study,  you 
are  about  to  construct  the  spiritual  building.  Already  the 
foundations  of  history  have  been  laid  in  you :  it  remains  now 
that  you  found  the  bases  of  the  superstructure.  You  stretch  out 
your  cord,  you  line  it  up  precisely,  you  place  the  square  stones 
into  the  course,  and,  moving  around  the  course,  you  lay  the 
track,  so  to  say,  of  the  future  walls.    The  taut  cord  shows  the 


path  of  the  true  faith.  The  very  bases  of  your  spiritual  structure 
are  certain  principles  of  the  faith — principles  which  form  your 
starting  point.  Truly,  the  judicious  student  ought  to  be  sure 
that,  before  he  makes  his  way  through  extensive  volumes,  he  is 
so  instructed  in  the  particulars  which  bear  upon  his  task  and 
upon  his  profession  of  the  true  faith,  that  he  may  safely  be  able 
to  build  onto  his  structure  whatever  he  afterwards  finds.  For 
in  such  a  great  sea  of  books  and  in  the  manifold  intricacies  of 
opinions  which  often  confound  the  mind  of  the  student  both 
by  their  number  and  their  obscurity,  the  man  who  does  not 
know  briefly  in  advance,  in  every  category  so  to  say,  some 
definite  principle  which  is  supported  by  firm  faith  and  to  which  all 
may  be  referred,  will  scarcely  be  able  to  conclude  any  single  thing. 
Do  you  wish  that  I  should  teach  you  how  such  bases  ought  to 
be  laid?  Look  back  at  those  things  which  I  listed  for  you  a 
moment  ago.  There  is  the  mystery  of  the  Trinity.  Many  books 
have  already  been  composed  on  this  mystery,  many  opinions 
given  which  are  difficult  to  understand  and  complicated  to 
resolve.  It  would  be  too  long  and  too  burdensome  for  you  to 
work  through  absolutely  all  of  them  and  possibly  you  would 
find  many  by  which  you  were  more  muddled  than  edified.  Do 
not  insist  on  doing  this:  you  will  never  have  done.  First  learn 
briefly  and  clearly  what  is  to  be  believed  about  the  Trinity,  what 
you  ought  unquestionably  to  profess  and  truthfully  to  believe. 
Afterwards,  however,  when  you  have  begun  to  read  books  and 
have  found  many  things  obscurely,  many  things  clearly,  and 
many  things  doubtfully  written,  take  those  things  which  you 
find  clear  and,  if  it  should  be  that  they  conform,  add  them  to 
their  proper  base.  The  doubtful  things  interpret  in  such  a  way 
that  they  may  not  be  out  of  harmony.  But  those  things  that  are 
obscure,  elucidate  if  you  can.  But  if  you  cannot  penetrate  to  an 
understanding  of  them,  pass  over  them  so  that  you  may  not 
run  into  the  danger  of  error  by  presuming  to  attempt  what  you 
are  not  equal  to  doing.  Do  not  be  contemptuous  of  such  things, 
but  rather  be  reverent  toward  them,  for  you  have  heard  that  it 
is  written:  "He  made  darkness  his  hiding-place."16  But  even  if 
you  find  that  something  contrary  to  what  you  have  already 
learned,  should  be  held  with  the  firmest  faith,  still  it  is  not  well 
for  you  to  change  your  opinion  daily,  unless  first  you  have 


sought  the  advice  of  men  more  learned  than  yourself  and, 
especially,  unless  you  have  learned  what  the  universal  faith, 
which  can  never  be  false,  orders  to  be  believed  about  it.  Thus 
should  you  do  concerning  the  mystery  of  the  altar,  thus 
concerning  the  mystery  of  baptism,  that  of  confirmation,  that  of 
marriage,  and  all  which  were  enumerated  for  you  above.  You 
see  that  many  who  read  the  Scriptures,  because  they  do  not  have 
a  foundation  of  truth,  fall  into  various  errors  and  change  their 
views  almost  as  often  as  they  sit  down  to  read.  But  you  see 
others  who,  in  accordance  with  that  knowledge  of  the  truth 
upon  which,  interiorly,  they  are  solidly  based,  know  how  to 
bend  all  Scriptural  passages  whatever  into  fitting  interpretations 
and  to  judge  both  what  is  out  of  keeping  with  sound  faith  and 
what  is  consonant  with  it.  In  Ezechiel  you  read  that  the  wheels 
follow  the  living  creatures,  not  the  living  creatures  the  wheels ; 
it  says :  "When  the  living  creatures  went,  the  wheels  also  went 
together  by  them:  and  when  the  living  creatures  were  lifted  up 
from  the  earth,  the  wheels  also  were  lifted  up  with  them."17 
So  it  is  with  the  minds  of  holy  men :  the  more  they  advance  in 
virtues  or  in  knowledge,  the  more  they  see  that  the  hidden 
places  of  the  Scriptures  are  profound,  so  that  those  places  which 
to  simple  minds  and  minds  still  tied  to  earth  seem  worthless,  to 
minds  which  have  been  raised  aloft  seem  sublime.  For  the  text 
continues :  "Whithersoever  the  spirit  went,  thither  as  the  spirit 
went  the  wheels  also  were  lifted  up  withal,  and  followed  it :  for 
the  spirit  of  life  was  in  the  wheels."18  You  see  that  these  wheels 
follow  the  living  creatures  and  follow  the  spirit. 

Still  elsewhere  it  is  said:  "The  letter  killeth,  but  the  spirit 
quickeneth,"19  because  it  is  certainly  necessary  that  the  student 
of  the  Scripture  adhere  staunchly  to  the  truth  of  the  spiritual 
meaning  and  that  the  high  points  of  the  literal  meaning,  which 
itself  can  sometimes  be  wrongly  understood  too,  should  not 
lead  him  away  from  the  central  concern  in  any  way  whatever. 
Why  was  that  former  people  who  received  the  Law  of  life 
reproved,  except  that  they  followed  the  death-dealing  letter  in 
such  a  way  that  they  did  not  have  the  life-giving  Spirit?  But  I 
do  not  say  these  things  in  order  to  offer  anyone  the  chance  to 
interpret  the  Scriptures  according  to  his  own  will,  but  in  order 
to  show  the  man  who  follows  the  letter  alone  that  he  cannot 


long  continue  without  error.  For  this  reason  it  is  necessary 
both  that  we  follow  the  letter  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  prefer  our 
own  sense  to  the  divine  authors,  and  that  we  do  not  follow  it 
in  such  a  way  as  to  deny  that  the  entire  pronouncement  of  truth 
is  rendered  in  it.  Not  the  man  devoted  to  the  letter  "but  the 
spiritual  man  judgeth  all  things."20 

In  order,  therefore,  that  you  may  be  able  to  interpret  the 
letter  safely,  it  is  necessary  that  you  not  presume  upon  your  own 
opinion,  but  that  first  you  be  educated  and  informed,  and  that 
you  lay,  so  to  speak,  a  certain  foundation  of  unshaken  truth 
upon  which  the  entire  superstructure  may  rest;  and  you  should 
not  presume  to  teach  yourself,  lest  perhaps  when  you  think  you 
are  introducing  you  are  rather  seducing  yourself.  This  intro- 
duction must  be  sought  from  learned  teachers  and  men  who  have 
wisdom,  who  are  able  to  produce  and  unfold  the  matter  to  you 
both  through  the  authorities  of  the  holy  fathers  and  the  evi- 
dences of  the  Scriptures,  as  is  needful;  and,  once  you  have 
already  had  this  introduction,  to  confirm  the  particulars  they 
have  taught  you  by  reading  from  the  evidences  of  the  Scriptures. 

So  the  matter  appears  to  me.  Whoever  is  pleased  to  follow 
me  in  this,  I  accept  with  pleasure.  Whoever  thinks  things  ought 
not  to  be  done  in  this  way,  let  him  do  what  he  pleases :  I  shall 
not  argue  with  him.  For  I  know  that  a  number  of  people  do  not 
follow  this  pattern  in  learning.  But  how  certain  of  these  advance, 
this  too  I  am  not  unaware  of. 

If  you  ask  what  books  are  best  for  this  study,  I  think  the 
beginning  of  Genesis  on  the  works  of  the  six  days;  the  three 
last  books  of  Moses  on  the  mysteries  of  the  Law;  Isaias;  the 
beginning  and  end  of  Ezechiel;  Job;  the  Psalter;  the  Canticle  of 
Canticles ;  two  Gospels  in  particular,  namely  those  of  Matthew 
and  John;  the  Epistles  of  Paul;  the  Canonical  Epistles;  and  the 
Apocalypse;  but  especially  the  Epistles  of  Paul,  which  even  by 
their  very  number  show  that  they  contain  the  perfection  of  the 
two  Testaments.21 

Chapter  Five :  Concerning  Tropolog  y,  That  Is,  Morality 

Concerning  tropology  I  shall  not  at  present  say  anything  more 
than  what  was  said  above,  except  that  it  is  more  the  meaning  of 


things  than  the  meaning  of  words  which  seems  to  pertain  to  it. 
For  in  the  meaning  of  things  lies  natural  justice,  out  of  which 
the  discipline  of  our  own  morals,  that  is,  positive  justice, 
arises.22  By  contemplating  what  God  has  made  we  realize  what 
we  ourselves  ought  to  do.  Every  nature  tells  of  God;  every 
nature  teaches  man;  every  nature  reproduces  its  essential  form, 
and  nothing  in  the  universe  is  infecund.23 

Chapter  Six :  Concerning  the  Order  of  Books 

The  same  order  of  books  is  not  to  be  kept  in  historical  and 
allegorical  study.  History  follows  the  order  of  time;  to  allegory 
belongs  more  the  order  of  knowledge,  because,  as  was  said 
above,  learning  ought  to  take  its  beginning  not  from  obscure 
but  from  clear  things,  and  from  things  which  are  better  known. 
The  consequence  of  this  is  that  the  New  Testament,  in  which 
the  evident  truth  is  preached,  is,  in  this  study,  placed  before  the 
Old,  in  which  the  same  truth  is  announced  in  a  hidden  manner, 
shrouded  in  figures.  It  is  the  same  truth  in  both  places,  but 
hidden  there,  open  here,  promised  there,  shown  here.  You 
have  heard,  in  the  reading  from  the  Apocalypse  (5:5),  that  the 
book  was  sealed  and  no  one  could  be  found  who  should  loose 
its  seals  save  only  the  Lion  of  the  tribe  of  Judah.  The  Law  was 
sealed,  sealed  were  the  prophecies,  because  the  times  of  the 
redemption  to  come  were  announced  in  a  hidden  manner.  Does 
it  not  seem  to  you  that  that  book  had  been  sealed  which  said: 
"Behold  a  virgin  shall  conceive  and  bear  a  son:  and  his  name 
shall  be  called  Emmanuel"?24  And  another  book  which  says: 
"Thou,  Bethlehem  Ephrata,  art  a  little  one  among  the  thousands 
of  Juda :  out  of  thee  shall  he  come  forth  unto  me  that  is  to  be 
the  ruler  in  Israel:  and  his  going  forth  is  from  the  beginning, 
from  the  days  of  eternity."25  And  the  Psalmist:  "Shall  not  Sion 
say:  This  man  and  that  man  is  born  in  her?  and  the  Highest 
himself  hath  founded  her."26  And  again:  "And  of  the  Lord, 
of  the  Lord  are  the  issues  from  death."27  And  yet  again  he 
says:  "The  Lord  said  to  my  Lord:  Sit  thou  at  my  right  hand."28 
And  a  little  later  in  the  same  place :  "With  thee  is  the  principality 
in  the  day  of  thy  strength,  in  the  brightness  of  the  saints ;  from 
the  womb  before  the  day-star  I  begot  thee."29  And  Daniel  says : 

146  HUGH  OF  ST.   VICTOR 

"I  beheld  therefore  in  the  vision  of  the  night,  and  lo,  one  like 
the  son  of  man  came  with  the  clouds  of  heaven,  and  he  came 
even  to  the  Ancient  of  days . . .  And  he  gave  him  power,  and 
glory,  and  a  kingdom:  and  all  peoples,  tribes,  and  tongues  shall 
serve  him:  his  power  is  an  everlasting  power  that  shall  not  be 
taken  away."30 

Who  do  you  think  could  understand  these  things  before  they 
were  fulfilled?  They  were  sealed,  and  none  could  loose  their 
seals  but  the  Lion  of  the  tribe  of  Judah.  There  came,  therefore, 
the  Son  of  God,  and  he  put  on  our  nature,  was  born  of  the 
Virgin,  was  crucified,  buried;  he  rose  again,  ascended  to  the 
skies,  and  by  fulfilling  the  things  which  had  been  promised,  he 
opened  up  what  lay  hidden.  I  read  in  the  Gospel  that  the  angel 
Gabriel  is  sent  to  the  Virgin  Mary  and  announces  the  coming 
birth:31  I  remember  the  prophecy  which  says,  "Behold,  a  virgin 
shall  conceive."32  I  read  that  when  Joseph  was  in  Bethlehem 
with  Mary,  his  pregnant  wife,  the  time  for  her  to  give  birth 
arrived  "and  she  brought  forth  her  firstborn  son,"33  who  the 
angel  had  foretold  would  reign  on  the  throne  of  David  his 
father:  I  remember  the  prophecy,  "Thou,  Bethlehem  Ephrata, 
art  a  little  one  among  the  thousands  of  Judah :  out  of  thee  shall 
he  come  forth  to  me  that  is  to  be  the  ruler  of  Israel."34  Again  I 
read:  "In  the  beginning  was  the  Word;  and  the  Word  was  with 
God:  and  the  Word  was  God":35  I  remember  the  prophecy 
which  says,  "His  going  forth  is  from  the  beginning,  from  the 
days  of  eternity."36  I  read:  "The  Word  was  made  flesh  and 
dwelt  among  us"  :37  I  remember  the  prophecy  which  says,  "You 
shall  call  his  name  Emmanuel,  that  is,  God  with  us."38  And  in 
order  not  to  risk  making  this  tedious  to  you  by  following 
through  each  item :  unless  you  know  beforehand  the  nativity  of 
Christ,  his  teaching,  his  suffering,  his  resurrection  and  ascension, 
and  all  the  other  things  which  he  did  in  the  flesh  and  through 
the  flesh,  you  will  not  be  able  to  penetrate  the  mysteries  of  the 
old  figures. 

Chapter  Seven :  Concerning  Order  of  Narration 

Concerning  order  of  narration  it  ought  especially  to  be  re- 
marked in  this  place  that  the  text  of  the  Divine  Page  keeps 


neither  to  a  natural  nor  to  a  continuous  order  of  speech,  both 
because  it  often  places  later  things  before  early  ones — for 
instance,  after  it  has  listed  a  number  of  items,  suddenly  the  line 
of  discourse  turns  back  to  previous  ones,  as  if  narrating  sub- 
sequent ones;  and  because  it  often  connects  even  things  which 
are  separated  from  each  other  by  an  interval  of  time,  as  if  one 
followed  right  on  the  heels  of  the  other,  so  that  it  seems  as  if  no 
lapse  of  time  stood  between  those  events  which  are  set  apart 
by  no  pause  in  the  discourse. 

Chapter  Eight:  Concerning  the  Order  of  Exposition 

Exposition  includes  three  things :  the  letter,  the  sense,  and  the 
deeper  meaning  {sententid).  The  letter  is  found  in  every  dis- 
course, for  the  very  sounds  are  letters;  but  sense  and  a  deeper 
meaning  are  not  found  together  in  every  discourse.  Some 
discourses  contain  only  the  letter  and  sense,  some  only  the  letter 
and  a  deeper  meaning,  some  all  these  three  together.  But  every 
discourse  ought  to  contain  at  least  two.  That  discourse  in  which 
something  is  so  clearly  signified  by  the  mere  telling  that  nothing 
else  is  left  to  be  supplied  for  its  understanding  contains  only 
letter  and  sense.  But  that  discourse  in  which  the  hearer  can 
conceive  nothing  from  the  mere  telling  unless  an  exposition  is 
added  thereto  contains  only  the  letter  and  a  deeper  meaning  in 
which,  on  the  one  hand,  something  is  plainly  signified  and, 
on  the  other,  something  else  is  left  which  must  be  supplied  for 
its  understanding  and  which  is  made  clear  by  exposition. 

Chapter  Nine :  Concerning  the  Letter 

Sometimes  the  letter  is  perfect,  when,  in  order  to  signify 
what  is  said,  nothing  more  than  what  has  been  set  down  needs 
to  be  added  or  taken  away — as,  "All  wisdom  is  from  the  Lord 
God";39  sometimes  it  is  compressed,  when  something  is  left 
which  must  be  supplied — as,  "The  Ancient  to  the  lady  Elect";40 
sometimes  it  is  in  excess,  when,  either  in  order  to  inculcate  an 
idea  or  because  of  a  long  parenthetical  remark,  the  same  thought 
is  repeated  or  another  and  unnecessary  one  is  added,  as  Paul,  at 
the  end  of  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  says:  "Now  to  him..." 


and  then,  after  many  parenthetical  remarks,  concludes,  "to 
whom  is  honor  and  glory."41  The  other  part  of  this  passage 
seems  to  be  in  excess.  I  say  "in  excess,"  that  is,  not  necessary 
for  making  the  particular  statement.  Sometimes  the  literal  text 
is  such  that  unless  it  is  stated  in  another  form  it  seems  to  mean 
nothing  or  not  to  fit,  as  in  the  following :  "The  Lord,  in  heaven 
the  throne  of  him,"42  that  is,  "the  throne  of  the  Lord  in  heaven" ; 
"the  sons  of  men,  the  teeth  of  those  are  weapons  and  arrows,"43 
that  is,  "the  teeth  of  the  sons  of  men";  and  "man,  like  grass  the 
days  of  him,"44  that  is,  "man's  days":  in  these  examples  the 
nominative  case  of  the  noun  and  the  genitive  case  of  the  pronoun 
are  put  for  a  single  genitive  of  the  noun;  and  there  are  many 
other  things  which  are  similar.  To  the  letter  belong  construction 
and  continuity. 

Chapter  Ten :  Concerning  the  Sense 

Some  sense  is  fitting,  other  unfitting.  Of  unfitting  sense, 
some  is  incredible,  some  impossible,  some  absurd,  some  false. 
You  find  many  things  of  this  kind  in  the  Scriptures,  like  the 
following:  "They  have  devoured  Jacob."45  And  the  following: 
"Under  whom  they  stoop  that  bear  up  the  world."46  And  the 
following:  "My  soul  hath  chosen  hanging."47  And  there  are 
many  others. 

There  are  certain  places  in  Divine  Scripture  in  which,  al- 
though there  is  a  clear  meaning  to  the  words,  there  nevertheless 
seems  to  be  no  sense,  either  because  of  an  unaccustomed 
manner  of  expression  or  because  of  some  circumstance  which 
impedes  the  understanding  of  the  reader,  as  is  the  case,  for 
example,  in  that  passage  in  which  Isaias  says :  "In  that  day  seven 
women  shall  take  hold  of  one  man,  saying :  We  will  eat  our  own 
bread,  and  wear  our  own  apparel:  only  let  us  be  called  by  thy 
name.  Take  away  our  reproach."48  The  words  are  plain  and 
open.  You  understand  well  enough,  "Seven  women  shall  take 
hold  of  one  man."  You  understand,  "We  will  eat  our  own 
bread."  You  understand,  "We  will  wear  our  own  apparel." 
You  understand,  "Only  let  us  be  called  by  thy  name."  You 
understand,  "Take  away  our  reproach."  But  possibly  you  cannot 
understand  what  the  sense  of  the  whole  thing  together  is.   You 


do  not  know  what  the  Prophet  wanted  to  say,  whether  he 
promised  good  or  threatened  evil.  For  this  reason  it  comes 
about  that  you  think  the  passage,  whose  literal  sense  you  do  not 
see,  has  to  be  understood  spiritually  only.  Therefore,  you  say 
that  the  seven  women  are  the  seven  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and 
that  these  take  hold  of  one  man,  that  is,  Christ,  in  whom  it 
pleased  all  fulness  of  grace  to  dwell  because  he  alone  received 
these  gifts  without  measure;  and  that  he  alone  takes  away  their 
reproach  so  that  they  may  find  someone  with  whom  to  rest, 
because  no  one  else  alive  asked  for  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

See  now,  you  have  given  a  spiritual  interpretation,  and  what 
the  passage  may  mean  to  say  literally  you  do  not  understand. 
But  the  Prophet  could  also  mean  something  literal  by  these 
words.49  For,  since  he  had  spoken  above  about  the  slaughter  of 
the  transgressing  people,  he  now  adds  that  so  great  would  be 
the  destruction  of  that  same  people  and  to  such  an  extent  were 
their  men  to  be  wiped  out  that  seven  women  will  hardly  find 
one  husband,  for  only  one  woman  usually  has  one  man;  and, 
while  now  women  are  usually  sought  after  by  men,  then,  in 
contrary  fashion,  women  will  seek  after  men;  and,  so  that  one 
man  may  not  hesitate  to  marry  seven  women  at  the  same  time, 
since  he  might  not  have  the  wherewithal  to  feed  and  clothe 
them,  they  say  to  him:  "We  will  eat  our  own  bread,  and  wear 
our  own  apparel."  It  will  not  be  necessary  for  you  to  be 
concerned  about  our  well-being,  "only  let  us  be  called  by  thy 
name,"  so  that  you  may  be  called  our  husband  and  be  our 
husband  so  that  we  may  not  be  heralded  as  rejected  women,  and 
die  sterile,  without  children — which  at  that  time  was  a  great 
disgrace.  And  that  is  why  they  say,  "Take  away  our  reproach." 

You  find  many  things  of  this  sort  in  the  Scriptures,  and 
especially  in  the  Old  Testament — things  said  according  to  the 
idiom  of  that  language  and  which,  although  they  are  clear  in 
that  tongue,  seem  to  mean  nothing  in  our  own. 

Chapter  Eleven :  Concerning  the  Deeper  Meaning 

The  divine  deeper  meaning  can  never  be  absurd,  never  false. 
Although  in  the  sense,  as  has  been  said,  many  things  are  found 
to  disagree,  the  deeper  meaning  admits  no  contradiction,  is 


always  harmonious,  always  true.  Sometimes  there  is  a  single 
deeper  meaning  for  a  single  expression;  sometimes  there  are 
several  deeper  meanings  for  a  single  expression;  sometimes 
there  is  a  single  deeper  meaning  for  several  expressions ;  some- 
times there  are  several  deeper  meanings  for  several  expressions. 
"When,  therefore,  we  read  the  Divine  Books,  in  such  a  great 
multitude  of  true  concepts  elicited  from  a  few  words  and 
fortified  by  the  sound  rule  of  the  catholic  faith,  let  us  prefer 
above  all  what  it  seems  certain  that  the  man  we  are  reading 
thought.  But  if  this  is  not  evident,  let  us  certainly  prefer  what 
the  circumstances  of  the  writing  do  not  disallow  and  what  is 
consonant  with  sound  faith.  But  if  even  the  circumstances  of 
the  writing  cannot  be  explored  and  examined,  let  us  at  least 
prefer  only  what  sound  faith  prescribes.  For  it  is  one  thing  not 
to  see  what  the  writer  himself  thought,  another  to  stray  from 
the  rule  of  piety.  If  both  these  things  are  avoided,  the  harvest 
of  the  reader  is  a  perfect  one.  But  if  both  cannot  be  avoided, 
then,  even  though  the  will  of  the  writer  may  be  doubtful,  it  is 
not  useless  to  have  elicited  a  deeper  meaning  consonant  with 
sound  faith."50  "So  too,  if,  regarding  matters  which  are  obscure 
and  farthest  removed  from  our  comprehension,  we  read  some 
of  the  Divine  Writings  and  find  them  susceptible,  in  sound  faith, 
to  many  different  meanings,  let  us  not  plunge  ourselves  into 
headlong  assertion  of  any  one  of  these  meanings,  so  that  if  the 
truth  is  perhaps  more  carefully  opened  up  and  destroys  that 
meaning,  we  are  overthrown;  for  so  we  should  be  battling  not 
for  the  thought  of  the  Divine  Scriptures  but  for  our  own  thought, 
and  this  in  such  a  way  that  we  wished  the  thought  of  the 
Scriptures  to  be  identical  with  our  own,  whereas  we  ought 
rather  to  wish  our  thought  identical  with  that  of  the  Scriptures."51 

Chapter  Twelve :  Concerning  the  Method  of  Expounding  a  Text52 

The  method  of  expounding  a  text  consists  of  analysis. 
Analysis  takes  place  through  separating  into  parts  or  through 
examination.  We  analyze  through  separation  into  parts  when 
we  distinguish  from  one  another  things  which  are  mingled 
together.  We  analyze  by  examination  when  we  open  up  things 
which  are  hidden. 


Chapter  Thirteen:  That  We  Are  Not  Here  Going  to  Speak  of 

And  now  those  things  which  pertain  to  reading  have  been 
explained  as  lucidly  and  briefly  as  we  know  how.  But  as  for  the 
remaining  part  of  learning,  namely  meditation,  I  omit  saying 
anything  about  it  in  the  present  work  because  so  great  a  matter 
requires  a  special  treatise,  and  it  is  more  worthy  to  be  altogether 
silent  about  a  matter  of  this  sort  than  to  say  anything  about  it 
imperfectly.  For  it  is  a  thing  truly  subtle  and  at  the  same  time 
delightful,  one  which  both  educates  beginners  and  exercises  the 
perfect,  one  which  has  not  yet  been  treated  in  writing  and  which 
therefore  deserves  all  the  more  to  be  followed  up. 

Now  therefore,  let  us  ask  Wisdom  that  it  may  deign  to  shine 
in  our  hearts  and  to  cast  light  upon  its  paths  for  us,  that  it  may 
bring  us  "to  its  pure  and  fleshless  feast."54 


Appendices  A  and  B  represent  authentic  additions  made  by  Hugh  to  the 
text  of  the  Didascalkon  (see  Buttimer,  pp.  xv-xvi).  They  appear  in  a  small 
but  superior  class  of  manuscripts  and  were  perhaps  intended  for  more 
perfect  integration  into  the  text  in  a  subsequent  edition.  Because  chapter 
xiii  of  Book  vi  was  clearly  meant  to  stand  as  the  conclusion  of  the  Didascali- 
con,  these  two  chapters  are  placed  in  an  appendix,  even  though  Buttimer 
treats  them  as  chapters  xiv  and  xv  of  Book  vi. 

Appendix  C,  equally  authentic,  occupies  an  even  more  obviously  in- 
appropriate place  in  most  manuscripts  of  the  delta  family,  which,  as  if  it 
were  an  introduction  to  the  entire  work,  prefix  it  to  the  D  i das cali con's  true 
preface,  (see  Buttimer,  pp.  xvi  and  xxxi).  It  may  have  been  intended  for 
insertion  after  chapter  vi  of  Book  i ,  since  it  clarifies  certain  obscurities  in 
that  chapter  (see,  e.g.,  i,  vi.  n.  42  on  ousiai;  appendix  C  makes  clear  where,  if 
not  in  the  divine  Mind  as  John  the  Scot  had  held,  the  ousiai  exist — namely, 
in  the  angelic  intellect).  Because  Hugh's  intention  regarding  it  is  not  certain, 
however,  it  is  here  placed  in  an  appendix,  following  Buttimer. 

Appendix  A:  Division  of  the  Contents  of  Philosophy  (Buttimer, 
vi.  xiv) 

Consider  these  three:  wisdom,  virtue,  and  need.  Wisdom  is 
the  understanding  of  things  as  they  are.1  "Virtue  is  a  habit  of  the 
mind — a  habit  adapted  to  the  reason  like  a  nature."2  A  need  is 
something  without  which  we  cannot  live,  but  [with  which,  i.e., 
when  supplied]  we  would  live  more  happily.  The  following 
three  are  remedies  against  three  evils  to  which  human  life  is 
subject:  wisdom  against  ignorance,  virtue  against  vice,  and 
needs  against  life's  weakness.  In  order  to  do  away  with  the 
three  evils,  we  seek  after  the  three  remedies,  and  in  order  to  find 
the  three  remedies,  every  art  and  every  discipline  was  dis- 

For  the  sake  of  wisdom  the  theoretical  arts  were  discovered; 
for  the  sake  of  virtue  the  practical  arts  were  discovered;  for  the 
sake  of  our  needs  the  mechanical  arts  were  discovered.  These 
three  were  first  in  practice,  but  afterwards,  for  the  sake  of 


eloquence,  logic  was  discovered.  Logic,  though  last  to  be 
discovered,  ought  to  be  the  first  learned.  Four,  then,  are  the 
principal  sciences,  from  which  all  the  others  descend;  these  are 
the  theoretical,  the  practical,  the  mechanical,  and  the  logical. 

The  theoretical  is  divided  into  theology,  physics,  and  mathe- 
matics. Theology  treats  of  invisible  substances,  physics  of  the 
invisible  causes  of  visible  things,  mathematics  of  the  visible 
forms  of  visible  things.  And  this  mathematics  is  divided  into 
four  sciences.  The  first  is  arithmetic,  which  treats  of  number, 
that  is,  of  discrete  quantity  in  itself.  The  second  is  music,  which 
treats  of  proportion,  that  is,  of  discrete  quantity  in  relation  to 
something  else.  The  third  is  geometry,  which  treats  of  space, 
that  is,  of  immobile  continuous  quantity.  The  fourth  is 
astronomy,  which  treats  of  motion,  that  is,  of  mobile  continuous 
quantity.  The  element  of  arithmetic  is  the  number  "one."  The 
element  of  music  is  the  single  tone.  The  element  of  geometry  is 
the  point.    The  element  of  astronomy  is  the  moment  of  time. 

The  practical  is  divided  into  solitary,  private,  and  public.  The 
solitary  teaches  how  each  man  can  found  his  own  life  upon 
upright  habits  and  furnish  it  out  with  virtues.  The  private 
teaches  how  to  regulate  one's  domestics  and  those  bound  to  one 
by  ties  of  flesh.  The  public  teaches  how  a  whole  people  and 
nation  ought  to  be  governed  by  their  rulers.  The  solitary 
pertains  to  individuals,  the  private  to  the  heads  of  families,  and 
the  public  to  the  governors  of  states. 

The  mechanical  treats  of  the  manual  occupations  of  men  and 
is  divided  into  seven  arts.  The  first  is  fabric  making,  the  second 
armament,  the  third  commerce,  the  fourth  agriculture,  the  fifth 
hunting,  the  sixth  medicine,  and  the  seventh  theatrics. 

The  logical  is  divided  into  grammar  and  the  theory  of 
argument.  The  theory  of  argument  is  divided  into  probable 
argument,  necessary  argument,  and  sophistical  argument. 
Probable  argument  is  divided  into  dialectic  and  rhetoric. 
Necessary  argument  belongs  to  philosophers,  sophistical  to 

In  these  four  parts  of  philosophy  such  order  ought  to  be 
preserved  in  learning  as  will  place  logic  first,  ethics  second,  the 
theoretical  arts  third,  and  the  mechanical  arts  fourth.  For 
eloquence  ought  to  be  attained  first ;  then,  as  Socrates  says  in  the 


Ethics,  the  eye  of  the  heart  must  be  cleansed  by  the  study  of 
virtue,  so  that  it  may  thereafter  see  clearly  for  the  investigation 
of  truth  in  the  theoretical  arts.  Last  of  all,  the  mechanical  arts 
follow,  which,  by  themselves,  are  altogether  ineffective  unless 
supported  by  knowledge  of  the  foregoing. 

Appendix  B:  Concerning  Magic  and  Its  Parts  (Buttimer,  vi.  xv)1 

The  first  discoverer  of  magic  is  believed  to  have  been 
Zoroaster,  king  of  the  Bactrians,  whom  some  say  is  none  other 
than  Cham  the  son  of  Noah  with  his  name  changed.  He  was 
afterwards  killed  by  Ninus,  king  of  the  Assyrians,  who  had 
conquered  him  in  war  and  who  also  caused  his  books,  filled 
with  the  arts  of  evil-doing,  to  be  destroyed  by  fire.  Aristotle 
writes  of  this  man  that  his  books  had  preserved  for  the  re- 
membrance of  posterity  as  many  as  two  million  two  hundred 
thousand  verses  on  the  art  of  magic,  dictated  by  himself.  Sub- 
sequently, Democritus  elaborated  this  art  at  the  time  when 
Hippocrates  was  enjoying  fame  in  his  practice  of  medicine. 

Magic  is  not  accepted  as  a  part  of  philosophy,  but  stands 
with  a  false  claim  outside  it:  the  mistress  of  every  form  of 
iniquity  and  malice,  lying  about  the  truth  and  truly  infecting 
men's  minds,  it  seduces  them  from  divine  religion,  prompts  them 
to  the  cult  of  demons,  fosters  corruption  of  morals,  and  impels 
the  minds  of  its  devotees  to  every  wicked  and  criminal  in- 
dulgence. As  generally  received,  it  embraces  five  kinds  of 
sorcery:  mantike — which  means  divination,  vain  mathematics, 
fortunetelling,  enchantments,  and  illusions.  Mantike,  moreover, 
contains  five  sub-species,  of  which  the  first  is  necromancy, 
which  means  divination  by  means  of  the  dead;  for  "necros"  in 
Greek  means  "dead,"  and  "necromancy"  is  derived  from  it. 
Divination  in  this  case  is  achieved  through  the  sacrifice  of 
human  blood,  for  which  the  demons  thirst  and  in  which  they 
delight  when  it  is  spilled.  The  second  is  geomancy,  or  divination 
by  means  of  earth;  the  third,  hydromancy,  or  divination  by 
means  of  water;  the  fourth,  aeromancy,  is  divination  by  means 
of  air ;  and  the  fifth  is  divination  by  fire,  which  is  called  pyro- 
mancy. For  Varro  declared  that  four  were  the  elements  in 
which  divination  consisted — earth,  water,  fire,  and  air.    The 


first,  therefore,  namely  necromancy,  would  seem  to  belong  to 
hell — the  second  to  earth,  the  third  to  water,  the  fourth  to  air, 
and  the  fifth  to  fire. 

[False]  mathematics  is  divided  into  three  types :  soothsaying, 
augury,  and  horoscopy.  Aruspices  (soothsayers)  are  so  called  as 
being  horuspices,  that  is,  inspectors  of  times  (horarum  inspectores), 
who  observe  the  times  in  which  things  should  be  done ;  or  they 
are  called  aruspices  as  being  examiners  of  altars  (aras  inspicientes), 
who  observe  the  future  from  the  entrails  and  viscera  of  sacrificial 
animals.  Augury,  or  auspicium,  sometimes  pertains  to  the  eye, 
and  is  called  auspicium  as  being  avispicium  (the  watching  of  birds) 
because  it  concerns  itself  with  the  movement  and  flight  of  birds ; 
sometimes  it  pertains  to  the  ears,  and  then  it  is  called  augurium 
ioigarritus  avium  (the  chattering  of  birds),  which  is  heard  by  ear. 
Horoscopy,  which  is  also  called  constellation,  consists  in  seeking 
the  fates  of  men  in  the  stars,  as  do  the  genethliaci,  who  observe 
births  and  were  once  especially  called  magi,  of  whom  we  read  in 
the  Gospel. 

Fortunetellers  are  those  who  seek  divinations  by  lots. 
Sorcerers  are  those  who,  with  demonic  incantations  or  amulets 
or  any  other  execrable  types  of  remedies,  by  the  cooperation 
of  devils  and  by  evil  instinct,  perform  wicked  things.  Performers 
of  illusions  are  those  who  with  their  demonic  art  make  sport  of 
human  senses  through  imaginative  illusions  about  one  thing's 
being  turned  into  another. 

All  in  all,  therefore,  there  are  eleven  parts  of  magic:  under 
mantike,  five — necromancy,  geomancy,  hydromancy,  aeromancy, 
and  pyromancy;  under  [false]  mathematics,  three — soothsaying, 
augury,  and  horoscopy;  then  there  are  three  others — fortune- 
telling,  sorcery,  and  performing  illusions. 

Mercury  is  reported  the  first  discoverer  of  illusions;  the 
Phrygians  discovered  auguries ;  Tages  first  gave  soothsaying  to 
the  Etruscans;  hydromancy  first  came  from  the  Persians. 

Appendix  C :  Concerning  the  Three  Subsistences  of  Things  (Buttimer, 
PP-  134-5) 

Things  are  able  to  subsist  in  three  ways:  in  actuality,  in  the 
intellect,  in  the  divine  Mind — that  is,  in  the  divine  Idea,  in  man's 


idea,  and  in  themselves.  In  themselves  they  pass  away  without 
subsistence;  in  the  intellect  of  man  they  subsist,  to  be  sure,  but 
are  not  immutable;  in  the  divine  Mind  they  subsist  without 
change.  Likewise,  what  exists  in  actuality  is  an  image  of  what 
exists  in  the  mind  of  man,  and  what  exists  in  the  mind  of  man  is 
an  image  of  what  exists  in  the  divine  Mind.  The  rational  creature 
was  made  according  to  the  divine  Mind;  the  visible  creature  was 
made  according  to  the  rational  creature.  Therefore,  the  whole 
movement  and  orientation  of  the  rational  creature  ought  to  be 
toward  the  divine  Mind,  just  as  the  whole  movement  and 
orientation  of  the  visible  creature  is  toward  the  rational  creature.1 

Just  as  a  man,  when  he  has  conceived  something  in  his  mind, 
draws  an  example  of  it  externally,  so  that  what  was  known  only 
to  him  may  be  seen  plainly  by  others,  and  afterwards,  to  make 
it  still  more  evident,  explains  in  words  how  the  thing  drawn  as 
an  example  matches  his  idea  of  it;  so,  too,  God,  wishing  to 
show  his  invisible  Wisdom,  drew  its  example  in  the  mind  of  the 
rational  creature,  and  next,  by  making  the  corporeal  creature, 
showed  the  rational  creature  an  external  example  of  what  it 
itself  contained  within.2  Thus,  the  rational  creature  was  made 
in  first  place  and  in  the  likeness  of  the  divine  Idea,  with  nothing 
mediating  between  them.  The  corporeal  creature,  however, 
was  made  in  the  likeness  of  the  divine  Idea  through  the  media- 
tion of  the  rational  creature.3 

For  this  reason,  the  book  of  Genesis,  speaking  of  the  angels 
under  the  appellation  "light,"  says:  "God  said:  Let  there  be 
light.  And  the  light  came  to  be."4  Concerning  all  the  other 
works  of  God,  however,  it  says:  "God  said:  Let  it  be.  And  it 
was  so" — and  then  it  adds,  "And  God  made  it."5  For  the 
angelic  nature  first  existed  in  the  divine  Idea  as  a  plan,  and  then 
afterwards  it  began  to  subsist  in  itself  through  creation.  The 
other  creatures,  however,  first  existed  in  the  Idea  of  God;  next, 
they  were  made  in  the  knowledge  of  the  angels ;  and  finally  they 
began  to  subsist  in  themselves.  When,  therefore,  Genesis  says, 
"God  said:  Let  it  be,"  this  refers  to  the  divine  Mind.  When  it 
says,  "And  it  was  so,"  this  refers  to  the  angelic  intellect.  And 
when  it  says,  "And  God  made,"  it  refers  to  the  actuality  of 


AHDL  Archives  d'histoire  doctrinak  et  litteraire  du  moyen  age 

BGPM  Beitrage  %ur  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  des  Mittelalters 

CM  Classica  et  mediaevalia 

CP  Classical  Philology 

CSEL  Corpus  scriptorum  ecclesiasticorum  latinorum 

DTC  Dictionnaire  de  theologie  catholique 

ETL  Ephemerides  theologicae  lovanienses 

GCFI  Giornale  critico  della  filosofia  italiana 

JTS  Journal  of  Theological  Studies 

MGH  Monumenta  Germaniae  historica 

MH  Mediaevalia  et  humanistica 

MP  Modern  Philology 

MRS  Mediaeval  and  Renaissance  Studies 

MS  Mediaeval  Studies 

MSR  Melanges  de  science  religieuse 

NS  The  New  Scholasticism 

PL  Patrologiae  cursus  completus;  series  latina  (ed.  J.  P.  Migne) 

RB  Revue  benedictine 

RHE  Revue  d'histoire  ecclesiastique 

RMAL  Revue  du  moyen  age  latin 

RSPT  Revue  des  sciences  philosophiques  et  theologiques 

RSR  Recherches  de  science  religieuse 

RTAM  Recherches  de  theologie  ancienne  et  medievale 




Sacris  erudiri 


Studi  e  testi 





i.  The  Didascalicon  can  be  dated  only  with  reference  to  Hugh's  De 
sacra  went  is  christianae  fidei,  of  the  structure  of  which  it  contains  a  preliminary 
sketch  (see  Didascalicon  vi.  iv).  The  De  sacramentis,  begun  after  February, 
1 1 30  (see  Roger  Baron,  Science  et  sagesse  che^  Hugues  de  Saint-Victor  [Paris: 
P.  Lethielleux,  1957],  p.  xlv)  was  brought  to  practical  completion  sometime 
in  1 1 33  (cf.  Jos.  de  Ghellinck,  Mouvement  theologique  du  Xlle  siecle  [Bruges: 
Editions  "de  Tempel"  1948],  pp.  189-90,  esp.  p.  189,  n.  6;  p.  193,  n.  5). 
A  date  in  the  late  1 1 20's  is  thus  possible  for  the  Didascalicon.  A  much  earlier 
date  seems  unlikely.  Hugh  did  not  arrive  at  Saint  Victor  until  1 1 1 5-1 8.  He 
would  not  have  begun  teaching  at  once.  By  the  time  he  composed  the 
Didascalicon,  however,  it  is  probable  that  he  had  been  teaching  some  time 
and  had  written  his  De  grammatica,  Practica  geometriae,  possibly  a  lost  De 
astronomia,  the  De  ponderibus,  the  Epitome  Dindimi  in  philosophiam,  the  De 
scripturis  et  scriptoribus  sacris,  and  the  De  sacramentis  legis  naturalis  et  scriptae 
dialogus,  which  last  Baron  {Science  et  sagesse,  p.  xlvi)  ranks  among  Hugh's 
earliest  productions.  By  11 27  Hugh  was  clearly  a  person  of  importance  in 
the  Abbey,  for  his  name  appears  after  those  of  Abbot  Gilduin  and  Prior 
Thomas  in  a  charter  of  this  date  (Jean  de  Toulouse,  Annates,  Bibliotheque 
Nationale,  MS  Latin  14368,  anno  11 27;  cf.  Fourier  Bonnard,  Histoire  de 
Pabbaye  rojale  et  de  Pordre  des  chanoines  reguliers  de  St-Victor  de  Paris  [2  vols.; 
Paris :  Arthur  Savaete,  n.d.],  I,  89,  n.  1).  This  is  a  fair  date  to  suggest  for  the 

2.  The  school,  at  least  during  Hugh's  lifetime,  remained  public.  See 
Bernhard  Bischoff,  "Aus  der  Schule  Hugos  von  St.  Viktor,"  Aus  der 
Geisteswelt  des  Mittelalters,  ed.,  Albert  Lang,  Joseph  Lechner,  and  Michael 
Schmaus,  BGPM,  Supplementband  III,  Halfband  I  (Minister,  1935), 
pp.  246—50.  Abaelard  is  witness  to  its  public  character  under  William  of 
Champeaux,  who  founded  the  community  in  1 108 ;  see  His  tor ia  calamitatum 
mearum,  J.  T.  Muckle,  ed.  MS,  XII  (1950),  177—78. 

3.  Treatments  of  various  aspects  of  the  early  didascalic  tradition  will  be 
found  in  Werner  Jaeger,  Paideia:  the  Ideals  of  Greek  Culture,  tr.  Gilbert 
Highet  (Oxford :  Basil  Blackwell,  1939);  Henri-Irenee  Marrou,  Histoire  de 
P  education  dans  P 'an ti quite  (Paris:  Editions  du  Seuil,  1948);  Aubrey  Gwynn, 
Roman  Education  from  Cicero  to  Quintilian  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1926); 
H.-I.  Marrou,  Saint  Augustin  et  la  fin  de  la  culture  antique  (Paris :  E.  de  Boccard, 
1949);  and  Pierre  Courcelle,  Les  Lettres  grecques  en  Occident  de  Macrobe  a 
Cassiodore  (Paris:  E.  de  Boccard,  1948).  For  the  later  didascalic  tradition, 
see  refs.  listed  in  n.  6—10. 

4.  See  Charles  Henry  Buttimer,  ed.,  Hugonis  de  Sancto  Victore  Didascalicon 


de  studio  legendi :  a  Critical  Text(" Studies  in  Medieval  and  Renaissance  Latin," 
X;  Washington,  D.  C. :  Catholic  University  of  America  Press,  1939), 
pp.  xv-xliii.  A  few  additional  manuscripts  are  noted  by  Buttimer's  reviewers ; 
see  Bibliotheque  de  V Ecole  des  chartes  CIII  (1942),  236;  and  Etudes  classiques, 
VIII  (1939),  432733- 

5 .  See  G.  Pare,  A.  Brunet,  P.  Tremblay,  La  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle :  les 
e'coles  et  V enseignement  (Paris:  Librairie  philosophique  J.  Vrin,  1933),  ch.  i, 
pp.  17-55.  On  secularist  adaptations  of  learning,  see  further  M.-D.  Chenu, 
"L'Homrae  et  la  nature:  perspectives  sur  la  renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle," 
AHDL,  XIX  (1952),  39-66;  reprinted  with  alterations  in  M.-D.  Chenu, 
La  Theologie  au  Xlle  siecle  (Paris:  Librairie  philosophique  J.  Vrin,  1957), 
pp.  19-51. 

6.  Ludwig  Baur  has  done  this  for  the  work  of  Gundissalinus.  See  his 
Dominicus  Gundissalinus:  De  divisione  philosophiae,  BGPM,  IV  (Miinster, 
1906),  164-316;  broad  sketch  of  the  transmission  of  didascalic  materials 
from  hellenistic  through  late  scholastic  writers  (pp.  316-97);  Hugh  of  St. 
Victor  discussed  (pp.  358-63). 

7.  See,  for  example,  Jos.  Marietan,  Le  Probleme  de  la  classification  des 
sciences  d'Aristote  a  Saint-Thomas  (Paris:  Felix  Alcan,  1901)  and  Martin 
Grabmann,  Die  Geschichte  der  scholastischen  Methode,  II  (Freiburg  im  Breisgau : 
Herder'sche  Verlagshandlung,  191 1 ;  reprinted,  Graz:  Akademische  Druck- 
und  Verlagsanstalt,  1957),  28-54,  23 5—49. 

8.  See  de  Ghellinck,  Motive  tnent  theologique  and  Beryl  Smalley,  The  Study  of 
the  Bible  in  the  Middle  Ages  (New  York:  Philosophical  Library,  1952), 
pp.  1— in. 

9.  See  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  pp.  94-137, 
213-39,  and  0«  Schmidt,  Hugo  von  St.  Victor  als  Pddagog  (Meissen,  1893). 

10.  Richard  P.  McKeon  has  written  this  kind  of  history  for  rhetoric, 
"Rhetoric  in  the  Middle  Ages,"  Spec,  XVII  (1942),  1-32;  for  dialectic, 
"Dialectic  and  Political  Thought  and  Action,"  Ethics,  LXV  (1954-5  5),  esp. 
pp.  3-16;  and  for  poetic,  "Poetry  and  Philosophy  in  the  Twelfth  Century: 
the  Renaissance  of  Rhetoric,"  MP,  XLIII  (1945-46),  217-34.  The  first  and 
last  of  these  are  reprinted  with  some  alterations  in  R.  S.  Crane,  ed.,  Critics 
and  Criticism,  Ancient  and  Modern  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press, 
1952),  pp.  260-96  and  297-318. 

1 1 .  Thus  Ludwig  Baur,  noting  the  rise  to  prominence  of  the  Aristotelian 
schematization  of  knowledge  in  the  twelfth  century,  names  only  Hugh, 
Richard  of  St.  Victor,  Gundissalinus,  and  Michael  Scot  as  its  proponents, 
and,  regarding  the  latter  two  as  directly  inspired  by  Arabic  sources,  treats 
principally  Hugh,  and  very  briefly  Richard,  as  springing  from  the  Latin 
encyclopedic  tradition;  see  Baur,  Gundissalinus,  pp.  358  ff. 

12.  Notably  by  Grabmann,  who,  dating  Radulfus  Ardens  a  century  too 
early  and  hence  regarding  his  four-part  division  of  the  arts  in  the  Speculum 
universale  as  antecedent  to  Hugh,  denies,  but  on  false  grounds,  Baur's 
implication  that  Hugh  was  the  first  proponent  of  this  division  (Grabmann, 
Geschichte  der  scholastischen  Methode,  I,  252);  at  the  same  time  he  adduces  the 
schematization  of  knowledge  found  in  Bamberg  MS  Q.VI.30  as  further 


evidence  that  the  fourfold  division  of  the  arts  "findet  sich  nicht  allein  bei 
Hugo  von  St.  Viktor"  (Vol.  II,  p.  238),  not  recognizing  that  the  Bamberg 
classification  represents  a  conflation,  not  without  its  crudities,  of  the 
divergent  schemas  of  William  of  Conches  and  Hugh.  Max  Manitius 
apparently  follows  Grabmann  in  speaking  of  Hugh's  fourfold  division 
"wie  bei  Radulfus  Ardens"  {Geschichte  der  lateinischen  Literatur  des  Mittel- 
alters,  II  [Miinchen,  193 1],  114). 

1 3 .  Thus  Marietan  praises  Hugh's  classification  because,  since  Aristotle, 
"aucun  auteur  n'etait  entre  dans  autant  et  de  si  minutieux  details.  II  offre 
meme  sur  ce  point  plus  de  renseignements  que  le  Philosophe  de  Stagire" 
{Probleme  de  la  classification,  p.  131);  at  the  same  time,  he  reserves  to  Thomas 
"une  solution  qui  eclaircit  tous  les  doutes  constates,  soit  chez  Aristote  soit 
chez  les  ecrivains  des  ages  suivants"  (p.  176)  and  observes  that  Thomas 
"donne  a  ce  probleme  la  solution  la  plus  logique  et  la  plus  parfaite  qu'il  ait 
recue"  (p.  194).  So,  too,  A.  Mignon,  Les  Origines  de  la  scolastique  et  Hugues  de 
Saint-Victor,  I  (Paris,  1896),  65-66,  places  Hugh  in  the  "true"  stream  of 
scholastic  philosophy  on  the  ground  that  he  distinguishes  clearly  between 
philosophy  and  theology  as  to  object  and  method — so  clearly  that  "la 
distinction  des  deux  ordres  de  science  est  etablie  dans  ses  traites  aussi 
nettement  qu'elle  le  sera  plus  tard  dans  les  ouvrages  du  docteur  angeli- 

14.  See  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  pp.  100-1. 
The  three  causes  are  apparently  taken  over  from  Baur,  Gundissalinus, 
pp.  357-58,  who,  however,  advances  them  not  to  explain  Hugh  but  the 
Aristotelianism  of  the  twelfth  century  at  large. 

1 5 .  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  pp.  97  ff.  for  general 
bracketing  of  Thierry  and  Hugh;  pp.  169-73  for  comparison  of  Hugh  and 
John  of  Salisbury;  pp.  173-210  for  discussion  of  twelfth-century  "human- 
ists," utilitarians,  scientists,  etc. 

16.  Thus,  Tullio  Gregory,  in  the  latest  work  to  appear  on  William  of 
Conches  {Anima  mundi:  lafilosofia  di  Guglielmo  di  Conches  e  la  scuola  di  Chartres 
[Publicazioni  dell'Universita  di  Roma,  III;  Florence:  Sansoni,  1955]) — 
though  he  discusses  in  detail  (pp.  29-40)  the  relative  contributions  of 
William  and  Hugh  to  the  brano  published  by  Ottaviano  (Carmelo  Ottaviano, 
ed.,  Un  brano  inedito  della  "Philosophia"  di  Guglielmo  di  Conches  [Naples: 
Alberto  Morano,  1935];  though  he  notes  the  different  approaches  of 
William  and  Hugh  to  natura  (p.  181,  n.  3)  and  their  different  views  on  the 
problem  of  initial  chaos  (pp.  197-98  and  p.  198,  n.  1);  and  though  he  notes 
the  "angoli  di  vista  diversissimi"  with  which  they  approach  sermo  (p.  269) 
and  the  differences  between  their  schematizations  of  knowledge  (pp.  270- 
78) — nowhere  does  he  bring  these  differences  into  relation  with  the  form 
taken  by  the  Didascalicon.  The  same  failure  is  to  be  found  in  Heinrich 
Flatten,  Die  Philosophie  des  Wilhelm  von  Conches  (Coblenz :  Gorres-Druckerei, 
1929),  pp.  20-32.  Baron,  Science  et  sagesse,  makes  only  two  references  to 
William,  and  these  most  general  (pp.  5  5  and  80).  Admitting  that  "Hugues 
a  parfaitement  pris  conscience  de  la  nouveaute  qu'il  apportait  par  son  tableau 
de  la  philosophie  et  que  cette  innovation  devait  se  justifier"  (p.  79),  Baron 


fails  to  make  clear  wherein  precisely  that  novelty  lay,  or  as  against  whom  it 
required  particular  justification. 

17.  Smalley,  Study  of  the  Bible,  p.  86. 

18.  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  specie,  pp.  94-95. 

19.  Baron  provides  no  help  here.  He  observes  that  the  "celebre  tableau 
[de  la  division  de  la  philosophic]  qu'en  propose  Hugues  est  au  point 
d'aboutissement  d'une  longue  evolution  et  ne  prend  toute  sa  signification 
que  par  l'expose  de  la  longue  serie  d'essais  qui  l'ont  precede"  {Science  et 
sagesse,  p.  38),  but,  while  providing  a  sketch  of  this  evolution  (pp.  38-47), 
he  does  not  make  such  contrasts  between  the  Didascalicon  and  selected  earlier 
works  as  might  have  thrown  the  distinctive  quality  of  the  Disdascalicon  into 
sharp  relief. 

20.  It  is  ascribed  to  the  entire  first  book  in  the  Indiculum  of  Hugh's  works 
found  in  Merton  MS  49  and  drawn  up  for  the  Victorine  edition  of  11 52. 
See  Buttimer,  p.  xvii,  and  de  Ghellinck,  "La  Table  des  matieres  de  la 
premiere  edition  des  oeuvres  de  Hugues  de  Saint- Victor,"  RSR,  I  (19 10), 
270-79.  Titles  ascribed  to  the  first  chapters  of  the  remaining  five  books  in 
the  Buttimer  edition  also  apply  unmistakably  to  the  whole  books  rather  than 
to  the  chapters,  although,  to  avoid  confusing  discrepancies  with  Buttimer, 
the  present  translation  does  not  change  the  location  of  the  titles.  Hugh's 
demonstrative  intention  is  expressed  in  the  opening  words  of  Didascalicon 
i.xi:  "Having  therefore  demonstrated  the  origin  of  the  theoretical,  the 
practical,  and  the  mechanical  arts,  we  must  investigate  as  well  the  derivation 
of  the  logical..."  The  reasoned  derivation  of  the  arts  in  Didascalicon  1 
contrasts  with  their  historical  and  human  derivation  treated  briefly  in 
Didascalicon  in.ii,  "Concerning  the  Authors  of  the  Arts." 

21.  Ultimately  underlying  Hugh's  scheme  is  Aristotle's  division  of  the 
sciences  into  theoretical  and  practical,  as  in  Topics  vn.i  and  Metaphysics  n.i, 
with  a  further  productive  subdivision  specified  in  Topics  vi.iii  and  vin.ii,  and 
Metaphysics  vi.i,  vi.ii,  and  xi.vii.  Augustine  mentions  a  twofold  division  of 
philosophy  into  action  and  contemplation  {De  civitate  Dei  vin.iv),  but  only 
to  assert  its  consistency  with  his  preferred  Platonic  division  (cf.  ibid.,  xi.xxv) 
and  without  associating  it  with  Aristotle.  Cassiodorus,  more  explicit, 
reports  even  the  Greek  names  for  the  theoretical  and  practical  sciences  and 
the  three  subdivisions  of  each,  but,  making  independent  use  of  the  Greek 
source  common  to  him  and  Boethius  (Ammonius  of  Alexandria's  comment- 
ary on  Porphyry's  Isagoge),  invents  a  Latin  terminology  which,  unlike  that  of 
Boethius,  does  not  come  into  general  use  (see  Courcelle,  Lettres  grecques, 
pp.  323-25).  It  is  Boethius  who  transmits  the  distinction  to  the  medieval 
West,  not  only  through  the  -n  and  6  described  as  woven  into  the  garment  of 
Philosophia  in  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae  1.  pr.  i,  and  consistently 
associated  with  practica  and  theoretica  by  commentators,  but  more  explicitly 
in  the  schema  of  the  theoretical  and  practical  sciences  introduced  into  his 
first  commentary  on  the  Isagoge  (entitled  In  Porphyrium  dialogi  duo  in  PL, 
XLIV,  1 1 A  f. ;  cf.  CSEL,  XL VIII,  8-9)  and  of  the  theoretical  sciences  in  his 
De  trinitate  ii.  Authority  for  the  addition  of  the  logical  arts  is  found  in  his 
second  commentary  which,  resolving  the  noncommital  reserve  of  the  first, 


recognizes  logic  as  both  instrument  and  part  of  philosophy  (second  com- 
mentary, entitled  Commentaria  in  Porphyrium  a  se  translatum,  in  PL,  XLIV, 
71-158;  see  ibid.,  73B-75A;  cf.  CSEL,  XLVIII,  138-143).  A  certain  basis, 
though  not  the  direct  inspiration,  for  the  addition  of  the  mechanical  arts 
exists  in  Boethius's  translation  of  Aristotle's  Topics,  esp.  vi.iii,  and  vm,  ii 
{PL,  XLIV,  978B  and  996B),  where,  however,  Aristotle's  productive 
category  is  called  effectiva.  Hugh's  term  mechanica  derives  from  late  Caro- 
lingian  masters,  whose  peculiar  etymology  for  it  he  adopts  (see  Didascalicon 
i.ix).  The  mechanical  arts  are  mentioned,  but  under  different  names  and 
without  being  considered  parts  of  philosophy,  by  the  Latin  Asclepius  i.iii 
(A.  D.  Nock,  ed.  Corpus  Hermeticum,  II  [Paris,  1945],  306);  Augustine  De 
doctrina  christiana  47  and  n.xxxix.  58  {PL,  XXXIV,  57  and  62); 
Chalcidius,  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  (Johannes  Wrobel,  ed.  Platonis 
Timaeus  interprete  Chakidio  cum  eiusdem  commentario  [Leipzig :  B.  G.  Teubner, 
1876];  or  F.  Mullach,  ed.,  Fragmenta  philosophorum  graecorum,  II  [Paris: 
Firmin-Didot,  n.d.],  237);  Cassiodorus  Inst,  i.xxviii.  5-7  (R.  A.  B.  Mynors, 
ed.,  Cassiodori Senatoris institutiones  [Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1937],  pp.  71- 
72;  or  Leslie  Webber  Jones,  tr.  An  Introduction  to  Divine  and  Human  Readings 
by  Cassiodorus  Senator  [New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1946],  pp.  129- 
31);  and  Isidore  of  Seville  Etymologiae  n.xxiv.  3-16.  Rhabanus  groups 
mechanica  with  the  quadrivium  and  medicine  as  comprising  the  Platonic 
physica,  and  he  limits  mechanica  to  "peritia  fabricae  artis  et  in  metallis  et  in 
lignis  et  lapidibus"  {De  universo  xv.i;  {PL,  CXI,  41 3C).  Gerbert  defends  the 
twofold  Aristotelian  division  as  "the  division  of  Vitruvius  and  Boethius" 
against  proponents  of  the  Platonic  scheme  in  a  debate  before  the  emperor 
(see  Richer  Historiarum  libri  ni.lvii-lxv;  PL,  CXXXVIII,  106-9).  The 
Platonic  division  is  followed  by  Bede,  Alcuin,  Rhabanus,  and  John  the  Scot. 

22.  "Alter  Augustinus,"  "secundus  Augustinus,"  "lingua  Augustini," 
"anima  Augustini":  reported  as  epithets  given  Hugh  by  his  contemporaries. 
See  PL,  CLXXV,  cxxxvinA  and  clxviiiA-B.  Cf.  de  Ghellinck,  Mouvement 
theologique,  p.  185,  n.  2. 

23.  On  1 1 27  as  the  probable  date  of  the  Didascalicon 's  composition,  see 
n.  1 .  It  is  true  that  no  division  of  philosophy  appears  in  the  commentary  on 
the  Timaeus  found  by  Schmid  at  Uppsala  and  alleged  by  him  to  be  a  copy  of 
William's  earlier  version  of  this  work  (see  Toni  Schmid,  "Ein  Timaios- 
kommentar  in  Sigtuna,"  CM,  X  [1949],  220-26),  but  Schmid's  attribution 
of  the  work  to  WilHam  has  been  questioned  by  Edouard  Jeauneau,  "L'Usage 
de  la  notion  d'integumentum  a  travers  les  gloses  de  Guillaume  de  Conches," 
AHDL,  XXIV  (1957),  35-100.  The  schema  does  appear  in  the  version  of 
William's  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  printed  in  PL,  CLXXII,  246  ff.  On 
evidence  for  two  versions  of  William's  commentary  on  the  Timaeus,  see 
Gregory,  Anima  mundi,  pp.  12  ff.,  and  J.  M.  Parent,  La  Doctrine  de  la 
creation  dans  Te'cole  de  Chartres  (Paris :  Librairie  philosophique  J.  Vrin,  1938), 
p.  120.  William's  glosses  on  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae  are  excerpted  in 
Charles  Jourdain,  "Des  commentaires  inedits  de  Guillaume  de  Conches  etde 
Nicolas  Triveth  sur  'La  Consolation  de  la  philosophic'  de  Boece,"  Notices  et 
extraits  des  manuscrits  de  la  Bibliotheque  Imperiale,  XX  (1862),  40-82,  and  in  the 


same  author's  Excursions  historiques  et  philosopbiques  a  travers  le  moyen-dge 
(Paris,  1888),  pp.  31-68. 

24.  Baur,  Gundissalinus,  pp.  358-59.  Of  Gundissalinus,  by  contrast,  Baur 
notes  that  his  material  is  "durch  lose  und  sehr  ausserliche  Uberganze  her- 
gestellt"  {ibid.,  p.  164). 

25.  See  Didascalicon  i.vii,  ad  fin. 

26.  Ibid.,  i.ii,  n.  21. 

27.  Ibid.,  n.  22. 

28.  Ibid.,  i.iii,  n.  24. 

29.  Ibid.,  i.xi,  n.  75. 

30.  Ibid.,  i.ii.  Augustinian  view  underlying  the  Boethian  passage  quoted 
by  Hugh  is  cited,  ibid.,  n.  21. 

31.  Ibid.,  i.i,  ad  fin.  With  Hugh's  adaptation  of  the  Platonic  doctrine  of 
reminiscence  here  and  in  the  passage  from  the  Epitome  (see  n.  33),  cf. 
William  of  Conches'  claim  that  both  Plato  and  Boethius,  far  from  teaching 
the  pre-existence  of  souls,  which  would  be  heresy,  speak  per  integumenta  on 
this  subject:  "Certain  persons  wish  to  condemn  Plato  and  his  follower, 
Boethius,  and  foist  upon  Plato  the  doctrine  that  souls,  before  coming  into 
bodies,  knew  all  things,  but,  upon  being  joined  to  flesh,  forgot  all  things 

and  recovered  them  afterwards  through  study Such  persons  do  not 

know  Plato's  mode  of  speaking,  for  in  philosophy  he  speaks  in  parables 
(per  integumenta)."  William's  dispute  with  an  unidentified  contemporary  on 
the  Platonic  doctrine  of  reminiscence  suggests  a  possible  motive  for  Hugh's 
adaptive  allusions  to  it.  Texts  and  discussion  of  the  dispute  in  Pierre 
Courcelle,  "Etude  critique  sur  les  commentaires  de  la  Consolation  de  Boece 
(IX-XVe  siecles),"  AHDL,  XII  (1939),  87-9.  Cf.  Hugh's  view,  borrowed 
verbatim  from  Boethius,  of  the  degeneration  of  intellectible  substance  upon 
its  descent  to  the  physical  world,  Didascalicon  n.iii. 

32.  See  Didascalicon  n.i. 

33.  Roger  Baron,  ed.,  "Hugonis  de  Sancto  Victore  Epitome  Dindimi  in 
philosophiam :  introduction,  texte  critique,  et  notes,"  Trad.,  XI  (1955),  109- 
10.  That  Hugh  may  have  intended  to  incorporate  in  the  Didascalicon  a 
schematized  account  of  the  origin  of  the  four  parts  of  philosophy,  resembling 
that  in  the  Epitome,  is  suggested  by  my  Appendix  A.  Richard  of  St.  Victor 
incorporates  such  a  schematic  account  in  his  condensation  of  the  Didascalicon 
in  the  Excerptiones priores;  so,  too,  does  the  revision  of  William  of  Conches' 
Philosophia  mundi  (refs.  cited,  Appendix  A,  n.  3).  Cf.  De  area  Noe  morali,  Pro- 
logus^-L,  CLXXVI,  619),  where,  in  a  more  familiar  doctrinal  formulation 
of  the  Fall,  Hugh  teaches  that  the  radical  good  lost  by  the  first  man  was  a 
cognitive  one.  Man  had  known  his  Creator.  From  that  knowledge  had  come 
love,  from  love  adherence,  from  adherence  physical  immortality.  When  the 
knowledge  was  lost,  the  goods  dependent  on  it  deteriorated.  Love,  ad- 
herence, immortality,  and  physical  well-being  were  lost  as  well.  Comparable 
analysis  of  the  Fall  in  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  (PL,  CLXXIV,  227D-228B). 

34.  Augustine  wrote  four  separate  commentaries  on  it:  Books  xi-xiii  of 
the  Confessiones,  the  De  Genesi  liber  imperfectus,  the  lengthy  De  Genesi 
secundum  litteram,  and  the  De  Genesi  contra  Manichaeos. 


3  5 .  Chenu  argues  that  the  great  twelfth-century  problem  was  not  merely, 
as  has  been  said,  the  relation  between  faith  and  reason,  but  more  broadly, 
the  relation  between  nature  and  the  divine,  nature  and  grace.  For  detailed 
discussion  and  documentation  of  this  thesis,  see  Chenu,  "L'Homme  et  la 
nature,"  AHDL,  XIX  (1952),  39-66;  Theologie  au  Xlle  siecle,  pp.  19-51; 
and  "Moines,  clercs  et  laics  au  carrefour  de  la  vie  evangelique  (Xlle  siecle)," 
RHB,  XLIX  (1954),  59  ff. 

36.  For  William's  and  Hugh's  exchange  of  views  on  this  point,  see 
Appendix  C,  n.  3.  Similar  difference  between  William  and  Hugh  on  the 
creation  of  Eve ;  cf.  De  philosophia  mundi  i.xxiii  {PL,  CLXXII,  5  6A-B)  and 
De  sacramentis  35-37  {PL,  CLXXVI,  284C-88A;  Roy  J.  Deferrari,  tr. 
Hugh  of  Saint  Victor  On  the  Sacraments  of  the  Christian  Faith  [Publication 
No.  58  of  The  Mediaeval  Academy  of  America;  Cambridge,  Mass.:  The 
Mediaeval  Academy  of  America,  195 1],  pp.  117-20).  On  the  unformed 
condition  of  the  rational  creature  and  the  source  of  its  acquired  form,  see 
Didascalicon  i.ii,  n.  21. 

37.  See  Dionysius  Lasic,  Hugonis  de  S.  Victore  theologia  perfectiva:  eius 
jundamentum  philosophicum  ac  theologicum  (Romae:  Pontificium  Athenaeum 
Antonianum,  1956),  pp.  8  ff. 

38.  See  Didascalicon  i.x.  n.  69,  where  texts  in  the  complicated  history  and 
varied  twelfth-century  use  of  this  conception  are  cited  in  connection  with 
Hugh's  first  definition  of  natura. 

39.  The  De  sapientia  animae  Christi  {PL,  CLXXVI,  845-56),  though 
written  in  response  to  a  question  put  by  Walter  of  Mortagne,  suggests  by 
the  very  length  and  detail  of  the  answer,  the  importance  Hugh  attached  to 
the  point.  For  Augustine's  treatment,  see  esp.  De  libero  arbitrio  n.ix  ("Quid 
sapientia  sine  qua  nemo  beatus;  an  una  sit  in  omnibus  sapientibus"),  x  ("Una 
est  sapientiae  lux  omnibus  sapientibus  communis"),  xii  ("Una  et  incommut- 
abilis  in  omnibus  intelligentibus  Veritas,  eaque  nostra  mente  superior"), 
and  xiii  ("Exhortatio  ad  amplexum  veritatis  quae  una  beatos  fecit");  PL, 
XXXII,  125 3-1263.   See,  further,  Didascalicon,  i.i.  n.  1,  2. 

40.  See  Didascalicon  n.  42,  with  explanation  and  texts  cited. 

41.  For  ref.,  see  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  5,  ad  fin.  Cf.  texts  cited  in  connection 
with  Hugh's  first  definition  of  "natura"  (i.x.  n.  69);  note  particularly  the 
passage  from  De  sacramentis  i.v.  3  quoted  in  extenso  (  n.  42). 

42.  See  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  5.  Discussion  of  the  figure  and  of  the  general 
influence  of  pseudo-Dionysius  on  Hugh  in  Heinrich  Weisweiler,  "Sakra- 
ment  als  Symbol  und  Teilhabe :  Der  Einfluss  des  Pseudo-Dionysius  auf  die 
allgemeine  Sakramentlehre  Hugos  von  Sankt- Viktor,  "Schol.,  XXVII  (1952), 
321-43.  The  late  date  of  Hugh's  commentary  on  the  Celestial  Hierarchy 
makes  it  uncertain  what  influence  the  latter  might  have  exercised  on  the 
Didascalicon  by,  for  example,  the  celebrated  definition  of  "hierarchy"  ("a 
divine  order,  both  knowledge  and  action,  conforming  as  far  as  possible  to 
the  Form  of  God  and  rising  toward  likeness  to  God  in  direct  proportion  to 
the  illuminations  divinely  conferred  upon  it"  [PL,  CLXXV,  989-90]),  of 
which  Hugh  observes  {ibid.,  992B)  that  it  applies  only  to  angels  and  men. 
The  concept  of  a  hierarchy  of  participation  in  the  divine  ideas,  however,  is 


suggested  in  Augustine  De  diversis  quaestionibus  i.xlvi,  "De  ideis"  {PL,  XL, 
31),  where  the  rational  soul's  participation  in  the  divine  ideas  is  said  to 
surpass  the  participation  of  all  the  rest  of  created  reality;  cf.  Enarratio  in 
Ps.  CIII,  sermo  iv.ii  {PL,  XXXVII,  1379):  "Thus  says  the  Lord:  I  do  not 
exact  participation  in  the  divine  Wisdom  from  creatures  not  made  in  my 
image;  but  of  those  so  made,  I  do  exact  it";  Confessiones  vn.ix:  "by  particip- 
ation in  that  divine  Wisdom  which  ever  remains  One  in  itself  are  souls 
renewed  and  made  wise" ;  De  consensu  evangelistarum  i.xxiii.  3  5  {PL,  XXXIV, 
1058):  "we  do  not  merely  admit,  we  especially  preach  that  highest  Wisdom 
of  God  which,  through  participation  in  Itself,  makes  wise  whatever  soul 
becomes  truly  wise."  In  the  last  three  texts,  participation  in  the  divine 
Wisdom  as  a  whole  is  restricted  to  the  rational  soul;  the  rest  of  created 
reality  participates  in  some  pattern  or  idea  within  the  divine  Wisdom. 

43.  See  Appendix  A. 

44.  See  Didascalicon  n.xviii. 

45.  See  Didascalicon  Preface,  third  paragraph. 

46.  See  Didascalicon  v.ix. 

47.  For  John  the  Scot's  view  that  religion  and  philosophy  are  convert- 
ible, see  De  praedestinatione  1  {PL,  CXXII,  3  5  6-8)  and  De  divisione  naturae 
i.lxix  {PL,  CXXII,  5 1 3).  Augustine's  view  in  De  vera  religione  v.viii  {PL, 
XXXIV,  126)  and  De  ordine  n.ix.  26  {PL,  XXXII,  1007).  With  Augustine's 
statement  {ibid.,  11. v.  14)  that  philosophy  has  "no  other  function  than  to 
teach  what  is  the  First  Principle  of  all  things,  great  an  Intellect 
dwells  therein,  and  what  has  proceeded  from  it  for  our  welfare,"  cf.  Hugh's 
Epitome  (Baron,  ed.,  p.  107):  "The  end  of  all  philosophy  is  apprehension  of 
the  highest  Good,  which  lies  in  the  Maker  of  things  alone,"  and  the 
opening  sentence  of  Didascalicon  i.i.  On  essential  differences  between  Hugh 
and  John  the  Scot,  see  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  16;  n.  42;  i.ii.  n.  21. 

48.  Ref.  to  Epitome  cited,  Didascalicon  i.ii.  n.  19. 

49.  Baron,  ed.,  pp.  1 14-15. 

50.  Reading  abiudicaverunt,  as  in  two  of  Baron's  MSS,  in  place  of  his 
adiudicaverunt,  which  does  not  make  sense;  ibid.,  p.  115. 

5 1 .  Ibid. 

52.  Literally,  "where  they  should  admit,"  reading  ammiserint  in  place  of 
Baron's  amiserint,  which  makes  no  sense. 

53.  Ibid.,  p.  116. 

54.  De  philosophia  mundi  1,  Praefatio  {PL,  CLXXII,  41 D  ff.).  The  work 
appeared  1125-30,  or  about  the  same  time  as  the  Didascalicon. 

55.  Metalogicon;  C.  C.  J.  Webb  ed.,  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1924), 
p.  21 ;  Daniel  D.  McGarry  (Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1955), 
p.  25. 

56.  Ibid.,  i.v  (Webb,  p.  19;  McGarry,  p.  23). 

57.  Ibid.,  i.i  (Webb,  p.  7;  McGarry,  p.  11). 

58.  Jourdain,  ed.,  "Commentaires  inedits,"  p.  72. 

59.  Ottaviano,  ed.,  Un  brano,  pp.  27,  28,  34.  For  summary  of  Hugh's 
position  on  the  mechanical  arts  and  a  close  paraphrase  of  Didascalicon  i.viii, 
see  Ottaviano,  Un  brano,  p.  25. 


60.  Epitome,  Baron,  ed.,  p.  116. 

61.  See  William's  commentary  on  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae,  Jour- 
dain,  ed.,  "Commentaires  inedits,"  pp.  72-3. 

62.  De  scripturis  et  scriptoribus  sacris  i  {PL,  CLXXV,  9D). 

63.  De  area  Noe  morali,  Prologus  {PL,  CLXXVI,  619). 

64.  Barthelemy  Haureau,  Histoire  de  la  philosophie  scolastique,  I  (Paris, 
1872),  424,  and  Ueberweg-Heinze,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  II 
(9th  ed.,  1905),  223.  Cited  in  Baron,  Science  et sagesse,  p.  7,  n.  30;  p.  11,  n.  46. 

65.  See  Didascalicon  vi.iii. 

66.  See  Didascalicon  v.viii  and  vii;  note  his  discussion  of  occupatio  in  the 
passage  from  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  cited,  Didascalicon  v. vii.  n.  28. 

67.  Historia  calamitatum,  Muckle,  ed.,  pp.  19 1-2. 

68.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXVI,  15  2D). 

69.  De  philosophia  mundi  i.xxiii  {PL,  CLXXII,  56B  f.).  The  irritableness 
of  William's  words  in  this  entire  passage  suggests  caricature  rather  than  a 
fair  picture  of  his  opponents'  position,  and  it  is  not  impossible  to  see  Hugh 
of  St.  Victor  as  among  those  intended. 

70.  De  animae  exsilio  et  patria  {PL,  CLXXII,  1 241-6). 

71.  Hans  Willner,  ed.,  Des  Adelard  von  Bath  Traktat  De  eodem  et  diver  so, 
BGPM,  IV  (Minister,  1904),  p.  16. 

72.  See  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  10,  for  documentation  of  the  disputes.  Despite 
the  differences  between  Abaelard  and  the  Chartrians  in  their  approach  to 
these  materials,  the  former  interpreting  them  per  involucrum,  the  latter  with  a 
literalness  related  to  their  scientific  purpose,  Chenu  notes  of  Abaelard  that 
"sans  qu'il  soit,  loin  de  la,  le  seul  a  user  de  ce  parallelisme  (cf.  Guillaume  de 
Conches  et  les  Chartrains),  il  en  est  bien  le  patron  au  Xlle  siecle"  ("Involu- 
crum: le  mythe  selon  les  theologiens  medievaux,"  AHDL.  XXII  [1955] 
77);  same  view  in  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  pp.  70  ff.,  esp.  pp.  74-5 

73.  Frequently  the  subject  of  commentaries  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  text 
(see  Courcelle,  "Etude  critique,"  AHDL,  XII  [1939],  pp.  119  fi°.),  the  metre 
was  recognized  as  a  summary  of  the  Timaeus,  or  even  as  a  "summa  totius 
philosophiae,"  according  to  one  enthusiastic  gloss  reported  by  Courcelle 
{ibid.,  p.  10,  n.  4). 

74.  Ibid.,  pp.  77-94. 

75.  See,  e.g.,  Didascalicon  n.  34,  35,  38,  45;  i.vii.  n.  56;  i.ix.  n.  59; 
i.x.  n.  69;  n.i.  n.  7;  n.iii.  n.  18;  11. iv.  n.  26,  27,  28;  11. vi.  n.  39;  n. vii.  n.  40, 
41;  n.xviii.  n.  63. 

76.  Quoted  in  the  final  sentence  of  the  Didascalicon  vi.xiii. 

77.  For  discussion  and  edition  of  the  work,  see  Theodore  Silverstein,  ed., 
"Liber  Hermetis  Triplicis  de  VI  rerum  principiis,"  AHDL,  XXII  (1955), 

78.  See   Didascalicon  i.vii.  n.  53,  55;  in.ii.  n.  8. 

79.  For  examples,  see  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  1,  4,  8,  9,  10,  13,  17;  i.iv.  n.  25. 

80.  So  Courcelle,  "Etude  critique,"  AHDL,  XII  (1939),  p.  65. 

81.  So  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  19. 

82.  His  commentaries  are  on  the  Pentateuch,  the  Books  of  Kings, 
Ecclesiastes,  the  Lamentations  of  Jeremiah,  the  Magnificat,  the  Lord's 


Prayer,  the  Ark  of  Noah,  the  Celestial  Hierarchy  of  pseudo-Dionysius,  and 
the  rule  of  St.  Augustine  and  occupy  some  6  5  o  columns  in  the  PL. 

83.  See  On  the  contrast  between  Hugh  and  the  Char- 
trians  on  the  use  of  poetry  and  literary  prose  in  teaching  the  arts,  see  ibid., 
n.  44;  ni.v.  n.  48;  n.xxix.  n.  84. 

84.  See  Didascalicon  iv.i.  Cf.  Abaelard,  for  whom  the  author  of  the  Latin 
Asclepius  is  "that  most  ancient  of  philosophers,  great  of  name,  Mercury, 
whom,  on  account  of  his  excellence,  men  called  a  god"  (Theologia  Christiana 
i.v  [PL,  CLXXVIII,  1 141  A]);  Plato,  "that  greatest  of  philosophers"  (ibid., 
1 144A) ;  and  Macrobius,  "himself  no  mean  philosopher,  and  the  expositor  of 
the  great  philosopher  Cicero"  (ibid.,  115  3C). 

85.  "  many  men  of  letters  we  now  see  who  wish  to  be  called 
Christians,  who  enter  the  church  with  the  rest  of  the  faithful,  who  there 
partake  of  the  sacraments  of  Christ,  yet  in  whose  hearts  the  memory  of 
Saturn  and  Jove,  of  Hercules  and  Mars,  of  Achilles  and  Hector,  of  Pollux 
and  Castor,  of  Socrates  and  Plato  and  Aristotle  is  more  often  found  than 
that  of  Christ  and  his  saints !  They  love  the  frivolities  of  the  poets,  and  they 
neglect  or  (what  is  worse)  deride  and  contemn  the  truth  of  the  Divine 
Scriptures.  Let  them  now  reflect  what  good  it  does  them  to  enter  the  church 
exteriorly,  while  interiorly,  in  their  hearts,  they  commit  fornication  far  from 
the  true  faith.  . . .  What  good  does  it  do  to  know  the  truth  if  one  loves  false- 
hood?" De  area  Noe  morali(PL,  CLXXVI,  674B-C).  On  the  mythological 
as  well  as  cosmological  lore  found  in  the  glosses  of  William  of  Conches,  as 
in  those  of  Remigius  of  Auxerre  before  him,  see  Jeauneau,  "La  Notion 
d'integumentum,"  AHDL,  XXIV  (1957),  35-100. 

86.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  (PL,  CLXXV,  238A-B).  The  first  opinion, 
that  nature  is  self-caused  and  cyclically  self-renewing,  is  reported  in  Augustine 
De  civ.  Dei  xn.xiii;  cf.  the  account  of  the  pre-Socratics,  ibid.,  vin.ii.  Cf. 
Hugh's  gloss  on  Ecclesiastes  1:10  ("Nothing  under  the  sun  is  new. . .  it  hath 
already  gone  before  in  the  ages  that  were  before  us"),  which  forms  an 
extended  treatment  of  those  "philosophers  of  the  gentiles"  who  "with 
amazing  madness  tried  to  assert  the  eternity  of  time,"  who  held  that  the 
universe  of  changeable  things  has  neither  beginning  nor  end  but  repeats  it- 
self every  1 5,000  years,  and  who  taught  that  all  nature,  all  men,  all  events,  all 
fates  and  fortunes,  all  fathers  and  sons  were  identically  repeated  in  each  such 
cycle.  Cf.  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  n.xi  (Franciscus  Eyssenhardt  ed., 
[Leipzig:  B.  G.  Teubner,  1893],  pp.  620-3;  tr.  William  Harris  Stahl, 
Macrobius'  Commentary  on  the  Dream  ofScipio  [New  York:  Columbia  Univer- 
sity Press,  1952],  pp.  219-22),  where  the  Great  Year  is  given  as  15,000  years, 
and  Timaeus  39D,  with  Chalcidius's  commentary  (Wrobel,  pp.  183-4; 
Mullach,  p.  208)  with  its  reference  to  an  "annorum  innumerabilem  seriem." 
Cf.  Cicero  De  finibus  n.xxxi.  102  and  De  natura  deorum  11.  51;  see  P.  R. 
Coleman-Norton,  "Cicero's  Doctrine  of  the  Great  Year,"  Laval  theologique  et 
philosophique,  III  (1947),  293-302. 

87.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  (PL,  CLXXV,  28  3 C). 

88.  In  addition  to  the  references  cited  above,  n.  86-7,  see  In  Pentateuchon 
iv  (PL,  CLXXV,  33B):  "Our  authors  differ  from  the  philosophers  in  that 


the  latter  treat  God  as  nothing  but  an  artisan.  They  hold  that  there  are  three 
creative  principles — God,  matter,  and  the  archetypal  ideas — whereas  our 
authors  hold  that  there  is  a  single  creative  principle  and  that  this  is  God 
alone."  Cf.  De  sacramentis  i.i.  i  {PL,  CLXXVI,  187B):  "The  philosophers 
of  the  gentiles  hold  to  three  uncaused  principles :  an  artisan,  matter,  and 
form.  They  say  that  creation  was  brought  from  matter  into  its  present  form 
by  the  artisan,  and  they  believe  God  to  be  a  mere  shaper,  not  a  creator.  But 
the  true  faith  confesses  only  one  uncaused  and  eternal  first  principle,  and 
confesses  that  by  him  alone  was  non-existent  creation  created." 

89.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV,  239D). 

90.  Ibid.,  177A-B. 

91.  In  Hierarchiam  Coelestem  i.i  {PL,  CLXXV,  92 5 -D):  "...and  this 
truth  had  to  be  served  by  them  [the  ancients] :  it  was  not  the  truth  which 
leads  to  Life,  and  they  were  not  the  sons  of  Life.  Their  task,  therefore,  was 
given  them  for  our  sakes.  To  us  the  consummation  of  truth  was  reserved, 
for  us  its  beginning  prepared.  They  found  that  truth  which  it  behooved  the 
sons  of  Life  to  use  in  the  service  of  the  highest  truth.  The  labor  of  it  was 
given  to  them,  the  fruit  to  us." 

92.  Above,  p.  10. 

93.  For  specific  texts,  see  Didascalicon  i.i,  n.  1.  On  heresies  risked  by 
John  the  Scot  and  Remigius,  see  further  Courcelle,  "Etude  critique," 
pp.  59-65;  new  details  on  the  dependence  of  Remigius  on  John  the  Scot 
available  from  the  Scotian  commentary,  unknown  to  Courcelle,  on  De  cons, 
phi/,  in.  m.ix,  in  H.  Silvestre,  "Le  Commentaire  inedit  de  Jean  Scot  Erigene 
au  metre  IX  du  livre  III  du  'De  consolatione  philosophiae'  de  Boece," 
RHE,  XL VII  (1952),  44-122.  Remigius 's  approach  was  merely  extended 
by  Adalbold  of  Utrecht,  but  the  latter's  lengthy  discussion  of  how  the 
Summum  Bonum  can  be  forma  without  being  formatum  has  independent 
importance  for  the  history  of  this  term;  see  R.  C.  B.  Huygens,  "Mittelalter- 
liche  Kommentare  zum  O  qui  perpetua,"  SE,  VI  (1954),  410-413.  On 
Hugh's  knowledge  of  the  writings  of  Remigius,  see  Didascalicon  i.x.  n.  74; 
n.iv.  n.  29;  n.xviii.  n.  63 ;  n.xxiv.  n.  72;  in.ii.  n.  6,  8,  9,  14,  19,  24,  26,  31,  36. 

94.  See  Didascalicon  i.ix.  n.  69. 

95.  On  Hugh's  adaptation  of  the  homo  erectus  theme,  see  Didascalicon  i.i. 

n-  3- 

96.  Hugh  so  interprets  it  in  the  De  contemplatione;  see  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  4. 

97.  See  Didascalicon  n.  42. 

98.  See  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  pp.  48  ff. 

99.  See  refs.  to  his  De  sex  dierum  operibus,  Didascalicon  11. i.  n.  7;  n.iv.  n.  28 ; 
and  esp.  n.vii.  n.  41. 

100.  See  section  11  of  the  Introduction.  On  the  mind  as  patterned,  like 
the  angelic  intellect,  after  the  entire  "contents"  of  the  divine  Mind,  see 
Didascalicon  n.  42. 

101.  See  p.  46. 

102.  Ibid. 

103.  Ibid.,  cf.  n.  9. 

104.  Ibid.,  cf.  n.  11. 


105.  Ibid.,  cf.  n.  10. 

106.  Ibid. 

107.  In  his  glosses  on  the  De  cons.  phi/,  and  the  earlier  glosses  on  the 
Timaeus,  both  probably  in  existence  before  the  Didascalicon;  not,  however, 
in  the  De  philosophia  mundi  or  the  later  glosses  on  the  Timaeus,  where  he 
reports  the  identification,  but  no  longer  as  his  own  view.  See  also  Didas- 
calicon i.i.  n.  10. 

108.  Glosses  on  the  Timaeus;  see  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  170. 
Variant  interpretation  oiidem,  diver  sum,  dividuum,  individuum,  in  his  glosses  on 
the  De  cons,  phil.,  Jourdain,  ed.,  "Commentaires  inedits,"  pp.  75-6. 

109.  See  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  169. 

1 10.  Glosses  on  the  De  cons,  phil.,  Jourdain,  ed.,  "Commentaires  inedits," 
pp.  76-7. 

in.  See  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  7. 

112.  Ibid. 

113.  Ibid. 

114.  See  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  10,  ad  fin. 

115.  Cf.  William  of  Conches,  commentary  on  De  cons,  phil.,  ed.  Jourdain, 
"Commentaires  inedits,"  p.  76:  "I  call  the  [world-]soul  threefold  in  nature, 
that  is,  in  power  and  property,  because  it  is  vegetable  in  grasses  and  trees, 
sensible  in  brute  animals,  rational  in  men." 

116.  De  tribus  diebus  xviii  {PL,  CLXXVI,  828B-C):  "One  must  not  in 
any  way  suppose  that,  as  the  intelligence  of  man  is  personally  joined  with 
the  body  which  it  activates,  so  too  the  Creator  Spirit  is  personally  joined 
with  the  body  of  this  sense-perceptible  world ;  for  God  fills  the  world  in  a 
manner  quite  different  from  that  in  which  the  soul  fills  the  body." 

117.  For  details,  see  below,  Didascalicon  i.i.  n.  8. 

118.  The  De  septem  septenis  vii  {PL,  CXCIX,  961D-962A)  speaks  of  "that 
created  spirit"  or  "natural  movement"  "which  is  called  'nature'  by  Hermes 
Mercury,  'world-soul'  by  Plato,  'fate'  by  certain  other  men,  and  'the  divine 
dispensation'  by  theologians";  Herman  of  Carinthia  De  essentiis  (Manuel 
Alonso,  ed.  [Comilles:  Universidad  Pontificia,  1946],  p.  63)  declares: 
"[Naturam]  eodem  nomine  vocare  possumus  quo  Plato  significans  mundi 
animam  vocat."  Adelard  of  Bath  parallels  natura  and  anima  in  De  eodem  et 
diverso  (Willner,  ed.,  p.  15 ;  see  Winner's  interpretation  of  the  passage,  ibid., 
p.  77).  Sources  of  the  identification  of  natura  and  world-soul  are  Chalcidius, 
for  whom  the  "works  of  nature"  are  the  works  of  the  world-soul  (see 
Didascalicon  i.ix.  n.  59),  and  the  Latin  Asclepius  (Nock,  ed.,  II,  299). 

119.  See  Didascalicon,  and  esp.  n.  38.  Though  to  name  God  in 
Didascalicon,  Hugh  uses  the  Timaean  Genitor  et  Artifex  naturae,  he  care- 
fully defines  God  in  the  orthodox  terminology  of  Boethius'  De  hebdomadibus. 

120.  See  Didascalicon  i.vii.  n.  53;  cf.  i.x.  n.  69.  Note  particularly  the 
striking  contrast  provided  by  the  different  uses  to  which  Hugh  and  the 
"Liber  Hermetis"  author  put  the  phrase  "unicuique  rei  non  solum  esse  sed 
etiam  tale  esse  constituit." 

121.  See  Didascalicon  i.x.  n.  71.  To  the  refs.  there  cited  as  precedents  for 
Hugh's  rejection  of  the  world-soul  in  favor  of  solar  fire,  add  Jerome  In 


Ecclesiasten  i  {PL,  XXIII,  1017A),  clearly  Hugh's  authority.  Cf.  Isidore  De 
natura  rerum  xxvu.ii  {PL,  LXXXIII,  1001A),  and  Rupert  of  Deut2  In 
Ecclesiasten  v  {PL  CLXVIII,  1201).  Though  in  the  Didascalicon  Hugh 
reserves  to  the  archetypal  Exemplar  the  distribution  of  each  thing's  esse  and 
esse  talis,  in  the  homilies  on  Ecclesiastes  he  considers  that  the  fiery  spiritus  or 
occulta  naturae  vis  of  the  sun  "unicuique  secundum  suae  naturae  capacitatem 
propriam  qualitatem  distribuit"  (homilia  ii  [VL,  CLXXV,  1 3  7 A]).  The  two 
positions  suggest  the  Nous  qualificans  and  natura  qualificata  of  the"  Liber 
Hermetis."  Note  further  homilia  xi  {PL,  CLXXV,  185A-186C),  where  the 
divine  Wisdom,  stretching  from  end  to  end  of  the  universe,  "comitatur  ac 
fovet  cuncta  quae  operata  est,  ut  non  subsistat  sine  ipsa  quae  facta  et  creata 
sunt  ab  ipsa" — an  attending  and  nourishing  function  reserved  to  the  world- 
soul  in  writers  of  different  stamp.  The  divine  Wisdom  "pursues"  genera  in 
their  "degeneration"  or  "flight"  down  the  hierarchical  ladder  of  being,  and, 
deserting  none,  gives  to  each  a  beauty  suited  to  its  genus — "unicuique  quod 
suum  est  tribuit"  {ibid.). 

122.  See  Didascalicon  i.ix.  n.  59. 

123.  See  Didascalicon  n.  34,  35. 

124.  See  concluding  paragraph  of  Didascalicon  i.v;  cf.  concluding  para- 
graph of  i.vii  and  the  considerations  which  form  the  bulk  of  i.ix. 

125.  See  Appendix  C. 

126.  See  remarks  introductory  to  Appendices  A,  B,  and  C. 

127.  William  of  Conches  attempts  to  reconcile  the  Platonic  {Timaean)  and 
scriptural  (Pauline  and  pseudo-Dionysian)  hierarchies  of  daimons  and  angels, 
De philosophia  mundi  i.xvi-xx  {PL,  CLXXII,  47A-48D).  Honorius  Augusto- 
dunensis  cites  scriptural  warrant  for  declaring  that  angels  possess  bodies  of 
fire  and  locates  them  above  the  aqueum  coelum  next  over  the  firmament, 
Libellus  octo  quaestionum  iii  {PL,  CLXXII,  1189A-B);  cf.  De  imagine  mundi 
i.lxvii  {PL,  CLXXII,  138A)  and  i.cxxxix  {ibid.,  146C).  See  further  the 
anonymous  twelfth-century  commentary  on  Genesis  mistakenly  printed 
among  the  works  of  Remigius  of  Auxerre  {PL,  CXXXI,  54D-55A); 
Clarenbaldus  of  Arras  Liber  de  eodem  secundus  (Nicholas  Haring,  ed.,  A.HDL, 
XXII  [1955],  212);  and  esp.  Summa  sententiarum  tractatus  n.i  {PL,  CLXXVI, 
81),  a  distinctly  un-Hugonian  passage  despite  the  mistaken  claim  of  Baron 
{Science  et  sagesse,  p.  5  6,  n.  11 6)  that  its  tenor  is  identical  with  Hugh's  In 
Pentateuchon  viii  {PL,  CLXXV,  34-35).  Once  and  tentatively  {ibid.,  vii  [PL, 
CLXXV,  37B]),  Hugh  concedes  that  man's  body  may  have  been  made 
through  the  ministry  of  angels  ("'Faciamus  hominem  ad  imaginem  et 
simiUtudinem  nostram'...  ipse  [Deus]  ad  angelos  ita  loquatur,  quorum 
ministerio  forsitan  formatum  est  corpus  hominis").  Such  a  function  is  not 
mentioned  in  the  tract  on  the  angels  in  De  sacramentis  i.v. 

128.  To  the  refs.  given  in  Appendix  C,  n.  1,  add  Hugh's  Expositio  in 
Hierarchiam  coelestem  i.iii  {PL,  CLXXV,  929-930). 

129.  Theologie  au  XI Ie  siecle,  p.  20. 

130.  Section  1  of  Introduction,  concluding  two  paragraphs. 

131.  It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  works  which  are  "encyclo- 
pedic" in  virtue  of  speculating  on  the  nature  of  the  'syxoxXioi;  raaSeioc,  the 


cycle  of  arts  by  which  education  can  best  be  accomplished,  and  those  that 
are  "encyclopedic"  in  the  modern  sense,  that  is,  as  repositories  of  informa- 
tion on  a  wide  variety  of  subjects.  Isidore's  Etymologiae  is  encyclopedic  in 
the  latter  sense,  the  DidascaUcon  in  the  former.  Cf.  Baur,  Gundissalinus, 
pp.  317-318,  for  further  discussion  of  the  distinction  as  applied  to  works  in 
the  didascalic  tradition. 

132.  De  area  Noe  morali  iv.i  {PL,  CLXXVI,  66  3  B):  "Let  no  man  excuse 
himself.  Let  no  man  say,  'I  am  not  able  to  build  a  house  for  the  Lord ;  my 
poverty  does  suffice  for  such  an  expensive  project;  I  have  no  place  in  which 
to  build  it.'...  You  shall  build  a  house  for  the  Lord  out  of  your  own  self. 
He  himself  will  be  the  builder ;  your  heart  will  be  the  place ;  your  thoughts 
will  supply  the  material." 

133.  See  DidascaUcon  n.i. 

134.  De  Trinitate  xiv.xvii  {PL,  XLII,  1054-5). 

135.  De  ordine  i.viii  {PL,  XXXII,  988).  Cf.  Augustine's  criticism  of  the 
De  ordine  in  the  Retractationes  i.iii.  2  {PL,  XXXII,  588):  "In  these  books  I 
am  displeased . . .  because  I  attributed  a  great  deal  to  the  liberal  arts,  of  which 
many  saintly  men  are  much  in  ignorance,  and  with  which  many  who  are  not 
saintly  are  thoroughly  conversant." 

136.  Cf.  Henri-Irenee  Marrou,  Saint  Augustin  et  la  fin  de  la  culture  antique 
(Paris:  E.  de  Boccard,  1949),  pp.  356-85. 

137.  De  doctrina  Christiana  n.xlii.  63  {PL,  XXXIV,  65). 

138.  Ibid.,  i.xxxv.  39  {PL,  XXXIV,  34);  cf.  n.vii.  10  {PL,  XXXIV,  39): 
"Everyone  who  studies  the  divine  Scriptures  will  find  nothing  in  them  but 
the  insistence  that  God  be  loved  for  God's  sake  and  that  one's  neighbor  be 
loved  for  God's  sake." 

139.  Ibid.,  n.vii.  9-1 1  {PL,  XXXIV,  39-40). 

140.  See  DidascaUcon  m.i. 

141.  See  DidascaUcon  in.iii. 

142.  De  doctrina  Christiana  n.xix.  29  {PL,  XXXIV,  50).  The  survey 
extends  to  n.xxxix.  5  8  {ibid.,  62). 

143.  The  looseness  of  the  classification  is  suggested,  for  example,  by  the 
double  appearance  of  astronomy  in  it:  in  II.  A.  3  by  name,  in  II. B.  3  as  number 
applied  to  motion.  Augustine's  more  conventional  formulation  of  the  arts, 
as  in  De  ordine  n.xii  ff.  {PL,  XXXII,  10 1 1  ff.)  should  not  be  forgotten.  The 
point  at  issue  here,  however,  is  the  difference  between  the  formulations  of 
the  De  doctrina  Christiana  and  the  DidascaUcon.  Baron  {Science  etsagesse,  p.  46, 
n.  57)  follows  de  Bruyne  in  attributing  the  above  scheme  to  Rhabanus 
Maurus  as  a  sign  of  his  independence  and  originality. 

144.  See  DidascaUcon  n.xxvii. 

145.  Ibid.,  in.iv. 

146.  See  Appendix  B. 

147.  De  doctrina  Christiana  n.xxix.  46  {PL,  XXXIV,  57). 

148.  Ibid.,  iv.iii.  4-5  {PL,  XXXIV,  90-1). 

149.  Ibid.,  n.xxxix.  58  {PL,  XXXIV,  62). 

150.  Ibid.,  59  {PL,  XXXIV,  62). 

151.  De  sacramentis  1.   Prologus.  6  {PL,  CLXXVI,  185 ;  Deferrari,  p.  5). 


152.  Henry  Osborn  Taylor,  The  Mediaeval  Mind,  II  (London:  Macmillan 
and  Co.,  1938),  387,  n.  2;  cf.  L.  W.  Jones,  "The  Influence  of  Cassiodorus  on 
Medieval  Culture,"  Spec,  XX  (1945),  438. 

153.  Institutiones  i.xxi  (Mynors,  p.  60;  Jones,  p.  120). 

154.  Ibid.,  1.  xxi,  xxvii,  xxviii  (Mynors,  pp.  60,  68,  69-71 ;  Jones,  pp.  120, 
127,  128-9). 

155.  Ibid.,  n.iii  (Mynors,  p.  no;  Jones,  p.  159). 

156.  See  Introduction,  n.  21. 

157.  Institutiones  1. xxviii,  xxix,  xxxi  (Mynors,  pp.  71-3,  78-9;  Jones,  pp. 
1 30-1,  135-6). 

158.  See  Didascalicon  11. ii.  n.  16. 

159.  Ibid.,  i.iv.  n.  27. 

160.  So  Hugonin  in  his  introductory  essay  to  Hugh's  works  {PL 
CLXXV,  cols.  l-li).  Mignon,  Origines  de  la  scolastique,  I,  65-6,  would  have 
Hugh's  distinction  between  philosophy  and  theology  "as  perfect"  as  that 
of  St.  Thomas.  Marietan,  Probleme  de  la  classification,  pp.  134-5,  believes  that 
the  "theology"  of  Hugh's  first  three  books  is  Aristotle's  "first  philosophy," 
or  metaphysics,  while  the  last  three  books  treat  revealed  theology.  The 
same  interpretation  is  found  in  Manitius,  Geschichte  der  lateinischen  Literatur, 
III,  113;  in  John  P.  Kleinz,  The  Theory  of  Knoiv  ledge  of  Hugh  of  Saint  Victor 
(Washington,  D.  C. :  Catholic  University  of  America  Press,  1944),  pp.  8-12; 
and  in  F.  Vernet,  "Hugues  de  Saint-Victor,"  DTC,  VII,  part  1  (Paris,  1927), 
258-60,  who  also  summarizes  the  views  of  several  others  on  the  point. 
Against  these,  the  anachronism  of  approaching  twelfth-century  authors, 
particularly  William  of  Conches  and  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  with  the  modern 
distinction  between  philosophy  and  theology  in  mind  has  been  pointed  out 
by  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  pp.  20-1,  and  the  unity  of  natural  and  super- 
natural knowledge  in  Hugh's  thought  has  been  demonstrated  by  Jakob 
Kilgenstein,  Die  Gotteslehre  des  Hugo  von  St.  Viktor  (Wurzburg,  1898), 
esp.  pp.  51-7. 

161.  See  Didascalicon  i.ii. 

162.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV,  197B):  "This  is  man's  wisdom 
in  this  life,  namely,  to  seek  and  search  out  the  divine  Wisdom." 

163.  See  Didascalicon  i.v. 

164.  Ibid.,,  third  paragraph  {ad fin.);  cf.  n.i,  third  paragraph. 

165.  In  the  sense  that  the  intellectual  creature  remains  unformed  unless  it 
turns  toward  the  divine  Wisdom  which  forms  and  informs  it.  See  Didascali- 
con i.ii.  n.  21. 

166.  Cf.  Hugh's  statement  in  Didascalicon,  Preface:  "The  book  instructs 
the  reader  as  well  of  secular  writings  as  of  the  Divine  Writings."  Vernet 
(see  n.  160)  cites  this  statement  but  takes  scripturae  as  if  it  were  scientiae; 
Hugonin  (see  n.  160)  does  the  same.  The  distinction  between  the  works  of 
creation  {opera  conditionis)  and  the  works  of  man's  restoration  or  salvation 
{opera  restaurationis)  is  basic  to  Hugh's  thought  and  recurs  constantly  in  his 
works :  cf.  De  area  Noe  morali  iv.iii  {PL,  CLXXVI,  667) ;  De  vanitate  mundi  n 
{ibid.,  716-17);  Expositio  in  Hierarchiam  coelestem  i.i  {PL,  CLXXV,  926-7); 
and  De  sacramentis  1.   Prologus.  ii  {PL,  CLXXVI,  183 ;  Deferrari,  pp.  3-4), 


which  also  adds  the  qualification,  "The  worldly  or  secular  writings  have  the 
works  of  creation  as  their  material;  the  Divine  Writings,  the  works  of 

167.  Expositio  in  Hierarchiam  coelestem  i.i  {PL,  CLXXV,  923-8). 

168.  Ibid.  (esp.  cols.  926D-928B).  Cf.  De  area  Noe  morali  {PL, 
CLXXVI,  672B):  "Because,  with  superstitious  curiosity,  the  philosophers 
of  the  gentiles  investigated  the  natures  of  things,  that  is,  the  works  of 
creation,  they  came  to  nothingness  and  vanity  in  their  thoughts.  Because 
the  philosophers  of  the  Christians  ceaselessly  ponder  the  works  of  salvation, 
they  drive  away  all  vanity  from  their  thoughts." 

169.  "naturalibus  quoque  pro  modo  subjunctis,  ut  in  illis  eruditionem 
conformaret."   Expositio  in  Hierarchiam  coelestem  i.i  {PL,  CLXXV,  927A). 

170.  The  De  tribus  diebus  {PL,  CLXXVI,  811-38)  is  entirely  devoted  to 
such  demonstrations,  combining  them,  significantly,  with  scriptural 
evidences.  Cf.  De  sacramentis  i.iii.i  ff.  {PL,  CLXXVI,  217  ff. ;  Deferrari, 
pp.  41  ff.),  which  presents  an  abbreviated  version  of  the  De  tribus  diebus  on 
man's  knowledge  of  the  Trinity. 

171.  De  sacramentis  I.  Prologus.  5  {PL,  CLXXVI,  185C;  Deferrari,  p.  5). 

172.  Ibid.  Significantly,  the  restoration  of  man  in  truth  and  virtue  is 
attributed  alike  to  the  allegorical  (doctrinal)  and  tropological  (moral)  inter- 
pretation of  Scripture  in  the  De  sacramentis  and  to  the  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical arts  in  the  Didascalicon  (see  esp.  i.v  and  i.viii).  Scripture  is  the  primary 
source  for  such  arts. 

173.  Expositio  in  Hierarchiam  coelestem  i.i  {PL,  CLXXV,  927A). 

174.  Philippe  Delhaye,  "La  Place  de  l'ethique  parmi  les  disciplines 
scientifiques  au  Xlle  siecle,"  in  Miscellanea  moralia  in  honor  em  eximii  do  mini 
Arthur  Janssen  (Gembloux:  Editions  J.  Duculot,  1948),  pp.  29-44,  argues 
that  two  ethics,  one  theological  and  one  philosophical  or  natural,  were 
recognized  in  the  Middle  Ages,  even  among  the  Victorines  and  by  Hugh  in 
particular  {ibid.,  pp.  3 1-4).  Delhaye's  thesis  requires  modification  in  the  case 
of  Hugh,  who  recognized  one  ethical  science  subserved  in  part  by  pagan 
writings,  but  finally  and  perfectly  by  Scripture.  Cf.  Delhaye's  "L'Enseigne- 
ment  de  la  philosophic  morale  au  Xlle  siecle,"  MS,  XI  (1949),  77-99,  which, 
repeating  the  argument  that  "les  classifications  scientifiques  du  Xlle  siecle 
font  place  a  Yethica  comme  une  science  morale  distincte  de  la  theologie," 
finds  that  this  natural  ethics  was  attached  to  the  study  of  the  trivium,  especi- 
ally to  commentaries  made  by  the  teacher  of  grammar  upon  literary  texts  in 
the  manner  prescribed  by  Quintilian,  to  moralizations  of  the  ancient  poets 
like  those  of  Bernardus  Silvestris  on  the  Aeneid  or  Arnulph  of  Orleans  on 
Ovid,  and  to  the  study  of  Cicero's  De  inventione,  with  its  appended  treatment 
of  the  virtues  necessary  to  deliberative  and  demonstrative  oratory.  Prac- 
ticed, to  be  sure,  by  men  of  Chartrian  connection,  such  an  approach  to 
grammar  was  foreign  to  Hugh's  thinking.  See  Didascalicon  n.xxix.  n.  84; 
in.iv.  n.  44;  iii.v.  n.  48.  Cf.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV,  177D- 
78B),  where  Hugh,  admitting  the  existence  of  a  natural  ethics  among  pagan 
philosophers,  blames  its  inadequacies  as  in  part  responsible  for  the  failure  of 
these  philosophers  to  attain  to  the  true  Wisdom.   Note  that  Godfrey  of  St. 


Victor  Fons  philosophiae  (ed.  Pierre  Michaud-Quentin,  Analecta  Mediaeva- 
lia  Namurcensia,  VIII  [Namur:  Editions  Godenne,  1956]),  lines  483  and 
485-96,  divides  the  tropological  interpretation  of  Scripture  into  ethics, 
economics,  and  politics— arts  enumerated  in  the  first  half  of  the  Didascalicon. 

175.  Monvement  theologique,  ip.  186. 

176.  See  Didascalicon  in.xix.  n.  86-8. 

177.  Ibid.,  vi.iii. 

178.  PL,  CLXXVI,  951,  or  Karl  Miiller,  ed.,  Hugo  von  St.  Victor: 
Soliloquium  de  arrha  animae  und  De  vanitate  mundi  ("Kleine  Texte  fur 
Vorlesungen  und  Ubungen,"  Hans  Lietzmann,  ed.,  Heft  CXXIII;  Bonn, 
1913),  p.  3. 

179.  PL,  CLXXV,  cols,  clxi-clxiii. 

180.  First  denied  by  Mabillon  (  Vete ra  analecta  [Paris,  1675],  I,  326)  on  the 
basis  of  two  notes  in  twelfth-century  MSS  from  the  monasteries  of  Anchin 
and  Marchienne  which  say  that  Hugh  was  from  the  territory  of  Ypres,  the 
story  has  been  further  attacked  in  recent  years  by  F.  E.  Croydon,  "Notes  on 
the  Life  of  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,"  JTS,  XL  (1939),  232-53,  and  most  recently 
by  Roger  Baron,  "Notes  biographiques  sur  Hugues  de  Saint- Victor,"  RHE, 
LI  (1956),  920-34.  For  defense  of  the  story,  see  Jerome  Taylor,  The  Origin 
and  Early  Life  of  Hugh  of  St.  Victor:  An  Evaluation  of  the  Tradition  ("Texts 
and  Studies  in  the  History  of  Mediaeval  Education,"  V,  A.  L.  Gabriel  and 
J.  N.  Garvin  ed.,  Notre  Dame,  Indiana:  The  Mediaeval  Institute,  1957).  Cri- 
tical review  of  the  arguments  of  Baron  and  of  Taylor  in  Robert  Javelet, 
"Les  Origines  de  Hugues  de  Saint -Victor,"  Revue  des  sciences  religieuses 
{Strasbourg),  XXXIV  (i960),  74-83. 

181.  On  this  movement  in  general,  and  particularly  on  its  development 
in  the  twelfth  century,  see  Chenu,  "Moins,  clercs,  et  laics,"  RHE,  XLIX 
(1954),  59-94.  Cf.  J.  C.  Dickinson,  Origins  of  the  Austin  Canons  and  Their 
Introduction  into  England  (London:  Macmillan  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  1950). 


1.  Ps.  35:4. 

2.  Cf.  Matt.  25:18. 

3.  Cf.  Isidore  of  Seville  Sententiarum  libri  in.ix.  5-8  {PL,  LXXXIII, 
681B-82A)  for  comparable  discussion  of  quick  and  slow  students. 
The  preceding  two  paragraphs  of  the  preface  are  found  in  only  one  class  of 
MSS  (see  Buttimer,  pp.  xv-xvii).  It  is  not  improbable  that  Hugh  added 
them  against  the  temporarily  influential  Cornificians,  who  preached  that 
study  was  futile  for  those  lacking  natural  ability,  superfluous  for  those 
possessing  it.  On  the  career  of  this  academic  sect,  see  John  of  Salisbury 
Metalogicon  i.i-x  (Webb,  pp.  5-28;  McGarry,  pp.  9-33).  On  the  scant 
reverence  of  the  Cornificians  for  Hugh,  ibid.,  i.v  (Webb,  p.  19,  McGarry, 
p.  23). 

4.  With  Didascalicon  i-iii,  cf.  Hugh's  Epitome  (Baron,  ed.),  a  briefer  and 
earlier  treatment  of  the  same  materials  in  dialogue  form;  with  Didascalicon 
iv- vi,  cf.  Hugh's  earlier  and  briefer  De  scripturis  et  scriptoribus  sacris praenota- 
tiunculae  {PL,  CLXXV,  9-28).   On  Hugh's  method  of  producing  opuscula 


on  limited  questions,  then  absorbing  these  into  more  comprehensive  treat- 
ments, see  De  sacramentis  Praefatio  {PL,  CLXXVI,  173-4;  Defarrari,  p.  1), 
and  Heinrich  Weisweiler,  "Die  Arbeitsmethode  Hugos  von  St.  Viktor,  ein 
Beitrag  zum  Entstehen  seines  Hauptwerkes  De  sacramentis"  Schol.,  XX- 
XXIV  (1949),  59-87,  232-67.  That  Hugh  was  still  contemplating  additions 
to  the  text  of  the  Didascalicon  is  evident  from  Appendices  A,  B,  and  C. 


1.  This  keynote  sentence  of  the  Didascalicon  is  adapted  from  Boethius 
De  consolatione  philosophiae  in.  pr.  x:  "  have  seen  what  the  form  of  the 
perfect  and  imperfect  good  is.  ...  Of  all  things  to  be  sought,  the  highest  and 
cause  why  the  others  are  sought  is  the  Good.  that  Good  lies  the  sub- 
stance of  God."  The  commentary  tradition  on  the  De  consolatione  identifies 
the  Boethian  "Form  of  the  Good"  with  the  Second  Person  of  the  Trinity,  to 
whom  is  assigned  the  role  of  formal  cause  or  exemplar  of  creation.  So,  e.g., 
in  the  ninth  century  by  Remigius  of  Auxerre,  on  whose  work  Hugh  relies 
elsewhere  in  the  Didascalicon.  See  Remigius's  commentary  on  De  consolatione 
in.m.9:  "By  'form'  he  [Boethius]  means  the  Son  of  God,  who  is  the  Wisdom 
of  God  and  through  whom  all  things  have  been  made.  . . .  Or,  again,  he  calls 
'form'  that  Exemplar  and  Idea  which  was  in  the  mind  of  God  and  according 
to  whose  likeness  the  world  was  afterwards  made.  . . .  Saint  John  gives  this 
very  Idea  and  Pattern  of  God  the  name  'Life';  Plato  calls  it  'the  ideas'" 
(Latin  text  in  H.  F.  Stewart,  "A  Commentary  of  Remigius  Autissiodorensis 
on  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae  of  Boethius,"  JTS,  XVII  [19 16],  31; 
improved  text  of  Remigius  in  parallel  columns  with  John  the  Scot's  earlier 
handling  of  the  same  ideas  in  Silvestre,  "Le  Commentaire  inedit  de  Jean 
Scot,"  RHE,  LXVII  [1952],  44-122,  esp.  5  3-4).  Comparable  interpretation 
of forma  in  the  twelfth  century  by  William  of  Conches  (cf.  Parent,  Doctrine  de 
la  creation,  p.  130).  Use  of  the  term  "form"  in  connection  with  Christ  has 
Pauline  and  patristic  sanction,  as  in  Phil.  2 : 6,  Augustine  De  civ.  Dei  vn.ix 
and  Sermo  cxvii:  De  verbis  evangelii  Johannis  1 : 1-3  {PL,  XXXVIII,  662-3). 
With  the  terms  and  effects  associated  with  Wisdom  in  this  opening  chapter, 
cf.  Hugh's  paraphrase  of  the  Father's  words  about  the  Son  in  De  tribus 
diebus  xxiv  (improperly  printed  as  Didascalicon  vn;  PL,  CLXXVI,  834): 
"He  is  the  Wisdom  through  whom  I  have  made  all  things.  ...As  God 
together  with  me,  he  created  you ;  as  man  together  with  you,  he  came  down 
alone  to  you.  . . .  He  is  the  Form,  he  the  Medicine,  he  the  Exemplar,  he  your 
Remedy."  The  need  of  fallen  man  for  reunion  with  the  divine  Wisdom  lies 
at  the  basis  of  Hugh's  thinking  on  education.  Treatments  of  Hugh's  concept 
of  Wisdom  in  Baron,  Science  et  sagesse,  pp.  147-66,  and  Jorgen  Pedersen, 
"La  Recherche  de  la  sagesse  d'apres  Hugues  de  Saint- Victor,"  CM,  XVI 
(1955),  91-133.  Allusion  to  the  opening  sentence  of  the  Didascalicon  is  found 
as  early  as  1 1 59  in  John  of  Salisbury  Metalogicon  n.i  (Webb,  p.  61 ;  McGarry, 
p.  74),  and  earlier  in  the  opening  words  of  William  of  Conches'  revised 
Philosophia  mundi  (Ottaviano,  ed.,  Un  brano,  p.  19;  on  the  authorship  of  the 
brano,  see  Tullio  Gregory,  "Sull'attribuzione  a  Guglielmo  di  Conches  di  un 


rimaneggiamento  della  Philosophia  mundi,"  GCFI,  XXX  [195 1],  119-25). 
The  form  of  the  many  borrowings  from  the  Didascalkon  found  in  the  revised 
form  of  the  Philosophia  mundi  suggests  that  the  Didascalicon  circulated 
originally  in  student  reportationes  and  that  these,  rather  than  the  Didascalicon 
as  we  have  it  now,  were  used  in  the  revision. 

2.  Cf.  John  1:9  and  Hugh's  commentary  on  this  verse  in  De  sapientia 
animae  Christi  {PL,  CLXXVI,  848C-848D):  '"He  [the  Word]  was  the  true 
Light  which  illuminates  every  man  who  comes  into  this  world.'  What  is  the 
Word  if  not  the  divine  Wisdom?  For  what  John  calls  the  Word,  Paul  calls 
'the  Wisdom  of  God'  (I  Cor.  1 :  24).  . . .  Wisdom  is  the  Word  because  T, 
Wisdom,  came  forth  from  the  mouth  of  God,  the  Firstborn  before  every 
creature'  (Eccli.  24: 5).  ...And  so  Wisdom  itself  is  Light,  and  God  is  Light, 
for  God  is  Wisdom.  And  when  God  illuminates,  he  illuminates  with  Wis- 
dom and  Light.  Nor  does  he  illuminate  with  any  other  light  but  that  Light 
which  he  himself  is. ..."  The  power  of  the  divine  Word  or  Wisdom  to  cure, 
before  illuminating,  man's  eyes  for  the  perception  of  itself  is  contrasted  to 
the  powerlessness  of  natural  or  worldly  knowledge  to  do  the  same,  in 
Hugh's  Expositio  in  hierarchiam  coelestem  i.i  {PL,  CLXXV,  923B-6D).  That 
Hugh  is  not  an  extreme  illuminationist,  however,  is  clear  from  his  empiricist 
analysis  of  knowledge  {scientia)  as  the  product  of  sensus,  itnaginatio,  and  ratio, 
in  De  unione  corporis  et  spiritus  {PL,  CLXXVII,  287B-9A).  To  knowledge 
he  contrasts  v/isdom  or  understanding  {intelligentia),  an  informing  of  the 
pure  reason  from  within  by  the  divine  presence  operating  concurrently  with 
reason  as  a  man's  soul  moves  upward  toward  God  (ibid.,  289A).  Cf.  Desacra- 
mentis  i.iii.  3,  30  {PL,  CLXXVI,  217C,  234C;  Deferrari,  pp.  42,  60-1), 
where  even  man's  knowledge  of  God  is  said  to  be  partly  natural  (through 
self-knowledge  and  knowledge  of  the  physical  universe)  and  only  partly  the 
effect  of  grace  (through  internal  inspiration  and  external  teaching  confirmed 
by  miracles). 

3.  Cf.  Boethius  De  consolatione  philosophiae  "In  all  other  animals 
it  is  natural  that  they  should  not  know  themselves;  in  man  it  is  a  defect;" 
and  Hugh  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV,  174C) :  "What  more  foolish 
than  always  to  look  to  the  lowest  things  and  to  hold  one's  face  toward 
earth?  This  is  the  lot  of  the  beasts,  who  are  granted  to  seek  nothing  higher. 
But  Wisdom  dwells  in  things  of  heaven,  and  those  unwilling  to  rise  erect 
and  be  lifted  toward  it  are  like  the  beasts  and  gaze  at  earth."  Further  dis- 
cussion {ibid.,  248D-5  iC),  where  Hugh  glosses  the  text,  "I  said  in  my  heart 
concerning  the  sons  of  men,  that  God  would  prove  them,  and  show  them  to 
be  like  beasts"  (Eccl.  3:18).  Involved  is  the  medieval  commonplace, 
derived  ultimately  from  Ovid  Metamorphoses  1.83-6,  which  took  the  prone 
posture  of  beasts  and  the  erect  posture  of  man,  his  head  toward  the  stars,  as  a 
symbol  of  the  former's  bondage  to  earth  and  the  latter's  relationship  to  the 
divine.  For  texts  and  studies  in  the  transmission  of  this  theme,  see  Theodore 
Silverstein,  "The  Fabulous  Cosmogony  of  Bernardus  Silvestris,'  'MP, 
XL VI  (1948-9),  97,  n.  28.  To  the  references  listed  by  Silverstein,  add  the 
striking  use  of  the  theme  by  Augustine  De  Trinitate  xn.i  {PL,  XLII,  998). 
Full  collection  of  ancient  and  earlier  Christian  references  in  S.  O.  Dickerman, 


De  argumentis  quibusdam  apud  Xenophontem,  Platonem,  Aristotelem  obviis  e 
structura  hominis  et  animalium  petitis  (Halle,  1909),  pp.  92-101. 

4.  Ultimate  source,  Xenophon  Memorabilia  iv.ii.24-25.  Of  frequent 
Latin  allusions  to  this  famous  epigram,  that  most  commonly  cited  in  the 
twelfth  century  was  Macrobius  Commentarium  in  somnium  Scipionis  i.ix.  1-2 
(Eyssenhardt,  p.  521;  Stahl,  p.  124).  However,  cf.  Macrobius  Saturnalia;  Ausonius  Ludus  de  VII  sapientibus  exxxvii-ix;  Ambrose  Sermo  11  in  Ps. 
cxviii  xiii-iv  {PL,  XV,  1214-5)  and  Sermo  x.x-xvi  {ibid.,  \^^z-^).  Location 
of  the  inscription  precisely  on  the  tripod  seems  to  be  reminiscence  of 
Priscian  Institutions  grammaticae  i.iv  (Heinrich  Keil,  ed.  Grammatici  latini,  II 
[Leipzig:  B.  G.  Teubner,  1858],  17).  For  general  discussion  of  the  signific- 
ance of  the  Delphic  inscription  in  medieval  thought,  see  Etienne  Gilson, 
The  Spirit  of  Mediaeval  Philosophy  (Now  York:  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1936), 
ch.  xi,  pp.  209-28.  In  De  contemplatione  et  eius  speciebus  ii  (Barthelemy 
Haureau,  ed.,  Hugues  de  Saint-Victor:  nouvel  examen  de  P  edition  de  ses  oeuvres 
[Paris,  1859],  pp.  177-8),  Hugh  identifies  Wisdom's  "tripod"  as  the  threefold 
sense  of  Sacred  Scripture,  source  of  man's  self-knowledge;  the  identification 
helps  emphasize  the  fact  that,  for  Hugh,  "philosophy"  makes  use  of 
Scripture.  On  self-awareness  as  the  indispensible  condition  of  man's  move- 
ment toward  the  divine  Wisdom,  see  De  tribus  diebus  xvii  {PL,  CLXXVI, 
825  A) :  "No  man  is  truly  wise  who  does  not  see  that  he  himself  exists."  The 
basis  of  this  condition  is  man's  nature  as  a  mysterious  projection  of  the  divine 
Wisdom:  "The  first  and  principal  mystery  [sacramentum]  of  the  divine 
Wisdom,  therefore,  is  the  created  wisdom,  that  is,  the  rational  creature, 
which,  partly  visible,  partly  invisible,  has  been  made  its  own  gateway  and 
road  to  contemplation"  {ibid.,  824D). 

5 .  With  the  opening  paragraph  of  the  Didascalicon,  cf.  Hugh's  Epitome 
(Baron,  ed.,  p.  107) :  "Philosophy  rightly  spends  every  effort  on  three  things. 
The  first  is  the  investigation  of  man;  this  is  necessary  that  man  may  know 
himself  and  recognize  that  he  has  been  created.  Next,  when  he  has  begun 
to  know  himself,  let  him  investigate  what  that  is  by  which  he  was  made. 
Last,  let  him,  as  his  practice,  begin  to  meditate  on  the  marvelous  works  of 
his  Maker,  so  that  he  may  equally  understand  what  it  is  that  was  made  with 
him  and  for  his  sake.  By  this  triple  way  the  search  for  Wisdom  runs  toward 
its  end.  The  end  of  all  philosophy  is  apprehension  of  the  highest  Good, 
which  lies  in  the  Maker  of  all  things  alone."  The  threefold  task  of  philo- 
sophy Hugh  derives  from  the  "three  eyes"  man  possessed  before  the  fall 
(see  De  sacramentis  i.x.2  and  12-15  [PL,  CLXXVI,  329C-30A,  270C- 
2C;  Deferrari,  pp.  167,  102-4]  '■>  c£-  Expositio  in  Hierarchiam  coelestem  in  [PL, 
CLXXV,  976A  ff.]).  These  are  the  eye  of  flesh,  through  which  man  saw  the 
physical  world ;  the  eye  of  reason,  through  which  he  saw  himself  and  what 
he  contained ;  the  eye  of  contemplation,  through  which  he  saw  within  him- 
self God  and  "the  things  which  are  within  God."  These  last  are  the 
exemplary  causes  in  the  divine  Wisdom,  shared  originally  by  the  intellectual 
creature,  but  lost  to  him  through  his  fall.  The  first  stage  of  philosophy, 
lectio  (study,  reading),  with  which  alone  the  Didascalicon  is  concerned,  begins 
to  restore  man's  lost  participation  in  the  divine  Wisdom  through  opening 


his  mind  to  that  "apprehension  of  Truth  and  perfect  knowledge"  originally 
received  by  man  "not  by  study  or  any  teaching  over  periods  of  time,  but 
simultaneously  and  immediately  from  the  very  beginning  of  his  creation  by 
a  single  and  simple  illumination  of  divine  imparting";  see  De  sacramentis  (PL,  CLXXVI,  270D;  Deferrari,  p.  102).  For  the  succeeding  stages 
by  which  philosophy  completes  man's  restoration — meditation,  prayer, 
performance,  and  contemplation — see  Didascalicon  v.ix. 

6.  The  Middle  Ages  had  direct  knowledge  of  Plato  primarily  through  the 
incomplete  translation  of  the  Timaeus  by  Chalcidius.  The  passage  to  which 
Hugh  alludes  concerns  the  world-soul  (see  Wrobel,  pp.  32,  92-3;  Mullach, 
pp.  162-3,  186-7).  On  Hugh's  transference  of  these  materials  to  the  human 
soul,  see  n.  8,  10. 

7.  "Entelechy"  is  said  to  be  Plato's  term  for  the  world-soul  in  Remigius 
of  Auxerre,  commentary  on  Martianus  Capella  (Bibliotheque  Nationale, 
MS  latin  14754,  fol.  3r)  ("Plato  tamen  endelichiam  animam  mundi  dicit"), 
and  John  the  Scot  on  the  same  text  (Cora  E.  Lutz,  ed.,  Iohannis  Scotti  annota- 
tiones  in  Marcianum  [Cambridge,  Mass. :  Mediaeval  Academy  of  America, 
1939],  p.  10);  for  a  twelfth-century  use  of  "entelechy"  to  designate  the  world 
soul,  see  Bernardus  Silvestris  De  mundi  universitate  (Carl  Sigmund  Barach 
and  Johann  Wrobel,  ed.  [Innsbruck,  1876]),  passim,  and  Silverstein, 
"Fabulous  Cosmogony,"  MP,  XLVI  (1948-9),  94,  1 14-6.  That  "entelechy" 
was  not  Plato's  but  Aristotle's  term  and  was  used  by  him  to  name  "the  first 
perfection  of  a  natural  organic  body"  is  made  clear,  however,  by  Chalcidius 
(Wrobel,  pp.  262  ff. ;  Mullach,  pp.  227-9),  who  employs  the  term  with 

;   particular  reference  to  man.    Hugh,  while  seemingly  associating  the  term 
with  Plato,  employs  it  here  with  reference  to  man's  soul,  not  the  world-soul. 

8.  Several  interpretations  of  "dividual  and  individual  substance"  and 
"same  and  diverse  nature"  current  in  the  twelfth  century  are  summarized  in 
the  brano  revision  of  William  of  Conches'  Philosophia  mundi  (Ottaviano,  ed., 
Un  brano,  pp.  48-5 1).  One  interpretation,  applying  these  terms  to  the  human 
soul  and  agreeing  in  several  particulars  with  the  Didascalicon,  may  safely  be 
inferred  to  be  Hugh's  (ibid.,  pp.  49-50):  "The  soul  is  said  to  consist  of 
'dividual'  and  'individual'  substance  because,  to  speak  first  of  the  human 
soul,  it  is  an  i  ndividual  thing,  lacking  parts  [cf.  Didascalicon  i.i,  where  the 
soul  is  called  "simple  essence  (not)  in  any  way  distended  in  quantitative 
parts"] ;  but  it  is  said  to  be  'dividual'  because  of  its  diverse  effects,  namely, 
vegetative  life,  sense-endowed  life,  and  rational  life  [cf.  Didascalicon  i.iii, 
where  the  threefold  vivifying  effects  of  the  soul  are  treated],  or  because  it  is 
irascible,  concupiscent,  and  rational  [cf.  Didascalicon  n.iv,  for  the  soul's 
extension  to  virtual  threeness  in  irascible,  concupiscent,  and  rational  powers]. 
...Its  being  composed  of  the  'same'  and  'diverse'  is  similarly  evident  in  the 
human  soul,  for,  according  to  Plato,  it  consists  of  the  rational  and  irrational, 
that  is,  of  reason  and  sensuality ;  reason  always  moves  the  soul  toward  self- 
sameness  or  unity  through  the  virtues,  sensuality  toward  external  earthly 
things  through  the  vices  [cf.  Didascalicon  11. iv,  for  the  soul's  distraction  when 
it  moves  toward  the  world  of  sense,  its  recovery  of  unity  when  it  returns  to 
the  source  of  its  nature]."    The  wide  variety  of  interpretations  of  this 


Timaean  passage  in  the  twelfth  century  is  suggested,  in  addition  to  those 
noted  by  the  brano  author,  by  Adelard  of  Bath's  association  of  the  "same" 
with  philosophia,  the  "diverse"  with  philocosmia  (pursuit  of  the  world)  (see 
De  eodem  et  diverso,  Willner,  ed.,  pp.  3-4)  and  by  Abaelard's  association  of 
both  terms  with  the  Holy  Spirit,  "same"  in  substance  and  nature  in  relation 
to  Father  and  Son,  but  "diverse"  from  them  in  person  and  gifts  (see  n.  10). 

9.  Adapted  from  Chalcidius  (Wrobel,  p.  120;  Mullach,  p.  193):  "And 
Plato  himself. . .  composes  the  soul  of  all  the  elements  so  that  it  may  have 
knowledge  both  of  the  elements  and  of  the  things  which  are  made  from 

them "    The  "soul"  involved  in  Chalcidius  is  the  world  soul;  the 

"elements"  are  fire,  air,  water,  and  earth,  invisible  in  their  pure  state. 

10.  Adapted  from  Boethius  De  consolatione  philosophiae  in.m.ix:  "When, 
divided,  it  has  gathered  movement  into  two  spheres,  it  passes  along  on  its 
way  back  to  itself  and  circles  the  deep  design  and  turns  the  heaven  in  like 
image."  Boethius,  echoing  the  doctrine  of  the  Timaeus,  speaks  of  the  world- 
soul.  Hugh's  adaptation  of  world-soul  materials  to  the  soul  of  man  had 
pointed  contemporary  significance.  The  passages  from  the  Timaeus  and 
De  consolatione  to  which  Hugh  alludes  figured,  along  with  others,  in  Abael- 
ard's contention  that  the  Platonic  nous  and  world-soul  designated  allegori- 
cally  (per  involucrum)  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit.  The  passages  received  a 
certain  notoriety  both  on  Abaelard's  condemnation  at  Soissons,  in  1 121,  for 
this  and  other  "novelties"  (see  Remigius  Stolzle,  ed.,  Abaelard's  1121  %u 
Soissons  verurtheilter  Tractatus  de  unitate  et  trinitate  divina  [Freiburg  im  Breisgau, 
1 891]  pp.  xxii-xxvi  and  pp.  9  ff. ;  cf.  H.  Ostlender,  ed.,  Theologia  Sum  mi  Boni, 
BGPM,  XXV,  2-3  [1939],  pp.  xxii-xxiii)  and  again  on  his  reaffirmation  of 
his  views  in  11 24  (Theologia  Christiana  i.v  [PL,  CLXXVIII,  1139C-66C],  and 
in  1 125  (Introductio  in  theologiam  i.xv-xxv  [PL,  CLXXVIII,  1 104D-34D] ;  on 
the  dating  of  these  works  see  J.  G.  Sikes,  Peter  Abailard  [Cambridge :  Cam- 
bridge University  Press,  1932],  Appendix  I,  pp.  258-71).  He  abandoned  his 
identification  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  the  world  soul  in  De  dialectica  (Victor 
Cousin,  ed.,  Ouvrages inedits d'Abelard [Paris,  1836],  pp.  475-6;  newly  ed.  by 
L.  M.  De  Rijk,  Petrus  Abaelardus :  Dialectica  [Assen,  1956],  pp.  558-9),  at 
least  part  of  which  was  written  after  the  appearance  of  the  Didascalicon,  i.e., 
after  1 127  (Sikes,  p.  271 ;  De  Rijk,  pp.  xxii-iii),  but  concern  for  his  use  of  the 
world-soul  materials  persisted  as  late  as  1 1 39,  when  William  of  St.  Thierry's 
Disputatio  adversus  Abaelardum  (see  esp.  ch.  v  [PL,  CLXXX,  265  A-6D] ;  cf. 
Disputatio  altera  adversus  Abaelardum  [ibid.,  321C-D])  led  to  Abaelard's 
second  condemnation,  at  Sens.  Identification  of  the  Platonic  world  soul 
with  the  Holy  Spirit  appeared  also  in  William  of  Conches'  early  gloss  on  the 
Timaeus  passage  (Schmid,  "Ein  Timaeoskommentar,"  CM,  X  [1949],  239) 
and  on  De  consolatione  in.m.ix  (Jourdain,  "Commentaires  inedits,"  p.  75),  as 
also  in  Thierry  of  Chartres  De  sex  dierum  operibus  (B.  Haureau  ed.,  Notices  et 
extraits  de  quelques  manuscrits  latins  de  la  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  I  [Paris,  1890], 
61;  newly  ed.  by  N.  Haring,  AHDL,  XXII  [1955],  193).  Like  Abaelard, 
William  of  Conches  abandoned  the  identification  (see  his  later  glosses  on  the 
Timaeus,  in  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  1 66).  For  convenient  summary 
of  the  controversy,  in  which  the  Didascalicon  may  have  played  an  incidental 


part  hitherto  unremarked,  see,  in  addition  to  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation, 
pp.  69-81,  Tullio  Gregory,  "L"anima  mundi'  nella  filosofia  del  XII  secolo," 
GCFI,  XXX  (195 1),  494-508,  and,  by  the  same  author,  Anima  mundi,  pp. 
1 23-74.  Hugh's  adaptation  of  the  materials  to  the  human  soul  seems  to  point 
to  their  more  proper  use;  it  goes  back  to  an  older  commentary  tradition 
found,  e.g.,  in  Remigius  of  Auxerre,  commentary  on  De  consolatione  in.m.ix 
(Stewart,  ed.,  p.  33;  Silvestre,  ed.,  p.  60):  "To  men  of  better  judgment, 
however,  it  seems  that  in  this  place  we  should  understand  rather  the  rational 
soul,  which  has  great  likeness  to  the  world,  so  that  in  Greek  man  is  called  a 
'microcosm,'  that  is,  a  lesser  world"  (comparable  observation  by  John  the 
Scot  [Silvestre,  p.  61]).  Remigius  takes  the  "twin  spheres"  of  the  Boethian 
text  as  literally  the  two  eyes,  but  John  the  Scot  writes:  "The  soul  is  not 
called  'divided'  because  divided  in  its  very  nature,  but  because  its  access  to 
the  contemplation  of  external  things  is  divided  into  two  eyes,  here  simply 
called  'two  spheres'.  ...For  as  spiritual  things  are  beheld  by  the  mind,  so 
corporeal  things  are  seen  by  eyes  of  flesh"  (Silvestre,  p.  63).  Cf.  Hugh's 
De  sacramentis  5  {PL,  CLXXVI,  266B;  Deferrari,  p.  97):  "The  rational 
soul  was  equipped  with  a  double  sense  in  order  that  it  might  grasp  visible 
things  without  through  the  flesh  and  invisible  things  within  through  the 
reason ...  so  that  it  might  enter  within  to  contemplate  and  go  outside  itself 
to  contemplate — within,  contemplating  Wisdom;  without,  the  works  of 
Wisdom."  Hugh's  use  of  these  materials  is  reflected  in  Alanus  de  Insulis 
De  planctu  naturae  {PL,  CCX,  443C),  where  the  "circling"  of  man's  reason 
from  heavenly  things  to  earthly  and  back  to  heavenly  is  mentioned. 

11.  Quoted  from  Chalcidius,  who  ascribes  the  verses  to  Empedocles 
(Wrobel,  p.  120;  cf.  p.  254;  Mullach,  p.  193 ;  cf.  p.  226).  William  of  Conches 
also  cites  the  verses  (Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  169).  The  principle  of 
knowledge  of  like  by  like  underlies  Hugh's  conception  of  man's  progressive 
assimilation  to  the  divine  Wisdom.  On  the  history  of  the  principle,  see 
A.  Schneider,  "Der  Gedanke  der  Erkenntnis  des  Gleichen  durch  Gleiches  in 
antiker  und  patristischer  Zeit,"  Abhandlungen  t(ur  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  des 
Mittelalters,  BGPM,  Supplementband  II  (Miinster,  1923),  49-77. 

12.  Cf.  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  i.xiv.  19-20  (Eyssenhardt,  pp. 
542-3;  Stahl,  pp.  146-7)  for  a  listing  of  the  opinions  of  twenty-one  Greek 
philosophers  who  agree  on  the  soul's  incorporeality. 

13.  "non  secundum  compositionem  sed  secundum  compositionis  ratio- 
nem."    Adapted  from  Chalcidius  (Wrobel,  pp.  265-6;  Mullach,  p.  229). 

14.  No  such  work  by  Varro  is  now  known.  Manitius  (III,  Geschichte  der 
lateinischen  Litteratur,  1 1 5,  n.  1)  claims  Hugh  is  here  citing  John  the  Scot,  but 
Manitius  does  not  give  the  source.  P.  G.  Meyer  ("Hugo  von  Sankt  Viktors 
Lehrbuch,"  Ausgexvahlte  Schriften  [Freiburg  im  Breisgau,  1890],  p.  159,  n.  1) 
suggests  Hugh  means  John  the  Scot's  De  divisione  naturae,  or  I1EPI  OTSHN, 
but  the  quotation,  if  it  is  such,  is  not  to  be  found  in  this  work.  On  Varro's 
belief  in  the  soul's  incorporeality,  see  Claudianus  Mamertus  De  statu 
animae  n.viii  {CSEL,  XI,  130).  The  Premnon  physicon  of  Nemesius,  trans- 
lated by  Alfanus  in  1085  (Carolus  Burkhard,  ed.  [Leipzig:  B.  G.  Teubner, 
1917]),  contains  no  passage  similar  to  that  cited  here  by  Hugh. 



1 5 .  Detailed  exposition  of  the  psychology  of  knowledge  in  Hugh's  De 
unione  corporis  et  spirt tus  {PL,  CLXXVII,  28  5-94).  Contrast  between  types  of 
change  undergone  by  body  as  opposed  to  soul  in  De  sacramentis  i.iii.  15-16 
{PL,  CLXXVI,  221C-3A;  Deferrari,  pp.  46-7). 

16.  Cf.  John  the  Scot  De  divisione  naturae  11. iv  {PL,  CXXII,  531):  "Man, 
as  we  have  said  and  shall  most  often  say  again,  has  been  created  of  such  a 
dignity  of  nature  that  there  is  no  created  thing,  visible  or  invisible,  that 
cannot  be  found  in  him."  John  here  expounds  Maximus  the  Confessor  on 
man  as  the  "laboratory"  {officina)  of  all  created  things,  through  whom  crea- 
tion will  achieve  reunion  {adunatid)  with  the  Creator  {ibid.,  m.xxxvi;  PL, 
CXXII,  733).  Hugh,  by  contrast,  teaches  that  the  soul's  being  composed  of 
all  things  is  the  psychological  basis  of  man's  own  return  to  the  divine 
Wisdom,  Exemplar  of  all.  The  passage  is  good  for  illustrating  the  radical 
difference  that  underlies  superficial  points  of  contact  between  the  Hugonian 
and  Scotian  systems. 

1 7.  "summum  in  vita  solamen".  The  phrase  occurs  in  the  opening  words 
of  Boethius  De  syllogismo  hypothetic  {PL,  LXIV,  83  iB).  Cf.  the  address  to 
Philosophy  in  De  consolatione  philosophiae  "O  summum  lassorum 
solamen  animorum." 

18.  Cf.  Augustine  De  libero  arbitrio  11.ix.26  {PL,  XXXII,  1254):  "No  one 
is  blessed  except  in  that  highest  Good  which  is  seen  and  possessed  in  the 
Truth  we  call  Wisdom." 

19.  Quoted  from  Boethius  De  musica  n.ii  {PL,  LXIII,  1195D).  Cf. 
Augustine  De  civitate  Dei  vm.ii;  Isidore  Etymologiae  Hugh,  in 
the  Epitome  (Raton,  ed.,  p.  106),  remarks  that  the  etymology  of  "philosophy" 
is  "a  question  not  to  be  passed  over  simply  because  the  interpretation  is 
common  knowledge,  for  not  all  men  understand  the  force  of  the  terms  in 
the  same  way."  The  Epitome's  explanation  of  the  terms,  while  differing  in 
detail  from  that  of  the  present  chapter,  involves  the  same  noetic  mysticism. 
The  "love"  implied  by  philosophy  is  "not  that  love  by  which  the  perfectly 
known  is  loved,  but  that  by  which  Truth,  tasted,  is  more  fully  desired." 
Wisdom  is  "the  unwavering  comprehension  of  the  true."  The  "true,"  while 
defined  as  a  transcendental  relationship  ("that  what  is,  is,  is  true;  and  that 
what  is  not,  is  not,  similarly"),  is  said  to  exist  "in  That  which  is,"  i.e.,  in  "the 
divine  Wisdom  itself,  in  which  is  every  'true'  that  is  true."  With  Baron's 
imperceptive  remark  {Epitome,  p.  121),  "II  [Hugues]  nous  presente  seule- 
ment  la  sagesse  comme  le  lieu  de  toutes  les  verites  et  de  toute  verite.  Rien 
n'indique  qu'il  puisse  s'agir  de  la  Sagesse  divine,"  cf.  Pedersen,  "Recherche 
de  la  sagesse,"  CM,  XVI  (1955),  no:  "...pour  Hugues...  la  verite  est  une 
realite  ontologique  a  la  valeur  religieuse,  en  vertu  de  l'appropriation  de  la 
sagesse  a  la  seconde  personne  de  la  Trinite..."  Cf.  De  tribus  diebus  xxvi 
{PL,  CLXXVI,  837A). 

20.  Quoted  from  Boethius  De  arithmetica  i.i  {PL,  LXIII,  1079D). 

21.  Quoted  from  Boethius  In  Porphyrium  dialogi  i.iii.  {PL,  LXIV,  10D- 
11  A;  CSEL,  XLVIII,  7).  With  the  Boethian  source,  cf.  Augustine  De 
Genesi  ad  litteram  i.v  {PL,  XXXIV,  249-50):  "But  the  spiritual,  intellectual, 
or  rational  creature,  which  is  seen  to  be  closer  to  the  divine  W'ord,  can  have 


a  formless  life.  ...For  turned  from  the  unchangeable  Wisdom,  it  lives  in 
folly  and  perfidy,  and  such  a  life  is  its  formlessness.  But  when  it  has  turned 
toward  the  unchangable  Light  of  Wisdom,  the  Word  of  God,  it  is  formed. . . 
so  that  it  may  live  wisely  and  blessedly.  The  source  of  the  intellectual 
creature  is  the  eternal  Wisdom,  which,  remaining  unchangeable  in  itself, 
never  ceases  by  hidden  inspiration  to  call  to  that  creature  whose  source  it  is, 
inviting  him  to  turn  to  his  source,  because  otherwise  he  cannot  be  formed 
and  perfected."  See  also  John  the  Scot  De  divisione  naturae  n.xvi  {PL, 
CXXII,  548B) :  "But  the  invisible,  that  is,  intellectual  and  rational  creature  is 
said  to  be  without  form  before  it  turns  to  its  form,  namely  to  its  Creator. 
For  it  is  not  sufficient  for  it  to  subsist  composed  of  an  essence  and  an 
essential  differentia...  unless  it  is  perfected  by  having  turned  to  the  sole- 
begotten  Word,  I  mean  the  Son  of  God,  who  is  the  form  of  all  intellectual 
life.  Without  him,  it  remains  imperfect  and  unformed."  Cf.  Wisdom  7:21, 
where  the  divine  Wisdom  is  said  to  make  those  who  pursue  it  sharers  in  the 
friendship  of  God.  Boethius,  in  the  passage  here  quoted  by  Hugh,  proceeds 
immediately  to  divide  philosophy  into  the  theoretical  and  the  practical, 
noting  the  triple  subdivisions  of  each  and  declining  to  say  whether  logic  is  a 
part  of  philosophy.  Suppressing  this  part  of  his  source,  Hugh  instead 
prepares  for  the  inclusion  in  philosophy  of  the  mechanical  arts  (ch.  viii)  and 
of  logic  (ch.  xi)  by  a  five-chapter  development  of  points  relating  to  human 
psychology,  cosmology,  and  the  effects  of  the  fall. 

22.  Quoted  from  Boethius  Commentaria  in  Porphyrium  a  se  translatum  i.i 
{PL,  LXIV,  71 A  ffi;  CSEL,  XL  VIII,  135  ff.). 

23.  On  the  meaning  of  this  Boethian  term  and  its  modification  by  twelfth- 
and  thirteenth-century  authors,  including  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  see  M.-D. 
Chenu,  "Imaginatio:  note  de  lexicographic  philosophique  medievale,"  ST, 
CXXII  (1946),  593-602.  On  the  relations  among  sensus,  imaginatio,  affectio 
imaginaria,  ratio  in  imaginationem  agens,  and  ratio  pura  supra  imaginationem,  see 
Hugh's  De  unione  corporis  et  spiritus  {PL,  CLXXVII,  esp.  288D-9A). 

24.  Entire  chapter  quoted  from  Boethius  Commentaria  in  Porphyrium  a  se 
translatum  i.i  {PL,  LXIV,  71 A  ff.;  CSEL,  XLVIII,  135  ff).  Another  trans- 
lation, differing  slightly  in  detail,  by  Richard  P.  McKeon,  Selections  from 
Medieval  Philosophers,  I  (Chicago:  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1929),  70-3.  The 
chapter  advances  Hugh's  argument  for  a  fourfold  division  of  philosophy  by 
proposing  that  the  rational  soul:  (1)  includes  vegetative  and  sensual 
functions  (province  of  the  mechanical  arts) ;  (2)  is  concerned  with  words  and 
their  arrangements  and  with  reasoning  (province  of  the  logical  arts) ;  and 
(3)  spends  every  effort  to  acquire  the  natures  of  things  (theoretical  arts)  and 
moral  instruction  (practical  arts). 

25.  "inextricabilem  labyrinthum"  A  Boethian  phrase;  cf.  De  consolatione 
philosophiae  "me  inextricabilem  labyrinthum  rationibus  texens." 

26.  Hugh's  expression  "involved  words"  {perplexus  sermd)  may  refer  to  the 
deliberate  concealment  of  an  inner  meaning  beneath  an  ambiguous  or  alle- 
gorical verbal  surface  {involucrum,  integumentum,  cortex),  a  concealment  which 
Abaelard,  William  of  Conches,  Thierry  of  Chartres,  Clarenbald  of  Arras, 
Bernardus  Silvestris,  and  Arnulph  of  Orleans  claimed  to  find  inPlato,  Vergil, 


Ovid,  Priscian,  Martianus  Capella,  Macrobius,  and  Boethius,  and  which  was 
practiced  by  Bernardus  Silvestris  and  by  Alanus  de  Insulis  in  their  own 
poetry.  See  Jeauneau,  "La  Notion  d'integumentum,"  AHDL,  XXIV  (1957), 
35-100;  M.-D.  Chenu,  " Tnvolucrum :  le  mythe  selon  les  theologiens  medie- 
vaux,"  AHDL,  XXII  (195  5),  75-9;  and  Pierre  Courcelle,  "Les  Peres  devant 
les  enfers  virgiliens,"  AHDL,  XXII  (1955),  5-74.  Reserving  allegory  to 
Scripture,  Hugh  demands  scientific  clarity  in  the  arts.  Cf.  Didascalicon 
in.iv,  where  he  rejects  fables,  histories,  didactic  poems,  and  ornamental 
prose  as  tangential  to  philosophy.  His  position  prepares  the  way  for  the 
insistence,  later  in  the  century,  of  Alanus  de  Insulis  that  the  language  of 
theology  be  "intellectu  perceptibilis,"  i.e.,  avoid  "involucra  verborum"; 
see  Alanus  de  Insulis  Theologiae  regulae  xxxiv  {PL,  CCX,  637). 

27.  "Philosophia  est  disciplina  omnium  rerum  humanarum  atque  divina- 
rum  rationes  plene  investigans."  Hugh  repeats  this  definition  (, 
substituting  probabi  liter  for  plene.  The  closest  parallel  is  in  Cassiodorus 
Institutiones  n.iii.5  (Mynors,  ed.,  p.  no) :  "Philosophia  est  divinarum  human- 
arumque  rerum  in  quantum  homini  possibile  est,  probabilis  scientia,"  where 
the  force  of  probabilis  must  be  "demonstrable,"  not  "probable"  as  rendered 
by  Jones,  Divine  and  Human  Readings,  p.  160.  Further  analogues  of  the 
definition  occur  in  Cicero  De  oratore  i.xlix.  212;  De  officiis  n.ii.  5 ;  in  Augustine 
Contra  academicos  {PL,  XXXII,  914);  in  Alcuin  De  diabetica  i  {PL,  CI, 
952);  in  Rhabanus  Maurus  De  universo  xv.i  {PL,  CXI,  41 6A,  41 3B);  in 
Isidore  of  Seville  Etymologiae  n.xxiv.1,9.  Note,  however,  that  Hugh  gives 
the  terms  of  the  definition  a  meaning  original  with  him.  His  "human 
things"  are  specifically  the  matters  served  by  the  mechanical  arts,  his  "divine 
things"  are  the  truth  and  virtue  served  respectively  by  the  theoretical  and 
practical  arts  (cf.  Didascalicon  i.viii).  For  Cicero,  on  the  other  hand,  "human 
things"  comprise  ethics  and  physics;  for  Augustine,  the  four  cardinal 
virtues  (see  Contra  academicos  i.vii  {PL,  XXXII,  916] :  "Knowledge  of  human 
things  is  that  knowledge  which  comprises  the  light  of  prudence,  the 
propriety  of  temperance,  the  strength  of  fortitude,  and  the  holiness  of 
justice";  cf.,  however,  De  trinitate  xiv.i  and  xn.xiv  [PL,  XLII,  1037C, 
1009D],  where  the  term  receives  somewhat  broader  extension);  for  Alcuin 
and  Rhabanus,  ethics  alone.  Isidore  merely  repeats  the  definitions  of  Cicero 
and  Cassiodorus.  Even  for  the  latter,  whose  words  Hugh  closely  follows, 
"human  things"  correspond  to  the  practical  {actuales)  arts,  "divine"  to  the 
theoretical  {inspectivae). 

28.  A  Chalcidian  idea.   See  n.  59. 

29.  "tot  esse  philosophiae  partes  quot  sunt  rerum  diversitates  ad  quas 
ipsam  pertinere  constiterit"  On  the  originality  of  this  principle,  see  Baur, 
Gundissalinus,  p.  359. 

30.  "Rise"  refers  to  the  historical  origin  of  the  arts  in  the  needs  suffered 
by  man  in  the  fall.  More  schematized  treatment  of  the  same  topic  in  Hugh's 
Epitome  (Baron,  ed.,  pp.  109-10);  to  three  evils  (ignorance  of  the  good, 
desire  of  evil,  and  mortal  weakness)  correspond  three  goods  (knowledge  of 
truth,  love  of  virtue,  and  the  pursuit  of  conveniences),  promoted  by  three 
categories  of  arts  (theoretical  arts,  practical  arts,  and  mechanical  arts).  The 


schematization  of  the  Epitome  is  reproduced  in  Richard  of  Saint  Victor 
Excerptiones prior es  i.ii-v  {PL,  CLXXVI,  194A-6)  and  in  the  brano  revision 
of  William  of  Conches'  Philosophia  mundi  (Ottaviano,  Un  brano,  pp.  22-5). 

31.  That  is,  to  angels  and  God. 

32.  The  twofold  nature  of  man  is  stressed  in  the  Latin  Asckpius,  which 
infers  from  it  man's  twofold  task  of  imitating  the  divine  ratio  and  diligentia  in 
his  immortal  part,  and,  in  his  mortal,  of  tending  and  managing  the  earth 
through  "agriculture,  care  of  herds,  architecture,  maintenance  of  harbors, 
navigation,  social  relationships,  commerce";  the  earthly  part  of  the  universe 
is  said  to  be  maintained  "by  the  knowledge  and  use  of  those  arts  and  disci- 
plines without  which  God  willed  the  world  should  not  be  perfect";  see 
Asckpius  i.viii  (Nock,  ed.,  p.  306).  The  importance  given  man's  earthly 
tasks  in  the  Asckpius  suggests  the  importance  to  which  Hugh  elevates  the 
mechanical  arts,  though  with  certain  essential  differences.  Hugh  relates 
these  arts  to  the  alleviation  of  fallen  man,  not  to  the  perfecting  of  the  world 
by  God's  original  plan;  he  makes  theoretical  knowledge  of  them  part  of 
man's  pursuit  of  the  divine  Wisdom,  hence  not  completely  dissociated  from 
man's  spiritual  part  as  in  the  Asckpius;  he  notes  that  their  execution,  while 
not  properly  part  of  philosophy,  has  on  occasion  been  praiseworthily  under- 
taken by  philosophers  {Didascalicon  m.xiv),  whereas  in  Asckpius  i.ix  (Nock, 
ed.,  p.  307)  attendance  on  the  lower  world  is  assigned  to  "all  who,  through 
the  conflict  of  their  double  nature,  have  sunk  under  the  body's  weight  to  a 
lower  grade  of  intelligence" ;  he  fills  them  out  to  the  number  seven  in 
schematic  parallel  with  the  liberal  arts  and,  to  name  them,  employs  terms 
found  scattered  in  Isidore  of  Seville.  Hugh  quotes  the  Asckpius  in  the  con- 
cluding words  of  the  Didascalicon  (vi.xiii)  and  may  allude  to  it  in  his  elabora- 
tion of  "the  number  Tour'  of  the  soul"  {Didascalicon  11. iv).  On  the  soul  as 
that  which  man  truly  is,  see  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  n.xii.9-10 
(Eyssenhardt,  ed.,  p.  625;  Stahl,  p.  224),  and  Nemesius  Premnon  physicon  (Burkhard,  ed.,  p.  6),  where,  however,  there  is  no  question  of  mechani- 
cal arts.   Cf.  De  sacramentis  {PL,  CLXXVI,  264C-D;  Deferrari,  p.  95). 

33.  Cf.  Asckpius  i.xii  (Nock,  ed.,  p.  311). 

34.  With  the  title  of  the  present  chapter  ("De  tribus  rerum  maneriis"),  cf. 
the  passage  beginning,  "Cum  igitur  tres  sunt  maneries  operum,"  in  the 
commentary  on  the  Timaeus  published  by  Schmid  ("Ein  Timaioskommen- 
tar,"  CM,  X  [1948],  220-66)  and  thought  by  him  and  by  Gregory  {Anima 
mundi,  pp.  15-7)  to  reproduce  the  earliest  form  of  William  of  Conches' 
glosses  on  the  Timaeus,  composed  in  the  first  years  of  William's  teaching,  or 
between  1 120-5  (on  dating,  see  Gregory,  Anima  mundi,  pp.  3,  7),  and  referred 
to  in  his  Philosophia  mundi  as  "glossulae  nostrae  super  Platonem"  {PL, 
CLXXII,  47A).  The  phrase  as  it  occurs  in  these  "glossulae"  refers  properly 
to  "the  work  of  God,  the  work  of  nature,  and  the  work  of  the  artificer,  who 
imitates  nature"  (cf.  Didascalicon  i.ix)  but  forms  part  of  a  larger  discussion  of 
that  being  "which  exists  eternally,  ungenerated,"  of  that  which  "is  generated 
and  does  not  always  exist,"  and  of  the  relations  between  the  world  and  time; 
cf.  Chalcidius'  translation  of  the  Timaeus  27D-8C  (Wrobel,  pp.  23-4; 
Mullach,  p.  157). 



35.  These  distinctions  among  "eternal,"  "perpetual,"  and  "temporal" 
occur  in  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae 
in.m.ix  (see  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  pp.  125-36).  Absent  from  the 
commentaries  of  John  the  Scot,  Remigius,  Bovo  of  Corvey,  and  Adalbald 
of  Utrecht,  they  appear  to  be  original  with  William  in  this  formulation, 
though  perhaps  suggested  to  him  by  the  discussion  of  time  and  eternity  in 
De  consolatione,  or  by  cognate  distinctions  among  time,  "sempitern- 
ity,"  and  eternity  in  Boethius  De  Trinitate  iv,  or  the  eternal,  "sempiternal," 
and  perpetual,  as  inspired  by  Timaeus  28C  (Wrobel,  p.  24;  Mullach,  p.  157) 
and  defined  by  William  in  his  later  glosses  on  the  text  (Parent,  Doctrine  de  la 
creation,  pp.  152-3). 

36.  Buttimer's  text  for  this  sentence  and  for  the  first  sentence  of  the  next 
paragraph  should  be  repunctuated  as  follows:  "In  primo  ordine  id  consti- 
tuimus  cui  non  est  aliud  'esse'  et  'id  quod  est,'  id  est,  cuius  causa  et  effectus 
diversa  non  sunt.  ...Illud  vero  cui  aliud  est  'esse'  et  'id  quod  est,'  id  est, 
quod  aliunde  ad  esse  venit,"  etc.  Cf.  Boethius  De  hebdomadibus  (PL,  LXIV, 
1311B),  which,  as  Buttimer  does  not  observe,  is  the  source  of  the  termino- 

37.  See  preceding  note  for  correction  of  Buttimer's  punctuation  of  this 
sentence  to  this  point. 

38.  "Nature"  and  "world"  in  this  passage  are  coextensive  with  the  whole 
of  creation,  not  merely  with  the  physical  universe.  Nature's  two  parts  are 
(1)  the  incorporeal,  invisible,  rational  creation  or  created  wisdom  (angels  and 
human  souls),  made  in  the  likeness  not  of  a  single  exemplar  in  the  Mind  of 
God,  but  of  the  entire  Mind  of  God  with  all  the  exemplary  causes  it  contains 
(see  n.  42) ;  and  (2)  the  corporeal,  visible  creation,  which,  as  initially  created 
(primordial  matter)  was  changeless  because  unformed,  and  out  of  which  God 
made  the  immutable  bodies  of  the  superlunary  world  and  the  changing 
bodies  of  the  sublunary  world.  Cf.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  (PL,  CLXXV, 
128D),  where  Hugh  says  that  the  angelic  nature  and  the  primordially  un- 
formed matter  of  visible  creation  were  made  together  with  time  in  the 
beginning.  Like  Hugh,  William  of  Conches  teaches  the  equal  perpetuity  of 
spiritual  and  material  creation ;  cf.  his  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  (Parent, 
Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  148):  "The  work  of  the  Creator  is  perpetual, 
lacking  dissolution,  for  neither  the  physical  world  nor  spirit  is  dissolved." 
Cf.  Hugh's  De  sacramentis  i.v.2-5  (PL,  CLXXVI,  246-9;  Deferrari,  pp. 
75-7),  in  which  Hugh,  basing  his  doctrine  on  Eccli.,  1:4  ("wisdom  hath 
been  created  before  all  things"),  closely  follows  Augustine's  teaching,  as 
e.g.,  in  Confessiones  xn.ii.7-9,  II-3>  J5>  where  the  two  parts  of  creation 
("heaven  and  earth")  of  Gen.  1 : 1  are  said  to  be  (1)  the  "heaven  of  heavens," 
that  spiritual,  unchanging  wisdom,  mind,  or  nature  made  by  God  before 
time,  yet  not  coeternal  with  himself  nor  identical  with  the  divine  Wisdom, 
and  (2)  the  originally  formless  and  hence  unchanging  matter  (on  the  un- 
changeableness  of  primordial  matter,  see  esp.  Confessiones  xn.xii)  underlying 
the  physical  universe,  itself  now  subdivided  into  the  superior  "heaven"  and 
the  inferior  earth.  Though  Augustine,  and  Hugh  following  him,  speak  of 
the  "created  wisdom"  in  Neoplatonic  terms,  they  have  in  mind  primarily 


the  angels,  secondarily  rational  souls  (see  n.  42).  Note  that  though  John  the 
Scot  divides  "nature"  into  two  parts  (De  divisione  naturae  m.i  [PL,  CXXII, 
621A]:  "The  first  and  greatest  division  of  all  nature  is  into  that  Nature 
which  creates  the  established  universe  and  that  nature  which  is  created  in  the 
established  universe")  and  teaches  that  the  former  part  "encompasses  all 
things"  (ibid.,  620C),  the  resemblance  to  Hugh  is  only  superficial.  The  parts 
of  John's  "nature"  are  Creator  and  creation;  Hugh's  "nature",  in  the  present 
context,  that  is,  is  like  Augustine's,  entirely  created. 

39.  The  primordial  causes  are  the  uncreated  exemplars  of  creation  sub- 
sisting in  the  divine  Wisdom,  or  Mind.  See  De  sacramentis  i.iv.26  (PL, 
CLXXVI,  246C;  Deferrari,  p.  74).  Hugh's  use  of  the  term  parallels  that  of 
John  the  Scot,  who,  however,  regards  the  primordial  causes,  or  ousiai,  as 
created  (see  n.  42).  For  discussion  of  the  manner  in  which  created  nature 
proceeds  from  the  primordial  causes,  see  De  sacramentis  i.ii.3  (PL,  CLXXVI, 
207;  Deferrari,  p.  30):  "Now  these  effect  without  movement  and  produce 
without  transference,  since  eternity  did  not  lose  anything  of  its  own  state  by 
ordaining  time,  nor  did  it  minister  substance  from  its  own  store  by  creating 
corruptible  things,  but  remaining  what  it  was,  it  made  what  was  not. 
. . .  For  it  did  not  degenerate  by  creating  lower  things ;  it  did  not  by  nature 
descend  into  those  very  things  to  which  it  had  given  beginning;  rather, 
without  using  its  own  nature,  it  created  that  nature  by  which  things  that 
were  not  might  take  beginning,  since  the  work  and  the  Maker  could  not  be 
the  same  by  nature." 

40.  Only  the  rational  creature  came  forth  from  the  primordial  causes 
nullo  mediante;  the  corporeal  creation  was  made  mediante  rationali  creatura. 
See  De  sacramentis  i.iv.26  (PL,  CLXXVI,  246B-C;  Deferrari,  pp.  73-4)  and 
Appendix  C. 

41.  Taking  constitit,  the  reading  of  MS  N,  rather  than  Buttimer's  consistit, 
which  provides  an  awkward  shift  in  tense.  For  another  instance  in  which 
MS  N  supplies  a  better  reading,  see  Didascaiicon  iv.i.n.i. 

42.  In  certain  of  Hugh's  contemporaries,  the  term  ousiai  typically  suggests 
the  influence  of  John  the  Scot ;  see,  e.g.,  Etienne  Gilson,  "La  Cosmogonie  de 
Bernardus  Silvestris,"  AHDL,  III  (1928),  10,  n.  4,  and  G.  Raynaud  de  Lage, 
Alain  de  Lille  (Montreal:  Institut  d'etudes  medievales,  195 1),  p.  60.  Note, 
however,  that  John  regularly  translates  the  term  as  essentia  (to  the  refs.  cited 
by  Gilson,  loc.  cit.,  add  the  striking  passage  in  De  divisione  naturae  i.lxiii  [PL, 
CXXII,  62 1  A],  where  ousiai  is  used  specifically  for  the  primordial  causes  or 
archetypal  essences);  it  is  rather  Augustine  De  Trinitate  v.viii  (PL,  XLII, 
917D),  quoted,  moreover,  in  De  sacramentis  11.1.4  (PL,  CLXXVI,  376D; 
Deferrari,  p.  211),  who  proposes  "substance,"  Hugh's  term  here,  as  a 
translation  for  the  Greek  word.  Hugh  is  clearly  alluding  to  John  the  Scot, 
but  the  allusion  takes  the  form  of  a  correction  rather  than  of  a  borrowing. 
In  John  the  Scot,  as  in  his  twelfth-century  follower  Bernard  of  Chartres,  the 
ousiai,  though  created  and,  hence,  it  would  seem,  distinct  from  God,  are  held 
to  subsist  in  the  Mind  of  God,  to  be  one  with  the  Mind  of  God,  and  even 
coeternal  (though  "not  quite")  with  it  (De  divisione  naturae  n.xv-xxvii  [PL, 
CXXII,  545C-66D];  summary  of  John's  and  Bernard's  teaching  in  Parent, 


Doctrine  de  la  creation,  pp.  45-8).  Hugh  removes  the  ambiguity  and  paradox 
of  the  Scot's  teaching  by  admitting  the  existence  of  uncreated  exemplars  in 
the  Mind  of  God  (see  first  definition  of  "nature,"  Didascalicon  i.x),  to  be 
sure,  but  by  exalting  the  "intellectual  creature"  to  a  place  of  prior  importance 
in  creation  and  ascribing  the  "ousiai"  to  this  creature's  mind.  See  De 
sacramentis  i.iv.26  {PL,  CLXXVI,  246B-C;  Deferrari,  pp.  73-4);  De  tribus 
diebus  xxv  {PL,  CLXXVI,  8  3  5  B) ;  and  Appendix  C,  which,  loosely  appended 
to  a  whole  class  of  Didascalicon  MSS,  may  have  been  intended  for  revisionary 
insertion  after  the  present  chapter,  the  meaning  of  which  it  clarifies.  On 
prelapsarian  man  as  included  in  the  term  "rational  creature"  and  as  sharing 
knowledge  of  the  "substances"  of  things,  see  De  sacramentis,  12  {PL, 
CLXXVI,  263B-4C,  270C-D;  Deferrari,  pp.  93-5,  102).  Hugh's  alteration 
of  John  the  Scot  emphasizes  the  two  postulates  on  which  Hugh's  educational 
theory  rests — the  rational  creature's  exclusive  assimilation  to  the  divine 
Wisdom,  and  its  natural  capacity  to  contain  the  rest  of  creation  (cf.  Didascal- 
icon i.i).  In  a  highly  significant  passage  in  De  sacramentis  1.  v.  3  {PL,  CLXXVI, 
247-8C;  Deferrari,  pp.  75-6)  Hugh  explains  as  follows  (Deferrari's  trans- 
lation altered):  "We  read  that  only  the  rational  creature  was  made  in  the 
likeness  of  God;  it  is  not  said  that  any  other  creature  beside  this  one  was  so 
made,  even  though  every  creature  has  in  the  divine  Idea  and  eternal  Provi- 
dence the  cause  and  likeness  out  of  which  and  according  to  which  it  is  per- 
fected in  subsistence.  But  there  is  a  great  difference,  a  gap,  between  having 
a  likeness  in  God  and  having  God  himself  as  one's  likeness.  ...  It  could  not 
suffice  for  the  rational  creature  to  have  in  the  divine  Idea  some  one  thing, 
this  or  that,  for  the  exemplar  to  whose  likeness  it  would  be  formed.  Rather, 
the  rational  creature  claimed  all  of  God,  so  to  speak,  in  order  to  be  made  in 
his  image,  and  it  was  sent  forth  striving  for  God's  total  perfection. 
...Through  its  striving  and  imitation,  through  its  being  an  image  and 
likeness,  this  second  being  contained  all  things  that  were  in  the  First — ideas 
and  causes  and  likenesses  and  forms,  the  dispositions  and  foreseeings  of  all 
future  things  which  were  to  be  made.  And  when  the  corporeal  things  to  be 
made  were  actually  made,  they  were  made  to  the  likeness  of  those  things 
made  in  this  second  being,  just  as  the  latter  was  made  in  the  likeness  of  the 
unmade  things  in  the  First.  Thus,  the  corporeal  creature  is  in  third  place, 
after  the  second  or  rational  creature,  because  made  with  reference  to  the 
rational  creature,  just  as  the  rational  creature  was  made  with  reference  to  the 
First  and  uncreated  Nature."  The  source  of  Hugh's  teaching  is  Augustine 
De  Genesi  ad  litteram  n.viii  {PL,  XXXIV,  269-70);  cf.  De  civitate  Dei 
xn.xvi  {PL,  XLI,  363-5,  where  the  chapter  is  numbered  "15";  CSEL,  XL, 
591-5).  Cf.  Chalcidius  on  the  divine  intelligences  of  the  fixed  stars  and  the 
aetherial  daimons,  "whom  the  Hebrews  call  holy  angels"  and  in  whom  the 
divine  Mind  promulgates  "Fate,"  or  divine  law  for  the  governance  of  all 
things  (Wrobel,  pp.  195  ff.;  Mullach,  pp.  290  fF.). 

43.  Buttimer's  punctuation  of  this  sentence  has  been  revised  as  follows: 
"...  natura  est,  quae  mundum  continet  omnem,  idque  in  gemina  secatur :  est 
quiddam  quod  a  causis  suis  primordialibus,  ut  esse  incipiat,  nullo  movente, 
ad  actum  prodit  solo  divinae  voluntatis  arbitrio,  ibique  immutabile  omnis 


finis  atque  vicissitudinis  expers  consistit  (ejusmodi  sunt  rerum  substantiae 
quas  Graeci  ousias  dicunt);  et  cuncta  superlunaris  mundi  corpora,  quae 
etiam  ideo  quod  non  mutentur  divina  appellata  sunt."  For  key  distinctions 
which  make  this  punctuation  of  the  passage  necessary,  see  n.  38,  40,  42. 
On  the  heavenly  bodies  as  divine,  see,  e.g.,  Mabrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis 
i.xi.6  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  528;  Stahl,  p.  131),  and  Chalcidius's  commentary  on 
the  Timaeus (Wrobel,  p.  195 ;  Mullach,  p.  209).  Cf.  Augustine  De  civitate  Dei 
iv.xi  and  vn.xv  {PL,  XLI,  12 1-3,  206-7). 

44.  See  Hugh's  third  definition  of  "nature,"  Didascalkon  i.x.n.71.  Cf. 
Didascalicon  11.x. 

45 .  "Nihil  in  mundo  moritur"  The  "world,"  for  Hugh,  means  more  than 
the  physical  universe ;  it  means  all  of  creation  (see  n.  3  8).  The  source  of  the 
quotation  may  be  Adelard  of  Bath  Quaes Hones  naturales  (Martin  Miiller,  ed., 
BGPM,  XXI  [Miinster,  1934],  9):  "in  hoc  sensibile  mundo  nil  omnino 
moritur,"  where,  however,  sensibilis  indicates  Adelard's  restriction  of 
"world"  to  the  physical  cosmos.  Similarly  restricted  are  William  of  Conches 
Dragmaticon  philosophiae  (G.  Gratarolus  ed.  [Strasbourg,  1567],  p.  233): 
"Nihil  in  mundo  perire  physica  sententia  est";  Macrobius  In  somnium 
Scipionis  11.xii.13  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  626;  Stahl,  p.  224):  "nihil  intra  vivum 
mundum  perire,  sed  ...solam  mutare  speciem";  and  Servius  Comm.  in  Verg. 
Georg.  iv.ccxxvi  (Georg  Thilo,  ed.  [Leipzig,  1887],  p.  337):  "nihil  enim  est 
quod  perire  funditus  possit." 

46.  Buttimer  mistakenly  places  this  explanatory  clause  within  the  pre- 
ceding quotation. 

47.  On  the  stability  of  essences  (and  of  forms  "in  their  genera"),  see 
further  Hugh's  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV,  215).  On  the  passing 
away  of  forms,  cf.  Bernardus  Silvestris  De  mundi  universitate  n.viii  (Barach 
and  Wrobel,  p.  5  2). 

48.  Sallust  Bellum  Jugurthinum  n.iii. 

49.  Ultimate  source,  Petsius  Saturae  in.  84.  Probably  taken  by  Hugh  from 
Remigius  of  Auxerre's  commentary  on  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae  (ed. 
Stewart,  p.  39),  where  the  line  is  quoted  and  correctly  attributed  to  Persius. 

50.  Maximianus  Elegiae  1.222. 

51.  The  reference  is  specifically  to  the  contrast  between  perpetual  and 
temporal  being,  developed  in  the  last  paragraph  of  the  preceding  chapter. 

5  2.  Chalcidius  reports  agreement  of  mathematici  on  the  lunar  sphere  as  the 
lowest  among  the  heavenly  spheres  and  notes  the  dependence  of  the  sub- 
lunary world  upon  moon,  sun,  and  planets  for  the  regulation  of  time, 
seasons,  climates,  birth  and  death,  growth  and  decay,  and  "every  variety  of 
interchange  and  local  motion"  (Wrobel,  pp.  143-4;  Mullach,  p.  198).  The 
special  power  of  the  moon  over  terrestrial  bodies  is  discussed  by  Firmicus 
Maternus  Matheseos  libri  VIII  iv.i.1-10  (W.  Kroll  and  F.  Skutsch,  ed., 
[Leipzig:  B.  G.  Teubner,  1897],  pp.  16-7),  a  work  quoted  extensively  in  the 
"Liber  Hermetis  Mercurii  Triplicis  de  VI  rerum  principiis,"  a  twelfth- 
century  compilation  which  seems  to  have  more  than  one  source  in  common 
with  Hugh  (see  n.  5  3).  Closest  as  a  whole  to  Hugh  is  Macrobius's  division 
of  the  universe  into  fiery  aether,  where  all  is  eternal,  incorrupt,  and  divine, 


and  the  sublunary  region  of  earth,  water,  and  air,  where  all  is  changing, 
corruptible,  and  mortal  (In  somnium  Scipionis  i.xxi.33;  cf.  S omnium  iv.3 
[Eyssenhardt,  pp.  657,  577;  Stahl,  pp.  180-1,  73]),  a  division  which  both 
suggests  the  terms  Hugh  applies  to  the  two  regions  in  the  present  chapter 
and  appears  to  underlie,  in  part,  the  special  role  he  later  assigns  to  aetherial 
fire  (third  definition  of  "nature,"  Didascalicon  i.x.n.71).  Cf.  Hugh's  con- 
stant, though  corrective,  refs.  to  Macrobius  in  the  discussion  of  cosmimetry 
in  his  Practica  geometriae  (Roger  Baron,  ed.,  "Hugonis  de  Sancto  Victore 
Practica  geometriae:  introduction,  texte,"  Osiris,  XII  [1956],  212-24), 
where,  moreover,  he  alludes  (ibid.,  p.  224)  to  an  intended  treatment  of 
astronomy,  either  never  written  or  since  lost. 

53.  Contrasting  with  Hugh's  use  of  the  term  "nature"  (n.  38),  the  present 
use,  taken  from  "astronomers,"  shows  unmistakable  relationship  to  the 
"Liber  Hermetis  MercuriiTriplicis"  (Silverstein,  ed.,  AHDL,  XXII  [1955], 
217-302),  which,  citing  the  De  electionibus  of  Zahel  ben  Bischr  as  saying  that 
planets  and  signs  of  the  zodiac  "in  naturalibus  operantur,"  says  further  that 
this  quality  of  the  heavenly  bodies  "a  philosophis  natura  dicitur,  que  iuxta 
varias  vires  suas  in  universis  et  singulis  sub  lunari  globo  variatur"  {ibid., 
p.  282).  It  is  from  it  that  the  quality  of  temporal  things  is  also  called  their 
"nature"  (ibid.);  proceeding  from  the  divine  Cause  or  Good  (Tugaton)  and 
the  Nous  or  Ratio,  the  celestial  "Nature"  distributes  to  the  inferior  world  of 
generation  the  essences  of  which  Nous  is  the  source,  and  in  this  sense 
establishes  each  thing's  being  and  nature  (''unicuique  rei  non  solum  esse  sed 
etiam  tale  esse  constituit")  (ibid.,  pp.  248-9).  Not  only  Zahel  but  a  pseudo- 
Pythagorean  Matentetraden  or  Tiber  quadrivii  may  have  been  common  sources 
for  Hugh  and  the  author  of  the  "Liber  Hermetis"  (see  n.  55).  Found  also  in 
the  Latin  Asclepius  i.iii  (Nock,  ed.  p.  299,  lines  3-15),  the  conception  of  a 
generating  celestial  Nature  was  assimilated  in  various  ways  to  the  Timaean 
world-soul  by  twelfth-century  writers  of  Chartrian  connection  or  spirit,  as, 
e.g.,  Adelard  of  Bath  De  eodem  et  diverso  (Willner,  ed.,  pp.  15,  77-8) ;  William 
of  Conches  and  Thierry  of  Chartres  (refs.  cited  in  n.  10);  Bernardus  Sil- 
vestris  (see  Silverstein,  "Fabulous  Cosmogony,"  MP,  XLVI  [1948-9], 
104-7  and  notes);  Alanus  de  Insulis  (see  de  Lage,  Alain  de  Tille,  pp.  59-80). 
For  occurrence  of  the  conception  in  vernacular  poetry,  see  Gerard  Pare,  Tes 
Idees  et  les  lettres  au  Xlle  specie:  Te  Roman  de  la  rose  (Montreal:  Institut 
d'etudes  medievales  Albert-le-Grand,  1947),  ch.V,  "La  Confession  de 
Nature,"  pp.  202-78.  The  doctrine  of  the  world-soul  Hugh  explicitly  rejects, 
interpreting  the  superlunary  "nature"  as  an  aetherial  fire  emanating  princi- 
pally from  the  sun  (see  n.  71)  and  attributing  the  distribution  as  well  as  the 
source  of  each  thing's  being  and  nature  exclusively  to  the  divine  Mind  or 
Wisdom  (see  n.  69;  contrast  Hugh's  use  of  the  phrase  "non  solum  esse  sed 
etiam  talis  esse"  with  that  of  the  "Liber  Hermetis.") 

54.  The  phrase  is  from  Chalcidius,  where  it  is  associated  with  the  gener- 
ative function  of  the  world-soul  (see  n.  59). 

55.  Cf.  "Liber  Hermetis"  (Silverstein,  ed.,  AHDT,  XXII  [1955]),  268): 
"In  the  Matentetrade,  mathematicians  call  the  superlunary  world  'time'  be- 
cause of  the  course  and  motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies;  but  they  call  the  sub- 


lunary  world  'temporal'  because  the  mutability  of  things  below  is  directed 
according  to  the  perpetual  order  of  the  things  above."  Striking  coincidence 
in  phraseology  suggests  either  that  the  author  of  the  "Liber  Hermetis," 
dated  by  Silverstein  tentatively  between  1135-47,  borrowed  from  Hugh  or 
that  both  used  the  same  source.  In  Didascalicon  m.ii,  Hugh  speaks  of 
Pythagoras  as  the  author  of  "the  Matentetradem,  a  book  concerning  the 
teaching  of  the  quadrivium";  cf.  the  gloss  on  Silverstein's  MS  Di  (Bodleian, 
Digby  67,  fol.  72r):  "i.e.  liber  de  doctrina  quadruvii  [sic]."  While  this  piece 
of  information  may  represent  an  inference  from  a  passage  in  Remigius  of 
Auxerre's  commentary  on  Martianus  Capella  (see  Didascalicon  in.ii.n.8),  one 
cannot  exclude  the  possibility  that  a  book  with  this  title  and  attributed  to 
Pythagoras  existed  in  Hugh's  time  and  supplied  both  him  and  the  "Liber 
Hermetis"  author  with  the  passage  in  question.  See  Silverstein's  discussion 
("Liber  Hermetis,"  AHDL,  XXII  [1955],  224-5). 

56.  On  the  sublunary  world  as  "underworld"  and  the  superlunary  world 
as  "elysium,"  see  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  i.xi,4-8  (Eyssenhardt, 
pp.  5  27-9;  Stahl,  pp.  1 3 1-2);  Cf.  Abaelard  Theologia  i.xvii  {PL,  CLXXVIII, 
1018A-B)  and  Bernardus  Silvestris  Commentum  super  VI  libros  Eneidos 
Virgilii  vi  (Guilielmus  Riedel  ed.,  [Greifswald:  Typis  Julii  Abel,  1924], 
p.  29),  who  in  turn  follows  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the  De 
consolatione  philosophise:  "Philosophers  have  called  this  sublunary  region 
'infernum'  because  the  lower  part  of  the  world  is  full  of  misery  and  sorrow" 
(cited  in  Jeauneau,  "La  Notion  diintegitmentum"  AHDL,  XXIV  [1957],  42). 

57.  The  distinction  between  intelligentia  and  scientia  derives  from  Hugh's 
view  of  the  knowledge  process.  Twofold  in  nature,  man  descends  to  the 
world  of  corporeal  objects  through  his  wholly  corporeal  senses  and  imagina- 
tion; he  ascends  to  spiritual  objects  through  the  internal  operation  of  his 
purely  spiritual  reason.  When  the  reason  turns  "below"  to  examine  sense 
impressions  {imaginationes)  critically,  it  is  "informed"  though  clouded  over 
by  them,  and  the  result  is  knowledge;  when  it  turns  "upward"  toward 
spiritual  objects  and  God,  it  operates  with  the  concurrent  aid  of  divine  in- 
spiration and  revelation  and  is  "illuminated"  with  "understanding."  Further 
detail  on  the  faculties  and  their  objects,  see  n.  2;  cf.  refs.  cited  in  n.  15,  23. 
See  Augustine  De  Trinitate  xn  and  xiv.i  {PL,  XLII,  997  ff.),  where  consider- 
ation of  the  exterior  and  interior  operations  of  man  leads  to  distinction 
between  scientia  as  "actio  qua  bene  utimur  temporalibus  rebus"  (1009D)  or 
"temporalium  rerum  cognitio  intellectualis"  (1012B),  and  sapientia  as 
"aeternarum  rerum  cognitio  intellectualis"  (1012B),  and  where  the  distinc- 
tion between  scientia  and  sapientia  is  further  related  to  a  definition  of  wisdom 
as  "knowledge  of  human  and  divine  things." 

58.  On  mechanical  as  "adulterate,"  see  n.  64. 

59.  Adapted  from  Chalcidius's  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  (Wrobel, 
p.  88;  Mullach,  p.  185).  Hugh  makes  radical  changes  in  the  meaning  of  his 
source.  In  Chalcidius,  the  opera  Dei  are  ascribed  to  the  summus  Deus,  who 
founds  all  things  according  to  the  exemplary  causes  existing  in  his  eternal 
Providence  (7tp6voia)  or  Mind  (vou<;),  and  promulgates  the  law  or  "fate"  of 
natural  things  in  created  intelligences  subsisting  visibly  in  the  fixed  stars  of 


the  outer  ignis  ('aTCXavrj)  and  invisibly  in  the  daemones  or  blessed  angels  of  the 
aether.  The  opera  naturae  are  the  province  of  the  anima  mundi,  a  secunda  mens 
and  the  substantial  projection  of  God's  law  of  "fate";  ruling  all  things 
according  to  their  proper  natures,  the  anima  mundi  may  be  called  their 
"law."  The  opera  artificis — human  arts,  disciplines,  and  the  things  effected 
with  their  aid — are  regular  and  fruitful  because,  imitating  nature,  they  too 
are  ruled  by  the  law,  idea,  and  order  of  the  anima  mundi '(for  summary  of  these 
ideas,  see  Wrobel,  pp.  225-7;  Mullach,  p.  219;  for  details,  see  antecedent  dis- 
cussion in  Wrobel,  pp.  195-225;  Mullach,  pp.  209-18).  Hugh  accepts  the 
Chalcidian  idea  of  the  exemplary  causes  (see  first  definition  of  "nature", 
Didascalicon  i.x.n.69)  and  their  communication  to  the  angelic  intellect  (see 
discussion  of  ousiai,  n.  42),  rejecting,  however,  the  identification  of  angels 
with  the  heavenly  bodies  (ibid.).  Among  the  opera  Dei  he  includes  the 
ordering  and  disposition  of  the  movements  of  all  things,  which,  in  Chalci- 
dius,  were  opera  naturae ;  the  anima  mundi,  in  which  certain  of  his  contempo- 
aries  saw  reference  to  the  Holy  Spirit  (see  n.  10),  he  altogether  rejects, 
limiting  the  opera  naturae  to  the  sun's  superintendence  of  growth  and  decay 
in  terrestrial  life  (see  third  definition  of  "nature,"  Didascalicon  i.x.n.71,  and 
In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae[PL,  CLXXV,  215-71]).  The  opera  artificis  imitantis 
naturam  are  associated  not,  as  in  Chalcidius,  with  the  anima  mundi,  but  with 
man's  efforts,  through  the  mechanical  arts,  to  supply  both  the  internal  and 
external  needs  of  his  body  (see  Didascalicon  11. xx).  Somewhat  more  elaborate 
division  of  the  opera  artificis  in  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  (PL,  CLXXV,  215-7). 
An  interpretation  of  the  "three  works,"  differing  in  detail  from  both 
Chalcidius  and  Hugh,  is  found  in  William  of  Conches'  commentaries  on  the 
Timaeus  (Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  147)  and  on  the  De  consolatione 
philosophiae  (ibid.,  pp.  127-8). 

60.  Gen.  1:1. 

61.  Gen.  1 :  11. 

62.  Gen.  3  : 7. 

63.  Luke  12:25. 

64.  Hugh  associates  "mechanical"  with  the  Greek  \j.oijoc„  Latin  moechus, 
adulterer,  rather  than  with  (r/jjcay/),  machine.  Cf.  Martin  of  Laon  Scholica 
graecarum  glossarum  (M.  L.  W.  Laistner,  ed.,  "Notes  on  Greek  from  the 
Lectures  of  a  Ninth  Century  Monastery  Teacher,"  Bulletin  of  the  John 
Rylands  Library,  VII  [1922-3],  439):  "'Moechus'  means  adulterer,  a  man 
who  secretly  pollutes  the  marriage  bed  of  another.  From  'moechus'  we  call 
'mechanical  art'  any  object  which  is  clever  and  most  delicate  and  which,  in  its 
making  or  operation,  is  beyond  detection,  so  that  beholders  find  their  power 
of  vision  stolen  from  them  when  they  cannot  penetrate  the  ingenuity  of  the 
thing."  Martin  of  Laon  was  a  pupil  of  John  the  Scot  and  a  teacher  of 
Remigius  of  Auxerre,  with  whose  works  Hugh  shows  familiarity  elsewhere 
in  the  Didascalicon.  Sallust  Bellum  Jugurthinum  xn.iii,  uses  the  term  claves 
adulterinae;  see  n.  48,  for  direct  quotation  of  this  work. 

65.  Ps.  103  :  10. 

66.  Comparable  discussion  of  man's  unarmed  state  in  Adelard  of  Bath 
Quaestiones  naturales  (Miiller,  ed.,  BGPM,  XXXI  [1934],  19-21). 


67.  Cicero  De  inventione  i.xxiv.34. 

68.  The  passage  which  follows  is  a  good  example  of  the  generalizing  and 
schematizing  habit  of  Hugh's  mind.  With  his  reduction  of  numerous  current 
definitions  of  "nature"  to  three  basic  senses,  cf.  the  more  diffuse  survey  in 
John  of  Salisbury  Metalogkon  i.viii  (Webb,  pp.  23-4;  McGarry,  pp.  28-9). 

69.  This  conception  of  nature,  associated  by  Augustine  with  the  teaching 
of  Socrates  {De  civitate  Dei  vin.iii;  note  esp.  the  reference  to  "the  Nature 
which  is  unchangeable  Light,  where  live  the  causes  of  all  created  natures"), 
is  recognizable  also  in  the  eternal  pattern  of  the  world  in  Timaeus  28,  and  in 
subsequent  Neoplatonic  discussions  of  Nous  (e.g.  in  Macrobius  In  somnium 
Scipionis  i.ii.14-17,  i.xiv.5-15  [Eyssenhardt,  pp.  482-3,  539-42;  Stahl, 
pp.  85-6,  143-5],  and  in  Chalcidius  [Wrobel,  pp.  27,  90-1,  534;  Mullach, 
pp.  159,  186,  251]);  it  found  its  biblical  counterpart  in  the  concept  of 
sapientia  set  forth  in  Wisd.  7 :  22-8 : 1 ;  Eccli.  1:1-10,  24 15-14;  Prov.  8 :  22- 
30;  and  in  scattered  places  in  the  Psalms  (see  O.  S.  Rankin,  Israel's  Wisdom 
Literature  [Edinburgh:  T.  and  T.  Clark,  1954],  ii,  222-64  and  notes). 
Neoplatonic  literature  and  the  sapiential  books  of  the  Old  Testament  are  the 
two  principal  sources  from  which  the  idea  enters  the  writings  of  the  Christi- 
an Fathers,  who  employ  it  in  their  interpretations  of  the  biblical  Hexaemeron 
and  the  Joannine  prologue  especially.  Thus,  in  their  exegesis  of  Gen.  1 : 1 
("In  principio  creavit  Deus  caelum  et  terram"),  principium  was  frequently 
identified  with  the  divine  Son,  Wisdom,  or  Mind,  and  caelum  et  terram  with 
the  archetypal  exemplars  of  spiritual  and  corporeal  nature  produced  from  all 
eternity  within  the  Son  (so,  e.g.,  Augustine  De  diversis  quaestionibus  i.i,  "De 
ideis,"  {PL,  XL,  30-1] ;  cf.  the  discussion  of  Gen.  1 : 1  in  Chalcidius  [Wrobel, 
pp.  306-10;  Mullach,  pp.  240-1]).  This  interpretation  of  Genesis  was  re- 
inforced not  only  by  the  passages  from  the  sapiential  books  cited  above  but 
by  John  1 : 1-4,  in  which  the  reading  preferred  by  Augustine  and  given 
currency  in  the  West  by  his  authority  ("In  principio  erat  Verbum. ...  Quod 
factum  est  in  ipso  vita  erat"),  led  to  the  interpretation  of  vita  as  that  formal 
principle,  within  the  living  Wisdom,  according  to  which  all  things  were 
created  (see  Augustine  Injoannis  evangelium  tractatus  i.xvi-xvii  [PL,  XXXV, 
1387];  see  also  n.  1).  Occurring  also  in  the  commentary  tradition  on 
Boethius  De  consolatione philosophiae  in.m.ix  (in  addition  to  the  commentaries 
of  Remigius  of  Auxerre  and  John  the  Scot  cited  in  n.  1,  see  that  of  Adalbold 
of  Utrecht  in  E.  T.  Silk,  "Pseudo-Johannes  Scottus,  Adalbold  of  Utrecht, 
and  the  Early  Commentaries  on  Boethius,"  MRS,  III  [1954],  17,  or  in 
R.  B.  C.  Huygens,  "Mittelalterliche  Kommentare  zum  O  qui perpetua,"  SE, 
VI  [1954],  414:  "Et  quid  est  mens  Dei  nisi  Films  Dei,  per  quem  et  a  quo 
facta  sunt  omnia,  et  in  quo  omnia  quae  facta  sunt,  sunt  et  vivunt,  sicut 
scriptum  est,  'Quod  factum  est  in  ipso  vita  erat'?";  and  of  William  of 
Conches,  in  Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  128-30),  the  concept  found 
lengthy  theoretical  elaboration  in  the  ninth  century  in  John  the  Scot's  dis- 
cussion of  "universalis  natura  quae  et  creatur  et  creat  et  in  primordialibus 
causis  constituta  est"  {De  divisione  naturae  n.xv-xxii  [PL,  CXXII,  545C- 
66D];  see  n.  42).  On  the  concept  as  transmitted  from  John  the  Scot  to 
Bernard  and  Thierry  of  Chartres  and  William  of  Conches,  see  Parent, 


Doctrine  de  la  creation,  pp.  44-58.  Interspersed  in  Abaelard's  controversial 
account  of  pre-Christian  allusions  to  the  Trinity  in  the  Law,  the  Prophets, 
and  the  pagan  philosophers  are  references  to  this  concept  which  form  a 
convenient  catalogue  of  loci  cited  repeatedly  throughout  the  twelfth 
century;  see  Theologia  christiana  i.iii-v  and  Theologia  i.xiii-xxiv  {PL, 
CLXXVIII,  1126D-66B,  998C-1034D).  Hugh's  "whence  each  thing  takes 
not  only  its  being  but  its  'being  such  or  such  a  thing'"  is  found  also  in  the 
"Liber  Hermetis,"  where,  however,  the  "nature"  meant  is  a  cosmic  or 
astronomical  agency  mediating  between  the  divine  Mind  and  the  world 
(see  n.  53). 

70.  Adapted  from  Boethius  Contra  Eutychen  i  {PL,  LXIV,  1342B). 

71.  "Natura  est  ignis  artifex,  ex  quadam  vi  procedens  in  res  sensibiles 
procreandas."  Ultimate  source,  Cicero  De  natura  deorum  n.xxii:  "Zeno 
igitur  naturam  ita  definit  ut  earn  dicat  ignem  esse  artificiosum,  ad  gignendum 
progredientem  via.  non  artificiosa  solum  sed  plane  artifex  ab 
eodem  Zenone  dicitur."  For  an  instance  of  direct  knowledge  of  the  De 
natura  deorum  in  the  twelfth  century,  see  Theodore  Silverstein,  "Adelard, 
Aristotle,  and  the  De  natura  deorum."  CP,  XLVII  (1952),  82-6.  Hugh's 
phrasing,  however,  suggests  that  he  drew  from  Victorinus  Expositio  in 
librum  De  inventione  ad  i.xxiv:  "natura  est  ignis  artifex  quadam  via  vadens  in 
res  sensibiles  procreandas"  (in  Carolus  Halm,  ed.,  Rhetores  latini  minores 
[Leipzig:  B.  G.  Teubner,  1863],  p.  215,  or  J.  C.  Orellius,  ed.,  M.  Tullii 
Ciceronis  opera,  V  [Turici,  1833],  p.  70).  Cf.  John  of  Salisbury  Metalogicon 
i.viii  (Webb,  p.  24;  McGarry,  p.  29),  where  a  further  variation  of  the  passage 
appears.  Citing  the  definition  in  his  exegesis  of  Eccl.  1 : 5-6  ("Oritur  sol  et 
occidit.  ...Pergit  spiritus  et  in  circulos  suos  revertitur";  In  Ecclesiasten 
homiliae  [PL,  CLXXV,  136C-7C]),  Hugh  locates  the  ignis  artifex  in  the  sun, 
ascribing  to  its  emanations  the  fostering  of  vegetative  and  sense-endowed 
life;  for  discussion  of  the  quasi-spiritual  nature  of  aetherial  fire  and  its 
special  mediating  function  between  senses  and  reason  (via  imagination)  in 
man,  see  Hugh's  De  unione  corporis  et  spiritus  {PL,  CLXXVII,  286A-C);  cf. 
Kleinz,  Theory  of  Knowledge  of  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  pp.  37-9.  Hugh  rejects 
explicitly  the  "opinion  of  those  erring  persons"  who  regard  the  cosmos  as 
animated  by  a  world-soul  {In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae,  loc.  cit.),  alluding  parti- 
cularly, it  seems,  to  his  contemporaries  Adelard  of  Bath  (see  De  eodem  et 
diverso  [Willner,  ed.  p.  15])  and  William  of  Conches  (see  commentary  on  the 
Timaeus  [Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  166]  and  on  the  De  consolatione 

philosophiae  [Jourdain,  "Commentaires  inedits,"  pp.  75-61]),  where  William 
argues  that  it  is  false  to  locate  the  animating  principle  of  the  cosmos  in  the 
sun.  Note  Remigius  of  Auxerre's  commentary  on  De  consolatione  in.m.ix 
(Stewart,  p.  32 ;  Silvestre,  p.  58):  "Philosophers  say  that  the  sun  is  the  world- 
soul  because,  just  as  the  soul  gives  heat  to  the  body,  so  the  sun's  heat  vivifies 
all  things  and,  suffused  through  all  creatures,  brings  them  into  being;  in 
fact,  physicists  claim  that  by  this  heat,  in  conjunction  with  moisture,  all 
things  both  beget  and  are  begotten,  God  so  disposing."  Antecedents  of 
Hugh's  and  Remigius's  position  in  the  Latin  Asclepius  i.ii  (Nock,  p.  298, 
lines  5-1 1),  which  presents  fire  as  the  generating  agency  by  which  the  caelum 


or  natura  vivifies  the  air,  water,  and  earth  below;  Macrobius  In  somnium 
Scipionis  i.xxi.35  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  578;  Stahl,  p.  181),  which  declares  that 
"earth,  water,  and  air,  lying  beneath  the  moon,  are  unable  to  produce  a  body 
capable  of  sustaining  life  but  need  the  help  of  aetherial  fire,  which  supplies  to 
earthly  members  their  power  to  support  life  and  soul" ;  similarly,  Macrobius, 
ibid.,  i.xx.7  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  565;  Stahl,  p.  169)  speaks  of  the  sun  as  the 
source  of  aetherial  fire,  mind  of  the  universe,  and  heart  of  heaven,  a  passage 
to  which  Chalcidius  apparently  refers  when  reporting  that  some  persons 
regard  the  sun  as  the  vital  source  of  the  world  soul  (Wrobel,  p.  170; 
Mullach,  p.  240).  In  rejecting  the  world  soul  in  favor  of  solar  fire,  Hugh 
belongs,  in  one  sense,  to  the  conservative  tradition  represented  by  the  ninth- 
century  Bovo  of  Corvey,  who  was  scandalized  to  find  the  world-soul  in 
Boethius  (see  In  Boethii  De  consolatione  in.m.ix  commentarius  [PL,  LXIV, 
1239  ff.]);  and  the  eleventh-century  Manegold  of  Lautenbach,  connected 
with  the  Victorines  as  teacher  of  William  of  Champeaux,  and  who  regarded 
Chalcidius  and  Macrobius  as  fertile  sources  of  heresy  {Opusculum  contra 
Wolfelmum  coloniensem  {PL,  CLV,  149  ff.]).  In  another  sense,  Hugh  went 
beyond  their  conservatism  by  using  the  very  texts  and  authorities  to  which 
they  object,  but  giving  them  a  different  meaning  (see  Introduction,  sec.  in). 
Hugh  goes  farther  than  Augustine,  who  suspended  judgment  on  the  world- 
soul  for  lack  of  knowledge  {Retractationes  i.xi.4;  cf.  De  or  dine  n. xi;  De  im- 
mortalitate  animae  xv.xxiv;  De  musica  vi.xiv.44),  and  Jerome,  who  is  non- 
commital  (Commentariorum  in  Isaiam  prophetam  libri  XV III xvi  {PL,  XXIV, 
5  5  8 A-B]) ;  he  also  departs  from  the  cosmology  of  Victorinus  himself, 
though  using  his  words,  and  resembles  John  the  Scot  (cf.  E.  and  R.  von 
Erhardt-Siebold,  Cosmology  in  the  Annotationes  in  Marcianum :  More  Light  on 
Erigena's  Astronomy  [Baltimore,  1940],  p.  41 :  "...the  sun  holds  in  Erigena's 
system  of  cosmogonic  powers  a  position  similar  to  that  of  the  Lower  Logos, 
the  Anima  Mundi,  in  the  Christian-neoplatonic  theology  of  Marius  Victor- 
inus Afer").  Hugh's  position  may  have  been  influenced  by  pseudo-Diony- 
sius,  who  describes  fire  as  "having  power  over  all  things  and  ability  to  move 
to  its  proper  action  whatever  comes  to  be  in  them"  (see  Hugh  Expositio  in 
Hierarchiam  coelestem  [PL,  CLXXV,  133 1  A]). 

72.  Hugh  discusses  the  generating  properties  of  heat  and  moisture  at  some 
length  in  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV,  1 37C-8D).  See  also  Macro- 
bius In  somnium  Scipionis  n.x.10-2  (Eyssenhardt,  pp.  618-9;  Stahl,  p.  218), 
where  aetherial  fire  is  said  to  feed  upon  moisture. 

73.  Vergil  Georgica  iv.382.  Cited  also  by  Thierry  of  Chartres  De  sex 
dierum  operibus  (Haring,  ed.,  p.  194). 

74.  Hugh's  source  appears  to  be  Remigius  of  Auxerre's  commentary  on 
Martianus  Capella,  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS  Latin  14754,  fol.  iov-nr; 
"[Iupiter]  unus  idemque  non  solum  diversis  nominibus  sed  et  vario  sexu 
appellatur,  iuxta  ilium  versiculum  Valerii  Sorani:  Iuppiter  omnipotens 
rerum  regumque  creator,  Progenitor  genitrixque  deum,  deus  unus  et  idem. 
...Ipse  est  enim  ignis  aethereus  qui  nunquam  de  sede  aetheris  descendit." 
In  Augustine  De  civitate  Dei  vi.ix,  xi,  xiii  the  same  verses  are  quoted  and 
Varro's  interpretation  of  them  given,  but  without  relating  Jupiter  to 


aetherial  fire.  In  the  Latin  Asclepius  m.xx-xxi  (Nock,  pp.  321-2),  the  "god 
and  father  of  all  things"  is  said  to  be  "filled  with  the  fertility  of  both 

75.  Quoted  from  Boethius  Commentaria  in  Porphjrium  a  se  translatum  11 
{PL,  LXIV,  73A-B;  CSEL,  XL VIII,  139).  Another  translation  of  the 
Boethius  passage  by  Richard  P.  McKeon,  Selections  from  Medieval  Philo- 
sophers, I  (New  York:  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1929),  73  f. 

76.  By  contrast,  Adelard  of  Bath  De  eodem  et  diverso  (Willner,  ed.,  p.  18) 
credits  grammar  with  making  speech  possible  for  men,  who  "at  first  roamed 
the  fields  like  beasts,  without  mutual  intercourse  and  with  their  reason 

77.  Another  translation  of  the  previous  paragraph  in  Ernest  A.  Moody, 
Truth  and  Consequence  in  Modern  Logic  (Amsterdam,  1953),  pp.  13-4. 

78.  Cf.  Cicero  De  oratore  i.xlii.  187-8:  "Almost  all  things  now  compre- 
hended in  the  arts  were  once  scattered  and  disordered.  So  in  music, ...  in 
geometry, ...  in  astronomy, ...  in  grammar,  all  these  things  seemed  unknown 
and  without  order.  A  certain  art  was  therefore  imposed  on  them  from  with- 
out ...  to  tie  together  the  disconnected  and  fragmentary  material  and  delimit 
it  in  some  kind  of  rational  order." 

79.  This  verse,  comprising  fine  47  of  the  Pythagorean  Aureum  carmen,  is 
quoted  in  Porphyry's  Life  of  Pythagoras,  whence,  according  to  Courcelle, 
Lettres  grecques,  p.  25,  n.  4,  it  was  taken  by  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis 
vi.xli  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  504;  Stahl,  p.  107),  whose  Latin  and  whose  associa- 
tion of  the  number  with  the  soul  Hugh  follows.  Text  of  the  Aureum  carmen 
in  F.  Mullach,  Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum,  I,  416-84,  together  with  the 
fifth-century  commentary  of  Hierocles  of  Alexandria,  which,  however,  sheds 
no  light  on  Hugh's  further  elaboration  of  the  quaternarium  animae  and 
quaternarium  corporis  in  Didascalicon  n.iv-v. 


1.  Quoted  from  Boethius  In  Porphjrium  dialogi  i.iii  {PL,  LXIV,  10D; 
CSEL,  XLVIII,  7).    See  Didascalicon  i.ii.n.21. 

2.  On  permanence  in  the  things  studied  by  the  arts,  see  Boethius  De 
arithmetica  i.i  {PL,  LXIII,  1079D):  "Wisdom  is  the  grasp  of  the  truth  of 
those  things  which  truly  exist  and  are  of  themselves  endowed  with  un- 
changeable substance"  (see  Didascalicon  i.ii.n.20);  cf.  Remigius  of  Auxerre, 
commentary  on  De  consolatione philosophiae  (Stewart,  p.  26):  "...the 
seven  liberal  arts . . .  will  never  perish  in  any  way,  for  even  if  knowledge 
should  fail,  the  knowable  will  always  exist."  On  permanence  in  the  arts 
themselves,  see  Cassiodorus  Institutiones  11.iii.22  (Mynors,  p.  131;  Jones, 
p.  179):  "They  [the  sciences]  are  neither  increased  by  expansion  nor  dimin- 
ished by  contraction  nor  modified  by  any  changes  but  abide  in  their  own 
proper  nature  and  observe  their  own  rules  with  indisputable  constancy"; 
and  Adelard  of  Bath  De  eodem  et  diverso  (Willner,  ed.,  p.  4  and  p.  39,  n.  1), 
where  Philosophia  and  her  arts  are  identified  with  the  Platonic  idem,  Philo- 


cosmia  (love  of  the  world)  with  the  diversum.  For  Hugh,  the  ultimate 
concern  of  the  arts  is  with  the  changeless  archetypal  patterns  in  the  divine 
Wisdom,  to  whose  likeness  the  arts  restore  man. 

3.  The  arts  intend  restoration  of  the  radical  cognitive  good  lost  to  man 
through  the  fall — knowledge  of  his  Creator,  of  himself,  of  things  created 
with  and  for  himself,  and  of  things  he  is  to  make  with  these  last.  See  De  area 
Noe  morali  prologus  {PL,  CLXXVI,  619).  Cf.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL, 
CLXXV,  197A-B),  where  man's  lost  contemplation  of  the  divine  Wisdom 
is  said  to  make  its  pursuit  in  this  life  incumbent  on  all,  and  De  sacramentis,  "On  man's  knowledge  before  sin"  {PL,  CLXXVI,  270D;  Deferrari, 
p.  102). 

4.  Quoted  from  Cassiodorus  Institutiones  n.iii.5  (Mynors,  p.  no;  Jones, 
p.  160)  or  Isidore  Etymologiae  n.xxiv.9. 

5.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  i.i.2. 

6.  "disciplina,  quae  dicitur  plena"  Hugh's  text  changes  the  sense  of  the 
source,  Cassiodorus  Institutiones  11.ii.17  (Mynors,  p.  109;  Jones,  p.  158): 
"Disciplina  enim  dicta  est  quae  dijvritur  plena";  cf.  Isidore  Etymologiae  i.i.i : 
"Disciplina  a  discendo  nomen  accepit.  ...Nam  scire  dictum  a  discere,  quia 
nemo  nostrum  scit  nisi  qui  discit.  Aliter  dicta  disciplina  quia  dijritur  plena." 
Cf.  Hugh's  definition  of  philosophy,  Didascalicon  i.iv,  as  "disciplina...  plene 

7.  "ut  est  in  doctrina"  Cf.  Didascalicon  11. hi:  "Mathematica  autem  doctri- 
nalis  scientia  dicitur."  Following  Boethius,  doctrina  became  the  traditional 
name  for  mathematics,  its  sense  being  variously  explained.  See,  e.g.,  Hugh 
Epitome  (Baron,  ed.,  p.  112):  "The  first  theoretical  art  is  mathematics,  which 
is  called  'instructional'  because,  by  the  start  it  makes,  it  forms  contemplation 
and  constitutes  the  approach  to  instruction  concerning  hidden  things,  or, 
because  it  accompanies  its  arguments  with  visible  figures  set  forth  for  in- 
struction." Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  {PL, 
CLXXII,  250),  on  the  De  consolatione philosophiae  (Jourdain,  "Commentaires 
inedits,"  p.  73),  and  the  brano  (Ottaviano,  p.  26),  the  latter  of  which  adds: 
"Mathematics  is  'instructional'...  because  through  instruction  in  numbers, 
proportions,  and  other  matters  taught  in  the  quadrivium,  knowledge  of  the 
Creator  and  his  creatures  is  prepared  for  us,  or  because  this  science  is  the 
way  to  physics  and  theology,  since  it  treats  the  exemplary  numbers  of  things 
and  the  invisible  forms  of  visible  things,  whereas  physics  treats  the  invisible 
causes  of  visible  things,  and  theology  invisible  essences."  For  an  arith- 
mological  treatment  of  the  procession  of  the  divine  Wisdom  from  the  Father 
and  of  creation,  see  Thierry  of  Chartres  De  sex  dierum  operibus  (Haring,  ed 
pp.  137-216).  Underlying  the  view  that  mathematics  and  theology  are 
closely  related  are  such  texts  as  Boethius  De  arithmetica  n.ii  {PL,  LXIII, 
1 08 3D):  "Whatever  things  were  constructed  by  the  primeval  Nature  of 
things  were  formed  according  to  the  pattern  of  numbers";  and  Macrobius 
In  somnium  Scipionis  i.v.3  (Stahl,  p.  95;  translation  altered):  "Not  without 
reason  did  he  attribute  fulness  to  numbers,  for  fulness  properly  belongs  only 
to  things  divine  and  heavenly.  . . .  This,  therefore,  is  the  common  fulness  of 
all  numbers,  that  to  our  thought  as  it  passes  from  ourselves  to  heavenly 


things,  they  represent  the  first  degree  of  abstraction  belonging  to  incorporeal 

8.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  i.i.3;  ff.  Cassiodorus  Institutiones 
n.ii.17  (Mynors,  p.  108;  Jones,  p.  158). 

9.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  n.xxiv.9  or  Cassiodorus  Institutiones 
n.iii. 5  (Mynors,  p.  no;  Jones,  p.  160),  and  particularly  apposite  to  Hugh's 
thought  when  taken  in  conjunction  with  Macrobius's  explanation,  In 
somnium  Scipionis  i.xiii.5-7  (Stahl,  pp.  138-9):  "...Plato... in  his  Phaedo 
(64A,  67D)  lays  down  the  rule  that  a  man  must  not  die  of  his  own  volition. 
And  yet  in  the  same  dialogue  he  also  says  that  philosophers  ought  to  seek 
after  death,  and  that  philosophy  is  itself  a  meditation  upon  dying.  These 
statements  seem  to  be  contradictory  but  are  really  not  so,  for  Plato  acknow- 
ledged two  deaths  in  a  man.  . . .  Man  dies  when  the  soul  leaves  the  body  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  nature;  he  is  also  said  to  die  when  the  soul,  still 
residing  in  his  body,  spurns  all  bodily  allurements  under  the  guidance  of 
philosophy,  and  frees  itself  from  the  tempting  devices  of  the  lusts  and  all  the 
other  passions.  This  is  the  death  which,  as  we  pointed  out  above,  proceeds 
from  the  second  type  of  those  virtues  which  befit  only  philosophers."  The 
virtues  alluded  to  are  the  "cleansing  virtues ...  found  in  the  man  who  is 
capable  of  attaining  the  divine.  They  release  the  minds  only  of  those  who 
have  resolved  to  cleanse  themselves  from  any  contamination  with  the  body, 
and  by  an  escape  from  mortal  things,  as  it  were,  to  mingle  solely  with  the 
divine"  {ibid.,  i.viii.8  [Stahl,  p.  122]).  Cf.  Abaelard  Theologia  Christiana  11 
{PL,  CLXXVIII,  1 185). 

10.  Cf.  Didascalicon  i.iv.n.27. 

11.  Buttimer's  punctuation  altered. 

12.  Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  De  consolatione  philosophiae 
(Jourdain,  "Commentaires  inedits,"  pp.  72-3):  "There  are  two  species  of 
knowledge :  wisdom  and  eloquence.  . . .  These  two  are  called  the  species  of 
knowledge  because  in  them  is  all  knowledge."  When  explained,  this 
contrast  between  Hugh  and  William  sets  their  respective  mysticism  and 
naturalism  in  strong  relief.   See  Introduction,  sec.  11. 

13.  See  Didascalicon  i.ix.n.64. 

14.  See  Didascalicon  i.xi. 

15.  Quoted  from  Boethius  In  Porphyrium  dialogi  i.iii  {PL,  LXIV,  11C; 
CSEL,  XLVIII,  8). 

16.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  11.xxiv.13  or  from  Isidore's  source, 
Cassiodorus  Institutiones  n.iii.6  (Mynors,  p.  in;  Jones,  p.  160,  where,  how- 
ever, the  passage  is  incorrectly  translated). 

17.  See  n.  7. 

18.  At  the  basis  of  the  distinction  are  the  Greek  |xa67)ai<;,  knowledge,  and 
[i.aTaioT7]?,  vanity.  For  refs.  and  discussion,  see  Lynn  Thorndyke,  A.  History 
of  Magic  and  Experimental  Science,  II  (New  York:  Macmillan,  1929),  n,  n.  3  ; 
and  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  XI Ie  siecle,  p.  177,  n.  1.  To  the 
refs.  cited  in  these  sources,  add  Augustine  De  doctrina  Christiana  n.xxi,  where 
superstitious  mathematici  are  explicitly  named.  On  the  distinction  in  William 
of  Conches,  see  Heinrich  Flatten,  Die  Philosophie  des  Wilhelm  von  Conches 


(Coblenz:  Gorres-Druckerei,  1929),  p.  23  ;  and  in  Clarenbaldus  of  Arras,  see 
Wilhelm  Jansen,  Der  Kommentar  des  Clarenbaldus  von  Arras  ^u  Boethius  de 
Trinitate  ("Breslauer  Studien  zur  historischen  Theologie,"  III;  Breslau: 
Kommissionsverlag  Miiller  u.  SeifTert,  1926),  p.  38. 

19.  Quoted  from  Cassiodorus  Institutiones  11.  Praefatio.  4;  n.iii.6;  or 
11.iii.21  (Mynors,pp.  92,  in,  or  130;  Jones,  pp.  160  and  179,  where,  how- 
ever, the  passage  is  mistranslated).  Cf.  Isidore  Etjmologiae  11.xxiv.14;  and 
in.  Praefatio. 

20.  Quoted  from  Boethius  In  Porphjrium  dialogi  i.iii  (PL,,  LXIV,  11C; 
CSEL,  XLVIII,  8). 

21.  "quo  amittit"  in  both  Buttimer's  text  and  Migne's.  The  sense,  how- 
ever, requires  admittit  (ammittit). 

22.  "compositionis  rationem"   See  Didascalicon  i.i.n.i  3. 

23.  Cf.  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  i.xiv.7-9  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  540; 
Stahl,  pp.  143-4,  where,  however,  patrem  is  mistakenly  read  for  partem; 
translation  here  corrected):  "The  soul  acquires  that  part  to  which  it  gives  its 
attention,  and,  when  its  attention  little  by  little  retreats  toward  the  bodily 
structure,  the  soul,  itself  incorporeal,  degenerates.  ...Degenerating  toward 
lower  and  earthly  things,  it  discovers  that  the  weakness  of  perishable  bodies 
cannot  sustain  the  pure  divinity  of  mind."  Though  Macrobius  here  treats 
the  world  soul's  descent  from  contemplation  of  Nous  to  the  animation  of  the 
physical  universe,  Hugh,  as  before  with  passages  from  the  Timaeus  and  De 
consolatione  philosophiae  (see  Didascalicon  i.i.n.8,  10),  adapts  the  material  to  the 
human  soul  in  its  dual  relationship  to  the  divine  Mind  and  the  body.  Cf. 
In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV,  1 5  6C-7A),  and  Boethius  De  consola- 
tione philosophiae  "Human  souls  are  necessarily  more  free  when  they 
preserve  themselves  in  contemplating  the  divine  Mind,  less  so  when  they 
lapse  toward  the  bodily,  still  less  when  they  are  bound  down  by  earthly 

24.  Buttimer's  invisibiles  corporum  jormas  corrected  to  in  visibiles  corporum 
jormas,  as  required  by  sense. 

25.  With  this  chapter's  arithmological  conception  of  the  quaternarium 
animae,  clearly  attributed  by  Hugh  to  others  (see  concluding  sentence  of  this 
chapter:  "some  men  think"),  cf.  his  own  interpretation  of  the  quaternarium 
as  the  four  major  categories  of  the  arts  in  Didascalicon  i.xi,  an  interpretation 
also  found  in  his  earlier  Epitome  (Baron,  ed.,  p.  108):  "Ancient  authority 
defined  the  first  and  principal  parts  of  philosophy  as  four,  and  therefore 
ordained  that  the  number  'four'  be  venerated  in  an  oath;  from  this  'four' 
rises  the  shrine  of  Wisdom,  built  by  philosophy  in  the  recesses  of  the  rational 
soul,  and  every  building  is  obviously  constructed  with  a  four-sided  plan." 
Despite  the  reminiscence  of  Vitruvius  De  architectura  m.i  in  the  last  part  of 
the  statement  and  the  resemblances  to  Macrobius  and  others  indicated  in  the 
notes  to  this  chapter,  neither  the  Epitome's  "ancient  authority"  for  the  four- 
fold division  of  philosophy  nor  the  present  chapter's  "some  men,"  pro- 
ponents of  the  arithmological  interpretation  of  the  quaternarium,  can  be 
identified.  They  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  published  commentaries  of 
Dunchad,  John  the  Scot,  Remigius  of  Auxerre,  Bovo  of  Corvey,  Adalbold 



of  Utrecht,  or  William  of  Conches  on  the  Timaeus  or  De  consolatione  philo- 
sophiae,  nor  in  Hugh's  own  copy  of  the  Remigius  commentary  on  Martianus 
Capella  (Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS  Latin  14754).  Most  likely  source  would 
seem  to  be  an  as  yet  unknown  Carolingian  commentary  on  one  of  the  above, 
or  perhaps  more  likely,  on  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  i.v-vi,  which  treat 
the  numbers  of  the  Pythagorean  decade  and  cite  the  oath  to  which  Hugh 
refers,  or  i.ix-xiv,  which  treat  the  heavenly  origin,  descent  into  the  body, 
and  reascension  of  man's  soul,  sections  repeatedly  quoted  during  the  Middle 
Ages.  Ignoring  the  latter  section,  M.-D.  Chenu,  "Platon  a  Citeaux," 
AHDL,  XXI  (1954),  99-106,  suggests  only  Macrobius  i.v-vi  as  ultimate 
source  of  Hugh's  arithmology  and  calls  attention  to  the  use,  ca.  11 51,  of 
Didascalicon  11. iv  by  Nicholas  of  Clairvaux,  whose  interest  in  the  material, 
like  Hugh's,  he  characterizes  as  "a  la  faveur  et  pour  le  besoin  de  perceptions 
religieuses,"  in  contrast  to  the  Chartrian  interest  in  arithmology,  which  he 
calls  "une  studiosite  scolaire,  avec  le  caractere  objectif  et  technique  que 
procure  la  lecture  des  textes"  {ibid.,  p.  104).  Chartrian  arithmology,  while  it 
affords  certain  striking  parallels  with  the  present  chapter,  as  suggested  in  the 
notes  immediately  following,  is  concerned  not  with  man  but  with  the  world- 
soul  (as  in  William  of  Conches)  or  with  the  arithmetical  rationalization  of  the 
relations  of  Father  and  the  divine  Wisdom,  or  Son  (as  in  Thierry  of  Chartres). 
By  the  different  contexts  in  which  the  ideas  common  to  Hugh  and  the 
Chartrians  appear,  the  distinctiveness  of  the  Victorine  and  Chartrian  schools 
is  emphasized.  On  Hugh's  interpolation  of  this  chapter  on  the  soul  into  the 
discussion  of  mathematics,  cf.  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  1.  vi.  5  (Eyssen- 
hardt,  p.  496;  Stahl,  p.  100):  "wise  men  have  not  hesitated  to  proclaim... 
that  the  soul  is  a  number  moving  itself." 

26.  The  arithmetical  series  which,  in  this  and  the  following  chapter,  re- 
present the  progressions  of  soul  (1-3-9-27-8 1)  and  body  (2-4-8-16-32) 
suggest  extensions  of  the  so-called  lambda  diagram  commonly  found  in 

1  commentaries  on  the  Timaeus  3  5  A  ff.,  a  passage  which, 

23  as  interpreted  by  Macrobius  (Eyssenhardt,  p. 

4  9  495;  Stahl,  p.  99),  teaches  "that  God,  who  made  the 

8  27         world-soul,  intertwined  odd  and  even  in  its  makeup: 

that  is,  used  the  numbers  'two'  and  'three'  as  a  basis,  alternating  the  odd  and 
even  numbers  from  two  to  eight  and  from  three  to  twenty-seven."  The 
diagram  is  described  further  in  Macrobius  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  505; 
Stahl,  pp.  108-9)  and  Chalcidius  (Wrobel,  pp.  98-9;  Mullach,  p.  188);  it  is 
reproduced  by  William  of  Conches  in  his  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  (see 
Jeauneau,  "La  Notion  d'integumentum"  AHDL,  XXIV  [1957],  89),  where 
the  linear,  square,  and  cube  numbers  in  both  series  are  regarded  as  symbol- 
izing the  world-soul's  power  to  move  body  in  all  three  dimensions. 

27.  Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  35B  (see 
Jeauneau,  "La  Notion  dCintegumentum,"  AHDL,  XXIV  [1957],  89):  "The 
number  'one'  appears  in  the  composition  of  the  [world]  soul  in  order,  by  its 
own  indivisibleness,  to  symbolize  the  indivisibleness  of  the  soul's  essence." 
See  also  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  (Eyssenhardt,  pp.  496-7; 
Stahl,  pp.  100-1),  who,  referring  the  number  "one,"  or  monad,  primarily  to 


the  supreme  God  and  the  divine  Mind,  attributes  it  as  well  to  the  [world] 
soul,  "free  from  contamination  with  anything  material . .  .and  endowed  with 
a  simple  nature,"  and  man's  soul  {ibid.,  i.xii.5  [Eyssenhardt,  p.  531;  Stahl, 
p.  134]);  cf.  ibid.,  1. xii. 6  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  531;  Stahl,  p.  135):  "Souls,  whether 
of  the  world  or  of  the  individual,  will  be  found  to  be  now  unacquainted  with 
division  if  they  are  reflecting  on  the  singleness  of  their  divine  state,  and 
again  susceptible  to  it  when  that  singleness  is  being  dispersed  through  the 
parts  of  the  world  or  of  man."  Cf.  Boethius  De  imitate  et  uno  {PL,  LXIII, 
1075D  f.):  "'One'  descends  from  the  first  One  which  created  it.  ...For  the 
nearer  each  'one'  is  to  that  first  and  true  One,  the  more  one  and  simple  will 
be  the  matter  it  forms ;  conversely,  the  farther  it  is  from  that  first  One,  the 
more  multiplied  and  complex  it  will  be...  so  that  as  a  'one'  descends  from 
higher  to  lower,  degeneration  takes  place." 

28.  Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  Timaeus  (in  Jeauneau,  "La 
Notion  Rintegumentum"  AHDL,  XXIV  [1957],  90):  "Even  number,  which 
can  be  divided  into  two  equal  parts,  refers  to  dissoluble  things,  while  odd 
number,  which  cannot  be  divided  into  equal  parts,  refers  to  indissoluble 
things";  and  Thierry  of  Chartres  De  sex  dierum  operibus  xxx  (Haring,  ed., 
p.  194)  and  Librum  hunc  (Jansen,  ed.,  p.  12),  where  the  number  "two"  is  said 
to  be  the  principle  of  all  otherness  and  mutability  and  to  represent  matter, 
according  to  Plato  and  Pythagoras. 

29.  The  term  "monad"  is  found  in  Macrobius,  who,  applying  it  both  to 
the  world-soul  and  to  the  human  soul  (see  ref.  in  preceding  note),  declares 
further  {ibid.,  [Eyssenhardt,  p.  504;  Stahl,  p.  108])  that  the  number 
"three"  marks  the  three  divisions  of  soul  into  cupiditas,  animositas,  and  ratio. 
Cf.  Chalcidius  (Wrobel,  pp.  230-3;  Mullach,  pp.  220-1),  whose  cupiditas, 
iracundia,  and  ratio  are  closer  to  Hugh's  concupiscentia,  ira,  and  ratio.  Identical 
with  Hugh,  however,  in  terminology  and  in  transference  of  world-soul 
materials  to  man  is  Remigius  of  Auxerre,  commentary  on  De  consolatione 
philosophiae  in.m.ix  (Stewart,  p.  33;  Silvestre,  p.  61):  "This  smaller  world 

man],  then,  has  a  soul  of  threefold  nature.  It  is  wrathful,  concupiscible,  and 
rational — wrathful  that  it  may  be  filled  with  wrath  by  the  vices  and  pleasures 
of  the  body;  concupiscible  that  it  may  love  God  and  seek  the  virtues; 
rational  that  it  may  be  able  to  distinguish  between  Creator  and  creature,  good 
and  evil." 

30.  See  Didascalicon  11. xii. 

31.  Cf.  Hugh's  exegesis  of  Eccl.  1:13  in  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL, 
CLXXV,  155D,  156C-7A):  "Because  the  sons  of  men  were  unwilling  to 
stand  fast  in  the  Truth,  they  now  become  distended  and  divided  into  a 
multiplicity  of  parts  and  occupied  with  vanity.  . . .  For  since  the  mind  of  man 
would  not  remain  in  that  one  Good  in  whom  it  could  rest  happily  and 
possess  the  fulness  of  the  highest  Truth  without  being  pulled  asunder  and 
without  dissipation,  it  was  cast  outside  itself  and  scattered  abroad  upon  the 
multiplicity  of  visible  things." 

32.  Cf.  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  i.xii.17  (Eyssenhardt,  p.  538; 
Stahl,  p.  137):  "Be  not  disturbed  that  in  reference  to  the  soul,  which  we  say 
is  immortal,  we  so  often  use  the  term  'death'...  for  when  it  has  rid  itself 


completely  of  all  taint  of  evil  and  has  deserved  to  be  sublimated,  it  again 
leaves  the  body  and,  fully  recovering  its  former  state,  returns  to  the  splendor 
of  everlasting  life." 

33.  Ps.  89: 10. 

34.  See  Didascalicon  i.xi.n.79. 

35.  See  n.  28. 

36.  Ibid. 

3  7.  Cf.  De  unione  corporis  et  spiritus  {PL,  CLXXVII,  287B  ff.),  where  Hugh 
explains  that  the  forms  of  sensible  things,  drawn  into  the  eyes  by  the  rays  of 
vision  and  passing  through  the  seven  tunicae  and  three  humor es  of  the  eyes, 
enter  the  cerebrum,  or  cella  phantastica,  of  the  brain,  where  they  become 
imaginationes.  The  other  senses,  similarly  "informed"  by  physical  objects, 
introduce  the  forms  of  those  objects  "by  hidden  channels"  into  the  cella 
phantastica.  The  imaginationes  so  formed  are  purely  corporeal  and  are  possess- 
ed by  brute  animals  as  well  as  man.  In  man,  however,  passing  into  the  middle 
part  of  the  brain,  they  are  sufficiently  purified  and  spiritualized  by  the  reason 
to  "touch  the  very  substance  of  the  rational  soul."  Reason,  like  a  light, 
makes  clear  and  well  defined  what  an  "imagination"  presents  to  it;  an 
"imagination,"  on  the  other  hand,  darkens  and  cloaks  the  reason — "insofar 
as  it  comes  upon  it,  it  clouds,  and  overshadows,  and  enwraps,  and  covers 
over  the  reason."  If  reason  merely  contemplates  its  "imaginations"  in  order 
to  form  knowledge  {scientid)  from  them,  it  wears  them  like  garments  easily 
cast  off.  If,  however,  it  clings  to  them  with  love,  then  they  adhere  to  it  like  a 
skin  which  cannot  be  stripped  off  without  pain,  so  that  even  souls  separated 
from  the  body  can  be  held  in  the  grip  of  corporeal  impressions  {passiones) 
because  not  yet  cleansed  from  affection  for  them.  But  the  primary  movement 
of  the  reason  should  be  upward  toward  God,  who,  working  along  with  the 
reason  and  informing  it  from  above  and  within,  produces  understanding 
within  it,  in  contrast  with  "imaginations,"  which,  informing  the  reason 
from  below  and  without,  produce  knowledge.  To  the  physiology  of  sense 
perception,  emanating  from  Constantine  the  African  and  found  also,  e.g., 
in  William  of  Conches  Philosophia  mundi  1  v.xxiv-xxvi  {PL,  CLXXII,  9  5  A- 
6C),  Hugh  characteristically  adds  the  concluding  emphasis  on  the  upward 
orientation  of  the  reason  toward  God.  For  identification  of  "knowledge" 
with  the  mechanical  arts  and  "understanding"  with  the  theoretical  and 
practical  arts,  see  Didascalicon  i.viii.  n.  57. 

38.  Compare  this  entire  chapter  with  Boethius  De  arithmetica  i.i  {PL, 
LXIII,  esp.  1081A-B),  with  which  it  has  many  verbal  parallels. 

39.  Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  De  consolatione  philosophiae  (Jourdain,  "Commentaires  inedits,"  p.  73)  for  a  closely  comparable 
discussion  of  the  four  branches  of  mathematics.  It  is  characteristic  that 
William's  discussion  of  mathematics  should  be  interpolated  into  a  literary 
commentary,  while  Hugh's  appears  in  a  textbook  on  the  arts. 

40.  See  Cora  E.  Lutz,  ed.,  Iohannis  Scotti  Annotations  in  Marcianum 
(Cambridge,  Mass.:  Mediaeval  Academy  of  America,  1939),  pp.  89,  152,  for 
translation  of  apy]?  as  virtus  and  'pu0[i.6?  as  numerus.  Cf.  William  of  Conches' 
commentary  on  De  consolatione  philosophiae  (Jourdain,  "Commentaires 


inedits,"  p.  73):  "arithmetic  treats  multitude  in  itself,  that  is,  the  power  of 

41.  Cf.  Boethius  De  arithmetica  i.ii  {PL,  LXIII,  1083B):  "Whatever 
things  were  constructed  by  the  primeval  Nature  of  things  were  formed 
according  to  the  pattern  of  numbers.  For  this  was  the  principal  exemplar  in 
the  Mind  of  the  Creator."  Cf.  Thierry  of  Chartres  De  sex  dierum  operibus 
xxxvi  (Haring,  ed.,  p.  196):  "But  the  creation  of  numbers  is  the  creation  of 
things" ;  and  xliii  {ibid.,  p.  198) :  "Just  as  all  things  derive  their  existence  from 
the  One,  so  from  the  One  Equal  to  the  One  [the  divine  Mind  or  Wisdom] 
proceed  the  form,  mode,  and  measure  of  each  thing.  . . .  Therefore,  as  the 
One  Equal  to  the  One  contains  within  himself  and  generates  from  himself 
the  ideas  of  all  things,  so  does  he  contain  within  himself  and  bring  forth 
from  himself  the  very  forms  of  all  things . . .  [together  with]  all  proportions 
and  inequalities.  And  all  things  resolve  themselves  into  him."  Cf.  Haring's 
discussion  of  the  passage  and  speculation  on  its  relation  to  a  possible  medie- 
val translation  of  Plato's  Parmenides  {ibid.,  pp.  160-9). 

42.  Cf.  Georgius  Henricus  Bode,  ed.,  Scriptores  rerum  mythicarum  latini  tres 
(Cellis,  1834),  p.  213:  "Sane  moys  Graece  aqua  dicitur;  inde  Musa  quasi 
aquatica.  Aer  enim  per  arterias  canentis  egrediens,  humore  aspergitur,  nee 
umquam  per  gutturis  fistulam  nisi  humoris  adjutorio  canitur.  Secundum 
Varronem  etiam  ipsae  sunt  Musae  quae  et  Nymphae;  nee,  ut  ait  Servius, 
immerito.  Nam  aquae,  inquit,  sonus  musicen  efficit,  ut  in  hydraulis,  id  est 
aquaticis  organis,  videmus."  Completely  different  derivation  of  "music"  in 
Cassiodorus  Institutiones  11. v.  1  (Mynors,  p.  142;  Jones,  pp.  189-90)  and 
Isidore  Etymologiae  iii.xv.i. 

43.  Entire  chapter  related  to  Cassiodorus  Institutiones  (Mynors 
pp.  1 50-1;  Jones,  pp.  197-8),  or  Isidore  Etymologiae  m.x.1-3. 

44.  Cf.  Isidore  Etymologiae  m.xxvii,  which,  however,  is  too  brief  to  be  the 
source  of  Hugh's  chapter.  Same  distinction  between  the  natural  and  super- 
stitious aspects  of  astrology  in  Abaelard  Expositio  in  Hexaemeron  (Victor 
Cousin,  ed.,  Petri  Abaelardi  opera,  I  [Paris,  1849],  649-51).  Cf.  Augustine 
De  diversis  quaestionibus,  "Contra  mathematicos"  {PL,  XL,  28D-9A). 

45.  Cf.  the  distinction  between  true  and  superstitious  mathematics  in 
Didascalicon  n.iii;  see  also  i.viii,  where  Hugh  attributes  to  "mathematicians" 
the  distinction  between  superlunary  and  sublunary  worlds. 

46.  The  terminology  of  this  chapter  is  explained  and  illustrated  briefly  in 
Isidore  Etymologiae  v.i-viii,  and  in  detail  in  Boethius  De  arithmetica  i.iii-xvii 
{PL,  LXIII,  1083-96). 

47.  Entire  chapter  digested  from  Boethius  De  musica  i.ii  {PL,  LXIII, 
1171D  f.)  Adelard  of  Bath  seems  to  have  drawn  on  the  same  source  in  the 
De  eodem  et  diverso  (Willner,  ed.,  p.  27). 

48.  Lucan  Pharsalia  11. 3 84-7.  Cf.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV, 
1 5  7B-C),  where  inordinate  concern  with  supplying  the  needs  of  this  life, 
identified  with  the  "evil"  of  Matt.  6:34  ("Sufficient  for  the  day  is  the  evil 
thereof")  and  associated,  therefore,  with  the  vain  solicitudes  for  food,  drink, 
and  clothing  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  is  said  to  be  second  only  to  in- 
ordinate zeal  for  knowledge  as  an  occupatio,  that  is,  "a  distraction  and  binding 


down  of  minds,  diverting,  dissipating,  and  trapping  souls,  so  that  they  can- 
not think  the  things  of  salvation." 

49.  See  n.  29. 

50.  Eph.  5 129. 

j  1.  Quoted,  with  slight  changes,  from  Boethius  De  musica  i.xxxiv  (PL, 
LXIII,  1196B). 

52.  The  chapter  is  digested  from  the  praenotanda  of  Hugh's  Practica 
geometriae  (Baron,  ed.,  pp.  187-8). 

53.  The  allusion  to  the  ball  and  egg  in  connection  with  cosmimetry, 
missing  from  the  Practica  geometriae,  suggests  the  comparison  of  the  universe 
to  a  ball  and  egg  found,  e.g.,  in  Honorius  Augustodunensis  De  imagine 
mundi  i.i  (PL,  CLXXII,  121  A),  but  also  in  Hildegarde  of  Bingen  and 
William  of  Conches  and  deriving  from  Macrobius  Saturnalia  vii,  though  in 
William  of  Conches,  from  Arabic  tradition  as  well.  The  details  which  link 
William  to  Arabic  tradition  are  missing  from  Hugh. 

5  4.  The  reference  is  to  the  reputed  origin  of  geometry  in  Egypt,  where 
periodic  inundations  of  the  Nile  required  continual  remeasurement  of  fields. 

55.  "fons  sensuum  et  origo  dictionum"  The  phrase,  though  attested  to 
in  its  present  position  by  the  authority  of  all  MSS  of  the  Didascalicon,  is 
actually  part  of  the  traditional  definition  of  topica.  Cf.  Cassiodorus  Instituti- 
0#£.rii.iii.i4(Mynors,  p.  124;  Jones,  p.  172):  "Nunc  ad  topica  veniamus,  quae 
sunt  argumentorum  sedes,  fontes  sensuum,  [et]  origines  dictionum";  re- 
produced in  Isidore  Etymologiae  11.xxix.16.  Application  of  this  phrase  to 
geometry  may  be  related  to  the  view  of  mathematics,  geometry  in  particular, 
as  concerned  with  visible  form,  and  to  the  view  that  form,  in  turn,  is  the 
source  of  a  thing's  species  or  genus  and  name.  See  n.  41.  Cf.  Richard  of  St. 
Victor  Excerptiones  priores  i.viii  (PL,  CLXXVII,  197A):  "Arithmetic  treats 
the  visible  forms  of  visible  objects.  . . .  But  every  visible  form  is  quantitative- 
ely  determined,"  and  Cassiodorus  Institutiones  ii.v.i  1  (Mynors,  p.  1 50;  Jones, 
p.  197),  where  the  Holy  Trinity  is  said  to  employ  geometry  in  granting 
various  species  and  forms  to  creatures. 

56.  Vergil  Georgica  11.479  &  Muller,  ed.,  Adelard  of  Bath  Quaestiones 
naturales,  p.  89,  apparently  ignoring  the  Vergilian  source  of  these  lines 
and  pointing  out  that  they  read  like  a  table  of  contents  for  Adelard's 
work,  concludes  that  Hugh  has  read  and  is  here  summarizing  the.  Quaestiones 

5  7.  Boethius  In  Porphyrium  dialogi  n.iii  (PL,  LXIV,  1  iC;  CSEL,  XLVIII, 
8).  On  physis  as  nature,  cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  De  consol- 
atione  philosophiae  (Jourdain,  ed.  "Commentaires  inedits,"  p.  73):  "Physics 
treats  the  properties  and  qualities  of  bodies,  whence  it  is  called  physics,  that 
is,  natural";  cf.  his  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  (PL,  CLXXII,  247): 
"Physics  treats  the  natures  and  complexions  of  bodies,  for  'physis'  means 

58.  The  division  of  philosophy  into  physics,  ethics,  and  logic,  attributed 
by  Augustine  to  Plato,  was  commonly  accepted  before  the  twelfth  century 
on  the  authority  of  Augustine.    See  Introduction,  ii. 

59.  On  the  mind's  formal,  not  physical,  inclusion  of  reality,  see  Didascali- 


con  i.i;  on  the  reason's  formation  of  knowledge  from  sense  perception  of 
things,  and  on  "understanding"  as  formed,  not  from  sense  perception  of 
things,  but  from  above  and  within,  see  ibid,  n.v.n.37. 

60.  Cf.  Adelard  of  Bath  Quaestiones  naturaks  i  (Miiller,  ed.,  p.  6);  also 
William  of  Conches  De  philosophia  miindi  i.xxi  {PL,  CLXXII,  48D),  where, 
against  the  ignorant  who  cite  philosophers  to  maintain  "that  the  elements 
are  properties  and  qualities  of  things  we  see,"  William  cites  Constantinus 
Afer,  a  physicist,  "according  to  whom  none  of  those  four  we  see,  and  which 
some  persons  think  are  elements,  is  an  element — not  earth,  not  water,  not  air, 
not  fire." 

61.  Hugh's  effort,  throughout  this  chapter,  is  to  establish  the  necessary 
interrelationship  of  logic,  mathematics,  and  physics  as  dealing,  all  of  them, 
with  things  (res),  though  on  different  levels — physics  dealing  with  actualities 
as  analyzable  into  elements,  mathematics  dealing  with  arithmetical  concepts 
abstracted  from  actual  entities,  logic  dealing  with  concepts  on  the  totally 
abstract  level  of  understanding  or  on  the  lower  level  of  knowledge.  On  the 
distinction  between  res  and  verba  as  applied  by  the  Chartrians,  especially 
William  of  Conches,  to  exclude  the  logical  arts  from  philosophy,  see  Pare, 
Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  p.  103,  n.  1,  and  pp.  194-7. 

62.  Instead  of  "philological"  one  would  expect  "physiological"  in  the 
sense  defined  in  n.xvi.  Richard  of  St.  Victor,  excerpting  the  present  chapter, 
writes  physiologiam,  not  philologiam  [Excerptiones  prior es  i.vii  [PL,  CLXXVII, 
197A]).  "Philological,"  however,  has  the  support  of  all  MSS,  and  that  the 
term  was  used  for  physics  appears  from  Dunchad's  commentary  on  Marti- 
anus  (Cora  E.  Lutz,  ed.,  Glossae  in  Martianum  [Lancaster,  Pa. :  Lancaster 
Press,  Inc.,  1944],  p.  13):  "Phylologia  vero  inferior  intelligentia  per  quam 
intelligimus  res  visibiles  et  invisibiles  significatur. " 

63.  Cf.  Remigius  of  Auxerre's  commentary  on  Martianus  Capella 
(Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS  Latin  14754,  fol.  3r):  "Pallas,  id  est  Tritonia. 
...Tritonia  dicta  quasi  trito  nota  noticia.  Scire  videlicet  deum,  animam, 
corpoream  creaturam."  John  the  Scot  on  Martianus  (Lutz,  ed.,  p.  11)  has  a 
comparable  gloss  but  assigns  the  threefold  knowledge  to  the  three  parts  of 
rational  nature,  "  dacr07)cri<;,  Xoyo?,  vou?,  hoc  est  sensus,  ratio,  animus."  Cf. 
William  of  Conches,  who,  drawing  upon  Fulgentius  (see  Fabii  Planciadis 
[Fu/geniii]  opera,  Rudolfus  Helm,  ed.,  [Leipzig:  B.  C.  Teubner,  1898], 
pp.  36-9),  associates  the  interpretation  of  Pallas  as  the  theoretical  arts  with 
the  myth  of  the  judgment  of  Paris:  "  the  fables  one  finds  that  three 
goddesses,  Juno,  Pallas,  and  Venus,  sought  to  discover  from  the  judgment 
of  Paris  which  of  them  was  the  worthiest.  . . .  The  fable  concerns  nothing 
other  than  the  three  kinds  of  life:  the  theoretical  or  contemplative,  the 
practical  or  active,  and  the  philargic  or  sensual.  Pallas  stands  for  the  con- 
templative, Juno  for  the  active,  Venus  for  the  sensual.  This  can  be  proved 
by  the  gifts  the  goddesses  promised  Paris.  Pallas  promised  him  wisdom, 
because  by  contemplation  does  a  man  become  wise."  Cited  in  Jeauneau, 
"Notion  dLtntegumentum"  AHDL,  XXIV  (1957),  52. 

64.  With  the  restriction  of  wisdom  to  arts  studying  the  truth  of  things 


(res),  see  Appendix  A,  where  Hugh,  quoting  Boethius  De  arithmetica  i.i, 
defines  wisdom  as  "the  comprehension  of  things  as  they  exist."  The  present 
exclusion  of  logic,  ethics,  and  mechanics  from  wisdom  is  at  variance  with 
Didascalkon  n.xvii,  where  Hugh  associates  logic  with  mathematics  and 
physics  as  concerned,  though  on  different  levels,  with  things,  and  with 
Didascalicon  i.viii,  where  Hugh,  arguing  from  premises  carefully  laid  down 
in  earlier  chapters  of  Bk.  1,  demonstrates  that  both  practical  and  mechanical 
arts  must  be  taken  as  parts  of  wisdom.  In  the  Epitome  (Baron,  ed.,  pp.  1 1 5— 
6),  Hugh  rejects  the  view  which  "by  too  severe  a  test"  excludes  logic  and 
the  mechanical  arts  from  philosophy ;  he  argues  that  logic  and  the  mechanical 
arts  are  proper  parts,  though  admittedly  not  the  first  parts,  of  philosophy. 
See  Introduction,  ii. 

65.  Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the  De  consolatione philosophiae 
(Jourdain,  "Commentaires  inedits,"  p.  73):  "Economics  teaches  how  each 
man  should  manage  his  own  family,  whence  it  is  called  'economics'  or 
managerial,  for  an  economicus  is  a  manager.  Politics  concerns  the  governance 
of  a  state,  for  polis  is  a  civitas,  or  state." 

66.  Quoted,  with  slight  changes,  from  Boethius  In  Porphyrium  dialogi  i.iii 
{PL,  LXIV,  nDf.;  CSEL,  XLVIII,  8). 

67.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  11.xxiv.16,  or  from  Isidore's  source, 
Cassiodorus  Institutiones  n.iii.7  (Mynors,  p.  112;  Jones,  p.  161). 

68.  Cf.  the  hrano  revision  of  William  of  Conches  De  philosophia  mundi 
(Ottaviano,  ed.,  p.  34) :  "It  is  to  be  noted  that  as  in  the  liberal  arts  there  is  the 
trivium  concerned  with  eloquence  and  the  quadrivium  concerned  with 
wisdom,  so  in  the  mechanical  arts,  the  first  three  are  called  a  trivium  because 
they  pertain  to  extrinsic  goods — to  fabric  making,  armament,  and  commerce ; 
while  four  are  a  quadrivium  because  related  to  internal  remedies  or  foods. 
It  is  asked  how  dramatics  pertains  to  interior  things.  Two  things  are 
vitally  necessary  to  man . . .  movement  to  keep  the  mind  from  languishing, 
joy  to  keep  the  body  from  exhaustion  by  too  much  work.  So,  plays  and 
diversions  were  established " 

69.  Cf.  John  the  Scot  on  Martianus  (Lutz,  ed.,  p.  74):  "After  Mercury 
gives  her  the  seven  liberal  arts,  then  the  virgin  gives  him  the  seven  mechan- 
ical arts."   Cf.  also  ibid.,  p.  59. 

70.  Quoted  from  Cicero  De  inventione  i.iv.5. 

71.  Quoted  from  Augustine  Enarrationes  in  psalmos  Ps.  67:39  (PL, 
XXXVI,  836D). 

72.  So  Remigius  of  Auxerre  on  Martianus  Capella  (Bibliotheque  Natio- 
nale,  MS  14754,  fol.  ir):  "Mercurius  dictus  est  quasi...  mercatorum  kyrios, 
id  est  dominus,  quia  sermo  maxime  inter  mercatores  viget.  . . .  Mercurius  in 
similitudine  facundie  et  sermonis."  Cf.  Dunchad  on  Martianus  (Lutz,  ed., 
p.  5).  The  third  Vatican  mythographer,  drawing  on  Fulgentius,  supplies  a 
variant  etymology  (Bode,  Scriptores  rerum  mythicarum,  pp.  214-5):  "Fulgen- 
tius Mercurium  negotiis  praeesse  dicit;  ideo  Mercurium  dictum  quasi 
merces  curantem,  quod  negotiatores,  quibus  praeest,  mercibus  semper  in- 
vigilent;  sive  ab   'Ep[iY)<;  Graeco,   quod  disserere  interpretatur,  eo  quod 


negotiatori  maxime  linguarum  dissertio  sit  necessaria."    Cf.  Helm,  Fabii 
Planciadis  [Fulgentii]  opera,  pp.  29-30. 

73 .  Cf.  the  third  Vatican  mythographer  (Bode,  Scrip  tores  rerum  mythicarum, 
p.  215),  where  medius  currens,  alternate  etymology  for  Mercurius,  supplies 
pacific  symbolism  for  Mercury's  caduceus:  "Ideo  serpentibus  innexam  et 
caduceum  dictum,  quod  rhetoris  sermo  inter  venenosas  adversariorum 
litigationes  medius  currens,  omnem  rixam  cadere  cogat,  eosque  sibi  adinvicem 
reconciliet.   Nam  bellantes  disertorum  oratione  sedantur." 

74.  The  following  paragraph  adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  xx.iii. 

75.  The  phrase  is  the  incipit  of  the  Isagoge  Joannitii  ad  Tegni  Galiegni  (see 
Articella  [Venice:  Baptista  de  Tortes,  1487],  fol.  2r-a),  which  supplies  the 
often  widely  separated  excerpts  joined  in  this  chapter.  Thus,  the  "two  parts" 
of  the  incipit  refer  in  the  original  to  theorica  etpractica,  but  Hugh,  telescoping 
the  intervening  material,  makes  them  refer  to  "occasions"  and  operations. 
On  Johannitius  and  the  Tegni  of  Galen  in  particular,  see,  e.g.,  Pierre  Duhem, 
he  Systeme  du  monde,  III  (Paris,  191 6),  88-9,  and  C.  H.  Haskins,  Studies  in  the 
History  of  Mediaeval  Science  (Cambridge,  Mass. :  Harvard  University  Press, 
1927),  p.  374,  n.  18,  and  refs.  there  cited. 

76.  Isagoge  Joannitii  {Articella,  fol.  3va:  "Occasiones...  aut  faciunt 
sanitatem  aut  conservant.  modi  sunt:  quorum  unus  est  aer  qui 
humanum  corpus  circumdat,  cibus  et  potus,  motus  et  quies,  somnus  et 
vigiliae,  inanitio  et  repletio,  et  accidentia  animae." 

77.  Ibid.,  fol.  3r_a:  "Sunt  quaedam  accidentia  animae  quae...  commovent 
naturalem  calorem . . .  aut  impetuose  ut  ira . . .  aut  leviter  cum  suavitate,  ut 
deliciae  et  gaudium.  Sunt  alia  quae . . .  contrahunt  et  celant  aut  impetuose 
ut  terror  vel  timor,  aut  leviter  ut  angustia,  et  sunt  quae  commovent  natura- 
lem virtutem  intus  et  extra,  ut  est  tristitia." 

78.  Ibid.,  fo.  4v"a:  "Operatio  medicinae  habet  triplicem  effectum:  intus 
ut  ea  quae  ore  aut  naribus,  auribus,  sive  ano  sive  vulva  intromittamus ; 

fores  ut  epithima,  cataplasma,  emplaustra,  et  similia,  quae  foris  operantur 

Cyrurgia  duplex  est:  in  carne  et  in  osse:  in  carne  ut  incidere,  suere,  coquere; 
in  osse  ut  solidare  aut  innectere  aut  reddere." 

79.  With  Hugh's  favorable  attitude  toward  theatrica,  perhaps  not  un- 
connected with  the  rise  of  liturgical  drama  in  the  twelfth  century,  cf.  the  shift 
in  the  late  thirteenth-century  view  of  Robert  Kilwardby,  who,  otherwise 
importantly  influenced  by  Hugh,  condemns  theatrica  as  unsuitable  for 
believers;  see  Kilwardby 's  De  ortu  et  divisione  philosophiae  xi,  as  outlined 
in  Baur,  Gundissalinus,  p.  373. 

80.  Cf.  Isidore  Etymologiae  i.v.i. 

81.  Cf.  the  brano  revision  of  William  of  Conches  De  philosophia  mundi 
(Ottaviano,  ed.,  p.  28):  "These  three  [grammar,  the  theory  of  argument,  and 
rhetoric]  are  the  appendages  and  instruments  of  philosophy,  and  therefore 
are  not  part  of  philosophy  itself  but  are  oriented  toward  it.  Boethius, 
however,  seems  to  say  that  logic  is  both  instrument  and  part,  so  that  nothing 
stands  in  the  way  of  the  opinion  of  certain  persons  that  logic  is  contained  in 
philosophy."  Cf.  Boethius  Commentaria  in  Porphyrium  a  se  translatum  i.ii-iii 
(PL,  LXIV,  73B-75A;  CSEL,  XLVIII,  138-43). 


82.  Probably  the  Ars  minor,  a  brief  dialogue  on  the  eight  parts  of  speech, 
generally  memorized  by  medieval  students.  Text  in  Keil,  IV  Grammatici 
latini,  355-66. 

83.  Probably  his  commentary  on  Donatus  is  meant.  See  Keil,  ibid., 
pp.  405-48, 

84.  Keil  prints  these  two  opuscula,  ibid.,  Ill,  519-28  and  459-515.  The 
first  is  not  actually  Priscian's  (ibid.,  pp.  400-10,  for  discussion  of  authorship), 
the  second  only  partially  his  (ibid.,  p.  398).  Note  that  Hugh  makes  no 
mention  of  Priscian's  lengthy  and  detailed  Institutionum  grammaticarum  libri 
XVIII  (ibid.,  II  and  III),  which  was  studied  at  Chartres  and  embodied 
verbatim  in  Thierry  of  Chartres'  Heptateuchon.  In  De  philosophia  mundi  iv.xli 
(PL,  CLXXII,  100D  f.)  William  of  Conches  announces  his  intention  to 
comment  on  Priscian ;  commentary  contained,  according  to  Parent  (Doctrine 
de  la  creation,  p.  117),  in  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS  Latin  14065 .  On  the  use 
of  Priscian  (and  Donatus)  in  the  twelfth  century,  see  C.  H.  Haskins,  The 
Renaissance  of  the  Twelfth  Century  (Cambridge,  Mass. :  Harvard  University 
Press,  1927),  pp.  129-31,  and  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle 
siecle,  pp.  1 5 1-2  and  notes.  Hugh,  unwilling  to  allow  students  a  protracted 
concern  with  one  or  a  few  arts,  prepared  a  compendium  of  grammar;  see 
Jean  Leclercq,  ed.,  "Le  'De  grammatica'  de  Hugues  de  Saint- Victor," 
AHDL,  XV  (1943-5),  263-322. 

8  5 .  The  third  part  of  Donatus  Ars  major  (Keil,  IV  Grammatici  latini,  392- 
402),  deriving  its  title  from  the  incipit  of  that  part. 

86.  See  Etymologiae  1. 

87.  Cf.  Didascalicon  i.xi.  par.  3.  Hugh's  division  of  "linguistic  logic,"  the 
fourth  part  of  philosophy,  derives  from  the  double  sense  of  logos  as  word  or 
reason  and  is  as  follows : 


<  demonstration 

/  dialectic 

rational,  or  argumen-       £ —  probable  argument  <^f 
tative,  logic;  also  called    \  ^rhetoric 

the  theory  of  argument  sophistic 

The  terms  "genus"  and  "species,"  which  tend  to  be  restricted  in  modern 
times  to  biological  classifications,  are  quite  properly  used  by  Hugh  to  name 
class  and  sub-class  in  any  order  of  being.  Thus,  linguistic  logic  stands  as 
genus,  or  class,  to  grammar  and  rational  logic,  its  species  or  sub-classes; 
rational  logic  stands  as  genus,  or  class,  to  demonstration,  probable  argument, 
and  sophistic,  its  species  or  sub-classes.  By  "divisive  part"  Hugh  means  a 
separable  part,  like  the  limbs  of  a  body;  by  "integral  part"  he  means  an 
inseparable  constituent  found  throughout  the  whole,  like  soul  and  body, 
which  comprise  the  whole  of  a  living  man  and  cannot  be  separated  without 
loss  of  existence  to  the  whole  as  such. 

88.  Hugh's  problem  in  this  and  the  next  two  paragraphs  is  to  determine 
the  precise  sense  in  which  invention  and  judgment,  as  treated,  e.g.,  in  Cicero 
De  inventione  and  Aristotle  De  interpretatione  (translated  into  Latin  and  twice 


commented  upon  by  Boethius),  are  included  in  philosophy.  He  concludes 
that  these  two  studies  are  "integral  parts,"  but  not  "divisive  parts,"  of 
philosophy.  See  preceding  footnote  for  meaning  of  these  terms.  On  in- 
vention and  judgment  as  parts  of  logic,  see  also  Boethius  Commentaria  in 
Porphyrium  a  se  translatum  i.ii  {PL,  LXIV,  73 B;  CSEL,  XL VIII,  139);  In 
Topica  Ciceronis  commentaria  1  {PL,  LXIV,  1044C);  Cicero  Topica  11. vi; 
Abaelard  Logica  ingredientibus{B.  Geyer,  ed.,  "Peter  Abaelards  philosophische 
Schriften,"  BGPM,  XXI  [1919-33],  1-3)-  Division  of  logic  into  demonstra- 
tion, probable  argument,  and  sophistic,  in  John  of  Salisbury  Metalogicon 
n.iii  (Webb,  pp.  64-5 ;  McGarry,  p.  79).  On  the  term  ratio  disserendi,  here 
translated  "theory  of  argument,"  see  Cicero  De  fato  i.i. 


1.  Cf.  Augustine  De  civitate  Dei  xvm.xiv  and  xxxvii,  where  Linus  is 
listed  with  Orpheus  and  Musaeus  as  a  theologian-poet  among  the  Greeks. 
He  is  mentioned  with  Homer  and  Vergil  in  Martianus  Capella  De  nuptiis 
philologiae  et  Mercurii  n.ccxii  (Adolphus  Dick,  ed.  [Leipzig:  B.  G.  Teubner, 

1925],  p.  78),  and  is  identified  with  Homer  by  Dunchad  commenting  on 
Martianus  (Lutz,  ed.,  p.  12).  On  the  meaning  of  "theologus"  and  "theo- 
logia"  in  this  context,  see  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  XII 
siecle,  pp.  308-9,  n.  3  ;  cf.  Isidore  Etymologiae,  vin.vii.9.  On  Hugh's 
euhemerism  throughout  the  chapter,  cf.  Augustine  De  consensu  evangelistarum 
i.xxiii.32  {PL,  XXXIV,  1056-7),  who  explains  the  teaching  of  Euhemerus 
and  reports  Cicero's  discussion  of  euhemerism  in  De  natura  deorutn  1. 

2.  Cf.  Augustine  De  civitate  Dei  vi.ii. 

3.  See  Maieul  Cappuyns,  Jean  Scot  Erigene,  sa  vie,  son  oeuvre,  sa  pensee 
(Louvain:  Abbaye  de  Mont  Cesare,  1933),  p.  71,  n.  2,  for  identification  of 
this  work  as  the  first  part  of  John  the  Scot's  De  divisione  naturae,  where  the 
applicability  to  God  of  the  Aristotelian  categories  is  examined. 

4.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  n.xxiv.4. 

5 .  Pliny's  Historia  naturalis  is  meant. 

6.  Quoted  from  Remigius  on  Martianus  Capella  (Bibliotheque  Nationale, 
MS  Latin  14754,  fol.  i8r:  "Hie  enim  arithmeticae  repertor  fuit."  Cf.  John 
the  Scot  on  Martianus  (Lutz,  ed.,  pp.  57,  74)  and  Isidore  Etymologiae  in.ii.i. 

7.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  m.i.  1 ;  cf.  Cassiodorus  Institutiones 
ii.iv.7  (Mynors,  p.  140;  Jones,  p.  187). 

8.  On  the  "Matentetradem,"  cf.  Remigius  on  Martianus  Capella,  Biblio- 
theque Nationale,  MS  14754,  fol.  i8r:  "Qui  [Pythagoras]  non  tacuit  mathen 
tetradem,  id  est  doctrinam  quaternariam.  Omnis  enim  doctrinae  perfectio  in 
iiii  artibus  continetur,  Arithmetica,  Geometria,  musica,  astronomia.  Hoc 
est  illud  quadruvium  [sic]  sine  quo  nulli  proponitur  philosophandum." 
Cf.  Martianus  Capella  De  nuptiis  n.cvii  (Dick,  ed.,  p.  44)  and  John  the  Scot's 
gloss  (Lutz,  ed.,  p.  5  7).  That  an  actual  book  with  this  title  existed  in  Hugh's 
time  is  suggested  not  only  by  Hugh's  statement  but  by  the  "Liber  Hermetis 
Mercurii  Triplicis  de  VI  rerum  principiis,"  Silverstein,  ed.,  AHDL,  XXII 


(1955),  217-302;  see  esp.  p.  268,  and  Silverstein's  discussion,  pp.  224-5. 
It  is  possible,  however,  that  the  anonymous  author  of  the  "Liber  Hermetis" 
is  merely  drawing  on  Hugh's  statements  in  the  Didascalicon,  and  that  Hugh 
is  making  a  mistaken  inference  from  Remigius.   See  Didascalicon  i.vii.  n.  5  2, 

53>  55- 

9.  Cf.  Remigius  on  Martianus  Capella  (Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS  Latin 
14754,  fol.  i7r"v):  "Pytagoras  [sic]  namque  .y.  litteram  ad  similitudinem 
humanae  vitae  adinvenit.  ...Nam  .y.  litteram  ab  una  virgula  incipit  et  in 
quoddam  bivium  finditur;  sic  et  natura  humana  in  puericia  simplex  est  nee 
facile  apparet  an  bonum  an  malum  item  apprehendat.  In  adolescentia  vero 
iam  aut  virtutes  eligit  que  per  dextram  virgulam  breviorem  et  angustiorem 
significantur,  aut  ad  vitia  deflectit  quae  notantur  per  sinistram  virgulam 
latiorem."  Briefer  ref.  to  this  figure  in  Isidore  Etymologiae  i.iii.7. 

10.  See  Paul  E.  Beichner,  The  Medieval  Representative  of  Music,  Jubal  or 
Tubalcain?  ("Texts  and  Studies  in  the  History  of  Mediaeval  Education,"  A. 
L.  Gabriel  and  J.  N.  Garvin,  ed.,  II;  Notre  Dame,  Ind. :  The  Mediaeval  In- 
stitute, 1954). 

11.  Cf.  Isidore  Etymologiae  m.xvi.i,  xxii.6. 

12.  Cf.  Cassiodorus  Institutiones  (Mynors,  p.  152;  Jones,  p.  198); 
for  Boethius's  translation,  see  PL,  LXIII,  1307  ff. 

13.  See  n.  34. 

14.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  iii.xxv.i,  iii.26;  Cf.  Cassiodorus 
Institutiones  n.vii.3  (Mynors,  pp.  1 5  5-6;  Jones,  pp.  201-2).  On  the  figure  of 
Nimrod,  see  Haskins,  Studies  in  the  History  of  Mediaeval  Science,  ch.  xvi, 
The  early  twelfth-century  Victorine  codex  (Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS 
Latin  14754),  contains  the  "Astronomie  de  Nemrod"  (fols.  202v-229v)  and 
the  "Canones  Ptolomei"  (fols.  Z33  r— 25  5 v).  Despite  dependence  on  Isidore 
or  Cassiodorus  in  the  present  passage,  Hugh  could  have  known  both 
astronomical  works;  so  A.  van  de  Vyver,  "Les  plus  anciennes  Traductions 
latines  medievales  (Xe-XIe  siecles)  de  traites  d'astronomie  et  d'astrologie," 
Osiris,  I  (1937),  658-91,  who  without  qualification  speaks  of  the  MS  as  "la 
copie  du  maitre  victorin"  {ibid.,  p.  688).  Further  discussion  of  the  MS  in 
relation  to  Hugh  by  van  de  Vyver  in  "Les  premieres  Traductions  latines 
(Xe-XIe  siecles)  de  traites  arabes  sur  l'astrolabe,"  Premier  Congres  Inter- 
nationale de  geographie  historique,  II  Memoires  (Brussels,  193 1),  278,  n.  47. 

1 5 .  On  Socrates  as  the  originator  of  ethics,  cf.  Isidore  Etymologiae  n.xxiv.  5 
and  Augustine  De  civitate  Dei  vin.iii.  On  the  writings  of  Socrates  and  Plato 
on  positive  and  natural  justice,  cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the 
Timaeus  {PL,  CLXXII,  246):  "Because  Socrates  delivered  so  perfect  an 
opinion  regarding  justice  [in  the  state],  his  disciples  asked  him  to  compose  a 
treatise  on  it,  and  he,  satisfying  their  wish,  treated  this  part  of  justice,  namely 
positive.  For  justice  is  partly  positive,  partly  natural.  The  positive  is  in- 
vented by  men,  like  the  hanging  of  a  thief;  the  natural,  like  love  of  parents, 
is  not.  . . .  Then  Plato,  his  disciple,  when  he  had  composed  ten  books  of  the 
Republic  and  wished  to  perfect  what  his  master  Socrates  had  slighted,  comp- 
osed this  work  [the  Timaeus]  on  natural  justice."  Cf.  Chalcidius  on  Timaeus 
(Wrobel,  p.  72;  Mullach,  p.  181). 


1 6.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  xvni.i.  i . 

17.  Adapted,  ibid.,  xix.xx.1-2. 

18.  Ibid.,  xix.viii.i. 

19.  Adapted  from  Martianus  Capella  De  nuptiis  n.xlviii  (Dick,  ed.,  p.  67), 
and  Remigius's  commentary  on  Martianus  (Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS 
14754,  fol.  25 r):  "apud  egyptios...  Isis...  monstravit  sementem  lini,  id  est 
quomodo  sereretur  et  usum  quomodo  inde  vestes  fierent." 

20.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  xvni.i. I. 

21.  Ibid.,;  Gen.  4:22. 

22.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  xix.xxxii.i. 

23.  Quoted  from  Martianus  Capella  De  nuptiis  n.clviii  (Dick,  ed.,  p.  67). 

24.  Adapted  from  Martianus,  ibid.,  and  Remigius's  gloss  (Bibliotheque 
Nationale,  MS  Latin  14754,  fol.  25 r):  "Italia  signat,  id  est  attribuit  Pilumno 
fragmenta  frugis  et  farris.  Ipse  enim  invenit  usum  molendi  et  pinsendi 

25.  Cf.  Martianus  Capella  De  nuptiis  n.xlvii  (Dick,  ed.,  p.  66). 

26.  Quoted  from  Remigius  on  Martianus  Capella,  as  cited  in  Karl 
Schulte,  ed.,  Das  Verhdltnis  von  N others  Nuptiae  Philologiae  et  Mercurii  %um 
Kommentar  des  Remigius  Autissiodorensis  (Miinster,  191 1),  p.  66:  "Osyris... 
apud  Aegyptios  cultum  vinearum  repperit,"  to  which  the  third  Vatican 
mythographer  (Bode,  Scriptores  rerum  mythicarum,  p.  244):  "...sicut  apud 
Aegyptios  Osiris...  sic  apud  Indos  Liber...  usum  invenerit  vinearum." 
Cf.  John  the  Scot  on  Martianus  (Lutz.  ed.  p.  63). 

27.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  xx.i.i. 

28.  Adapted,  ibid.,  iv.iii.1-2. 

29.  Adapted,  ibid.,  xvin.xvi.2. 

30.  Adapted,  ibid.,  i.iii.5-6. 

3 1 .  Closely  adapted  from  Remigius  on  Martianus  Capella  (Bibliotheque 
Nationale,  MS  Latin  14754,  fol.  2  5r):  "Carmentis  ipsa  est  Nicostrata . . . 
mater  Evandri...  haec  primum  latinas  litteras  repperit."  Cf.  Schulte,  Das 
Verhdltnis,  p.  76 ;  Isidore  Etymologiae  in.iv.  1 ;  and  John  the  Scot  on  Martianus 
(Lutz,  ed.,  p.  69). 

32.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  i.xlii.1-2. 

33.  Ibid.,  i.xxxix.i. 

34.  Cf.  Hugh's  statement  (first  paragraph  of  the  present  chapter):  "Certain 
ones  say  that  Cham,  son  of  Noah,  first  discovered  astronomy.  The  Chaldeans 

first  taught  astrology Josephus  asserts  that  Abraham  first  instructed  the 

Egyptians  in  astrology."  Back  of  the  contradiction  between  Hugh's 
previous  and  present  remarks  lie  two  conflicting  traditions  attributing  the 
origin  of  the  arts  variously  to  the  Egyptians  or  to  the  Chaldeans  (Noah,  his 
sons,  Abraham).  Martianus  Capella  reports  that  the  arts,  discovered  in 
Egypt  by  Thoth,  otherwise  known  as  Mercury  or  Trismegistus,  and  hidden 
there  for  a  time,  were  unknown  in  Europe  till  after  the  flood.  Cicero  De 
natura  deorum  ni.xxii,  Lactantius,  and  Arnobius  speak  of  Mercury  as  the  dis- 
coverer of  the  arts,  and  Macrobius  In  somnium  Scipionis  i.xix.2,  credits  Egypt 
with  the  discovery  "omnium  philosophiae  disciplinarum."  Cassiodorus, 
Isidore,  and  Rhabanus  Maurus,  on  the  other  hand,  credit  the  Hebrews, 


especially  Abraham,  with  having  taught  the  arts  to  the  Egyptians,  and  take 
this  view  from  Josephus  Antiquitates  i.viii.2.  Josephus  recounts  that  the 
arts  survived  the  flood  because  the  sons  of  Seth,  warned  by  Adam's  pre- 
diction of  the  world's  destruction  in  fire  and  water,  erected  two  pillars,  one 
stone,  one  clay,  on  which  they  inscribed  all  that  was  known  of  the  arts.  In  a 
unique  gloss  in  one  of  the  oldest  MSS  of  the  Remigius  commentary  on 
Martianus,  a  gloss  not  improbably  by  Remigius,  the  sons  of  Noah  are 
credited  with  having  set  up  the  two  columns  preserving  the  arts.  "By  means 
of  this,  when  Abraham  was  in  exile  in  Egypt,  he  taught  astronomy,  and 
from  this  all  the  other  arts  were  originally  discovered  in  Egypt  and  taken 
from  there  to  Greece."  In  the  Remigius  commentary  on  Donatus  Ars  maior 
only  Cham  is  credited  with  having  erected  the  two  pillars.  For  full  dis- 
cussion, see  Cora  E.  Lutz,  "Remigius'  Ideas  on  the  Origin  of  the  Seven 
Liberal  Arts,"  MH,  X  (1956),  32-49. 

35.  Adapted  from  Martianus  Capella  De  nuptiis  iv.cccxxx  (Dick,  ed., 
p.  153)  and  a  Remigius  gloss  on  the  text  reported  by  Raymond  Klibansky, 
"The  Rock  of  Parmenides:  Mediaeval  Views  on  the  Origin  of  Dialectic," 
MRS,  I  (1941-3),  182:  "Hie  [Parmenides]  philosophus  fuit  et  primus  apud 
Aegyptios  artem  dialecticam  repperit.  Erat  autem  solitus  deserere  divitates 
et  conventus  publicos  et  in  hac  rupe  solus  residere,  ut  liberius  posset 
dialecticam  meditari.  Unde  et  a  Parmenide  rupes  Parmenidis  vocata  est. 
Claret  autem  et  hanc  et  alias  artes  apud  Aegyptum  repertas  et  ab  his  ad 
Graecos  deductas."  Hugh  refers  again  to  Parmenides  and  his  rock,  Dida- 
scalicon  in.xiv. 

36  Closely  adapted  from  Remigius  on  Martianus  (cited  in  Klibansky,  op. 
cit.  in  previous  note,  p.  182):  "Socrates  Platonis  magister  fuit,  post  cuius 
mortem  Plato  amore  sapientiae  Aegyptum  demigravit  ibique  perceptis 
liberalibus  studiis  Athenas  rediit  et  apud  Achedemiam  villam  coadunatis 
studiis  operam  dedit." 

37.  Cf.  Dunchad  on  Martianus  (Lutz,  ed.,  p.  19):  "Varro  primum  dialec- 
ticam Romanis  tradidisset...  protulit  primo  a  Greca  in  Latinam  linguam." 

38.  Cf.  John  the  Scot  on  Martianus  (Lutz,  ed.,  p.  no):  "Corax  fuit  in- 
ventor rhetoricae  artis,  Tisias  usitator."   Cf.  Cicero  De  oratore  i.xx.91. 

39.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  n.ii.i. 

40.  That  Hugh  uses  the  terms  "art"  and  "science"  interchangeably  is 
evident  from  a  comparison  of  the  title  and  opening  sentence  of  this  chapter. 

41.  Cf.  Aulus  Gellius  Nodes  atticae  i.ix.1-7  for  a  comparable  account  of 
Pythagoras's  teaching  method. 

42.  "scholares"  So  Buttimer,  p.  53,  but  "scholastici"  in  PL,  CLXXVI, 
76 8 C.  Clearly,  students,  not  scholars  in  the  sense  of  masters,  are  meant.  On 
the  history  and  meanings  of  schola,  scholaris,  see  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay, 
Renaissance  du  Xlle  Steele,  p.  59,  n.  3 ;  on  scholasticus,  ibid.,  pp.  70-1 ;  on  the 
meaning  of  scholares  in  Hugh  in  particular,  ibid.,  p.  71,  n.  1. 

43 .  Apparently  an  allusion  to  the  terminology  of  medieval  florilegia,  which 
typically  classified  excerpts  under  auctores,  or  poets,  and  philosophi,  or  prose 
writers.   See  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  p.  1 5  3,  n.  21. 

44.  Hugh's  views  of  literature  in  relation  to  grammar  and  the  other  arts 


are  flatly  opposed  to  those  of  the  school  of  Chartres — an  opposition  not 
without  its  paradoxical  elements,  however.  Thus,  Hugh,  who,  as  against 
the  Chartrians,  insists  on  the  rightful  place  in  philosophy  of  the  logical  arts, 
including  grammar  (see  DidascaBcon  n.xvii.n.6i ;  xix.n.64;  xxviii.n.81;  and 
Introduction,  sec.  ii),  nonetheless  excludes  from  philosophy  the  songs 
of  poets,  fables,  and  histories  which  he  earlier  reported  as  parts  of  grammar 
{Didascalicon  n.xxix).  On  the  other  hand,  the  Chartrians,  much  given  to 
elaborate  commentary  on  poets,  fables,  and  histories,  exclude  from  philos- 
ophy the  entire  trivium,  including  the  literary  commentary  which  they 
practice  in  connection  with  grammar  and  other  arts.  With  Hugh's  views  in 
this  chapter,  cf.  John  of  Salisbury  Metalogicon  i.xxiv  (Webb,  p.  53  ff. ; 
McGarry,  pp.  65  ff.),  where  Bernard  of  Chartres  is  described  as  "the  most 
copious  fount  of  literary  study  in  Gaul  in  modern  times,"  his  teaching  of 
grammar  by  means  of  commentary  on  poetry  and  prose  is  praised,  and  his 
admonition  to  students  that  histories  and  poems  were  to  be  read  with  utmost 
diligence  is  recorded.  See  also  John  of  Salisbury's  own  view,  formed  by 
William  of  Conches,  his  teacher  in  grammar  and  described  by  John  as  "the 
richest  teacher  of  letters  after  Bernard  of  Chartres"  {ibid.,  i.v  [Webb,  pp. 
16—7;  McGarry,  p.  21]),  that  a  grammarian,  in  commenting  upon  a  poem, 
should  explain  whatever  the  auctor  has  borrowed  from  the  arts  and  woven  by 
picturatio  into  "a  sort  of  image  of  all  the  arts"  {ibid.,  i.xxiv  [Webb,  p.  54; 
McGarry,  pp.  66-7]).  The  phrase  "appendages  of  the  arts"  occurs  also  in 
the  brano  revision  of  William  of  Conches'  De  pbilosopbia  mundi  (Ottaviano, 
ed.,  p.  28),  where,  however,  as  one  would  expect  in  a  work  of  Chartrian 
inspiration,  it  applies  to  grammar,  dialectic,  and  rhetoric,  which  are  there 
excluded  from  philosophy. 

45.  Vergil  Eclogae  v.  16-7.  Of  Hugh's  interpolation  of  poetry  at  this 
point,  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay  {Renaissance  du  XI Ie  siecle,  p.  171)  remark: 
"heureux  dementi  a  son  dedain  pour  la  verbosite  des  poetes." 

46.  Cf.  Vitruvius  De  architectura  i.i.12:  "...they  easily  believe  it  possible 
that  all  the  disciplines  are  linked  together  in  subject  matter  and  have  a 
common  bond.  The  curriculum  of  the  disciplines  {encyclios  disciplina),  like  a 
single  body,  is  composed  of  the  disciplines  as  so  many  members."  Contrast 
Adelard  of  Bath  De  eodem  et  diverso  (Willner,  ed.,  p.  17),  where  Philosophia 
requires  Adelard  to  choose  among  the  liberal  arts  one  which  will  be  his 
special  reward  for  assiduity,  "for  to  embrace  them  all  together  would  be 
beyond  your  capacity." 

47.  "quid  uniuscuiusque  sit  proprium"    Cf.  Cicero  De  oratore  11.ix.38. 

48.  Hugh's  recommendations  throughout  this  chapter  run  counter  to 
Bernard  of  Chartres'  method  of  teaching  grammar  by  reading  not  technical 
treatments  "of  the  art"  but  poets  and  historians  who  treat  "by  means  <?/the 
art,"  and  by  explaining  to  beginning  students  not  only  "what  was  simple 
and  according  to  rule"  but  "grammatical  figures,  rhetorical  embellishment, 
and  sophistical  quibbling,  as  well  as  the  relation  of  given  passages  to  other 
studies"  (said  in  praise  of  Bernard  by  John  of  Salisbury  Metalogicon  i.xxiv 
[Webb,  p.  5  5 ;  McGarry,  p.  67] ;  see  n.  44).  Cf.  John's  view  that  the  works  of 
the  auc tores,  especially  Vergil  and  Lucan,  are  "seasoned  with  every  part  of 


philosophy" — grammar  and  poetics  "flood  the  entire  composition";  logic 
"interpolates  its  reasonings,  agleam  with  gold";  rhetoric,  "when  persuasion 
is  in  order,  supplies  the  silver  luster  of  its  resplendent  eloquence":  mathem- 
atics "is  drawn  in  the  footsteps  of  the  other  arts  in  the  four-wheeled  car  of 
the  quadrivium,  interweaving  its  'colors'  and  pleasing  ornaments  with 
manifold  variety";  physics,  "from  its  store,"  does  the  same;  and  ethics 
"exceeds  all  the  other  arts  by  the  loveliness  of  the  beauty  it  brings"  {ibid.; 
McGarry's  translation  altered).  With  Bernard's  literary  approach  to  teaching 
the  arts,  especially  grammar,  cf.  Hugh's  De  grammatica  (Leclercq,  ed., 
AHDL,  XV  [1943-4],  263-322),  which  follows  his  principle  that  in  teaching 
an  art,  "when  everything  must  be  reduced  to  outline  and  presented  for  easy 
understanding,  we  should  be  content  to  set  forth  the  matter  in  hand  as 
briefly  and  clearly  as  possible,  lest  by  excessively  piling  up  extraneous 
considerations  we  distract  the  student  more  than  we  instruct  him"  (see  third 
paragraph  of  present  chapter).  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the 
Timaeus,  an  exercise  which  involves  excursions  into  the  "by-ways"  of  many 
arts  (cf.  PL,  CLXXII,  247:  "Something  of  all  the  arts  is  contained  in  this 
work.  In  the  summary  of  positive  justice,  there  is  something  from  the 
practical  arts.  In  the  discussion  of  the  formal  and  final  cause  of  the  universe 
and  of  the  world  soul,  there  is  something  from  theology.  In  the  discussion 
of  numbers  and  proportions,  there  is  something  from  mathematics.  In  the 
discussion  of  the  four  elements,  the  creation  of  animals,  and  primordial 
matter,  there  is  something  from  physics")  exemplifies  the  "comparative  and 
back-and-forth  examination  of  the  arts"  which  Hugh  allows  to  proficients 
but  disapproves  as  a  means  of  learning  the  arts. 

49.  Hugh  draws  here  upon  traditional  discussion  of  the  relative  value,  in 
the  educational  process,  oiingenium  (or  naturd)  and  exercitium  on  the  one  hand, 
and  ars  or  disciplina  on  the  other.  See,  e.g.,  Cicero  De  oratore  i.iv.14  and 
passim;  Quintilian  Institutiones  oratoriae  iii.v.i;  Augustine  De  civitate  Dei 
xi.xxv;  Boethius  In  Topica  Ciceronis  commentaria  vi  {PL,  LXIV,  1168C). 
Note,  however,  that  in  the  words  which  follow  Hugh  gives  his  own  defini- 
tion to  each  term,  altering  particularly  the  sense  of  disciplina  from  "art"  to 
moral  excellence. 

50.  Quoted  by  John  of  Salisbury  Metalogicon  i.xi  (Webb,  p.  28 ;  McGarry, 
p.  34,  where  the  translation  is  "an  immanent  power  infused  into  one's  soul 
by  nature"),  and  wrongly  attributed  by  him  to  Isidore,  (see  Webb's  note, 
p.  28,  1.  27). 

51.  Quoted  by  John  of  Salisbury  Metalogicon  i.xi  (Webb,  p.  29;  McGarry, 
p.  36),  who  attributes  it  to  "a  certain  wise  man,"  evidently  Hugh,  as  neither 
Webb  nor  McGarry  recognizes. 

52.  Cf.  John  of  Salisbury  Metalogicon  i.xxiv  (Webb,  p.  53;  McGarry, 
p.  65):  "The  word  'reading'  is  equivocal.  It  may  refer  either  to  the  activity 
of  teaching  and  being  taught,  or  to  the  occupation  of  studying  written 
things  by  oneself." 

53.  That  is,  works  may  be  selected  for  inclusion  in  a  single  codex  either 
because  they  belong  to  a  single  author  or  connected  group  of  authors,  or 
because  they  treat  a  common  subject. 


54.  The  four  types  of  order  set  forth  in  this  chapter  form  the  structure  of 
Didascalkon  vi,  where  they  are  applied  to  Sacred  Scripture  (see  Didascalicon 
vi. i:  "I  have  mentioned  that  order  in  study  is  a  fourfold  matter:  one  thing  in 
the  disciplines,  another  in  books,  another  in  narrative,  and  another  in 
exposition.  How  these  are  to  be  applied  to  Sacred  Scripture  I  have  not  yet 
shown").  An  order  like  that  among  disciplines  is  sought  among  history, 
allegory,  and  tropology  (chs.  ii,  iii,  iv,  v);  then,  the  order  of  biblical  books  in 
relation  to  Scripture  study  (ch.  vi),  the  order  of  narration  observed  in  Script- 
ure (ch.  vii),  and  the  order  to  be  observed  in  expounding  Scripture  (chs. 
viii,  ix,  x,  xi)  are  discussed.  The  problems  of  order,  then,  are  one,  though 
they  bear  upon  two  distinct  classes  of  writing,  secular  and  scriptural. 

5  5 .  Didascalicon  vi.xii  bears  the  same  title.  Raising  the  same  question 
with  regard  to  Scripture,  the  later  chapter  is  briefer  than  the  present  one  and 
adds  nothing  to  it. 

56.  Entire  chapter,  omitting  the  last  three  sentences  of  the  first  paragraph, 
reproduced  in  Hugh's  De  contemplatione  et  eius  speciebus  (Haureau,  ed., 
Nouvel  examen,  pp.  177-8;  on  the  authenticity  of  the  work,  see  D.  Lasic, 
"Hugo  de  Sancto  Victore  auctor  operis  'De  contemplatione  et  ejus  specie- 
bus,"'  Antonianum,  XXVIII  [1953],  377-88),  where  meditation  is  presented 
as  a  division  of  contemplation,  itself  defined  as  "the  setting  out  of  the  mind 
along  the  manifold  roads  of  salvation"  and  "an  illumination  of  the  mind 
which  fixes  it,  to  its  salvation,  upon  the  invisible  things  of  God."  These 
definitions,  as  well  as  the  present  chapter's  reference  to  the  divine  command- 
ments and  works  substantiate  the  view  that  the  "arts"  of  Didascalicon  i-iii, 
hardly  profane,  are  part  of  a  "philosophy"  which  includes  Sacred  Scripture 
among  its  sources  and  intends  nothing  less  than  man's  salvation. 

57.  "praecipiens . . .  promittens...  terrens"  The  De  contemplatione  et  eius 
speciebus  (Haureau,  ed.,  Nouvel  examen,  p.  178)  reads  "praecipiens...  pro- 
hibens . . .  permittens,"  which  makes  better  sense.  The  reading  "permittens" 
is  supported  by  three  MSS  of  Buttimer's  gamma  class  (see  Buttimer,  p.  60). 

58.  Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  {PL,  CLXXII, 
250):  "As  Priscian  says  when  speaking  of  exercises  for  boys,  to  recollect  is 
to  gather  into  one  a  number  of  things  held  in  the  mind  by  study  or 

59.  Image  unhappily  borrowed  from  Augustine  De  Trinitate  xn.xxiv.23 
{PL,  XLII,  1011A). 

60.  Cf.  the  instruction  on  the  art  of  memorizing,  the  tables,  and  the 
mnemonic  devices  included  in  Hugh's  Chronica  (William  M.  Green,  ed., 
"Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  De  tribus  maximis  circumstantiis  gestorum,"  Spec, 
XVIII  [1943])  and  suggestive  of  the  high  value  Hugh  places  on  factual 
knowledge.    Cf.  Didascalicon  vi.iii. 

61.  Verses  quoted  in  John  of  Salisbury  Policraticus  vn.xiii  (C.  C.  J.  Webb, 
ed.  [Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1909],  II,  43),  where  they  are  attributed  to 
Bernard  of  Chartres.  Quoted  again  in  the  twelfth  century  by  Peter  Comestor 
Sermo  III  {PL,  XCVIII,  1730D),  and  in  the  thirteenth  century  by  Vincent  of 
Beauvais  Speculum  doctrinale  i.xxviii  (Douai,  1624)  and  Guibert  de  Tournai 
De  modo  addiscendi  iv.xxvi  (Bonifacio,  ed.  [Turin,  1653],  p.  243). 


62.  Cf.  Quintilian  Institutiones  oratoriae  i.xviii;  xn.i;  Seneca  Epistulae 
morales  esp.  lxxxviii. 

63.  Ref.  to  King  Agathocles,  who  drank  from  a  goblet  of  clay  after 
drinking  from  one  of  gold  to  remind  himself  of  his  humble  origin.  See 
Valerius  Maximus  Facta  et  dicta  memorabilia  vn.iv.  1 ;  the  work  was  frequently 
epitomized  during  the  Middle  Ages.  Cf.  M.  Junianus  Justinus  Historiarum 
philippicarum  libri  XLIV  xxn.i  and  Cicero  Ver.  n.iv.  5  5 . 

64.  Cf.  Horace  Saturae  n.ii.2  and  Vergil  Eclogae  viii.63. 

65.  From  Jerome  Epistulae  ep.  liii.i.2  (CSEL,  LIV,  443). 

66.  Buttimer's  text  has  been  repunctuated  here  as  follows:  "nugigeruli 
nunc  quidam,  nescio  unde  gloriantes."   See  Buttimer,  p.  63. 

67.  Cf.  Job  12:2. 

68.  Cf.  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay  {Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  p.  67,  n.  5),  who 
see  in  these  words  an  unmistakable  allusion  to  Abaelard.  Not  merely  these 
words,  however,  but  the  entire  chapter  alludes  to  Abaelard,  who,  in  the 
Historia  calamitatum  mearum  (J.  T.  Muckle,  ed.,  MS,  XII  [1950],  163-214), 
describes  his  presumption  in  setting  up  as  master  while  still  a  student  (ibid., 
p.  176);  his  attempt  to  out-dispute  his  master  William  of  Champeaux, 
founder  of  Saint  Victor  and  therefore  "forefather"  to  Hugh  {ibid.);  his 
contempt  for  the  venerated  Anselm  of  Laon,  whose  lectures  in  divinity  he 
abandoned,  asserting  that  to  literate  men,  the  text  of  Scripture  and  its  glosses 
were  enough,  without  a  master,  to  enable  them  to  expound  the  Sacred  Text 
(ibid.,  p.  180);  his  notorious  affair  with  Heloise  {ibid.,  pp.  182-91);  and  the 
condemnation  and  burning  at  Soissons  of  his  De  unitate  et  trinitate  divina 
(ibid.,  pp.  192-6).  On  Abaelard's  personality,  see  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay, 
Renaissance  du  XI Ie  siecle,  pp.  277-81. 

69.  See  n.  35. 

70.  3  Kgs.  1.   Interpretation  in  last  paragraph  of  present  chapter. 

71.  Quoted  from  Jerome  Epistulae  ep.  Lii.iii.2  (CSEL,  LIV,  416). 

72.  Buttimer's  text  (p.  65)  reads  tristior  here,  but  I  have  used  tritior,  which, 
besides  being  the  reading  of  Jerome,  Hugh's  source,  is  the  reading  of  MS  N 
of  the  Didascalicon,  a  MS  which  contains  a  good  text  (see  Buttimer,  p.  xxxi) 
and  one  whose  readings  must  be  followed  elsewhere. 

73.  The  best  MSS  of  Jerome  omit  any  name  here.  That  Jerome  was 
thinking  of  Theophrastus,  however,  may  plausibly  be  inferred  from  Cicero 
Tusc.  disp.  1n.xxviii.69.  On  Themistocles  as  an  aged  Greek  of  worthy 
accomplishment,  see  Cicero  De  senectute  vn.xxi. 

74.  Ibid,  v.xiii. 

75.  Isocrates  is  the  correct  reading  in  Jerome  Epistulae  ep.  Lii.iii.2 
(CSEL,  LIV,  416);  cf.  Cicero  De  senectute  v.xiii. 

76.  Stesichorus  is  the  correct  reading  in  Jerome,  ref.  cited  in  n.  71. 

77.  Quoted  from  Jerome  Epistulae  ep.  Lii.iii.3  (CSEL,  LIV,  417-8).  On 
Homer  and  Nestor,  see  Cicero  De  senectute  x.xxxi. 

78.  Quoted,  with  adaptation,  from  Jerome,  ref.  cited  in,  n.  77. 

79.  Cf.  Martianus  Capella  De  nuptiis  (Dick,  ed.,  p.  62),  and  gloss  of  Remi- 
gius  of  Auxerre  (Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS  Latin  14754*  fols.  23v-24r): 
c'Memorantur  hii  duo,  labor  et  amor,  subvehere  lecticam  a  fronte,  hoc  est  ab 


anteriore  parte.  Nam  posticam,  id  est  extremam  partem  lectice  sustulerunt 
pimelia  et  agrimnia  dilecta  mancipia.  Pimelia  graece :  latine  cura.  Non  ilia 
quae  sollicitudines  saeculi  parit,  sed  ilia  quae  studium  sapientiae.  Agrimnia 
vigilia  interpretatur,  et  his  duabus  rebus,  curaet  vigilia,  acquiritur  sapientia." 
Allusion  to  the  same  passage  from  Martianus  found  in  John  of  Salisbury 
Metalogicon  iv.xvii  (Webb,  p.  183;  McGarry,  p.  229). 

80.  Cf.  Remigius's  gloss  on  Martianus  (Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS  Latin 
14754,  fol.  2  2v):  "Haec  autem  lectica  significat  corpus  omnium  philoso- 
phorum.  Lectica  iiii  portatoribus  gestabatur  et  humanum  corpus  iiii  de- 
mentis subsistit.  Et  pulchre  duobus  sexibus  portabatur,  duobus  scilicet 
pueris  et  duabus  puellis  sicut  in  sequentibus  legitur,  quia  iiii  elementorum 
duo  quodammodo  sunt  mares,  ignis  et  aer,  duae  feminae,  terra  et  aqua." 
Cf.  Dunchad  on  Martianus  (Lutz,  ed.,  p.  3). 

8 1 .  Quoted  from  Jerome  Epistulae  ep.  Lii.xi  (CSEL,  LI V,  43  5 ).  Cited  by 
Anselm  of  Havelberg  Epistula  ad  Abbatem  Ecbertum  {PL,  CLXXXVIII, 
1 1 20) ;  Anselm,  proponent  of  the  canonical  reform  in  which  the  Abbey  of 
Saint  Victor  figured,  applied  the  saying  to  Rupert  of  Deutz,  Cistercian 
proponent  of  monasticism.  The  phrase,  thus,  is  found  in  the  polemics 
between  monks  and  canons  over  the  true  nature  of  "vita  aspostolica." 
See  Chenu,  "Moines,  clercs,  et  laics,"  RHE,  XLIX  (1954),  72,  where 
Anselm  of  Havelberg  is  quoted  and  discussed. 

82.  Buttimer  reads  "quia  magistros  suos  imitari  nolunt."  The  variant 
volunt,  attested  by  three  MSS,  one  of  them  "H"  which  Buttimer  rates  highly 
(see  Buttimer,  p.  xx),  makes  better  sense.  Hugh  is  ironical  here.  On  con- 
temporary masters  who  grew  rich  in  fees,  see  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay, 
Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  pp.  76-7. 

83.  "exilium"  On  exilium  for  the  wise  man,  cf.  Seneca  Epistulae  morales 
LXVIII  and  CII;  John  of  Salisbury  Epistula  C XXXIV  (to  Thomas 
Becket)  (PL,  CXCIX,  113). 

84.  Cf.  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  (PL,  CLXXV,  22  iC):  "All  the  world  is  a 
foreign  soil  to  those  whose  native  land  should  be  heaven.  ...Therefore 
comes  a  'time  for  scattering  stones'  (Eccl.  3:5),  so  that  man  may  see  he  has 
no  stable  dwelling  here  and  may  get  used  to  withdrawing  his  mind  and 
freeing  it  from  the  chains  of  earthly  pleasures." 

85.  Ovid  Epistulae  ex  Ponto  i.iii.35-6. 

86.  Cf.  Vergil  Eclogae  1.68-70. 

87.  See  Vernet,  DTC,  VII,  241,  and  ref.  to  Cicero  there  given. 

88.  Cf.  Horace  Carmina  n.xvi.9-12.  On  various  interpretations  placed 
upon  this  autobiographical  reference  in  their  bearing  upon  Hugh's  origin, 
see  Taylor,  Origin  and  Early  Life  of  Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  pp.  5 1-4. 


1.  Taking  the  variant  depromi,  substantiated  by  MS  N,  which  Buttimer 
rates  highly  (see  Buttimer,  p.  xxxi),  in  place  of  Buttimer's  deprimi,  which 
makes  poor  sense. 


2.  Substance  of  this  chapter  from  Jerome  In  libros  Samuel  et  Malachim 
{PL,  XXVIII,  5  5  2  ff.)  or  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.i,  neither  of  whom,  however, 
divides  the  New  Testament  into  three  groups  parallel  to  the  Old.  On  the 
originality  of  Hugh's  grouping,  see  Ludwig  Ott,  "Hugo  von  St.  Viktor  und 
die  Kirchenvater,"  Divus  Thomas  (Ft.),  ser.  3,  XXVII  (1949),  184;  cf.  Baron, 
Science  et  sagesse,  p.  104,  who,  without  denying  Hugh's  originality,  finds 
earlier  traces  of  the  division. 

3.  Though  the  meaning  of  the  Hebrew  titles  in  this  chapter  is  to  be  found 
in  Hugh's  sources,  Hugh  himself  undertook  to  learn  Hebrew.  On  this 
point,  see  Smalley,  Study  of  the  Bible,  p.  103.  Cf.  Abaelard's  recommendation 
that  Heloise  and  her  nuns  learn  Greek  and  Hebrew  {PL,  CLXXVIII,  325 
and  5 1 1-2). 

4.  Hugh  excludes  these  books  from  the  canon  on  the  authority  of  Jerome ; 
see  n.  33  and  context. 

5.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.ii.1-12. 

6.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.26-7. 

7.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.13. 

8.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.28-33. 

9.  Quoted  from  ibid.,  vi.iii.1-2. 
[  o.  Quoted  from  Jerome  In  libros  Samuel  et  Malachim  {PL,  XXVIII,  5  5 1  A). 

1.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.iii.3-5 ;  vi.iv.1-2. 

See  Jerome  Praefatio  in  Pentateuchum  {PL,  XXVIII,  150A-B). 
3.  Adapted,  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.iv.3-5. 
[4.  Cf.  Gregory  Regulae  pastoralis  liber  n.xi  {PL,  LXXVIII,  48D). 
5.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.ii.35-9. 
[6.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.44-9. 

7.  Quoted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.50-3. 

8.  Quoted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.2-6. 

9.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.7-9. 

20.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.9-11. 

21.  Quoted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.22-4. 

22.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.25-7. 

23.  Quoted  from  ibid.,  vi.ii.14-5.  Cf.  Jerome  Praefatio  in  Job  {PL, 
XXVIII,  1081A-B). 

24.  Quoted  from  Jerome  In  libros  Samuel  et  Malachim  {PL,  XXVIII, 
5  5  3A). 

25.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae,  21. 

26.  Adapted  from  Jerome  Comm.  in  Ecclesiasten  {PL,  XXIII,  1063A-4B) 
with  interpolation  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.ii.  1 8-20  and  Jerome  In  libros 
Samuel  et  Malachim  {PL,  XXVIII,  551A).  Cf.  Hugh's  In  Ecclesiasten 
homiliae  {PL,  CLXXV,  116  [misnumbered  161]  B). 

27.  Adapted  from  Jerome  Praefatio  in  Danielem  {PL,  XXVIII,  1291B- 

28.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.ii.12. 

29.  Quoted  from  Jerome  In  libros  Samuel  et  Malachim  {PL,  XXVIII 
5  54A). 

30.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.ii.28. 


31.  Quoted  from  ibid,  vi.ii.30. 

32.  Quoted  from  ibid,  vi.ii.32. 

33.  Quoted  from  Jerome  Praefatio  in  Salamonem  {PL,  XXVIII,  1242 A- 

34.  Quoted  from  Jerome  In  libros  Samuel  et  Malachim  {PL,  XXVIII, 

35.  Adapted  from  ibid.  {PL,  XXVIII,  554A-B). 

36.  Both  paragraphs  quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.xv;  found  also  in 
Rhabanus  Maurus  De  universo  Cf.  Jerome  Praefatio  in  Evangelia  {PL, 
XXIX,  528A-42A).  Illustrations  of  canon  tables  in  the  Book  of  Kells  in 
W.  R.  W.  Koehler,  ed.,  Medieval  Studies  in  Memory  of  A..  Kingsley  Porter,  II 
(Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  1939),  644-61. 

37.  Both  paragraphs  quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.xvi.1-4.  This 
and  the  following  chapter  comprise  Rhabanus  Maurus  De  universo  v.vii. 

38.  Dates  of  the  four  synods,  or  General  Councils,  named  by  Hugh  are  as 
follows:  Nicaea,  325;  Constantinople,  381;  Ephesus,  431;  Chalcedon,  451. 

39.  Previous  three  paragraphs  quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  v1.xvi.5- 

40.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.viii.17  and  vi.ii.46. 

41.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vr.ii.48-9. 

42.  Quoted  from  ibid., 

43.  On  the  meaning  of  "authentic,"  see  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renais- 
sance du  Xlle  siecle,  pp.  147-8,  and  M.-D.  Chenu,  " 'Authentica'  et  'magi- 
stratia':  deux  lieux  theologiques  au  Xlle-XIIIe  siecles,"  Divus  Thomas 
(Piacenza),  XXVIII  (1925),  257-85. 

44.  Quoted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.vii.2-3. 

45.  Adapted  from  the  pseudo-Gelasian  decretal  1v.ii.180  ff.  (E.  von 
Dobschutz,  ed.,  Texte  und  Untersuchungen,  XXXVIII  [Leipzig,  1912],  36-7). 
That  Hugh's  knowledge  of  the  decretal  came  to  him  via  Ivo  of  Chartres 
Panormia  is  the  judgment  of  Ludwig  Ott  (ref.  cited  in  n.  2),  reaffirming  the 
conclusion  of  Dobschutz. 

46.  Quoted  from  the  pseudo-Gelasian  decretal  iv.v.232-6  (Dobschutz, 
ed.,  pp.  44-5). 

47.  Adapted  from  the  Libri  pontificalis  pars  prior  li  (Theodore  Mommsen, 
ed.,  MGH :Gesta pontificum  romanorum,  I  [Berlin,  1898],  117). 

48.  Quoted  from  the  pseudo-Gelasian  decretal  1  v. v. 242-6  (Dobschutz, 
ed.  p.  46). 

49.  Entire  chapter  quoted  from  the  pseudo-Gelasian  decretal  v.ii-xi.263- 
353  (Dobschutz,  ed.,  pp.  49-60). 

50.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae  vi.xiii. 

51.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.xiv.8. 

52.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.x.1-2,  vi.xi.1-2. 

53.  Adapted  from  ibid.,  vi.viii.2-5. 

54.  Taking  expositiones,  the  reading  of  MS  "H",  which  Buttimer  (p.  xx) 
evaluates  as  one  of  the  three  best  MSS  of  the  Didascalicon,  in  place  of  Butti- 
mer's  expositores,  which  makes  poor  sense. 

55.  Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  {PL,  CLXXII? 


250):  "A  comment,  following  the  thought  alone,  pays  no  attention  to  the 
continuity  or  exposition  of  the  letter.    A  gloss,  however,  does  all  these 
things;  it  is  therefore  called  'gloss'  as  meaning  tongue.  It  must  give  as  clear 
an  exposition  as  if  it  were  the  tongue  of  a  doctor  speaking." 
56.  Adapted  from  Isidore  Etymologiae 


1.  Hugh's  threefold  understanding  of  Scripture  derives  from  the  historic^ 
significatio  typica,  moralitas  of  Gregory  the  Great;  see  Didascalicon  vi.iii.  n.  9' 
A  threefold  understanding  of  Scripture  is  also  taught  by  Jerome  {historia'' 
tropologia,  intelligentia  spiritualis'),  who  was  influenced  in  turn  by  Origen  and 
Philo  Judaeus.  A  tradition  of  fourfold  interpretation  is  found,  e.g.,  in 
Augustine  {historia,  allegoria,  analogia,  aetiologid),  Bede  {historia,  allegoria, 
tropologia,  anagoge),  and  Bede's  many  imitators,  including  the  comparably  in- 
fluential Rhabanus  Maurus.  Refs.  for  the  authors  named  are:  Gregory 
Moralium  libri  Epistula  missoria  iii  {PL,  LXXV,  513C);  Jerome  Epistolae 
ep.  cxx.xii  {PL,  XXII,  1005);  Augustine  De  Genesi  ad  litter  am  imperjectus 
liber  ii  {PL,  XXXIV,  222);  Bede  De  tabernaculo  et  vasis  eius  {PL,~X.CI, 
410B-D);  Rhabanus  Maurus  Commentaria  in  Exodum  m.xi  {PL,  CVIII, 
147D-8B).  Further  authors  and  refs.  in  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay,  La 
Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  221-2,  and  in  Jean  Danielou,  "Les  divers  Sens  de 
l'Ecriture  dans  la  tradition  chretienne  primitive,"  ETL,  XXIV  (1948), 
119-26.  Cf.  Hugh's  De  scripturis  et  scriptoribus  sacris  iii  {PL,  CLXXV,  12), 
where  Hugh  subdivides  allegoria  into  simplex  allegoria  and  anagoge. 

2.  Quoted  verbatim  from  Isidore  Quaestiones  in  Vetus  Testamentum  Prae- 
fatio  iv  {PL,  LXXXII,  208),  but  independently  applied  by  Hugh  to 
Scripture.  Earlier  source  in  Augustine  Contra  Faustum  Manichaeum  xxn.xciv 
{PL,  XLII,  463),  which,  however,  is  not  verbally  identical  with  Hugh. 

3.  So  Augustine  reasons  on  the  utility  of  tropes  and  figures  in  Scripture, 
De  doctrina  Christiana  11. vi.  8  {PL,  XXXIV,  39). 

4.  Cf.  ibid.,  i.ii;  ii.i;  iii.v  ff.  {PL,  XXXIV,  10,  35,  68  ff.). 

5.  Taking  natura  in  the  first  of  the  three  senses  defined  by  Hugh  in 
Didascalicon  i.x,  namely,  as  the  divine  Wisdom,  Second  Person  of  the  God- 
head, conceived  as  archetypal  exemplar  of  creation.   See  ibid.,  n.  69. 

6.  Cf.  Augustine  In  Joannis  evangelium  xiv.iii.7  {PL,  XXXV,  1506):  "We 
speak  flying  words  which  pass  away:  as  soon  as  your  word  has  sounded  in 
your  mouth,  it  passes . . .  into  silence."  De  Genesi  ad  litteram  liber  imperjectus 
v.  19  {PL,  XXXIV,  227):  "...away  with  the  impiety  by  which  we  should 
think  that  the  Word  of  God,  the  only-begotten  Son,  is  like  a  word  uttered  by 
us.  The  Word  of  God. . .  neither  begins  to  be  nor  ceases."  De  civitate  Dei  {PL,  XLI,  484):  "God  does  not  speak  as  do  we  to  one  another — 
For  the  speaking  of  God,  anterior  and  superior  to  all  his  works,  is  the  immu- 
table Idea  of  his  work.  It  has  no  noisy  and  fading  sound,  but  an  energy 
which  abides  eternally  and  brings  forth  effects  in  time." 

7.  Cf.  John  the  Scot  De  divisione  naturae  in.xxxv  {PL,  CXXII,  723):  "As 


through  sense  perception  one  comes  to  a  concept,  so  through  the  creature 
one  comes  back  to  God." 

8.  Peter.  5:8. 

9.  Isa.  61:10. 

10.  Isa.  44:21-22. 

11.  Isa.  13:11. 

12.  Isa.  14:  26. 

13.  Isa.  13:17. 

14.  Isa.  19:2. 

15.  Ps.  21 :  17-19. 

16.  Gen.  10: 20,  31. 

17.  Gen.  11 : 1. 

18.  Matt.  13:28. 

19.  John  6:71. 

20.  Isa.  14: 12. 

21.  Entire  chapter  quoted,  with  some  omissions  and  adaptations,  from 
Isidore  Libri  sententiarum  i.xix.1-19  {PL,  LXXXIII,  581A-6A).  Pare, 
Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  p.  229,  mistakenly  observe  of 
these  rules  that  Hugh  "les  emprunte  mot  pour  mot,  sans  nommer  leur 
auteur,  non  pas  au  De  doctrina  Christiana,  mais  au  De  Genesi  ad litter  am  de  saint 
Augustin";  cf.,  however,  ibid.,  p.  222:  "Hugues,  afin  de  guider  l'interprete, 
expose  alors  les  sept  regies  de  Tichonius,  dont  le  De  doctrina  Christiana 
donnait  deja  la  substance,  mais  dont  il  emprunte  le  texte  a  saint  Isidore." 
On  the  rules,  see  F.  C.  Burkitt,  The  Book  of  Rules  of  Tyconius  (Oxford,  1894). 

22.  Wisdom  6: 1. 

23.  "moralitatis  gratiam"  The  phrase  is  Gregory  the  Great's.  Entire 
context  of  phrase  quoted  in  Didascalicon  vi.iii.n.9. 

24.  Matt.  6:33. 

25.  Gregory's  Moralium  libri,  sive  expositio  in  librum  Job  is  an  example  of 
scriptural  commentary  with  conspicuous  moral  orientation.  Treating  first 
the  historical  and  allegorical  senses  of  a  passage,  it  culminates  in  exposition 
of  the  moral  sense.  See,  e.g.,  Gregory's  treatment  of  the  first  four  verses  of 
Job — the  historical  sense  {PL,  LXXV,  5  27D),  allegorical  sense  {ibid.,  5  3  3D), 
and  moral  sense  {ibid.,  542D-5  54C).  Cf.  also  Gregory's  general  observations 
on  the  relation  of  Scripture  to  moral  concern :  "We  ought  to  transform  what 
we  read  into  our  very  selves,  so  that  when  our  mind  is  stirred  by  what  it  hears, 
our  life  may  concur  by  practicing  what  has  been  heard"  {ibid.,  542C);  and 
"Sacred  Scripture  holds  a  kind  of  mirror  to  the  eyes  of  our  mind  so  that  our 
interior  face  may  be  seen  in  it.  There  we  recognize  what  is  shameful  in  our- 
selves, what  beautiful Scripture  tells  the  deeds  of  the  saints  and  excites 

the  hearts  of  the  weak  to  imitate  them"  {ibid.). 

26.  "colore  dictaminis"  Cf.  Hugh's  dedication  to  his  elegantly  phrased 
ascetical  treatise,  De  arrha  animae:  "I  do  not  wish  to  stir  you  here  by  the  art 

of  literary  composition  {colore  dictaminis') "   (Karl  Miiller,  ed.,  Hugo  von 

St.   Victor:  Soliloquium  de  arrha  animae  und  De  vanitate  mundi  [Bonn, 
1913],  p.  3;  PL,  CLXXVI,  951). 

27.  For  use  of  the  term  "philosophy"  and  its  cognates  in  a  strictly  moral- 


istic  context,  see,  e.g.,  Hildebert  of  Lavardin's  letter  to  William  of  Cham- 
peaux  on  the  latter's  monastic  conversion  {PL,  CLXXI,  141  f.) :  "...  now  at 
last  you  have  decided  to  philosophize,"  etc.  Such  a  use  represents  a  tradi- 
tional Christian  extension  of  the  Socratic  emphasis  on  moral  uprightness  in 
the  philosopher  and  derives  from  the  identification  of  the  "wisdom"  sought 
with  Christ,  Wisdom  of  the  Father. 

28.  "occupatio"  Cf.  Hugh's  exegesis  of  Eccl.  1:12-3  ("proposui  in 
animo  meo  quaerere  et  investigare  sapienter  de  omnibus  quae  fiunt  sub  sole. 
Hanc  occupationem  pessimam  dedit  Deus  filiis  hominum  ut  occuparentur  in 
ea")  in  In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae  {PE,  CLXXV,  149D-59B).  The  kind  of 
reading  condemned  as  occupatio  is  that  classifiable  with  works  performed 
"under  time  and  for  time"  and  which  are  "vain  in  act  and  fruit";  opposed  is 
reading  classifiable  with  works  done  "under  time  but  for  eternity"  and  which 
"in  act  are,  in  a  measure,  vain,  but  which  in  fruit  are  not  so,  since  even  if  the 
work  itself  passes  away,  its  reward  does  not"  {ibid.,  151C).  Intellectual 
occupatio  is  a  greater  evil  than  preoccupation  with  material  goods;  see 
Didascalicon  n.xii.n.48,  esp.  the  definition  of  occupatio  there  cited. 

29.  Matt.  1 1 :  28-29. 

30.  Ps.  70: 15-17. 

31.  See  Palladius  Paradisus  sen  historia  lausiaca  xxviii,  "Vita  abbatis  Pauli 
simplicis"  {PE,  LXXIII,  1126C-30A;  tr.  Ernest  A.  Wallis,  The  Paradise  of 
the  Holy  Fathers,  I  [London:  Chatto  and  Windus,  1907],  125-8).  The  Paul 
intended  was  a  late  fourth-century  ascetic,  one  of  the  desert  fathers. 

32.  Cf.  James  1:22;  Romans  2:13. 

33.  Ps.  75:3.  Cf.  Isidore  Etymologiae  xv.i.5,  where  Sion  is  interpreted  as 

34.  Eccl.  12: 12-3. 

35.  Cf.  Jerome  Contra  Vigilantium  xv  {PE,  XXIII,  351B). 

36.  Ps.  18:12. 

37.  Buttimer's  arcem  consilii  emended  to  arcam  consilii.  Cf.  Hugh's  De  area 
Noe  morali  ii  {PE,  CLXXVI,  63  5  A  f.),  where  the  construction  and  inhabiting 
of  the  area  sapientiae  in  the  soul  are  treated. 

38.  Jos.  1 :  18;  cf.  1  Par.  22: 13  and  1  Cor.  16: 13. 

39.  Ps.  33:9. 

40.  "reddere  rationem  de  ea . . .  fide"  Quoted  from  1  Peter  3  : 1 5 ,  in  which, 
however,  the  correct  reading  is  "reddere  rationem  de  ea...spe."  On 
variations  of  this  this  text  and  the  relation  of  the  common  twelfth-century 
form  of  it,  here  cited  by  Hugh,  to  the  twelfth-century  preoccupation  with  the 
place  of  reason  in  faith,  see  de  Ghellinck,  Mouvement  theologique,  pp.  279-84; 
discussion  of  Hugh's  use  of  the  phrase,  p.  282. 

41.  Vernet,  DTC,  VII,  292,  regards  Hugh's  three  types  of  readers  as 
taken  from  Bernard  Sermones  in  Cantica  sermo  xxxvi  {PE,  CLXXXIII, 
968D).  Bernard's  classification,  however,  is  fivefold  and  applies  not  to 
readers  of  Scripture  but,  more  generally,  to  seekers  after  knowledge:  "There 
are  some  who  wish  to  know  merely  to  know,  and  this  is  base  curiosity ;  there 
are  some  who  wish  to  know  in  order  to  become  known  themselves,  and  this 
is  base  vanity;  .  ..there  are  some  who  wish  to  know  in  order  to  sell  their 


knowledge  for  money  or  for  honors,  and  this  is  a  base  effort.  But  there  are 
some  who  wish  to  know  in  order  that  they  may  edify  others,  and  this  is 
charity,  and  some  who  wish  to  know  in  order  that  they  may  be  edified,  and 
this  is  prudence." 


1.  See  Didascalicon  m.viii.n.54. 

2.  By  saying  that  "the  order  sought  in  the  disciplines" — i.e.,  an  order  of 
study  based  upon  natural  priority,  like  the  priority  of  arithmetic  to  music 
(see  Didascalicon  m.viii) — is  to  be  sought  among  history,  allegory,  and 
tropology,  Hugh  emphasizes  that  these  three  are  not  merely  senses  of 
Scripture  but  separate  studies,  to  be  pursued  successively.  Cf.  Pare,  Brunet, 
Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  pp.  222  ff.,  and  diagram,  p.  219,  who, 
however,  may  go  too  far  in  referring  to  these  studies  as  "disciplines"; 
Hugh's  term  for  them  is  eruditiones  or  lectiones.  See  De  sacramentis  i.Prologus 
{PL,  CLXXVI,  183;  Deferrari,  p.  3):  "Since  I  previously  dictated  a  com- 
pendium on  the  first  instruction  in  the  Sacred  Utterance,  which  consists  in  a 
historical  reading,  I  have  now  prepared  this  second  instruction,  which  con- 
sists in  allegory,  for  those  who  are  to  be  introduced  to  it."  (Deferrari's 
translation  altered). 

3.  Borrowed  from  Gregory  the  Great;  see  n.  9.  Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay, 
Renaissance  du  XI Ie  siecle,  p.  259,  mistakenly  suggest,  instead,  Rhabanus 
Maurus;  see  De  universo  xiv.xxiii  {PL,  CXI,  400D  ff.),  where  the  image 
represents  an  approach  to  Scripture  taken  also  from  Gregory  but  possibly 
influenced  by  others  as  well.  In  the  chapters  immediately  following,  Hugh 
identifies  the  foundation  with  "history,"  or  the  literal  level  of  Scripture;  the 
building  itself  with  "allegory,"  which  includes  both  the  mysteries  of  faith 
and  the  method  of  deriving  them  from  the  letter;  and  the  color  with  "tropo- 
logy," the  moral  interpretation  of  Scripture,  aimed  at  personal  sanctification. 

4.  With  these  four  historical  considerations,  cf.  the  three  discussed  in 
Hugh's  De  tribus  maximis  circumstantiis  gestorum  (Green,  ed.,  Spec,  XVIII 
[1943],  484-93)  and  the  six  "circumstances"  pertinent  to  allegorical  inter- 
pretation in  De  scripturis  et  scriptoribus  sacris  praenotatiunculae  xiv  ff.  {PL, 
CLXXV,  20  ff.).  On  the  place  of  history  in  Hugh's  thought,  see  Pare, 
Brunet,  Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  pp.  218-27;  W.  A.  Schneider, 
Geschichte  und  Geschichtsphilosophie  bei  Hugo  von  St.  Victor:  Ein  Beitrag  t^ur 
Geistesgeschicbte  des  12.  Jahrhunderts  ("Munster'sche  Beitrage  zur  Geschichts- 
forschung,"  Folge  III,  Heft  1;  Miinster,  1933),  who,  however,  is  unac- 
quainted with  the  whole  of  Hugh's  De  tribus  maximis  circumstantiis  gestorum; 
and  M.-D.  Chenu,  "Conscience  de  l'histoire  et  theologie  au  Xlle  siecle," 
AHDL,  XXI  (1954),  107-33. 

5 .  Quoted  from  Marbodus  De  omamentis  verborum  Prologus  {PL,  CLXXI, 

6.  "Saepe  nocturnus  horoscopus  ad  hiberna  pervigilia  excubavi"  On 
horoscopus  as  one  of  the  thirty-six  fixed  stars,  see  the  Latin  Asclepius  in 


(Scott,  ed.,  I,  325).  Martin  of  Laon  Scholica  graecarum  glossarum  (Laistner, 
ed.,  p.  437)  glosses  horoscopus  as  horanim  inspector,  but  the  hours  involved 
may  have  been  night  hours  and  measured  by  the  fixed  stars. 

7.  "quae  secundum  proprietatem  verborum  exprimitur"  The  meaning 
seems  to  be,  "any  narrative  which  makes  literal  sense."  The  "proper 
nature"  or  "property"  of  words  is  apparently  to  signify  literally  or  directly 
(cf.  the  brief  discussion  of  literal  vs.  allegorical  signification,  above  v.iii). 
Hugh  discusses  passages  lacking  literal  sense  below,  vi.x;  passages  lacking 
literal  sense  would  belong  to  allegory,  not  to  history. 

8.  Cf.  Jerome  Epistula  cxxix  (ad  Dardanum)  vi  {PL,  XXII,  1 105) :  " . . .  the 
truth  of  history,  which  is  the  foundation  of  spiritual  understanding"; 
Rhabanus  Maurus  De  universo  xxn.i  {PL,  CXI,  5  94C) :  "...  Divine  Scripture 
is  a  honeycomb  filled  with  the  honey  of  spiritual  wisdom." 

9.  Quoted,  with  slight  adaptations,  from  Gregory  the  Great  Moralium 
libri  Epistula  missoria  iii  {PL,  LXXV,  513C).  Cf.  Hugh's  De  area  Noe 
morali  i.i  {PL,  CLXXVI,  621):  "God  dwells  within  the  human  heart  in  two 
ways,  namely,  through  knowledge  and  through  love.  Yet,  there  is  but  one 
dwelling,  for  everyone  who  knows  God  loves  him,  and  no  one  can  love  him 
who  does  not  know  him.  Yet,  knowledge  and  love  of  God  differ  in  this  way, 
namely,  knowledge  builds  the  house  of  faith  while  love,  through  virtue, 
paints  the  edifice  as  with  color  spread  upon  the  whole."  "History"  and 
"allegory"  provide  knowledge,  faith-knowledge,  one  might  say;  "tropo- 
logy" provides  love  and  virtue.  Cf.  Didascalkon  i.v  and  viii,  where  know- 
ledge and  virtue  are  said  to  work  the  restoration  of  man's  nature. 

10.  Gen.  1:1. 

11.  Gen.  2:  8. 

12.  Ps.  77:70. 

13.  Ps.  7:13-14- 

14.  With  the  exposition  that  follows,  cf.  Philo  of  Alexandria,  cited  with- 
out ref.  in  Smalley,  Study  of  the  Bible,  p.  5 :  "Allegory  is  'a  wise  architect  who 
directs  the  superstructure  built  upon  a  literal  foundation.' "  The  resemblance 
is  more  than  coincidental,  but  I  cannot  trace  a  line  of  transmission  from  Philo 
to  Hugh,  who  seems  to  borrow  the  analogy  directly  from  Gregory's 
Moralium  libri;  see  n.  9  and  context. 

15.  The  eight  "courses"  dictate  the  structure  of  Hugh's  De  sacramentis, 
composed  to  provide  students  with  the  definitive  knowledge  of  doctrine  he 
requires  as  a  prerequisite  to  allegorical  interpretation.  See  De  sacramentis 
1.  Prologus  {PL,  CLXXVI,  183  ;  Deferrari,  p.  3).  Table  of  correspondences 
between  the  "courses"  and  parts  of  the  De  sacramentis  in  Pare,  Brunet, 
Tremblay,  Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle,  263-4;  cf.  G.  Robert,  Les  Ecoles  et 
Penseignement  de  la  theologie  pendant  la  premiere  moitie  du  Xlle  siecle  (Paris,  1909), 
pp.  140-8,  who  first  recognized  in  the  present  chapter  a  sketch  later  filled 
out  in  the  De  sacramentis. 

16.  Ps.  17:12. 

17.  Ezech.  1:19. 

18.  Ibid.,  1 :  20. 

19.  II  Cor.  3:6. 


20.  I  Cor.  2:15. 

21.  The  Pauline  Epistles  are  fourteen  in  number;  the  number  fourteen  is 
twice  seven,  the  perfect  number. 

22.  Cf.  William  of  Conches'  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  {PL,  CLXXII, 
246)  for  preliminary  definitions  of  both  kinds  of  justice,  natural  ("it  was  not 
invented  by  man. . .  it  is  most  evident  in  the  creation  of  the  universe")  and 
positive  ("it  is  invented  by  man...  it  is  most  evident  in  the  decrees  of  the 
state");  the  Timaeus,  associated  with  natural  justice,  and  the  Republic,  as- 
sociated with  positive  justice,  are  observed  to  constitute  "one  and  continuous 
tract  upon  justice"  {ibid.,  250).  On  natural  justice  as  productive  of  standards 
of  positive  justice,  or  morality,  see,  in  the  same  commentary,  William's 
moralisatio  of  the  movements  of  the  stable  firmament  and  the  erratic  planets : 
"God  gave  man  eyes  so  that  when  man  saw  that  there  are  two  motions  in  the 
heavens  and  two  in  himself,  and  that  the  Divine  Wisdom  makes  the  erratic 
planets  follow  the  rational  motion  of  the  firmament,  man  would  subject  the 
erratic  movements  of  his  flesh  to  the  rational  motion  of  his  spirit,  a  matter 
for  practical  philosophy"  (quoted  in  Jeauneau,  "La  Notion  ftintegumentum," 
AHDL,  XXIV  [1957],  77).  Equally  striking  is  Hugh's  moralisatio  of  the 
movement  from  chaos  to  order  in  the  six  days  of  creation  {De  sacramentis 
i.i. 3  [PL,  CLXXVI,  1 8 8C  ff. ;  Deferrari,  pp.  8-9]) :  "The  omnipotent  God . . . 
just  as  he  made  everything  else  for  the  rational  creature,  so  in  all  [the  works 
of  the  six  days]  must  have  followed  a  plan  especially  adapted  to  the  benefit 
and  interest  of  the  rational  creature.  Now  this  plan  was  one  in  which  not 
only  a  service  but  also  an  example  should  be  prepared  for  the  rational 
creature.  . . .  The  rational  creature  itself  was  first  made  unformed  in  a  way 
proper  to  it,  and  was  afterwards  to  be  formed  through  conversion  to  its 
Creator.  Therefore,  exteriorly,  it  was  first  made  to  see  matter  unformed, 
then  formed,  so  that  it  would  perceive  how  great  was  the  distance  between 
mere  being  and  beautiful  being.  And  by  this  it  was  warned  not  to  be  content 
with  having  received  mere  being  from  the  Creator  through  its  own  creation, 
but  to  seek  beautiful  and  happy  being,  which  it  was  destined  to  receive  from 
the  Creator  through  turning  toward  him  with  love."  (Deferrari's  translation 

23.  "omnis  natura  rationem  parit,  et  nihil  in  universitateinfecundumest," 
the  passage  has  a  Hermetic  ring.  Cf.  Latin  Asclepius  i.iv  (Nock,  pp.  299- 
300),  where  the  reproductive  power  of  all  species  is  discussed:  ibid,  m.xiv 
(Nock,  pp.  3 1 3-4),  where  the  power  of  procreation  is  attributed  to  both 
matter  and  spirit  as  a  "quality  of  nature,  which  has  in  itself  the  power  and 
material  of  both  conception  and  birth";  and  esp.,  ibid.,  vi.xxi  (Nock, 
pp.  321-3)  on  the  fecundity  of  all  created  beings:  "it  is  impossible  that  any 
one  of  the  things  that  exist  should  be  infecund." 

24.  Isa.  7: 14. 

25.  Mich.  5  :z. 

26.  Ps.  86:5. 

27.  Ps.  67:21. 

28.  Ps.  109: 1. 

29.  Ps.  109:3. 


30.  Dan.  7: 13-14. 

31.  Luke  1 :  26-31. 

32.  Isa.  7: 14. 

33.  Luke  2:4-7. 

34.  Mich.  5 :  2. 

35.  John  1:1. 

36.  Mich.  5 :  2. 

37.  John  1 :  14. 

38.  Isa.  7:14;  cf.  Matt.  1:23. 

39.  Eccli.  1:1. 

40.  II  John  1:1. 

41.  Rom.  16:25-7. 

42.  Ps.  10:15. 

43.  Ps.  56:5. 

44.  Ps.  102: 15. 

45.  Ps.  78:7. 

46.  Job  9:13. 

47.  Job  7:15.  This  and  the  previous  example  are  adduced  by  Gregory 
the  Great  Moralium  libri  Epistula  missoria  iii  {PL,  LXXV,  51 3D)  to  show 
the  impossibility  of  understanding  all  things  in  Scripture  literally. 

48.  Isa.  4: 1. 

49.  The  exclusively  allegorical  interpretation  is  Origen's;  see  Jerome 
Translatio  homiliarum  Origenis  in  visiones  Isaiae  Homilia  in:  "De  septem 
mulieribus"  {PL,  XXIV,  910  ff.).  Jerome  himself,  in  his  commentary  on 
Isaias,  gives  both  a  literal  and  an  allegorical  interpretation;  Commentaria  in 
Isaiam  prophetam  n. iv  {PL,  XXIV,  72-3). 

50.  Quoted  from  Augustine  De  Genesi ad litteram i.xxi{PL,  XXXIV,  262). 

51.  Quoted  from  ibid.,  i.xviii  {PL,  XXXIV,  260). 

52.  Cf.  Didascalicon  in.ix. 

53.  Cf.  Hugh's  De  contemplatione  et  ejus  speciebits  (Haureau,  ed.,  Nouvel 
Examen,  pp.  177-210),  which,  however,  gives  brief  treatment  to  meditation 
as  but  one  species  of  contemplation  and  which,  moreover,  gives  the  im- 
pression of  being  an  outline  rather  than  a  finished  treatise;  cf.  Baron, 
Science  et  sagesse,  p.  xxxi,  who  regards  the  work  as  a  reportatio. 

54.  "ad  puram  et  sine  animalibus  coenam"  These  are  the  concluding 
words  of  the  Latin  Asclepius  (Nock,  355),  here  interpolated  into  a  Christian 
context.  Failure  to  recognize  the  source  led  Grabmann  to  transcribe  the 
passage  as  "ad  puram  et  finalem  coenam"  {Geschichte  der  scholastischen 
Methode,  II,  235,  n.  3). 


1.  Cf.  Boethius  De  arithmetica  i.i  {PL,  LXIII,  1079D). 

2.  "Virtus  est  habitus  animi  in  modum  naturae  rationi  consentaneus" 
Variant  form  in  De  sacramentis  {PL,  CLXXVI,  273 B;  Deferrari, 
p.  105):  "Virtus...  est...  affectus  mentis  secundum  rationem  ordinatus." 


Ultimate  source,  Cicero  De  inventione  ii.liii:  "Virtus  est  animi  habitus  modo 
atque  rationi  consentaneus."  Cited  with  slight  variations,  not  without  their 
significance,  by  Augustine  De  diversis  quaestionibus  i.xxxi  {PL,  XL,  20); 
William  of  Conches,  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  {PL,  CLXXII,  247) ;  and 
the  brano  revision  of  William  of  Conches  De  philosophia  mundi  (Ottaviano, 
ed.,  p.  29).  Thierry  of  Chartres,  in  his  commmentary  on  the  De  inventione, 
glosses  Cicero's  definition  as  follows:  "The  definition  of  virtue  is  to  be 
understood  thus :  virtue  is  a  habit  of  the  mind  by  which  the  mind  is  made  to 
return  to  the  norm  of  nature  through  following  reason.  Vice  exceeds  the 
norm  of  nature ;  virtue,  through  following  reason,  produces  a  return  to  this 
norm"  (quoted  in  Delhaye,  "Enseignement  de  la  philosophic  morale,"  MS, 
XI  [1949],  98)- 

3.  Schematization  of  the  three  evils,  three  remedies,  and  three  arts  in 
Richard  of  Saint  Victor  Liber  Excerptionum  i.iv  {PL,  CLXXVI,  195)  and 
the  brano  revision  of  William  of  Conches  De  philosophia  mundi  (Ottaviano, 
ed.,  pp.  22-3),  where,  however,  "eloquence"  is  bracketed  with  "wisdom"  as 
a  twofold  remedy  against  ignorance.  Cf.  the  fourfold  scheme  of  Bernardus 
Silvestris  Commentum  super  sex  libros  Eneidos  Virgilii  (Riedel,  ed.,  p.  36): 
"There  are  four  evils  which  beset  human  nature:  ignorance,  vice,  lack  of 
skill  in  speaking,  material  want.  To  these  four  evils,  four  goods  are  op- 
posed: to  ignorance,  wisdom;  to  vice,  virtue;  to  lack  of  skill  in  speaking, 
eloquence;  to  material  want,  sufficiency." 


1.  With  the  material  of  this  chapter,  cf.  Isidore  Etymologiae  vm.ix.i  ff. ; 
Rhabanus  Maurus  De  magicis  artibus  {PL,  CX,  1095  ff.);  and  the  brano 
revision  of  William  of  Conches  De  philosophia  mundi  (Ottaviano,  ed.,  p.  35). 


1.  Buttimer's  text  (p.  134)  has  here  been  repunctuated  as  follows:  "Ideo 
omnis  motus  et  conversio  creaturae  rationalis  esse  debet  ad  mentem  divinam, 
sicut  omnis  motus  et  conversio  creaturae  visibilis  est  ad  rationalem  creatur- 
am."  On  the  created  universe  as  a  network  of  hierarchically  arranged  causes 
deriving  ultimately  from  the  primordial  causes  or  exemplars  in  God  (eternal 
and  invisible ;  causes  only,  not  effects ;  rooted  in  the  divine  Will,  ordered  by 
the  divine  Wisdom,  made  fruitful  by  the  divine  Power),  see  De  sacramentis 
i.ii.22  {PL,  CLXXVI,  216C;  Deferrari,  p.  41)  and  i.ii.2  {PL,  CLXXVI, 
206D  f. ;  Deferrari,  pp.  29  ff.);  on  the  creative  extension  of  the  primordial 
causes  through  three  orders  of  created  being,  (1)  temporal  and  invisible 
(angels),  (2)  temporal  and  partly  invisible,  partly  visible  (men),  (3)  temporal 
and  visible  only,  down  to  the  ultima  et  postrema  universorum  (effects  only, 
causes  to  nothing  below  themselves),  see  ibid.,  i.iv.26  {PL,  CLXXVI, 
246A-C;  Deferrari,  pp.  73-4).   The  term  "rational  creature"  Hugh  some- 


times  restricts  to  angels  alone,  created  with  primordial  matter  in  the  first 
instant  of  time  {ibid.,  i.i.5  [PL,  CLXXVI,  189D  f.;  Deferrari,  p.  10];  cf. 
Adnotationes  elucidatoriae  in  Pentateuchon  v  [PL,  CLXXV,  3 4 A]),  sometimes 
extends  to  man,  like  the  angels  created  prior  to  the  rest  of  creation  not  in 
time  but  in  dignity,  and,  before  the  fall,  directly  illuminated  by  God  with 
knowledge  of  the  natures  of  all  beings  {De  sacramentis,  5,  12-15  [PL, 
CLXXVI,  263B  f.,  266B  £,  270C  ff.;  Deferrari,  pp.  94,  97,  102-4]).  The 
orientation  or  "conversion"  of  every  being  is  properly  toward  that  for  which 
it  was  created,  its  "final  cause";  in  man's  case,  this  is  God;  in  the  world's, 
man  {ibid.,  i.ii.i  [PL,  CLXXVI,  20 5 B  f. ;  Deferrari,  pp.  28-9]). 

2.  Buttimer's  text  (p.  134)  here  repunctuated  as  follows:  "Sicut  homo, 
cum  quid  mente  conceperit,  ut  aliis  etiam  patere  possit  quod  sibi  soli  notum 
est,  foris  exemplum  eius  depingit,  postea  etiam  ad  maiorem  evidentiam,  quo- 
modo  id  quod  ad  exemplum  propositum  est  cum  ratione  eius  concordat, 
verbis  exponit;  ita  Deus,  volens  ostendere  invisibilem  sapientiam  suam, 
exemplum  eius  in  mente  creaturae  rationalis  depinxit,  ac  deinde  corpoream 
creaturam  faciens,  foris  illi  quid  intus  haberet  ostendit." 

3.  Cf.  De  tribus  diebus  xxv  {PL,  CLXXVI,  83  5B);  De  sacramentis  i.v.2-5 
{PL,  CLXXVI,  247A-9B;  Deferrari,  pp.  75-7).  According  to  Hugh,  divine 
ideas,  communicated  to  the  angelic  intellect,  provided  the  exemplars  accord- 
ing to  which  primordial  chaos  was  ordered  by  God  in  the  works  of  the  six 
days.  Underlying  this  view  is  Hugh's  repeated  insistence,  as  against  criticism 
by  William  of  Conches,  upon  the  didactic  purpose  of  the  mode  of  creation 
and  upon  the  literal,  not  merely  figurative,  import  of  the  hexaemeron.  A 
series  of  texts  of  varying  date  give  the  impression  of  a  debate  between 
William  and  Hugh  on  this  point:  (1)  William,  in  his  commentary  on  the  De 
consolatione  philosophiae  (Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  p.  129),  declares  it 
heresy  against  the  divine  goodness  to  affirm  that  God  created  original  con- 
fusion or  chaos ;  (2)  Hugh,  in  Adnotationes  elucidatoriae  in  Pentateuchon  iii  {PL, 
CLXXV,  33 A  ff.),  observes:  "It  is  neither  wrong  nor  unsuitable  to  say  that 
God  created  something  imperfect  or  unformed ;  . . .  daily  he  makes  children 
who  are  imperfect  with  respect  to  the  growth  that  is  to  follow,  but  perfect  in 
the  number  of  parts,  that  is,  feet,  hands,  and  the  like";  God  created  initial 
chaos  and  ordered  it  through  six  days  "not  because  he  lacked  power  to  do 
differently  (hardly  true),  but  because  he  intended  an  example  and  lesson  for 
the  rational  creature.  Just  as  he  first  conferred  being,  and  then  beautiful 
being,  upon  things,  so  upon  angels  and  men,  to  whom  he  first  gave  rational 
being,  he  would  afterward  have  given  blessed  being,  if  they  had  remained 
faithful";  (3)  William,  in  De philosophia  mundi  i.xxi  {PL,  CLXXII,  5  3A~D) 
and  in  his  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  (Parent,  Doctrine  de  la  creation,  pp. 
1 5  8  ff.),  remarks  that  angels  did  not  need  external  instruction  since  they  knew 
all  things  from  within,  and  men  did  not  exist  to  be  instructed  at  the  time  of 
creation;  (4)  Hugh,  in  the  De  sacramentis  1.L3  {PL,  CLXXVI,  188C-9B; 
Deferrari,  p.  9)  reaffirms  his  belief  that  both  angels  and  men  learn  from  the 
ordering  of  initial  chaos  not  to  be  satisfied  with  mere  existence,  and  adds : 
"But  if  anyone  asks  what  rational  creature  existed  in  the  very  beginning  of 
the  universe,  to  whom  this  example  and  lesson  could  be  proposed,  one  can 


easily  reply  that  the  angels  were  already  created  and  that  they  were  admon- 
ished by  this  fact  to  know  themselves,  and  that  to  the  end  of  time  men  would 
be  created,  who,  although  they  did  not  see  creation  when  it  was  accom- 
plished, nonetheless,  taught  by  the  Scriptures,  could  not  fail  to  know  that  it 
was  accomplished"  (Deferrari's  translation  altered).  If  anyone  wishes  still  to 
disagree  with  Hugh's  reasons  for  his  belief,  let  him,  in  all  friendliness  "seek 
out  some  better  and  more  subtle  idea,"  Hugh  adds. 

4.  Gen.  1:3. 

5.  For  example,  Gen.  1 :  14-16:  "And  God  said:  Let  there  be  lights  made 
in  the  firmament  of  heaven,  to  divide  the  day  and  the  night.  . . .  And  it  was 
so  done.  And  God  made  two  great  lights. ..." 

6.  Cf.  Augustine  De  Genesi  ad  Utteram  (PE,  XXXIV,  268-70): 
"When,  therefore,  we  hear,  'And  God  said:  Let  it  be,'  let  us  understand 
what  existed  in  the  Word  of  God.  . . .  But  when  we  hear,  'And  it  was  so,'  let 
us  understand  the  rational  creature's  knowledge  of  the  thing  destined  for 
creation  and  foreseen  in  the  idea  of  the  Word  of  God;  for  God  first  'creates,' 
so  to  speak,  in  the  rational  creature  those  things  which,  by  a  prior  movement 
in  the  Word  of  God,  he  knew  to  be  destined  for  creation.  Finally,  when  we 
hear  it  said,  'God  made,'  let  us  understand  that  the  created  object  itself  has 
been  brought  forth  according  to  its  kind."  Cf.  Abaelard  Theologia  Christiana 
{PE,  CLXXVIII,  1 1 29C)  and  Thierry  of  Chartres  De  sex  dierum  operibus 
(Haring,  ed.,  p.  185). 


The  following  list  is  restricted  to  the  more  important  primary  works  cited  in 
the  notes  to  the  translation  of  the  Didascalkon,  and  to  secondary  materials 
which  the  translator  has  found  particularly  useful  for  understanding  the 
sources  of  the  text,  the  text  itself,  and  the  intellectual  and  historical  milieu  in 
which  the  text  first  appeared.  Recent  editions  of  primary  works  are  listed 
under  the  editor's  name  only. 


Abaelard,  Peter.   Introductio  in  theologiam.   PL,  CLXXVIII,  979-1 114. 

Theologia  Christiana.   PL,  CLXXVIII,  1123-1330. 

Alanus  de  Insulis.   De  planctu  naturae.   PL,  CCX,  431-82. 

Theologiae  regulae.   PL,  CCX,  617-84. 

Alcuin.   Dialogus  de  rhetorica  et  virtutibus.   PL,  CI,  919-50. 

De  dialectica.   PL,  CI,  951-76. 

Alonso,  Manuel,  ed.  Hermann  de  Carintia:  De  essentiis.    Comillas  [San- 

tander],  Universidad  Pontificia,  1946. 
Articella.   Venice,  Baptista  de  Tortes,  1487. 
Augustine.   Contra  academicos.   PL,  XXXII,  905-58. 

Contra  Faustum  manichaeum.   PL,  XLII,  207-518. 

De  civitate  Dei.   PL,  XLI,  13-804. 

De  diversis  quaestionibus.   PL,  XL,  11-100. 

De  Genesi  ad  litteram.  PL,  XXXIV,  245-486. 

De  Trinitate.   PL,  XLII,  819-1098. 

Retractationes.   PL,  XXXII,  583-656. 

Barach,  Carl  Sigmund,  and  Wrobel,  Johann,  eds.  Bernardi  Silvestris  De 
mundi  universitate  libri  duo  sive  megacosmus  et  microcosmus.  Innsbruck, 

Baron,  Roger,  ed.  "Hugonis  de  Sancto  Victore  Epitome  Dindimi  in  philo- 
sophiam:  introduction,  texte  critique  et  notes,"  Trad.  XI  (195  5),  91-148. 

ed.  "Hugonis  de  Sancto  Victore  Practica  geometriae:  introduction, 

texte,"  Osiris,  XII  (1956),  176-224. 

Baur,   Ludwig,  ed.   Gundissalinus,   De  divisione  philosophiae.    BGPM, 

Band  IV,  Heft  11-111.   Miinster,  1906. 
Bode,  Georgius  Henricus,  ed.,  Scriptores  rerum  mythicarum  latini  tres 

Romae  nuper  reperti.   Cellis,  Impensis  E.  G.  C.  Schulze,  1834. 
Boethius,  Anicius  Manlius  Severinus.    De  arithmetica.    PL,  LXIII,  1079- 


Commentaria  in  Porphyrium  a  se  translatum.    PL,  LXIV,  71-158. 


In  Porphyrium  dialogi.   PL,  LXIV,  9-70. 

Bossuat,  R.,  ed.,  Alain  de  Lille,  Anticlaudianus.    Texte  critique  avec  une 

introduction  et  des  tables.   Paris,  Librairie  Philosophique  J.  Vrin,  1955. 
Bovo  of  Corvey.  Commentary  on  the  De  consolatione  philosophiae  in.m.ix 

of  Boethius.   PL,  LXVI,  1239-46. 
Bubnov,  Nicolaus,  ed.,  Gerberti  opera  mathematica.   Berlin,  1899. 
Biilow,  G.,  ed.,  Des  Dominicus  Gundissalinus  Schrift  de  processione  mundi 

herausgegeben  und  auf  ihre  Quellen  untersucht.    BGPM,  Band  XXIV, 

Heft  iv.  Munster,  1925. 
Burkhard,   Carolus,  ed.,  Nemesii  episcopi  Premnon  physicon.    Leipzig, 

B.  G.  Teubner,  19 17. 
Buttimer,  Charles  Henry,  ed.,  Hugonis  de  Sancto  Victore  Didascalicon  de 

studio  legendi.    A  critical  text.    Studies  in  Medieval  and  Renaissance 

Latin,  X.   Washington,  Catholic  University  of  America  Press,  1939. 
Cousin,  Victor,  ed.,  Ouvrages  inedits  d'Abelard.   Paris,  1836. 

ed.,  Petri  Abaelardi  opera.   Paris,  1849. 

De  Rijk,  L.  M.,  ed.,  Petrus  Abaelardus:  Dialectica.   Assen,  1956. 

Dick,  Adolphus,  ed.,  Martiani  Minnei  Felicis  Capellae  De  nuptiis  Philologiae 

et  Mercurii  libri  Villi.   Leipzig,  B.  G.  Teubner,  1925. 
Dobschiitz,  E.  von,  ed.,  Decretum  pseudo-Gelasianum.   Texte  und  Unter- 

suchungen,  XXXVIII.   Leipzig,  191 2. 
Eyssenhardt,  Franciscus,  ed.,  Macrobius.    Leipzig,  B.  G.  Teubner,  1893. 

ed.,  Martiani  Minnei  Felicis  Capellae  De  nuptiis  Philologiae  et  Mer- 
curii libri  Villi.   Leipzig,  B.  G.  Teubner,  1866. 

Freundgen,  Joseph,  tr.,  "Hugo  von  St.  Viktor,  Das  Lehrbuch."  Sammlung 

der  Bedeutendsten  padagogischen  Schriften  aus  alter  und  neuer  Zeit. 

Band  XXIII.   Paderborn,  Ferdinand  Schoningh,  1896. 
Gibb,  John,  and  Montgomery,  William,  eds.,  The  Confessions  of  Augustine. 

Cambridge  Patristic  Texts.  Ed.  by  A.  J.  Mason,  Cambridge,  Cambridge 

University  Press,  1927. 
Green,  William  M.,  ed.,  "Hugh  of  St.  Victor,  De  tribus  maximus  circum- 

stantiis  gestorum,"  Spec,  XVIII  (1943),  484-93. 
Gregory  the  Great.    Moralium  libri,  sive  expositio  in  librum  Job.    PL, 

LXXV,  509-1162. 
Halm,  Carolus,  ed.,  Rhetores  latini  minores.  Leipzig,  B.  G.  Teubner,  1863. 
Haring,  Nicholas  M.  "The  Creation  and  Creator  of  the  World  according  to 

Thierry  of  Chartres  and  Clarenbaldus  of  Arras."  Introductory  study  and 

texts  of  the  De  sex  dierum  operibus  of  Thierry  of  Chartres  and  the  Liber 

de  eodem  secundus  of  Clarenbaldus  of  Arras.    AHDL,  XXII  (1955), 

Honorius  Augustodunensis.    De  animae  exsilio  et  patria.    PL,  CLXXII, 

1 241-6. 

De  imagine  mundi.   PL,  CLXXII,  115-88. 

Hugh  of  St.  Victor.   De  area  Noe  morali.  PL,  CLXXVI,  617-80. 

De  area  Noe  mystica.  PL,  CLXXVI,  681-712. 

De  sacramentis  christianae  fidei.   PL,  CLXXVI,  173-618. 

De  sapientia  animae  Christi.   PL,  CLXXVI,  845-56. 



De  scripturis  et  scriptoribus  sacris  praenotatiunculae.   PL,  CLXXV, 


De  tribus  diebus.   PL,  CLXXVI,  811-38. 

De  unione  corporis  et  spiritus.   PL,  CLXXVII,  285-94. 

Expositio  in  Hierarchiam  coelestem.   PL,  CLXXV,  923-1154. 

In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae.   PL,  CLXXV,  113-256. 

Huygens,  R.  B.  C,  ed.,  Conradus  de  Hirsau,  Dialogus  super  auctores. 

Collection  Latomus,  XVII.   Brussels,  1955. 
■  "Mittelalterliche  Kommentar  zum  O  qui  perpetua,"  SE,  VI  (1954), 

Jansen,  Wilhelm,  ed.,  Der  Kommentar  des  Clarenbaldus  von  Arras  zu 

Boethius  De  Trinitate.    Breslauer  Studien  zur  historischen  Theologie. 

Band  VII.   Breslau,  1926. 
Jean  de  Toulouse.  Annales.  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  MS  Latin  14368. 
Jerome.   Commentariorum  in  Isaiam  prophetam  libri  XVIII.   PL,  XXIV, 


Praefatio  in  Ecclesiasten.   PL,  XXIII,  1009-16. 

Praefatio  in  Evangelia.   PL,  XXIX,  515-30. 

Praefatio  in  libros  Samuel  et  Malachim.   PL,  XXVIII,  547-58. 

Praefatio  in  Pentateuchum.   PL,  XXVIII,  147-52. 

Praefatio  in  Salamonem.   PL,  XXVIII,  1 241-4. 

Translatio  homiliarum  Origenis  in  visiones  Isaiae.  PL,  XXIV,  901-36. 

John  of  Salisbury.   De  septem  septenis.   PL,  CXCIX,  945-64. 

Entheticus  de  dogmate  philosophorum.   PL,  CXCIX,  965-1004. 

John  the  Scot.   De  divisione  naturae.   PL,  CXXII,  441-1022. 

Jones,  Leslie  Webber,  tr.  An  Introduction  to  Divine  and  Human  Readings 

by  Cassiodorus  Senator.    New  York,  Columbia  University  Press,  1946. 
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de  Nicolas  Triveth  sur  la  Consolation  de  la  philosophic  de  Boece." 

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Aaron,  139 

Abaelard,  Peter,  xii,  4,  6,  158/22,  217/23;  on 

the    classic    philosophers,    13,    167/284, 

182/226,  192/269;  disputations  of,  16,  18, 

19,   23,   166/272,  215/268;  on  the  world 

soul,  25,  28,  178/28,  179/210 

Z?£  dialectica,  179/210 

Expositio  in  Hexaemeron,  202/244 

Historia  calamitatum  mearttm,  15  8/22,  166/2 
67,  215/268 

Introductio  in  theologian:,  179/210 

Logica  ingredientibus,  207/288 

Theologia  Christiana,  167/284,  179/210,  190 
#56,  192/269,  197/29,  228/26 

Z>tf    imitate    et    trinitate    divina,    179/210, 

bdias,  104 

belard,  jw  Abaelard,  Peter 
Abisag,  98,99 
Abraham,  84,  86,  210/234 
Action:  philosophy  and,  9,  10,  15,  48,  54, 

132-33,  161/221;  divine  and  human,  55, 

190//59;  for  the  perfect  (student),  130-31 
Acts  of  the  Apostles  (N.T.),  103,  104,  107, 

1 14-15,  137 
Actuality:   Divine  Wisdom  and,    14,    15, 

164/242,  156;  powers  of  the  soul  and,  50; 

change  and,  53-54;  reason  and,   58-59, 

73,  156 
Adalbold  of  Utrecht,  168/293,  185/235,  192 

#69,  198/225 
Adam  of  Saint  Victor,  5,37 
Adelard  of  Bath:  on  the  arts,  18,  195/2/276, 

2;  212/246 

De   eodem   et   diver  so,    166/271,    169/21 18, 
178/28,    189/253,    193/271,    195/2/276,    2; 
202/247,  2 1 2/246 
Qttaestiones    naturales,     188/245,     191/266, 
203//56,  204/260 
Aemilian,  84 
Aesculapius,  85 
Agathocles,  King,  215/263 
Aggeus,  105 
Agriculture:  among  the  arts,  33,  74,  83, 

153;  provinces  of,  51,  77;  origins  84,  85 
Alanus  de  Insulis,  x,  xi,  189/253 

De  plane tn  naturae,  179/210 

Theologiae  regulae,  182/226 
Alcabitius,  20 
Alcmon  of  Crotona,  86 
Alcuin,  3,  161/221 

De  dialectica,  183/227 

Alexander,  106 

Alexandria,  106 

Allegory:  in  Scripture,  35,  120,  121,  127, 
135,  136,  138,  214/254,  219/21,  220/225, 
222/2/22,  3,  4;  223/2/27,  9;  the  study  of,  139- 
44,  145-46;  see  also  Involucrum  (integtt- 

Alphabets:  origin  of,  85-86,  210/231;  He- 
brew, 105-106,  108-109,  in 

Ambrose,  Saint,  104,  115 
Sermo  ii  in  Ps.  cxviii,  1 77/24 
Sermo  x,  i~/jn4 

Ammonius  of  Alexandria,  112,  161/221 

Amos,  104 

Amphio,  84 

Analecta  Mediaevalia  Namurcensia,  i-j$nij4 

Andrew  of  Saint  Victor,  4 

Angels:  nature  of,  14,  27-28,  156,  170/2127, 
184/231,  185/238,  186/242,  190/259;  the 
Devil  as,  125;  as  rational  beings,  226/21, 
227/23;  see  Ottsiai 

Animals,  distinguished  from  man,  5 1 

j\nima  mundi,  see  World  soul 

Anselm  of  Havelberg :  Epistula  ad  Abbatem 
Ecbertttm,  216/281 

Anselm  of  Laon,  215/268 

Apicius,  85 

Apocalypse  (N.T.),  104,  107,  111,  115,  144, 

Apocrypha,  103;  defined,  107-108;  listed, 

Apollo,  Tripod  of,  46,  177/24;  as  author  of 

medicine,  85 
Apostles,  Acts  of  the(N.T.),  104,  107,  114- 

15,  137 

Aptitude,  for  study,  43-44,  91,  93;  see  also 

Apuleius,  84 

Aquila,  106 

Arabic  tradition,  6,  1 59/211,  203/253 

Arator,  115 

Archetypal  essences,  see  Ottsiai 

Architecture,  62,  84;  typifying  the  study 
of  Scripture,  140-42,  222/23,  223/29 

Argument,  theory  of,  81-82,  83,  153,  207 

Aristotle,  3,  21,  160/214,  167/285,  172/2160; 
on  logic,  6,  86;  division  of  philosophy 
by,  8,  19,  36,  62,  1 59/21 1,  161/221,  207/2 
88,  208/23;  entelechy  and,  26,  178/27;  on 
Zoroaster,  154;  Marietan  on,  160/213 
De  interpretatione,  207//88 



Aristotle  {continued) 
Metaphysics,  i6i«2i 
Topics,  1 61/221 

Arithmetic:  in  the  quadrivium,  67,  71,  83; 
power  of,  67,  201/239;  subjects  of,  68, 
153,  203/255 

Arithmology :  the  creating  "One,"  24,  65, 
I99«27;  and  number  "Four"  of  the  soul, 
64-66;  and  number  "Four"  of  the  body, 
66-67, 198/22  5;  Lambda  diagram,  199/226; 
number  "Fourteen,"  as  perfect,  224/221 

Arius,  113,115 

Armament,  74,  76,  83,  153,  205/268 

Arnobius,  2io«34 

Arnulph  of  Orleans,  173/2174,  182/226 

Artaxerxes,  King,  85 

Articella,  206/275 

Arts  and  sciences,  The :  education  and,  4, 5 ; 
schematization  of,  6;  "Quaternary"  of, 
7-19,  159/212;  Divine  Wisdom  and,  11, 
29-31,  61,  195/22;  in  the  interpretation  of 
Scripture,  32,  33,  35,  44-45,  173/2172; 
origins  of,  46-47,  51-52,  59-60,  83-86, 
161/220, 183/230,  210/234;  order  and  meth- 
od of  study  of,  83,  86-87,  153;  function 
of,  71-73,  152,  226/23;  teaching  of,  89-90; 
order  within,  91-92;  permanence  in, 
195/22;  see  also  specific  categories,  i.e., 
Logical  arts;  Mechanical  arts;  Practical 
arts ;  Theoretical  arts ;  and  see  specific  arts, 
e.g.,  Eloquence 

Asclepius,  161/221,  167/284,  225/254;  on  na- 
ture, 13,  20,  169/2118,  189/253;  on  two- 
fold nature  of  man,  184/232;  on  fire, 
193/271,  194/274;  on  fixed  stars,  222/26; 
on  procreation,  224/223 

Astrology,  see  Astronomy,  astrology  and 

Astronomy,  23-24,  31,  32,  83,  171/2143; 
superlunary  and  sublunary  worlds,  9, 
27,  54,  188/252,  189/253,  190/256;  province 
of,  67,  70,  71,  153;  astrology  and,  68, 
84,  202//44,  209/214,  210/234;  reason  and, 
2242222;  see  also  Stars;  Sun 

Athanasius,  bishop  of  Alexandria,  115 

Atlas,  84 

Augustine,  Saint,  ix,  xi,  3,  104;  influence 
on  Hugh,  7,  8,  13,  28,  29-32,  36,  161/230, 
171/2/2135,  143;  185/238,  214/259;  division 
of  philosophy  and,  8,  36,  161/221,  190/2 
57,  203/258;  on  Genesis,  12,  13,  19,  163/2 
34,  185/238,  192/269,  225/2/250-51,  228/26; 
on  Divine  Wisdom,  14,  24,  164/2/239,  42; 

176/23,   181/2/218,  21;  on  the  nature  of 
philosophy,  15,  165/247;  outline  of  pagan 
knowledge,  31-32;  number  of  writings, 
104,  115;  on  fourfold  interpretation  of 
Scripture,  219/2/21-4,  6;  220/221 
De  civitate  Dei,  161/221,  167/286,  175/21, 
181//19,  186/242,  187/243,  192/269,  194/2 
74,  208/2/21-2,  209/215,  213/249,  219/26 
Confessiones,  185/238,  163/234,  1641142. 
De  consensu  evangelistarum,  164/242,  208/21 
Contra  academicos,  183/227 
Contra  Faustum  manichaeum,  219/22 
Z)tf  diversis  quaestionibus ,  164/242,  192/269, 

Z)tf  doctrina  Christiana,  xi,  7,  28,  161/221, 
197/218,  220/221;  compared  with  7V2£ 
Didascalicon,   29-32,   36,   171/2/21 36-39, 

143,  147-5° 
Enarrationes  in  psalmos ,  164/242,  205/271 
Z?£  Genesi  ad  litteram,    163/234,    181/221, 

186/242,  219/2/21,  6;  220/221,   225/2/250, 

51 ;  228/26 
Z)tf  Genesi  contra  Manichaeos,  163/234 
Z)e  Genesi  liber  imperfectus,  163/234 
.De  immortalitate  animae,  i^^nji 
In  Joannis  evangelium,  192/269,  219/26 
Z?£  libera  arbitrio,  164/239,  181/218 
Z)£  musica,  iqinji 

Deordine,  \6jn4j,  ijinni$5,  143;  193/271 
Retractationes,  171/2135,  193/271 
Sermo  cxvii:  De  verbis  evangelii  Johannis, 

.De    Trinitate,    171/2134,    176/23,    183/227, 

186/242,  190/257,  214/259 
Z)e  z'era  religione,  165/247 
Aulus  Gellius:  Nodes  atticae,  211/241 
Ausonius:  Ludus  de  VII  sapientibus,  iJin^ 

Babylon,  123-24,139 

Barach,  Carl  Sigmund  (ed.):  Bernardi  Sil- 
vestris  De  mundi  universitate  libri  duo  sive 
megacosmus  et  microcosmus ,  178/27;  see  also 
Wrobel,  Johann 

Barnabas,  Saint,  107 

Baron,  Roger:  "Hugonis  de  Santo  Victore 
Epitome  Dindimi  in  philosophiam:  intro- 
duction, texte  critique  et  notes,"  163/233, 
165//47,  166/260,  174/24,  181/219,  196/27, 
198/225,  204/264 

"Hugonis  de  Sancto  Victore  Practica 
geometriae:  introduction,  texte,"  188/2 
52,  203/252 



"Notes  biographiques  sur  Hugues  de 
Saint-Victor,"  174/2180 

Science  et  sagesse  che^  Hugues  de  Saint- 
Victor,  158/21,  160/216,  161/219,  166/264 
170/2127,  171/2143,  175/21,  217/22,  225/2 


Basil,  bishop  of  Cappadocia,  115 

Baur,  Ludwig  (ed.) :  Domini  cms  Gundissalinus, 
10,  159/2/26,  11;  163/224,  183/229,  206/279 

Bede,  3,  104,  115,  161/221 

De  Tabemaculo  et  vasis  eius,  219/21 

Beichner,  Paul  E. :  The  Medieval  Represen- 
tative of  Music ,  Jubal  or  Tubalcain?  209/210 

Bernard  of  Chartres,  14,  24,  186/242;  on 
study,  211/244,  2 1 2/248 

Bernard  of  Clairvaux:  Sermones  in  Cantica, 

Bernardus  Silvestris,  xii,  4,  173/2174,  176/2 
3,  182/226,  186/242,  189/253 
Commentum  super  sex  libros  Eneidos  Vir- 

gilii,  190/256,  226/23 
Z>tf  mundi  universitate,  25,  178/27,  188/247 

Bible,  The:  .SVe  Scriptures,  The 

Bibliotheque  de  I'Ecole  des  Charles,  1 5  8/24 

Bischoff,  Bernhard:  "Aus  der  Schule  Hu- 
gos von  St.  Viktor,"  158/22 

Bode,  Georgius  Henricus  (ed.):  Scriptores 
rerum  mythicarum,  202/242,  205/272,  206/2 
73,  210/226 

Body,  The:  nature  of,  9,  18;  action  and, 
10;  intelligence  and,  11,  47,  169//116, 
184/232,  186/242;  eye  of  the  flesh,  14, 
175/25;  powers  of  the  soul  and,  48-49, 
63-64,  198/223;  arithmetical  series  re- 
presenting, 64,  65,  199/226;  number 
"Four"  of,  66-67;  rnusic  of,  69;  "Chair 
of  Philology"  and,  100;  of  God,  in 
Scriptural  metaphor,  122-23;  of  the 
Devil,  in  Scriptural  metaphor,  125; 
angels  and,  170/2127;  primordial  causes 
and,  186/240 

Boethius,  Anicius  Manlius  Severinus,  ix,  x, 
3,  169/21 19,  182/226;  division  of  philo- 
sophy and,  8,  10,  11,  27,  33,  62,  73, 
161/221,  181/221,  196/27,  204/264,  206/281; 
on  Divine  Wisdom,  13,  19-20,  24,  163/2 
30,  181/2/217,  19,  21;  195/21,  198/220;  on 
perfect  good,  23,  175/21;  on  the  world 
soul,  25,  28,  179/210;  on  grammar,  80; 
translations  of  Cicero  and  Aristotle,  84, 
207/288;  on  the  arts,  161/221,  195/22,  204 
7264,  213/249;  on  self-knowledge,  176/23; 

on  the  powers  of  the  soul,  182/2/222-24, 
198/223;  on  numbers,  199/227,  201/2/238- 
39,  202/2/241,  46-47;  203/251,  225/21 
/Jte   arithmetica,    181/220,    195/22,    196/27, 

201/238,  202/2/241,  46;  204/264,  225/21 
Comment  aria  in  Porphyrium  a  se  translatum, 
io-ii,    161/221,    182/2/222-24,    195/275, 
206/281,  208/288 
jCV  consolafione  philosophiae,  ix,  13,  19-20, 
27,  1 6 1/22 1,  182/225,  198/223;  William 
of  Conches  on,  8,  20,  21,  25,  162/223, 
169/2/2107,  108,  no,  115;  179/210,  190 
2/59,   193/271,   196/27,    197/212,   198/225, 
201/2/239-40,    203/257,    205/265,    227/23; 
Remigius  of  Auxerre  on,  175/21,  179 
/210,   188/249,   192//69,   193/271,   195/72, 
Contra  Eutychen,  193/270 
Z)tf  hebdomadibus,  16 9/2 119,  185/236 
Z?«  musica,  1 81/21 9,  202/247,  203/251 
7/2  Porphyrium  dialogi  duo,  161/221,  181/221, 
195/2    1;     197/215,     198/220,     203/257, 
Z)tf  syllogismo  hypothetico,  1 81/217 
7/2  Topica  Ciceroni s  commentaria,   207/288, 

21 3/249 
Z?£  Trinitate,  161/221,  185/235,  197/218 
Z)£  imitate  et  uno,  199/227 
Bologna,  School  of,  4 
Bonaventure,  Saint,  5 
Bonnard,  Fourier :  Histoire  de  I'abbaye  royale 
et  de  I'ordre  des  chanoines  reguliers  de  Saint 
Victor  de  Paris,  158/21 
Book  of  Kells,  218/236 
Bovo  of  Corvey :  In  Boethii  De  consolafione 
Hi.  m.  ix  commentarius,  185/235,   193//71, 
Brunet,    Adrien:    See    Renaissance   du   xiie 

siecle  (Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay) 
Bruyne,  Edgar  de,  171/2143 
Burkhard,  Carolus  (ed.):   Nemesii  episcopi 

Premnon  physicon,  180/214,  184/232 
Burkitt,  F.  C. :  Book  of  Rides  of  Tyconius, 

Buttimer,  Charles  Henry  (ed.) :  Hugonis  de 
Sancto  Victore  Didascalicon  de  studio  legendi, 
ix,  xi,  7,  158/24,  161/220,  174/23,  185/2/2  36- 
37,  186/241,  187/243,  188/246,  197/211, 
198/2/220,  24;  211/242,  215/2/266,  72;  216 
22/282,  1;  218/254,  221/237,  226//1,  227/22 

Cadmus,  86 



Canonical  Epistles  (N.T.),  104,  107,  144 
Canonical  tables  (N.T.),  11 2-1 3 
Canticle  of  Canticles,  103,  105,  no,  144 
Cappuyns,   Maieul:  Jean  Scot  Erigene,   sa 

vie,  son  oeuvre,  sa  pensee,  208/73 
Carolingians,  ix,  3 
Cassiodorus,  116,  210/734 

Institutiones  divinarum  et  saeculariam  lec- 

tionum,  xi,  7,  28,  29,  1 61/721,  1 72/7/71 5  3- 

57,  195/7/72,  6;  197/7/78-9,  16;  198/719, 

203/755,  206/767,  208/26,  209/7/712,  14; 

Didascalicon  compared  with,  32-33,  36, 

I  83/727,  202««42-43 

Catiline,  Sallust  on,  16 
Cato,  20,  69,  99 

Concerning  Agriculture,  84 
Ceres,  85 

Chalcedon,  Council  of,  114,  21 8/738 
Chalcidius,  ix,   19,  25,  26,   178/76;  "three 
works"  doctrine  and,  27;  on  the  world 
soul,  169/7118,  178/7/76-7,  179/79,  i8o/z«ii, 
13;   189/754;  astronomy  of,   186/7/742- 
43,  188/752,  190/752,  193/771 
Platonis  Timaeus  interprete  Chalcidio   cum 
eiusdem  commentario,  13,  161/721,  179/79, 
180/713,  184/734,  185/735,  187/7/743,  52; 
190/759,  192/769,   193/771,  199/726,  200 
7729,  209/715 
Chaldeans,  84,  85-86,  210/734 
Challoner,  Bishop,  xi 
Cham,  son  of  Noah,  84,  154,  210/734 
Chaos,  13,  23,  160/716 

Chartrianism :  Hugh  and,  4,  13,  24,  28,  36, 
166/772,  167/783,  211/744,  212/748;  arith- 
mology  and,  198/725;  on  re.r  and  verba, 
204/761;  the  trivium  and,  211/744,  212/748 
Chenu,  Marie-Dominique:  " 'Authentica' 
et  'magistratia' :  deux  lieux  theologiques 
au  Xlle-XIIIe  siecles,"  218/743 
"Conscience  de  1'histoire  et  theologie  au 

Xlle  siecle,"  222/74 
"L'Homme  et   la  nature:   perspectives 
sur  la  renaissance   du   Xlle    siecle," 
159/75,  164/735 
"Imaginatio:  note  de  lexicographic  phi- 

losophique  medievale,"  182/723 
"Involucrum:  le  mythe  selon  les  theolo- 

giens  medievaux,"  182/726 
"Moines,  clercs  et  laics  au  carrefour  de 
la  vie  evangelique  (Xlle  siecle),"  164 
«35,  174/7181,  216/781 
"Platon  a  Citeaux,"  198/725 

Theologie    au    Xlle    siecle,    La,    159/735, 
164/735,  170/7129 
Christianity:    Neoplatonism    and,    13;    of 

Hugh,    22,    23,    24,     167/788,     168/791; 

didascalic  literature  and,   28-29;  pagan 

knowledge  and,  30-31,  34-35,  173/7/2167- 

68 ;  meditation  on  death  and,  62 
Church,    The,    xi;    Councils    of,    1 13-14, 

218/738;  doctrine  of,  142-43,  150,  223/7 

1 5 ;  fathers  of  (See  specific  names)  ;  heresy 

and  (See  Heresy) 
Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius  (Tully),  ix,  3,  13, 

x6,  37,  57,  75,  86,  167/7/784,  86;  215/7/763, 

73;  216/787 

Defato,  207/788 

De  finibus,  167/786 

De  inventione,  173/7174,  192/767,  205/770, 
207/788  225/72 

De  natura  deorum,  167/786,  193/771,  208/71, 

Z??  officis,  183/727 

De  oratore,  183/227,  195/778,  211/738,  212 
7747,  213/749 

Republic,  84 

Z)e  senectute,  215/7/773-77 

S omnium  Scipionis,  ix-x,  13;  jw  a/ro  Ma- 
crobius,  Commentarium  in  somnium 

Topica,  86,  207/788,  213/749 
Cistercianism,  4 
Clarenbaldus  of  Arras,  xii,  5,  182/726,  197 


/./for  de  eodem  secundus,  170/7127 
Clement,  Saint,  107 
Codex,  defined,  118 
Coleman-Norton,    P.R. :   Cicero's   Doctrine 

of  the  Great  Year,  167/786 
Comestor,  Peter,  5,  214/761 
Commentaries,  defined,  119,  218/755 
Commerce,  74,  76-77,  83,  153,  205/768 
Concupiscence,  65,  200/729 
Constantine    the    African    (Constantinus 

Afer),  201/737,  204/760 
Constantine  Augustus,  113 
Constantinople,  Council  of,  113,  218/738 
Contemplation,    225/753;    eye    of,    14-15, 

177/75;  in  the  pursuit  of  Truth,  29,  54; 

as  fifth  step  in  perfection,  132-33;  defin- 
ed, 214/756 
Cookery,  85 
Corax,  86,  211/738 
Corinthians,  221/738,  223/719,  224/720 



Cornelius,  84 

Comificians,  4,  16;  on  study,  174/23 

Cosmimetry,  70,  203/753 

Cosmology,  x,  xi,  10,  13;  heterodox  texts 

and  themes,  ly-zSpassim 
Councils  (Synods),  1 13-14,  218/738 
Courcelle,  Pierre,  20-21 

"Etude  critique  sur  les  commentaires  de 
la  Consolation  de  Boece,"  163/731, 
i66««73-74,  80;  168/793 

Let/res  grecques  en  Occident  de  Macrobe  a 
Cassiodore,  1 58/23,  16 1/72 1 

"Peres  devant  les  enfers  virgiliens,  Les," 
Cousin,  Victor  (ed.) :  Outrages  inedits  d' 'Abe- 
lard,  179/210 

Petri  Abaelardi  opera,  202*744 
Crane,   R.    S.   (ed.) :  Critics  and  Criticism, 

Ancient  and  Modern,  1 59/210 
Creation:  as  the  work  of  God,  12,  13,  14, 

19,   21-26,    55,    I38,    156,    1907/59,   224«22, 

228/76;  the  world  soul  and,  19,  26,  27; 
primordial  causes  and,  53,  186/739,  41  > 
226/71,  227/73;  procreation  by  heat  and 
moisture,  57,  194/772;  pagans  on,  167/7/7 
86,  88;  mathematics  and,  202/741 

Croydon,  F.  E. :  "Notes  on  the  Life  of 
Hugh  of  Saint  Victor,"  174/7180 

Cyprian,  bishop  of  Carthage,  115 

Cyril  of  Alexandria,  115 

Cyrus,  139 

Daedalus,  85 

Daniel  (O.T.),  103,  105,  no,  145-46,  225/7 
30;  St.  Jerome  on,  217/727 

Danielou,  Jean:  "Les  divers  sens  de  l'Ecri- 
ture  dans  la  tradition  chretienne  primi- 
tive," 219/21 

Dares  the  Phrygian,  86 

David,  King,  98,  103,  104,  105,  109,  139; 
Samuel  and,  108;  See  also  Psalms  (O.T.) 

Death,  52,  53,  62;  "Eighty,"  the  number 

designating,  65-66;  Plato  on,  197/79;  the 
soul  and,  200/732 

Decretals  (N.T.),  104;  Pseudo-Gelasian, 

Deferrari,  Roy  J.  (tr.) :  Hugh  of  St.  Victor 
on  the  Sacraments  of  the  Christian  Faith, 
164/736,  174/24,  117/25,  179/210,  181//15, 
184/232,  185/238,  186/7/239,  40,  42;  196/23, 
222/22,  224/222,  225/22,  226/21,  227/23 

Delhaye,  Philippe:  "L'Enseignement  de  la 

philosophic    morale    au    Xlle    siecle," 

173/2174,  225/22 

"La  place  de  l'ethique  parmi  les  disci- 
plines  scientifiques  au  Xlle  siecle," 
Delphic  altar  inscription,  46,  177/24 
Democritus,  84,  98,  154 
Demosthenes,  86 
De  Rijk,  L.  M.  (ed.):  Petrus  Abaelardus: 

Dialectica,  179/210 
Deuteronomy  (O.T.),  108 
Devil,  The,  122,  125 
Dialectic,  81-82,  86 
Dick,    Adolphus    (ed.):    Martiani    Minnei 

Felicis  Capellae  De  nuptiis  Philologiae  et 

Mercurii  libri  viii,  208/2/21,  8;  211/235 
Dickerman,  S.  O. :  De  arguments  quibusdam 

apud  Xenophontem,  Platonem,  Aristotelem 

obviis   et   structura   hominis   et   animalium 

petitis,  176/23 
Dickinson,    J.    C. :    Origins   of  the   Austin 

Canons  and  Their  Introduction  into  England, 

Dioscorus,  bishop  of  Alexandria,  114 
Dionysius  the  Areopagite,  116 
Disciplines,  see  Arts  and  sciences,  The 
Disputation,  8,  16,  18,  22 
Divination,  154-55 
Dobschiitz,  E.  von  (ed.) :  Decretum  pseudo- 

Gelasianum,  218/2/245-46,  48-49 
Donatus,  80,  90,  207/284,  210/734 

Ars  major,  207/785,  210/734 

Ars  minor,  207/782 
Douay  translation  of  Bible,  xi 
Dramatics:  among  the  arts,  31,  32,  74,  83, 

153,  206/279;  province  of,  79,  205/268 
Duhem,  Pierre:  Le  systeme  du  monde,  206/275 
Dunchad:  cited,  198/225,  211/237,  216/280; 

on  Martianus,  204/262,  205/272,  208/21 

"Eagerness  to  inquire,"  97-99,  100 

Ecclesiastes  (O.T.),  103,  105,  109,  no, 
167/286,  185//38,  192/269,  193/271,  200/231, 
216/284,  221/2/228,  34;  225/739;  Jerome  on, 
in,  169/7121,  217/726 

Ecclesiasticus  (O.T.),  105,  in 

Economics,  74,  205/765 

Education:  twelfth-century  changes  in,  4, 
5;  teaching  methods,  89-90,  92,  no; 
obstacles  to,  126-27;  Hugh's  methods  of 
learning,  136-37,  144;  didactic  literature 
and,     170/713 1 ;    postulates    of    Hugh's 



Education  {continued) 

theory,  1 867/42;  see  also  Study 

Egypt,  84,  85,  86,  97,  2037754,  2107734, 
211777735-36;  in  Scripture,  124 

"Eighty,"  the  number  designating  life's 
end,  65-66 

Elements :  of  the  soul's  composition,  46-47, 
179779;  "Chair  of  Philology"  and,  100; 
of  the  mathematic  arts,  153;  in  divina- 
tion, 154-55 

Eloquence:  philosophy  and,  15-16,  17; 
logic  and,  31,  59,  73,  1957778,  2077787; 
commerce  and,  76-77;  theory  of  argu- 
ment and,  81-82,  83,  153,  207777787-88; 
letter  and  sense  in  Scripture,  121-22, 
143-44,  145,  147-50,  21977776,  7;  2247722; 
Adelard  of  Bath  on,  1957776;  ethics  and, 
1 73771 74,  226773 ;  see  also  Allegory;  Gram- 
mar; Poetry 

Elysium,  9,  154,  1907756 

Empedocles,  25,  26,  1807711 

Entelechy,  x;  nature  of,  24-25,  46;  human 
soul  and,  26-27,  169*116,  17877776-8, 
17977779-10;  see  also  World  soul 

Ephesians  (N.T.),  2037750 

Ephesus,  Council  of,  113-14,  2187738 

Epicurus,  11,  58 

Eratosthenes,  84 

Erhardt-Siebold,  E.  and  R.  von:  Cosmology 
in  the  Annotations  in  Marcianum:  More 
Light  on  Erigena's  Astronomy,  ic/$nji 

Erigena,  see  John  the  Scot 

Esdras,  103,  106;  restoration  of  the  Old 
Testament,  105,  109,  no 

Edras  (O.T.),  103,  105,  no 

Esther  (O.T.),  103,  105 

Ethics:  philosophy  and,  8,  33,  71,  73,  no, 
1837727;  Scripture  and,  35 ;  origin  of,  84, 
2097715;  natural  and  positive  justice  in, 
145,  17377174,  2247722;  see  also  Morals; 

Etruscans,  1 5  5 

Etudes  classiques,  1 5  8774 

Etymology :  of  philosophy,  15;  of  the 
names  of  the  arts,  67-68,  70,  71,  73,  74, 
76,  77,  79,  85,  87;  of  things  pertaining 
to  reading,  1 18-19 

Euclid,  84 

Euhemerus,  208771 

Eusebius  of  Caesarea,  106,  109,  112,  115; 
on  Origen,  116 

Eutyches  of  Constantinople,  abbot,  1 1 4, 1 1 5 

Eve,  creation  of,  1647736 

Evil:  relation  of  wisdom  to,  12,  52,  183 
7730;  intellectual  occupatio  as,  18,  129-30, 
2217728;  Scripture  on,  123;  three  evils  to 
which  man  is  subject,  152,  226723;  magic 
and,  154-55 ;  as  concern  for  the  needs  of 
life,  2027/48;  see  also  Morals;  Virtue 

Exemplar  of  Creation,  i^;  see  also  Wisdom, 

Exodus  (O.T.),  103,  108,  137 

Exposition,  order  in,  91-92,  93,  147,  150 

Eyssenhardt,  Franciscus  (ed.):  Macrobius, 
1847/32,  1877743,  1887/7/45,  52;  1907/56, 
1927/69,  1937/71,  1947/72,  1957/79,  1987/7/ 
23,  25;  1997/7/26,  27;  2007/7/29,  32 

Ezechiel  (O.T.),  103,  104-105,  107,  109, 
139,  143,  144,  2237/7/17-18 

Fabric-making,  74,  75,  83,  85,  153,  2057/68 

Fall  of  Man,  The,  138-39;  Divine  Wisdom 
and,  8,  24,  29-30,  1777/5;  philosophy 
and,  11-12,  14-15,  17-18,  141,  163/77/31, 
33;  human  perfectibility  and,  28,  1847/ 
32,  1967/3 

Fate,  1867742,  1907/59 

Fathers  of  the  Church,  see  specific  names, 
e.g.,  Augustine,  Saint 

Fiction,  as  an  art,  31,  32 

Fire,  cosmic  or  ethereal,  27,  53,  1697/121, 
1887/52;  superlunary  nature  and,  10, 
189775  3 ;  as  mediator  between  reason  and 
the  senses,  57,  1937/71;  Jupiter  and,  57, 
1947/74;  moisture  and,  1947/72 

Firmicus  Maternus:  Matheseos  libri,  20, 

Fishing,  33 

Flaccus,  109 

Flatten,  Heinrich:  Die  Philosophie  des  Wil- 
helm  von  Conches,  1607/16,  1977/18 

Flesh,  The :  See  Body,  The 

"Foreign  soil,"  36-37,  101 

Fronto:  Strategematon,  84 

Fulgentius,  2047/63,  2057/72 

Galen:  Tegni,  ix,  3,  n,  2067/75-78 

Games,  origin  of,  85 

Gelasius,  115,  2187/7/45-49 

Genesis  (O.T.),  12-13,  103,  108,  137,  144, 
156,  1707/127,  1857/38,  1917/7/60-62,  1927/ 
69,  2207/7/16-17,  2237/7/10-11,  2287/7/4-5; 
Augustine  on,  1637/34,  18 17/21,  1867/42, 
219/7/71,  6;  2207/2I,  2257/7/50-51,  2287/6 



Gennadius,  115 

Genus,  in  Scripture,  123-24 

Gerbert  (Sylvester  II,  pope),  161/721 

Geyer,  B.  (ed.):  "Peter  Abaelard's  philo- 

sophische  Schriften,"  207/788 
Ghellinck,  Joseph  de,  quoted,  36 

Mouvement  theologique  du  XI Ie  siecle,  1 5  8« 

I,   I59«8,  l62/722,  174^175,  22I«40 

Table  des  matures  de  la  premiere  edition 
des  oeuvres  de  Hugues  de  Saint-Victor, 
1 61/720 

Gilbert  of  Porree,  16 

Gilduin,  Abbot  of  Saint  Victor,  158/71 

Gilson,  Etienne :  "Cosmogonie  de  Bernar- 
dus  Silvestris,  La,"  186/742;  Spirit  of 
Mediaeval  Philosophy,  The,  iljn^ 

Gloss,  defined,  119,  218/755 

God:  work  of,  9,  93,  132-33;  relation  of 
nature  to,  12,  21-22,  27,  52-53,  57,  164/z 
35,  167/7/786-88,  169/7/7116,  121,  176/72;  as 
creator,  19,  21-22,  23-24,  26,  138,  156, 
167/7/786-88,  226/71,  227/73,  228/76;  man's 
relation  to,  22,  24,  32,  36,  51,  54-55,  61, 
121-22,  132-33,  145,  156,  219/7/76,  7; 
223/79,  224/722;  Scripture  as  the  Word  of, 
34,  121-22,  219/7/76,  7;  as  Wisdom  and 
Light,  176/72;  world  soul  and,  178/78, 
189/753;  see  also  Trinity,  The;  Wisdom, 

Godfrey  of  Saint  Victor,  4 
Fons philosophiae,  1751JIJ4 

Good,  Form  of  the,  19,  23,  46,  168/793, 

Gorgias,  86 

Gospel,  see  New  Testament 

Grabmann,  Martin:  Geschichte  der  scholas- 
tischen  Alethode,  i^ynnj,  12;  225/754 

Grammar:  function  of,  15-16,  80,  82,  83, 
206/781;  origin  of,  86;  teaching  of,  90, 
212/748;  poetry  and,  211/744,  212/748;  see 
also  Eloquence 

Greece,  the  origins  of  the  arts  and,  83-86 

Green,  William  M.  (ed.):  "Hugh  of  St. 
Victor,  De  tribus  maximis  circumstantiis 
gestorum,"  214/760,  222/74 

Gregory  the   Great,   Saint,  ix,    104,    128, 
220/7/723,  25;  222/73 
Moralium   libri,    219/71,    220/725,    223/79, 

Regulae  pastor alis  liber,  217/714 

Gregory,  bishop  of  Nazianzen,  Saint,  115 

Gregory  of  Nyssa,  Saint,  115 

Gregory,  Tullio:  Anima  mundi:  la  filosofia 
di  Gitglielmo  di  Conches  e  la  scuola  di 
Chartres,  160/716,  162/723,  179/710,  184/734 
"Sull'attribuzione  a  Guglielmo  di  Con- 
ches di  un  rimaneggiamento  della 
P  hi  I 0  sophia  Mundi,"  175/71 

Guibert  de  Tournai:  De  modo  addiscendi, 

Gundissalinus,  159/7/76,  11;  163/724 

Gwynn,  Aubrey:  Roman  Education  from 
Cicero  toQuintilian,  158/73 

Habacuc  (O.T.),  104 

Hagiographers  (O.T.),  103,  104,  no,  in 

Halm,  Carolus  (ed.) :  Rhetores  latini  minores, 

Hamersleben,  Saxony,  37,  38 

Haring,  Nicholas  M. :  "The  Creation  and 
Creator  of  the  World  According  to 
Thierry  of  Chartres  and  Clarenbaldus  of 
Arras,"  196/77,  200/728,  202/741,  228/76 

Haskins,  C.  H. :  Renaissance  of  the  Twelfth 
Century,  207/784 

Studies  in  the  History  of  Mediaeval  Science, 
206/775,  209/714 

Haureau,  Barthelemy:  Histoire  de  la  philo- 
sophic s colas ti que,  18,  166/764;  Hugues  de 
Saint-  Victor :  Nouvel  examen  de  l' edition  de 
ses  oeuvres  177/74,  214/7/756-57,  225/753; 
Notices  et  extraits  de  quelques  manuscrits 
latins  de  la  Bibliotheque  Nationale,  179/710 

Heinze,  Max  (see  Ueberweg,  Friedrich,  and 
Max  Heinze) 

Helm,  Rudolfus  (ed.):  Fabii  Planciadis 
(Fulgentii)  opera,  204/763,  205/772 

Heloise,  215/768,  217/73 

Henry  V,  emperor,  38 

Heresy:  heterodox  themes  and  texts,  19-28, 
168/793;  the  Apocrypha  and,  107-108, 
118;  four  principal  synods  and,  1 13-14; 
of  Abaelard,  179/710 

Hermagoras,  86 

Herman  of  Carinthia:  De  essentiis,  169/71 18 

Hermetic  texts,  ix,  13,  19,  20,  28;  see  also 

Hesiod  Ascraeus,  84,  98 

Hierocles  of  Alexandria,  195/779 

Hilary,  bishop  of  Poitiers,  1 1 5 

Hildebert  of  Lavardin,  220/727 

Hildegarde  of  Bingen,  203/753 

History:  Scripture  as,  12-13,  120,  121,  127, 

135-39,    214/754,    219KI,    220/725,    222/7/72, 



History  {continued) 

3,  4;  223/2/27-9;  Augustine  on,  31,  32; 

first  written,  86 
Homer,  98,  99,  208/21,  215/277 
Homily,  denned,  119 
Honorius  Augustodunensis,  xi,  18 

De  animae  exsilio  et  patria,  i66«70 

De  imagine  mundi,  170K127,  2037253 

Libellus  octo  quaestionum,  170/2127 
Horace,  37 

Carmina,  216/288 

Saturae,  215/264 
Hugh,  archdeacon,  37,  38 
Hugh  of  Saint  Victor:  commentaries,  21, 

166/282;    biography   of,    36-39;   works, 


Adnotationes  elucidatoriae  in  Pentateuchen, 
167/288,  170/2127,  226/21,  227/23 

.De  ^4ra2  AW  morali,  29,  163/233,  166/263, 
167/285,  171/2132,  172/2166,  196/23,  221 
«37,  223/29 

De  a/r/.w  animae,  37,  174/2178,  220/226 

De  astronomia,  158/21 

Chronica,  214/260 

De  contemplatione  et  eius  speciebus,  \7~in\, 
214/2/256,  57;  225/253 

Didascalicon :  see  Introduction,  3-39,  and 
notes  to  text,  passim 

In  Ecclesiasten  homiliae,  zj,  163/233,  166/2/2 
66,  68;  167/2/286-87,  168/2/289-90,  172/2 
162,  173/2174,  176/23,  185/238,  188/247, 
190/259,  217/226;  on  the  world  soul, 
193/271;  on  heat,  194/272;  on  the  Fall 
of  Man,  1 96/23,  200/231;  on  man's  soul, 
198/223,  202/248;  on  the  world,  216/2 
84;  on  study,  221/228 

Epitome  Dindimi  in  philosophiam,  12,  15, 
158/21,  163/2/231,  33;  165/2/247-53,  I74« 
4,  177/25,  181/219,  183/230,  196/27,  198/2 
25,  204/264 

Expositio  in  Hierarchiam  Coelestem,  iG^n 
42,  168/291,  170/2128,  172/2166,  173/2/2 
167-69,  173;  176/22,  177/25,  193/271 

De  grammatica,  158/21,  207/284,  212/248 

Indiculum  of  Hugh's  works,  161/220 

De  ponder ibus,  158/21 

Practica  geometriae,  158/21,  188*252,  203/2/2 

52-5  3 
De  sacramentisChristianae  fidei,  158/21,  164 
22/236,  41;  167/288,  171/2151,  173/2/2171- 
72,   179/210,   181/215,   184/232,   185/238, 
186/2/239-40,  42;  196/23,  222/22,  223/215, 

224/222,  225/22,  226/21,  227/23 
.De  sacramentis  legis  naturalis  et  scriptae 

dialogus,  158/21,  172/2166,  173/2/2170-72 

176/22    177/25 
De  sapient ia  animae  Christi,   14    1 64/23  9, 

De  scrip tur is  et  scrip toribus  sacris,  158/21, 

166/262,  174/24,  219/21,  222/24 
De  /ri£«.r  diebus,  26    169/21 16    173/2170, 

175/21,  177/24,  181/219,  186/242,  227/23 
De  Tribus  maximis  circumstantiis  gestorum, 

214/260,  222/24 
De    unione    corporis   et   spiritus,    1 81/21 5, 

193/271,  201/237 
De  vanitate  mundi,  172/2166    174/2178 
Hugonin,  Flavien,  36,  172/2160 
Humility,  94-97,  131,  136,  137 
Hunting,  74,  77-78,  83,  153 
Huygens,  R.  C.  B. :  "Mittelalterliche  Kom- 
mentare  zum  O  <?«/  perpetua,"    168/293, 

"Idea,"  jee  Wisdom,  Divine;  Ousiai 
Imagination,  66-67,  201/237 
Immortality,  163/233 
India,  85 

Infernum,  9,  54,  190//56 
Integumentum,  see  Involucrum  (Integumentum) 
Intelligence,  .ree  Reason 
Intelligentia,  55,  190/257 
Invention,  81-82 

Involucrum  (Integumentum),  x,  163/231,  166/2 
72,  182/226;  world  soul  and,  25,  199/226- 

Isagoge  Johanitii  ad  Tegni  Galiegni,  ix,   11, 

Isaias  (O.T.),  103,  104-105,  108,  144,  148, 

220/2/29-14,  20;  224/224,  225/2/232,  38,  48, 

49;  St.  Jerome  on,  193/271,  225/249 
Isidore  of  Seville,  Saint,  3,  104,  115,  184/232 

Etymologiae,  7,  28,  29,  80,  161/221,  170/2 
131,  181/219,  183/227,  196/2/24-6,  197/2/2 
8-9,  16;  202/2/242-44,  46;  203/255,  205/2 
67,  206/2/274,  80;  207/286,  208/2/21,  4,  6, 
7;  209/2/29,  11,  14,  15;  210/2/216-18, 
20-22,  27-33;  211/239;  226/21;  on  the 
Bible,  217/2/22,  5-9,  11,  13,  15-23,  25, 
26,  28,  30;  218/2/231-32,  36,  37,  39-42, 
44,  50-53;  219/256,  221/233 

D/^ri  sententiarum,  174/23,  220/221 

De  natura  rerum,  169/2121 

Quaestiones  in  Vetus  Testamentum,  219/22 



Isis,  85,  86,  210/219 

Isocrates,  3,  98,  215/275 

Ivo  of  Chartres:  Panormia,  218K45 

Jaeger,  Werner :  Paideia :  The  Ideals  of  Greek 

Culture,  1 5  8«3 
James,   Saint:   Canonical  epistle  of,    107, 

Jansen,  Wilhelm:  Der  Kommentar  desClaren- 

baldus  von  Arras  %u  Boethius  de  Trinitate, 

I97«l8,  2O0/228 

Jean  de  Toulouse:  Annates,  158/21 

Jeauneau,  Edouard:  "L'Usage  de  la  notion 
d' integumentum  a  travers  les  gloses  de 
Guillaume  de  Conches,"  i62«23,  167/285, 
182/226,  190/256,  199/226-27,  200/228,  204 
#63,  224/222 

Jeremias  (O.T.),  103,  104-105,  108,  109, 
no,  III 

Jerome,  Saint,  ix,  104,  193/271,  215/2/265, 
71,  76-78;  216//81,  217/2/22,  4,  10,  12, 
23-24,  26-27,  29;  218/2/733-36,  219/21,  221 
«35,  223/28,  225/249;  translations  of 
Scripture,  106,  109,  217/212;  library  of, 


Commentaria  in  Ecclesiasten,  in,  169/21 21, 

Commentaria  in  Isaiam  prophet  am,  193/271, 

Contra  Vigilantium,  221/235 
Epistulae,   215/2/265,   71,   76-78;   216/281, 

/«  Libros  Samuel  et  Malachim,  21 7/2/72,  10, 

24,  26,  29;  218/734-35 
Praefatio  in  Danielem,  217/227 
Praefatio  in  Evangelia,  218/236 
Praefatio  in  Job,  217/223 
Praefatio  in  Pentateuchen,  217/212 
Praefatio  in  Salamonem,  in,  218/733 
Translatio  homiliarum  Origenis  in  visiones 
Isaiae,  zz^n^y 
Jesus  Christ,  21,  22,  23,  167/285;  as  A/o«j, 
19,  23,  179/210;  Scripture  and,  35,  in, 
139,  141,  146;  Nestorian  heresy  con- 
cerning, 114;  as  Form  of  the  Good,  175 
/21,  176/22 
Jesus,  son  of  Sirach,  103,  105,  in 
Joannine  prologue,  13,  23 
Job(O.T.),  103,  105,  109,  no,  144,  215/267, 

217/723,  220/225,  225/2/246-47 
Joel  (O.T.),  104 
Johannitius,  ix,  11,  206/2/275-78 

John,  Saint,  112,  115,  175/21;  Gospel  of, 
104,  107,  in,  144,  176/22,  192/269,  220/2 
19,  225/2/737,  40 
John  Chrysostom,  Saint,  115 
John  of  Salisbury,  x,  4,  5,  160/715;  on  tne 
Cornificians,  16,  174/73 
Epistula,  CXXXIV  (to  Thomas  Becket) 

Metalogicon,  6,  165/2/755-57,  174/23,  175/21, 
192/268,  193/271,  207/288,  211/244,  212/2 
48,  213/2/250-52,  215/279 
Policraticus,  214/261 
John  the  Scot,  x-xi,  3,  23,  24,  161/721,  191/2 
64;  on  the  ousiai,  14,  152,  186/7/739,  42; 
on  the  arts  and  religion,  15,  83,  165/247; 
on  world  soul,  25,  26;  on  man's  soul, 
179/210, 180/214,  181/2/216,  21;  on  time  and 
eternity,  185/235;    on   threefold    knowl- 
edge, 204/263 

Commentary  on  £><?  consolatione  philoso- 
phiae,  168/293,  I75WI>  I79WIO»  192/269, 
193/271,  198/225 
Commentary  on  Martianus  {Annotations 
in  Marcianum,  Lutz  ed.),  178/27,  201/7 
40,  205/769,  208/76,  210/7/226,  31,  211/238 
Z)tf    Divisione   narurae,    165/247,    180/214, 
181/2/216,    21;    185/238,    186/2/739,    42; 
192/769,  208/73,  219/77 
De praedestinatione,  lG^n^i 
Jonas,  104 
Jones,  Leslie  Webber: 

"Influence  of  Cassiodorus  on  Medieval 

Culture,"  172/7152,  209/2/212,14 
(tr.)  Introduction  to  Divine  and  Human 
Readings  by  Cassiodorus  Senator,  1 61/221, 
172/2/2153-55,  157;  183/727,  196/2/74,  6; 
197/7/28,  9,  16;  202/242-43,  203//55,  205 
Joseph,  124 

Josephus,  84,  109;  Antiquitates ,  210/234 
Josue  (O.  T.),  103,  108,  137,  221/238 
Jourdain,    Charles   (ed.):    "Commentaires 
inedits  de  Guillaume  de  Conches  et  de 
Nicolas  Triveth  sur  'La  Consolation  de 
la  Philosophic'  de  Boece,"  162/223,  165 
2258,  166/261,  169/2/2108-109,  179/210,  193/7 
71,  196/27,  197/212,  201/2/239-40,  203/257, 
Excursions  historiques  et  philosophiques  a 

travers  le  moy en-age,  162/223 
Notices   et   extraits   des   manuscrits  de  la 
Bibliotheque  Imperiale,  162/223 



Judas,  125 

Jude  (N.  T.),  107 

Judges  (O.  T.),  103,  104,  108,  137 

Judgment,  81-82 

Judith  (O.  T.),  103,  105,  in 

Julius  Atticus,  84 

Justinus,  M.  Junianus :  Historiarum  philip- 

picarum  libri,  215/263 
Juno,  204/263 
Jupiter  (Jove),  57,  i94>?74 
Juvenal,  20 
Juvencus,  115 

Keil,  Heinrich:  Grammatici  latini,  \j1n4, 

Kells,  Book  of,  21 8/736 

Kilgenstein,  Jakob:  Gotteslehre  des  Hugo 
von  St.  Viktor,  1 72/21 60 

Kilwardby,  Robert,  5 

De  ortu  et  divisione  philosophiae,  206//79 

Kings  (O.T.),  103,  106,  108,  no,  137,  215/2 

Kleinz,  John  P.,  36 

Theory  of  Knowledge  of  Hugh  of  Saint  Vic- 
tor, 172/2160,  193/271 

Klibansky,  Raymond :  "The  Rock  of  Par- 
menides :  Mediaeval  Views  on  the  Origin 
of  Dialectic,"  211/2//35,  36 

Knowledge:  defined,  9;  man's  attain- 
ment of,  10,  52;  relation  to  philosophy, 
15,  30-31,  81-82,  132-33,  207///287-88; 
love  of  God  and,  17-18,  223/29;  as  evil,  18, 
129-30,  202/248;  of  like  by  like,  46-47, 
180/21 1;  Hugh's  analysis  of,  61,  176/22, 
1 81/21 5 ;  understanding  and  imagination, 
66-67,  201/237;  William  of  Conches  on, 
160/216,  197/712;  mechanical  arts  and, 
201//37;  the  senses  and,  203/259;  See  also 
Arts  and  sciences;  Philosophy;  Under- 

Koehler,  W.  R.  W.  (ed.) :  Medieval  Studies 
in  Memory  of  A.  Kingsley  Porter,  218/236 

Lactantius,  210/734 

Laistner,  M.  L.  W. :  "Notes  on  Greek  from 
the  Lectures  of  a  Ninth  Century  Monas- 
tery Teacher,"  191/764,  222/76 

Lambda  diagram,  199/726 

Langton,  Stephen,  5 

Lasic,  Dionysius:  "Hugo  de  Sancto  Vic- 
tore  auctor  operis  'De  contemplatione  et 
eius  speciebus,'"  214/756 

Hugonis  de  S.  Vic  fore  theologia  perfectiva: 
eius  fundamentum  philosophicum  ac  theo- 
logicum,  164/737 

Law,  The  Biblical  Books  of  the,  103,  104, 
105-106,  no,  in,  144 

LeClercq,  Jean:  "Le  De  grammatica  de 
Hugues  de  Saint-Victor,  "207/783,  212/248 

Lectio,  see  Study 

Leo,  Pope,  115 

Leviticus  (O.T.),  103,  108 

Liber  (deity),  85 

Liber,  defined,  118 

Liber  Her  met  is  Mercurii  Triplicis  de  VI  rerum 
principiis,  x,  20,  27,  166/277,  1 69/2/71 20, 
121;  188/252;  astronomy  of,  189/7/253, 
55;  192/769;  on  Matentetradem,  208/28 

Liberal  arts,  75,  89,  1 71/21 3 5 

Libraries,  4,  105,  106,  115 

Libri  pontificalis  pars  prior  (Mommsen,  ed.), 
2 1 8/747 

Linus,  83,  84,  208/71 

Literature:  didactic,  3-4,  28-36,  158/23,  159 
nnd,  10;  poetic,  21,  88;  Victorine  versus 
Chartrian  attitudes  toward  teaching  of, 
87-89,  211/744  212/248;  Scripture  as,  128; 
encyclopedic,  170/21 31 

Logical  arts:  relation  to  philosophy,  8, 
10,  n,  12,  15,  17,  31,  32,  62,  71,  161/2/7 
20,  21;  181/221,  182/724,  204/764;  origin 
of,  57-60,  86;  function  of,  72-73,  153, 
204/761 ;  division  of,  79-80,  83,  153,  206/7 
8 1 ;  grammar  in,  80 ;  theory  of  argument 
in,  81-82,  207/2/287-88 

Lucan,  69,  212/248 
Pharsalia,  202/248 

Luke,  Saint,  Gospel  of,  104,  107,  112,  191 
2763,  225/2/731,  33 

Lutz,  Cora  E. :  Glossae  in  Martianum,  204/2 
62,  205/272,  208//1,  211/737,  216/780 
Iohannis  Scotti  annotationes  in  Marcianum, 
178/27,   201//40,   205/269,  208/26,   210/2/7 
26,  31;  211/738 
"Remigius'  Ideas  on  the  Origins  of  the 
Seven  Liberal  Arts,"  210/234 

Lybia,  85 

Lydians,  games  of,  85 

Macedonius,  113 

McGarry,  Daniel  D.  (tr.):  The  Metalogicon 
of  John  of  Salisbury,  165/2/255-57,  1 74/23 , 
175/21,  192//68,  193/271,  207/288,  211/744, 
212/748,  213/7/750-52,  215/279 



Machabees  (O.T.),  103,  105,  in 
McKeon,  Richard  P.,  histories  of  rhetoric, 
dialectic,  and  poetic,  1 597210 
Selections  from  Medieval  Philosophers,  18222 
24,  i95«75 
Macrobius,   ix,    13,    19,    167/2/284,    86;   on 
mathematics,  196/27,  1 98/22  5,  199222226-27, 
2002229,  2032253 

Comment  arium  in  somnium  Scipionis,  ix,  13, 
1672286, 177224, 180/212, 1842232, 1877243, 
188/245,   5Z'>   190/256,   192/269,   193/271, 
194/272,  195/779,  196/2227,  9;  197/29,  198 
22/223,   25;   199/2/226,  27;  200/2/229,  32; 
Saturnalia,  ijjn4,  203/253 
Mabillon:  Vetera  .analecta,  1 74221 80 
Magic,  31,  32,  154-55 
Malachias  (O.T.),  105 
Mamertus,   Claudianus:    Z?<?  j/fl/22  animae, 

Man:  spiritual  perfectibility  of,  3,  11,  13- 
15,  18-19,  28,  1647236;  relation  of,  to 
nature,  9,12,  46-47,  56,  145,  156,  1812216, 
2247222;  relation  of,  to  Divine  Wisdom, 
22,  24,  32,  36,  51,  54-55,  61,  121-22,  132- 
33,  145,  156,  219/2//6,  7;  223/29,  2242222; 
twofold  nature  of,  54,  190/257;  music  of, 
69 ;  see  also  Fall  of  Man,  The 
Manegold  of  Lautenbach :  Opusculum  contra 

Wolf  elm  um  coloniensem,  1 93/27 1 
Manitius,  Max,  36 

Geschichte  der  lateinischen  Literatur  des  Mit- 
telalters,  159/212,  172//160,  180/214 
Marbodus:  De  ornamentis  verborum,  222775 
Marcian,  Emperor,  114 
Marietan,  Joseph,  36 

Probleme   de    la    classification   des   sciences 
d'Aristote  a  Saint-Thomas,  159117,  16072 
13,  172/2160 
Mark,  Saint,  Gospel  of,  104,  107,  112 
Marrou,  Henri-Irenee :  Histoire  de  P 'educa- 
tion dans  Pantiquite,  1 58723  ;  Saint  Augustin 
et  la  fin  de  la  culture  antique,  158/23,  171/2136 
Martianus  Capella,  x,  3,  6,  20 

De  nuptiis  Philologiae  et  Mercurii.  205/2/269, 
72;  208/2/21,  6,  8;  210/2//19,  23-26,  31, 
34;  211/235-38;  Remigius  on,  178/27, 
189/255,  198/225,  204/263,  205/272,  208/2 
6,  210/2/219,  24,  31;  215/279  216/280 
Martin   of  Laon:   Scholica  graecarum  glos- 

sarum,  191/264,  222226 
Matentetraden,  see  Pythagoras 

Mathematics:  as  an  art,  17,  31,  32,  61,  62, 
83>  J53>  196/27;  logic  and,  58,  59-60; 
understanding  and,  63-64;  number 
"four"  of  the  soul  and,  64,  198/225;  the 
quadrivium  and,  67,  201/239;  astrology 
and,  68,  202/2/244-45  >  function  of,  72,  73, 
204/261;  imagination  and,  73;  false,  in 
magic,  154,  155;  arithmetical  progres- 
sions of  soul  and  body,  199/226;  creation 
and,  202/241;  see  also  Arithmetic;  Arith- 
mology;  Geology 

Matthew,  Saint,  Gospel  of,  104,  107,  112, 
144,  174222,  202/248,  220/2/218,'  24;  221/229 

Matthew  of  Venddme,  4 

Maximianus:  Elegiac,  188/250 

Maximus  the  Confessor,  181/216 

Meaning :  Scriptural  relation  of  Word  and 
Idea,  121-22,  143-44,  145,  147-50,  219/2/2 
6,  7;  224/222;  allegory  and,  140-44 

Mechanical  arts:  in  philosophy,  10,12,  15, 
17,  51-52,  56,  60,  62,  73,  165/259,  181/221, 
182/224,  183/2/227,  30;  1847232,  204/764; 
three  works  and,  27,  56,  190/259,  191/264; 
sevenfold  division  of,  32,  33,  74-75,  83, 
153,  205/268;  origins  of,  38-39,  84-85; 
understanding  and,  55,  201/237;  see  also 
specific  arts,  e.g.  Fabric-making 

Medicine:  function  of,  33,  78-79;  as  an  art, 
74,  83,  153,  161/221,  206/2/275-78;  origin 
of,  85 

Meditation,  15,  151,  2147256,  2257253;  study 
and,  91,  92-93,  132-33;  scrutiny  and, 
99-100;  see  also  Contemplation 

Memory,  study  and,  87,  91,  93-94,  120, 
214/2/258,  60 

Mercury  (deity),  75,  77,  84,  155,  169/21 18, 
205///269,  72;  206/273,  210/234 

"Mercury,"  19,  see  also  Asclepius 

Meyer,  P.  G.  (ed.) :  "Hugo  von  Sankt  Vik- 
tors  Lehrbuch,"  180/214 

Michaeas  (O.T.),  104,  2242225,  225/2/234,  36 

Mignon,  A.,  36,  172/2160 

Origines  de  la  scolastique  et  Hugues  de  Saint 
Victor,  160/213 

Minerva  (Pallas-deity),  73,  85,  204/263 

Miscellanea  moralia  in  honorem  eximii  domini 
Arthur  fanssen,  i-jyiij^ 

Mommsen,  Theodore  (ed.):  Gestorum ponti- 
ficum  romanorum  liber  pontificalis,  2187747 

Monad,  200/229;  see  also  "One" 

Monasteries,  4,  28-29,  32-33,  38 

Montpellier,  School  of,  4 



Moody,  Ernest  A. :  Truth  and  Consequence 

in  Modern  Logic,  19  5/277 
Moon,   see   Astronomy,    superlunary   and 

sublunary  worlds 
Morals,  9,  93,  94,  220/227;  the  Scriptures 

and,  13,  121,  127-30,  138,  220/225,  223/29; 

parsimony  and,  100,  131 ;  tropology  and, 

127-28,  144-45,  224/222;  magic  and,  154- 


Moses,  84,  85,  86,  103,  104,  105,  in,  139 

Muckle,  J.  T.  (ed.):  "Abelard's  Letter  of 
Consolation  to  a  Friend  ( Historia  cala- 
mitatum  mearum) ,"  158/22,  215/268 

Mullach,  F.  (ed.) :  Fragmenta  philosophorum 
graecorum,  161/221,  179/29,  180/213,  I84«34, 
185/235,  186/242,  187/2/243,  52;  190/259, 
192/269,  193/271,  195/279,  199/226,  200/229, 

Miiller,  Karl  (ed.):  ///go  von  St.  Victor, 
Soliloquium  de  arrha  animae  und  De 
vanitate  mundi  174/2178,  220/226 

Miiller,  Martin  (ed.):  Quaestiones  naturales 
des  Adelardus  von  Bath,  188/245,  i9i«66, 
203/256,  204/260 

Musaeus,  208/21 

Music:  in  the  quadrivium,  67,  71,  83 ;  three 
varieties  of,  69-70;  origin  of,  84,  202/2 
42,  209/210;  typifying  the  Scriptures,  120- 
21;  proportion  and,  153 

Mynors,  R.  A.  B.  (ed.) :  Cassiodori  Senatoris 
institutions,  1 61/221,  172/2/2153-55,  157; 
183/227,  196/2/24,  6;  197/2/28,  9,  16;  198/2 
19,  202/2/242-43,  203//55;  205/267,  209/2/2 
12,  14 

Nabuchodonosor,  139 

Nahum,  104 

Natural  history,  31,  32 

Nature:  character  of,  x,  9-10,  24,  27,  53, 
56-57,  185/238,  188/2/244-45;  man's  rela- 
tion to,  9, 12, 46-47, 56, 145,  156, 181/216, 
224/222;  God's  relation  to,  12,  21-22,  27, 
52-53,  57,  164/235,  167/2//86-88,  169/2/2116, 
121;  176/22;  world  soul  and,  26,  27, 
169/2/2115-18,  178/2/26,  7;  theology  and, 
34-35,  173/2/2167-68;  mechanical  arts  and, 
56;  procreation  and,  145,  224/223 

Nehemias,  105,  no 

Nemesius:  Premnon  physicon,  180/214,  184/2 

Nemroth  (Nimrod),  84,  209/214 

Neoplatonism,  13,  19,  185/238,  192/269 

Nestorius,  114,  115 

New  Testament,  The,  111-112, 141 ;  Gospel 
in,  103,  104,  112-13,  125,  137,  138,  146; 
Books  of,  104;  Authors  of,  107;  Canons 
of,  1 1 2-1 3;  books  most  useful  in  study 
of,  137,  144,  145-46;  see  also  specific  Books 

Nicaea,  Coucil  of,  113,  218/238 

Nicholas  of  Clairvaux,  198/225 

Nichomachus,  83-84 

Nicostrata,  86 

Nile  River,  geometry  and,  203/754 

Ninus,  King  of  Assyria,  85,154 

Noah,  84,  125,  139,  154,  210/234 

Nock,  A.  D.  (ed.):  Corpus  Hermeticum  16 1/2 
21,  184/2//32,  33,  189/253,  193/271,  194/274, 
224/223,  225/254 

Numbers  (O.T.),  103,  108 

Oceanus,  57 

Old  Testament,  The,  102,  138,  149;  Books 
of,  103-104;  Authors  of,  104-105;  trans- 
lators of,  106;  sense  of  the  names  of  the 
Sacred  Books,  108-n  1 ;  books  most  use- 
ful in  study  of,  137,  144,  145-46;  see  also 
specific  Books 

"One,"  as  expressing  the  soul,  64-65 ;  as 
expressing  God,  1 99/227;  Boethius,  Ma- 
crobius,  William  of  Conches  on  the  num- 
ber, 199/227;  see  also  Monad 

Order,  214/254;  of  exposition,  91-92,  93, 
147,  150;  sought  in  the  disciplines,  135, 
222/22;  of  books  in  study,  145-46;  of 
narration,  146-47;  in  study  of  the  arts, 


Orellius,  J.  C.  (ed.):  M.  Tullii  Ciceronis 
opera,  i^^nji 

Origen,  104,  106, 109,  219/21,  225/249;  num- 
ber of  writings,  115;  Eusebius  on,  116 

Orleans,  School  of,  4 

Orosius,  115 

Orpheus,  208/21 

Osee  (O.T.),  104 

Osiris  (deity),  85,  86,  210/226 

Ostlender,  H.  (ed.):  Theologia  Summi  Boni, 

Ott,  Ludwig:  "Hugo  von  St.  Viktor  und 
die  Kirchenvater,"  217//2;  218/2/243,  45 

Ottaviano,  Carmelo  (ed.):  Un  brano  inedito 
del  la  "Philosophia"  di  Guglielmo  di  Conches, 
26,  160/216,  165/259,  175/21,  178//8,  183/2 
30,  196/27,  205/268,  211/244,  225/22,  226/2/2 
3.  1 



Ousiai,  9,  14,  53,  152,  186/2/239,  42 

Ovid,  173K174,  182/226 
Epistulae  ex  Ponto,  216/285 
Metamorphoses,  ij6n$ 

Paganism,  21,  22,  167/285,  168/291;  "world- 
ly theology"  of,  34-35,  173/2/2167-68; 
Augustine's  outline  of  pagan  knowledge, 

Palladius:  On  Agriculture,  84 

Paradisus  seu  his  tor  tea  lausiaca,  221/231 

Pallas  (Minerva-deity),  73,  85,  204/263 

Pamphilus,  106,  115 

Paper,  origin  of,  119 

Paralipomenon  (O.T.),  103,  106,  no,  137 

Pare,  Gerard :  Les  ide'es  et  les  lettres  au  XI Ie 
siecle :  Le  Roman  de  la  rose,  1 89/75  3 ;  see  also 
Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle  (Pare,  Brunet, 

Parent,  Joseph-Marie:  Doctrine  de  la  crea- 
tion dans  I'ecole  de  Chartres,  28,  162/723, 
166/2/272,  81;  168/798,  169/2/2108,  109; 
172/2160,  175/21,  179/210,  180/21 1,  185/2/2 
35,  38,  186/242,  190/259,  192/269,  193/271, 
207/284,  227/23 

Paris,  Judgment  of,  204/263 

Parmenides,  86,  97,  98,  211/235 

Parsimony,  100,  131 

Patriotism,  in  the  philosopher,  101 

"Pattern,"  see  Wisdom,  Divine 

Paul,  Saint,  104,  107,  144,  147,  224/22 1 

Paul  (4th  century  ascetic),  130,  221/231 

Pedersen,  J0rgen :  "Recherche  de  la  sagesse 
d'apres  Hugues  de  Saint- Victor,"  175/21, 

Pelasgians,  85 

Pentateuch  (O.T.),  103,  104,  108 

Performance,  see  Action 

Persians,  155 

Persius,  20:  Saturae,  188/249 

Peter,  Saint,  canonical  epistles  of,  107, 

Pherecydes,  86 

Philo  Judaeus  of  Alexandria,  105,  in, 
219/21,  223/214 

Philology,  100,  215/279,  216/280 

Philosophy:  defined  by  Hugh,  x,  9,  10, 
33-34,  48,  51,  172/2160,  181/219,  196/26; 
fourfold  division  of,  xi,  7-19,  28,  60, 
61-62,  83,  152-54,  160/216,  161/2/219,  21; 
182/224;  relation  to  Divine  Wisdom,  xi, 
9,  11-19,  22,  24,  29-32,  33-34,  36>  47,  48, 
61,  164/242,  167/285,  172/2/2162,  165;  177 

/2«4-5;  schematizations  of,  5-6,  159/213; 
threefold  division  of,  8,  10;  origins  of, 
12;  Scripture  and,  30,  32,  33,  35,  44-45, 
103,  173/2172;  as  pursuit  of  wisdom,  48, 
50-51,  61;  stages  of,  130-31,  132-33, 
177/25;  see  also  Arts  and  sciences,  The; 
and  see  specific  schools  or  aspects  of  philosophy, 
e.g.,  Neoplatonism 
Phrygians,  155 

Physics:  in  philosophy,  8,  17,  33,  62,  no, 
153;    Scripture    and,    35;    defined,    71, 
203/257;  function  of,  72-73,  203/257,  204 
/2/261-62;  origin  of,  83 
Pilumnus,  85,  210/224 
Pindar,  109 
Pisistratus,  106,  115 

Plato,  3,  11,  95,  98,  167/285,  175/21 ;  division 
of  philosophy  and,  8,  62,  203/258;  cos- 
mology   of,    19,    166/273;    trinitarianism 
and,  19;  on  justice,  84,  209/215,  224/222; 
Socrates  and,  86,  211/236;  Abaelard  on, 
167/284,  178/28,  179/210 
Parmenides,  202/241 
Phaedo,  197/29 
Republic,  84,  224/222 

Timaeus,  i-x,  8,  13,  19,  22,  161/223,  T66« 
73;  Chalcidius  on,  13,  161/221,  179/29, 
180/213,  I84«34,  185/235,186/242,187/2/2 
43,  52;  190/259,  192/269,  193/271,  199/2 
26, 200/229, 209/21 5 ;  William  of  Conches 
on,  20,  21,  25,  27,  162/223,  163/231, 
166/261,  169/2/2107,  108;  178/28,  179/2 
10,  182/226,  184/234,  185/235,  190//59, 
196/27,  198/225,  199/2/226-27,  200/228, 
203/257,  209/215,  214/258,  218/255,  224/2 
22,  225/22,  227/23;  on  the  world  soul, 
24-25,  26,  28,  46,  169/21 18,  178/2/26-8, 
1 79/2/29- 10,  192/269;  arts  represented 
in,  212/248 
Platonism,  13,  19,  23-24 
Pliny,  83:  Historia  naturalis,  208/25 
Poetry,  21,  167///283,  85;  211/2//44-45,  48; 

Scriptural  use  of,  108-109 
Politics,  74,  205/265 

Porphyry:    Boethius    on,    10-11,    161/221, 
181/221,  182/2/222-24,  195/2/275,  1;  197/215, 
198/220,203/257,  205/266,206/2/275-78,  81; 
Zi/<?  of  Pythagoras,  195/279 
Poverty  (parsimony),  100,  131 
Practical  arts:  virtue  and,  10,  152,  182/224, 
183/2/227,  30;  in  philosophy,  35,   51-52, 



Practical  arts  {continued) 

60,  62,  74,  161/2/220,  21,  181/221,  204//64; 

division  of,  83,  153;  understanding  and, 

Prayer,  15,  132-33 
Premier   Congres  Internationale  de  geographic 

historique,  II  Memoires,  209/214 
Primordial  causes,  see  Ousiai 
Priscian,  80,  90,  182/226,  207/2/283-84,  214/* 


Institutiones  grammaticae,  ijjn^.,  207/284 

Private  science,  74,  83,  153 

Proculus,  115 

Procreation,  145,  224/223 

Prometheus,  85,  97 

Prophets:  Twelve,  103,  104-105,  109;  mi- 
nor and  major,  104-105;  "sealed,"  145- 

Prosper,  115 

Proverbs  (O.T.),  103,  105,  109-11,  192/269 

Prudentius,  20,  115 

Psalms  (O.T.),  103,  105,  109,  144,  145, 
174/21,  191/265,  192/269,  2oi«33,  220/215, 
221/2/230,  33,  36,  39;  223/2/213-14,  16, 
224/2/226-29,  225/2/242-45 

Pseudo-Dionysius :  Celestial  Hierarchy,  x, 
14,  164/242,  193/271 

Ptolemy:  Canones,  84,  209/214 

Ptolemy  Philadelphus,  king  of  Egypt,  106 

Public  science,  74,  83,  153 

Pythagoras,  20,  46,  48,  83-84,  98;  teaching 
methods  of,  87,  211/241;  on  the  quater- 
nary number  of  the  soul,  195/279,  198/225; 
on  the  number  '"Two,"  200/228;  Remi- 
gius  and,  208/28,  209/29 
A.ureum  carmen,  195/279 
Matentetraden,  x,  20,  84,  189/2/253,  55; 

Quadrivium,  The,  4,  8,  22,  33;  Scripture 
and,  35;  Hugh's  study  of,  37,  38;  divi- 
sions of,  67,  196/27;  of  the  mechanical 
arts,  75,  205/268;  Pythagoras  and,  87, 
189/255;  Rhabanus  on,  161/221 

Quintilian,  3,  86,  173/2174 

Institutiones  oratoriae,  21 3/249,  215/262 

Radulfus  Ardens:  Speculum  universale,  159/2 

Rankin,  O.  S.:  Israel's  Wisdom  Literature, 


Raynaud  de  Lage,  Guy:  Alain  de  Lille,  189 

Reality,  see  Actuality 

Reason:  nature  of,  9,  176/22;  eye  of,  14, 
177/25;  world  soul  and,  26,  46-47,  169/2 
116,  179/210;  powers  of  the  soul  and, 
49-50,  65;  reality  and,  58-59,  73,  156; 
analysis  and,  92;  faith  and,  134,  221/240; 
Divine  Wisdom  and,  156,  181/221,  186 
Z242,  201/237,  228/26;  primordial  causes 
and,  186/240,  226/21,  227/23;  astronomy 
and,  224/222 

Reinhard,  bishop,  38 

Remigius  of  Auxerre,  x,  20,  23,  168/293, 
170/2127,  191/264;  on  anima  mundi,  25, 
26,  178/27,  179/210,  193/271;  mythologi- 
cal lore  of,  167/285,  194/274;  on  the 
arts,  195/22,  210/2/219,  24,  26,  31,  34; 
21 1/2/235-36;  on  Pythagoras,  189/255; 
208/28,  209/29 

"Commentary  of  Remigius  Autissiodo- 
rensis  on  the  De  consolatione  philoso- 
phiae  of  Boethius,"  175/21,  179/210, 
188/249,  192/269,  193/271,  195//2,  200/229 
Remigii  A.utissiodorensis  in  Martiani  Ca- 
pellae  De  nuptiis  comment arius,  178/27, 
189/255,  198/225,  204/263,  205/272,  208/2 
6,  210/2//19,  24,  31;  215/279,  216/280 

Renaissance  du  Xlle  siecle  (Pare,  Brunet, 
Tremblay),  159/2/25,  9;  160/2/214-15,  161/2 
18,  197/218,  204/261,  207/284,  208/21,  211 
22/242-43,  212/245,  215//68,  216/282,  218/243, 
219/21,  220/221,  222/2/22-4,  223/215 

Resurrection,  141 

Rhabanus  Maurus,  3,  161/221;  formulation 
of  the  arts,  171/2143;  on  origin  of  arts, 

Commentaria  in  Exodum,  219/21 
De  institutione  clericorum,  7,  28-29 
De  magicis  artibus,  226/21 
Z>£  universo,  183/227,  218/2/236,  37;  222/23, 

Richard  of  Saint  Victor,  5,  15  9/2 11 
.L/for  exceptionum  ( Excerptiones  priores) , 
163/233,  183/230,  203/255,  204/262,  226/23 

Richer:  Historiarum  libri,  1 61/221 

Riedel,  Guilielmus  (ed.):  Commentum  Ber- 
nardi  Silvestris  super  sex  libros  Eneidos 
Virgilii,  2.1(311^ 

Robert,  G.,  cited,  223/215 

Romans  (N.T.),  221/232,  225/241 

Roscelin,  Jean,  19 



Rufinus,  115 

Rupert  of  Deutz,  216//81:  In  Ecclesiasten, 

Ruth(O.T.),  108,  in 

Sabellianism,  19 

St.  Pancras  priory,  Hamersleben,  37,  38 

Saint  Victor,  Abbey  of,  3,  4,  19,  1 58/7/71-2, 

173/7174;   necrology   on   Hugh,    37-38; 

Codex,  209/714 
Sallust,    16:    Bellum  Jugurthinum,    188/148, 

Samuel  (O.T.),  103,  104,  105,  108 
Sapientia,  distinguished  from  scientia,  190/2 


Saul,  108 

Saxony,  37,  38 

Scheda,  denned,  1 18-19 

Schmid,  Toni:  "Ein  Timaios-kommentar 
in  Sigtuna,"  162/723,  179/710,  184/734 

Schmidt,  O. :  Hugo  von  St.  Victor  als  Pdda- 
gog,  159/79 

Schneider,  A. :  Abhandlungen  %ur  Geschichte 
der  Philosophic  des  Mittelalters,  18  0/7 11 

Schneider,  W.  A.  :  Geschichte  mid  Geschichts- 
philosophie  bei  Hugo  von  St.  Victor,  nzn^ 

Scholasticism,  36,  159/76,  160/713 ;  see  a^so 
specific  scholastic  writers,  e.g.,  Thomas 

Schools,  medieval,  4 

Schulte,  Karl:  Das  Verhdltnis  von  N others 
Nuptiae  Philologiae  et  Mercurii  ^um  Kom- 
mentar  des  Remigius  Autissiodorensis,  210 
77/726,  31 

Science :  distinguished  from  intelligentia,  5  5 , 
190/757;  public,  private  and  solitary,  74, 
83,  153;  distinguished  from  sapientia, 
190/757;  see  also  Arts  and  sciences,  The; 
and  see  specific  categories  of  science,  e.g., 

Scott,  Michael,  15  9/7 11 

Scott,  Walter  (ed.) :  Hermetica,  222/76 

Scriptures,  The,  xi:  Hugh's  conception  of 
philosophy  and,  12-13,  x^»  2I>  23>  24»  2^» 
34-36,  167/785,  172/7166,  177/74,  214/756; 
Augustine's  conception  of  philosophy 
and,  30,  32;  arts  in  interpretation  of,  32, 
33,  35,  44-45,  173/7172;  Cassiodorus  and, 
33;  study  of,  102-19,  133-34,  135-51; 
order  and  number  of  Books  of,  103-104, 
217/73;  threefold  understanding  of,  120- 
21,   219/71;  the  nature  of  meaning  in, 

121-22,  143-44,  145,  147-50,  219/7/76,  7; 
seven  rules  of  utterance  in,  122-25; 
recapitulation  in,  125;  fruit  of  sacred 
reading,  127-28,  129-30,  220/725;  Books 
most  useful  in  historical  study,  137; 
Books  most  useful  in  allegorical  study, 
144,  145-46;  on  Nature  as  primordial 
cause,  192/769;  order  in  the  exposition 
of,  214/754;  see  also  Apocrypha;  New- 
Testament,  The;  Old  Testament,  The; 
and  see  specific  Books,  e.g.,  Genesis  (O.T.) 

Scrutiny,  99-100 

Sedulius,  20,  115 

Seleucus  Nicanor,  106 

Seneca,  3 ;  Epistulae  morales,  215/762,  216/783 

Senses,  The :  powers  of  the  soul  and,  9,  49, 
51,  64,  65;  entelechy  and,  26;  imagina- 
tion and,  66-67,  201/737;  knowledge  and, 
203/759;  understanding  and,  219/77 

Sermo,  defined,  119,  160/716 

Servius,  80,  90,  207/783 
Comm.  in  Verg.  Georg.,  188/745 

Seth,  sons  of,  210/734 

"Seven  rules"  of  Scriptural  interpretation, 

Silverstein,  Theodore:  "Adelard,  Aristotle, 

and  the  De  natura  deorum,"  193/771 

"The  Fabulous  Cosmogony  of  Bernar- 

dus  Silvestris,"  176/73,  178/77,  189/753 

See  also  Liber  Hermetis  Mercurii  Triplicis 

de  VI  rerum  principiis 

Sikes,  J.  G. :  Peter  Abailard,  179/710 

Silk,  E.  T. :  "Pseudo-Johannes  Scottus, 
Adalbold  of  Utrecht,  and  the  Early  Com- 
mentaries on  Boethius,"  192/769 

Silvestre,  H. :  "Commentaire  inedit  de  Jean 
Scot  Erigene  au  metre  IX  du  livre  III  du 
'De  consolatione  philosophiae'  de  Boe- 
ce,"  168/793,  175/71,  179/710,  192/769,  193 
/771,  198/725 

Simonides,  98 

Sin,  see  Evil ;  Morality ;  Virtue 

Smalley,  Beryl:  Study  of  the  Bible  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  159/78,  1 61/71 7,  217/73 

Socrates,  3,  21,  81,  86,  98,  167/785,  192/769, 
215/775;  ethics  and,  84,  154,  209/715,  211 
7735,  220/727 

Solitary  science,  74,  83,  153 

Solomon  (O.T.),  105,  109-11,  130,  139, 
192/769,  220/722 

Sophocles,  98-99 

Sophonias,  105 



Sophroniscus,  81 

Soul,  The:  number  "Four"  of,  x,  10,  60, 
64-66,  184/232,  i95«79,  198/225;  powers 
of,  9,  10,  48-50,  178/28,  182/2/222-24;  pre- 
existence  of,  23,  163/231;  entelechy  and, 
26-27,  169*116,  178/2/26-8,  179/2/29-10; 
divided  nature  of,  46,  1 78/28,  179/210, 
i85«38;  composition  of,  46-47,  i8i«i6; 
incorporeality  of,  47,  1 80/2/21 2,  14;  the 
body  and,  48-49,  63-64,  66-67,  198/223; 
music  of,  69;  meditation  and,  93;  three- 
fold nature  of,  200/229;  see  also  World 
soul,  The 

Species,  in  Scripture,  123-24 

Speech,  arts  of,  see  Eloquence;  Grammar; 

Stahl,  William  Henry  (ed.):  Alacrobius' 
Commentary  on  the  Dream  of  Scipio,  1 67/2 
86,  184/232,  187/243,  188/2/245,  52;  190/256, 
192/269,  193/271,  194/272,  195/279,  196/27, 
197/29,  198/2/223,  25;  199/2/226-27,  200/2/229, 

Stars:  as  divine  beings,  20,  23-24,  186/242, 
187/243,  190/259;  astrology  and,  68;  fixed 
stars  as  measurement  of  time,  137,  222/2 
6;  relation  of  stars  to  Nature,  188/252, 

Statius,  20 

Stesichorus  (Tersichorus),  98,  215/276 

Stewart,  H.  F. :  "A  Commentary  of  Re- 
migius  Autissiodorensis  on  the  De  con- 
solatione  Philosophiae  of  Boethius,"  175/21, 
193/271,  195/22 

Stoicism,  13 

Stolzle,  Remigius:  Abaelards  11 21  %u 
Soissons  verurtheilter  Tractatus  De  imitate 
et  trinitate  divina,  179/210 

Students:  Hugh  on  ability  in,  43-44;  efforts 
of,  87-89,  91,  126-27,  136-37;  necessary 
qualifications  for  study,  90-101;  eager- 
ness to  inquire,  97-99;  beginning,  and 
educated,  130-31,  132-33;  three  types 
of,   133-34,  221/241 

Study,  3,  15,  29;  three  points  of  reading, 
44;  order  and  method  of,  83,  86-87, 
126-27;  necessary  qualities  for,  90-101; 
meditation  and,  92-93,  132-33  ;  choice  of 
books,  96,  128-29,  137,  142,  144;  etymo- 
logy of  things  pertaining  to,  11 8-1 9; 
fruit  of  sacred  reading,  127-28,  220/225; 
intellectual  occupatio  in,  129-30,  221/228; 
as  first  stage  of  philosophy,  177/25 

Sumnmm  Bonum,  19,  23,  46,  168/293,  T75WI 

Sun,  The:  aetherial  fire  and,  27,  169/2121, 
189/253,  193/271;  superintendence  of 
growth  and  decay,  188/252,  190/259 

Sybil,  The,  19 

Sylvester  II,  Pope  (Gerbert),  161/221 

Symmachus,  106 

Synods  (Councils),  113-14,  218/238 

Tages,  155 

Tagus,  85 

Taylor,    Henry    Osborn:     The    Mediaeval 

Mind,  172/2152 
Taylor,  Jerome:  Origin  and  Early  Life  of 

Hugh  of  St.  Victor:  An  Evaluation  of  the 

Tradition,  174/2180,  216/288 
Tersichorus  (Stesichorus),  98,  215/276 
Thales  of  Miletus,  83 
Theatrics,  see  Dramatics 
Themistocles,  98,  215/273 
Theodosius  Augustus,  114 
Theodosius  the  elder,  113 
Theodotion,  106 

Theology:  shift  from  positive  to  systema- 
tic, 5;  as  an  art,  33-34,  62-63,  IIO>  I7zn 

160;  pagan,  34-35,  173/2/2167-68;  in  the 

theoretical  arts,  73,  83,  153 
Theophilus,  Bishop  of  Alexandria,  107,  115 
Theophrastus,  215/273 
Theoretical  arts:  place  of,  in  philosophy, 

10,  12,  51-52,  60,  62,  71,  152,  161/2/220-21, 

181/221,    182/224,    183/2/227,    30;    184/232; 

division  of,  33,  72-74,  83,  153,  203/258; 

understanding  and,  55,  201/237 
Thierry   of  Chartres,    6,    16,    24,    160/215, 

182/226,  198/225,  207/284,  225/22,  228/26 

Disputatio  adversus  Abaelardum,  179/210 

Disputatio    altera    adversus    Abaelardum, 

Heptateuchon,  6,  207/284 

Librum  hum,  200/228 

De  sex  dierum  operibus,  168/299,  179/210, 
196/27,  200/228,  202/241,  228/26 
Thomas,  Prior  of  Saint  Victor,  158/21 
Thomas  Aquinas,  Saint,  5,  6,  160/213,  172/2 

Thomas  Becket,  216/283 
Thorndike,  Lynn:  A  History  of  Magic  and 

Experimental  Science,  II  197/218 
"Three,"  as  number  representing  divisions 

of  the  soul,  200/229 
"Three  eyes,"  14,  164/242,  177/25 



"Three  manners  of  things,"  doctrine  of, 
x,  9>  27,  52-54,  155-56 

"Three  works,"  doctrine  of,  x,  9,  27,  55-56 

Tichonius,  see  Tyconius 

Time:  astronomy  and,  9,  54;  eternity  and, 
52,  184/234,  185K35;  in  scriptural  meta- 
phor, 124-25,  147;  creation  and,  167/286; 
superlunary  world  as,  189/255,  190/256 

Tisias,  86,  211/238 

Titian,  86 

Tobias  (O.T.),  103,  105,  hi 

Tor  ah,  The,  103; 

Tours,  School  of,  4 

Travel,  and  the  philosopher,  101 

Tremblay,  Pierre:  See  Renaissance  du  Xlle 
siecle  (Pare,  Brunet,  Tremblay) 

Trinity,  The :  Wisdom  as  Second  Person  of, 
xi,  17,  24,  29,  175/21,  181/219;  pagans  and, 
19,  192/269;  Abaelard  on,  25,  179/210; 
Scripture  on,  35,  141,  142,  173/2170; 
geometry  and,  203/25  5 

Trivet,  Nicolas,  162/223 

Trivium,  The,  22,  33,  35,  173/2174;  Hugh's 
study  of,  37,  38;  of  the  mechanical  arts, 
75,  205/268;  Pythagoras  and,  87;  Char- 
trians  on,  211/244 

Tropology:  in  Scripture,  35,  120,  121,  135, 
173/2174,  214/254,  219/zi,  222/2/22-3,  223/29; 
morals  and,  127-28,  144-45,  224/222 

Troy,  86 

"Truth,"  see  Wisdom,  Divine 

Tubal  Cain,  84,  85,  209/210 

Tully,  see  Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius  (Tully) 

Tyconius,  220/221 

Twelve  Minor  Prophets,  103,  104-105,  109 

"Twenty-seven"  as  number  representing 
all  visible  things,  65 

"Two,"  the  number  as  principle  of  mu- 
tability, 66-67,  200/228 

Ueberweg,   Friedrich,    and   Max   Heinze: 

Grundriss  der  Geschi elite  der  Philosophie,  18, 

Understanding,  9,  92,  121-22;  the  senses 

and,  203/259,  219/27;  see  also  Knowledge; 

Universities,  4 
Usage,  science  and,  59-60 

Valerius  Maximus:  Facta  et  dicta  memora- 
bilia, 215/263 
Valerius  Soranus,  57,  194/274 

Varro,  Marcus  Terentius,   3,   83,   84,   86, 


Periphysion,  47,  180/214 
Venus  (deity),  204//63 
Vergil,  19,  37,  57,  182/226,  208/21,  212/248 

Aeneid,  173/2174,  190/256,  226/23 

Eclogae,  212/245,  215/264,  216/286 

Georgica,  84,  188/245,  194/273,  203/256 
Vernet,  F.,  36,  216/287 

"Hugues    de    Saint-Victor,"    172/2/2160, 

166;  221/241 
Victor,  Saint,  relics  of,  37,  38 
Victorines,    3,   4,    19,    15 8/2/21-2,    173/2174; 

necrology     entry     on     Hugh,     37-38; 

twelfth-century  codex,  209/214 
Victorinus:  Expositio  in  librum  De  Inven- 

tione,  ly^n-fi 
Vincent  of  Beauvais,  5 :  Speculum  doctrinale, 

Viniculture,  85,  210/226 
Virgin  Mary,  146 
Virtue:   man's  attainment  of,   9,    10,    52, 

54-55,  128;  befitting  philosophers,  131, 

197/29;  defined,  152,  225/22;  four  cardinal 

virtues,  183/227;  eloquence  and,  226/23 
Vitruvius,  3,  161/221 

De  architectura,  84,  198/225,  212/246 
Vivarium,  29,  33 
Volumen,  defined,  118 
Vulcan  (deity),  85 
Vyver,  A  van  de,  x,  209/214 

Wallis,  Ernest  A. :  The  Paradise  of  the  Holy 
Fathers,  221/231 

Walter  of  Mortagne,  164/239 

Webb,  C.  C.  J.  (ed.):  Joannis  Saresberiensis 
Metalogicon,    165/2/255-57,    174/23,    i75«i, 
192/268,  193/271,  207/288,  211/244,  212/248, 
213/2//50-52,  215/279 
Joannis  Saresberiensis  Policraticus,  214/261 

Weisweiler,  Heinrich:  "Arbeitsmethode 
Hugos  von  St.  Viktor,  ein  Beitrag  zum 
Entstehen  seines  Hauptwerkes  De  sacra- 
men 'tis,"  174/24 

"Sakrament  als  Symbol  und  Teilhabe: 
Der  Einfluss  des  Pseudo-Dionysius 
auf  die  allgemeine  Sakramentlehre 
Hugos  von  Sankt- Viktor,"  164/242 

William  of  Champeaux,  158/22,  193/271, 
215/268,  220/227 

William  of  Conches,  5,  6,  23,  159/212;  on 
division  of  philosophy,  8,  10,  17,  172/2 



William  of  Conches  {continued) 

160,  183/730,  197//12;  compared  with 
Hugh,  16,  18,  21,  27,  39,  i6o«i6,  164/; 
36,  166/7/769,  72; 175/71, 197/718,  201/77737, 
39;  on  angels,  28,  170/7127,  227/73; 
mythological  lore  in,  167/785,  204/763; 
Arabic  tradition  and,  203/753 
Commentarius  in  Timaeum  Platonis,  13,  20, 

21,  24,  25,  26,  27,  162/723,  163/731,  166/7 
61,  169/7/7107-108,  178/78,  179/710,  182/7 
26,  184/734,  185/735,  190/759,  196/77, 
198/725,  199/7/726-27,  200/728,  203/757, 
209/715,  212/748,  214/758,  218/755,  224" 

22,  225/72,  227/73 

Commentary  on  De  consolatione  philosophiae 
of  Boethius,  8,  20,  21,  25,  162/723,  l(^9 
77/7107-108,  no,  115;  179/710,190/7/756, 
59;  193/771,  196/77,  197/712,  198/725, 
201/7/739-40,  203/757,  205/765,  227/73 

Dragmaticon  philosophiae,  1 8  8/745 

Philosophia  mundi,  16,  26,  160/7 16,  163/7 
33,  164/736,  165/7/754,  59;  166/769,  1&9n 
107,  175/21,  178/78,  183/730,  184/734, 
196/77,  201/737,  204/7/760,  61;  205/768, 
206/781,  207/784,  211/744,  225/72,  226/7/7 
3,  1;  227/73 
William  of  St.  Thierry,  179/710 
Willner,    Hans    (ed.):    Adelard   von    Bath 

Traktat  De  eodem  et  diver  so,  166/771,  178/7 

8,   189/753,   193/771,   195/7/776,  2;  202/747, 

Winnigstedt,    Johann:     Halberstadter    Bi- 

schofschronik,  38 
Wisdom,  Divine,  4-5,  10;  as  Second  Person 

of  the  Godhead,  xi,  17,  24,  29,  175/71, 

1 81/71 9;  philosophy's  relation  to,  xi,  9, 
11-19,  22,  24,  29-32,  33-34,  36,  47,  48, 
61,  164/742,  167/785,  172/7/7162,  165,  177 
77/74-5;  trie  arts  and,  8,  29-31,  61,  195/72; 
actuality  and,  14,  15,  156,  164/742;  paga- 
nism and,  21-22;  man's  relation  to,  22, 
24,  32,  36,  51,  54-55,  61,  121-22,  132-33, 
156,  219/7/76,  7;  223/79;  Scripture  and,  34 

Wisdom  of  Solomon,  The(0.  T.),  1 09-11, 
192/769,  220/722 

World  soul,  The  (Anima  mundi),  nature 
and,  x,  24-25,  26,  27,  169/7/71 1 5-18,  178 
77/76-7;  cosmic  fire  and,  27,  169/7121,  189 
w53>  I93^7I  J  fate  and,  190/759;  arithmo- 
logy  of,  199/7/726-27 

Wrath,  65,  200/729 

Wrobel,  Johann  (ed.):  Bernardi  Silvestris 
De  mundi  universitate  libri  duo  sive  mega- 
cosmus  et  microcosmus,  178/77;  see  also  Ba- 
rach,  Carl  Sigmund 

Platonis  Timaeus  interprete  Chalcidio  cum 
eiusdem  commentario,  161/721,  179/79, 
180/713,  I84«34,  185/735,  186/742,  187 
77/743,  52;  190/759,  192/769,  193/771, 
199/726,  200/729,  209/715 

Xenocrates,  98 

Xenophon:  Memorabilia,  ijjn4 

Zacharias,  105 

Zahel  ben  Bischr,  20:  Z?^  electionibus,  189/7 

Zeno,  98,  193/771 
Zetus,  84 
Zoroaster,  king  of  the  Bactrians,  154 

BflBBHflOBaUlfci  M I 

Date  Due 

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JUL  1  B1S8S] 

Due         Returned 

JUL  19 

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